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ADMINIST4TIVE LAW
I. ADMINISTRATiVE LAW
A. Open Meetings Law1
In response to the North Carolina Supreme Court's 1977 decision
in Student Bar Association v. Byrd,2 which curtailed the reach of the
state Open Meetings Law,3 the General Assembly made important
changes in the statute that affect both its coverage and notice
provisions.4
The original statute provided:
All official meetings of the governing and governmental bodies of
this State and its political subdivisions, including all State, county,
city and municipal commissions, committees, boards, authorities,
and councils and any subdivision, subcommittee, or other subsidiary
or component part thereof which have or claim authority to conduct
hearings, deliberate or act as bodies politic and in the public interest
shall be open to the public.5
Plaintiffs in Byrd argued that this provision extended to meetings
of the faculty of the University of North Carolina School of Law.
Writing for the majority, Justice Lake, however, read the words "gov-
erning" and "governmental" in the conjunctive and held in essence
that the use of the words "bodies politic" indicated that the statute was
to cover only meetings of governing and governmental bodies that ex-
ercise sovereign powers not exercisable by private groups. 6 Because de-
cisions of the Law School faculty were subject to review by the
University's Board of Governors (which the court denominated the
true governing body of the school), the court held that the faculty was
not a governing body; neither was it a component part of the Board of
1. A bill that will significantly revise the state Open Meetings Law is now pending in the
General Assembly. H. 183, N.C. Gen. Assembly, 1979 Sess. Unless otherwise indicated, the new
bill will not alter any of the recent changes discussed herein.
2. 293 N.C. 594, 239 S.E.2d 415 (1977).
3. The application of the Open Meetings Law, ch. 638, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 610 (codified
as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-318.1 to .8 (1978 & Interim Supp. 1978)), enacted in 1971
to provide public access to the decisionmaking process of public bodies, was challenged in Byrd
by members of the Student Bar Association Board of Governors of the University of North Caro-
lina School of Law who had been thwarted in their attempts to attend a general faculty meeting at
the Law School. 293 N.C. at 595, 239 S.E.2d at 417. The trial court decision, affirmed by the court
of appeals, 32 N.C. App. 530, 232 S.E.2d 855 (1977), enjoined defendants, including University of
North Carolina School of Law Dean Robert Byrd, from holding closed meetings and required the
dean to post written notice of meetings at least six hours before each meeting. 293 N.C. at 596,
239 S.E.2d at 417. The state supreme court reversed both holdings. Id. at 606, 239 S.E.2d at 423.
See Survey af Developments in North Carolina Law, 1977, 56 N.C.L. Rav. 843, 861-67 (1978).
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-318.1 to .4, .8, 153A-40, 160A-71 (Interim Supp. 1978).
5. Law of June 21, 1971, ch. 638, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 611 (formerly codifed at N.C.
GEN STAT. § 143-318.2 (amended 1978)).
6. 293 N.C. at 601, 239 S.E.2d at 420.
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Governors, the court said, but rather a "group of employees of the
Board."'7 The court in dictum went on to state that even if the faculty
were a component part of the Board, the Board was not a governmental
body and, therefore, neither the Board nor the faculty were required to
hold public meetings. Governmental bodies, according to the court,
must exercise powers exclusive to a sovereign political entity, and the
operation of an educational system is not an exercise of a governmental
power because private concerns can also carry out such activities.'
The revised statute requires that "public" bodies9 rather than
"governing and governmental bodies" hold open meetings, and defines
public bodies broadly to include any group with at least two members
that is a part of government and that exercises "any legislative, policy-
making, quasi-judicial, administrative, or advisory function."10 This
general coverage, however, is restricted somewhat; G.S. 143-318.2(b)(2)
requires that public bodies be formally established by
(i) the State Constitution, (ii) an act or resolution of the General As-
sembly, (iii) a resolution or order of a State Agency, pursuant to a
statutory procedure under which the agency establishes a political
subdivision or public corporation, (iv) an ordinance, resolution, or
other action of the governing board of one or more counties, cities,
school administrative units, or other political subdivisions or public
corporations, or (v) an executive order of the Governor or formal
action of the head of a principal State office or department ... or of
a division thereof."
Because of the broad language of the new statute, it is clear that
the General Assembly intended the original statute to have broader
coverage than the court in Byrd interpreted it to have. The new lan-
guage rejects the lengthy dicta in Byrd concerning governing and gov-
7. Id. at 602-03, 239 S.E.2d at 421.
8. Id. at 603-04, 239 S.E.2d at 421-22. In his dissent, Justice Exum objected to this narrow
interpretation of the statute, and argued that a strict reading defeated the statute's purpose of
ensuring that the public's business is conducted in the public view. Id. at 606-16, 239 S.E.2d at
423-29 (dissenting opinion).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.2 (Interim Supp. 1978).
10. Id. § 143-318.2(b)(1). The statute clearly, however, does not extend to bodies that exer-
cise a judicial function, Ze., the courts. See REPORT OF THE LEGISLATIVE STUDY COMMISSION
FOR STATE POLICIES ON THE MEETINGS OF GOVERNMENTAL BODIES 5 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
REPORT OF THE LEGISLATIVE STUDY COMMISSION].
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.2(b)(2)(Interim Supp. 1978). In addition, if a group is a pub-
lic body, its committees are also considered public bodies. Id. § 143-318.2(b). The statute also
specifically subjects the governing boards of public hospitals to the open meetings requirement, see
Id., in order to assure "coverage of non-profit corporations that operate hospitals owned by local
government." REPORT OF THE LEGISLATIVE STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 10, at 5. Hospital
committees that do not make policy, however, are exempted from the requirement. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 143-318.2(b) (Interim Supp. 1978).
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ernmental bodies, including the observation that the University's Board
of Trustees was not required to hold open meetings; however, it does
not appear to affect the narrow holding of the case as it pertains to the
Law School faculty because that body is not established by any of the
described methods. 12 The language also appears to exempt nonprofit
corporations appropriated money by the state'3 as, for example, a
chamber of commerce or a private university. In addition to these
changes, the new statute specifically exempts the professional staffs of
state agencies, 14 because they are considered not to make final policy,
and the Judicial Standards Commission,'" which has authority under
its own statute16 to meet in confidential session.
Notice provisions varying with the type and circumstances of
meetings were also enacted to clarify the diverse judicial interpretations
that the original statute yielded. Originally, North Carolina was one of
the few states that had no notice provision in its open meetings law.17
While many lower courts throughout the state read requirements of
reasonable notice into the former statute on the basis that otherwise the
12. While it may be argued that a group such as the Law School faculty is established by the
method set out in § 143-318.2(b)(2)(iv), the report of the committee that devised the new langauge
indicates that subsection (iv) was intended to extend only to local units. See REPORT OF THE
LEGISLATIVE STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 10, at 5.
13. Because nonprofit corporations are created by filing articles of incorporation, they do not
meet the specific requirements of § 143-318.2(b)(2).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.2(c) (Interim Supp. 1978) exempts meetings of the profes-
sional staff of a public body, unless the staff is a public body established by appropriate formal
action described in § 143-318.2(b)(2). The report of the legislative study commission, in reference
to this section, gives the following example: A monthly meeting of a county manager with his
department heads or a conference between a director of a state division and two or three assistants
could be held in private. If a city council, however, established a standing committee of four
department heads to review federal grant requests originating within city government, meetings of
that committee would be subject to the open meetings requirement. REPORT OF THE LEGISLA-
TIVE STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 10, at 6.
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.4(4) (Interim Supp. 1978). A new provision also specifies that
any public body specifically authorized by law to meet in executive or confidential session may do
so. Id. § 143-318.4(11).
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-377(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
17. Like North Carolina, other states have recently amended their open meetings laws to
include provisions for notice. See S.C. CODE § 30-4-80 (Cum. Supp. 1978); W. Va. CODE § 6-9A-
3 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Only a few states-Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Minnesota, Mon-
tana, North Dakota and South Dakota--still have no notice provision. See ALA. CODE tit. 13,
§ 5-1 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-9-101 (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (West 1975 & Supp.
1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3301 (1975 & Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471-705 (West 1977);
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 82-3401 to -3406 (1966 & Supp. 1977); N.D. CErr. CODE § 44-04-19
(1978); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 1-25-1 to -5 (1974). The Supreme Court of Minnesota,
however, has read into its open meetings law an implied provision for notice, see Sullivan v.
Credit River Township, 299 Minn. 170, 217 N.W.2d 502 (1974), and the Attorney General of
Florida has stated that some regulatory boards are required to give notice of all meetings at which
official action is to be taken, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 note 10 (West 1975)(citing Op. Att'y
Gen. 072-400 (1972)).
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law would not afford the protection it was intended to offer, 8 both the
majority and the dissent in Byrd agreed that no notice was required. 19
The new law requires those public bodies that have established a
schedule of regular meetings to keep the schedule on file in a central
location.20 If a regular meeting is adjourned or recessed until a later
date, however, no further notice is required if the time and place of the
later meeting is announced at the first session.2' Special meetings (a
category that appears to include the meetings of those bodies that hold
regular meetings on indefinite dates) require at least forty-eight hours
notice by posting an announcement in a specified place and mailing or
delivering it to any local news medium that has filed a prior written
request for notice.22 Finally, emergency meetings, called because of
unexpected circumstances that require immediate consideration, may
be held as soon as members can be contacted and convened and notice
is given to local news media that have requested emergency notice.2 3
18. See, e.g., News & Observer Publishing Co. v. Interim Bd. of Educ., 29 N.C. App. 37,223
S.E.2d 580 (1976); Weathers v. Shelby Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 75 CVS 290 (Cleveland County,
N.C. Super. Ct., July 16, 1975).
19. 293 N.C. at 596, 239 S.E.2d at 418; id. at 616, 239 S.E.2d at 429 (Exum, J., dissenting).
Their reasoning was based on the lack of a notice provision.
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.8(a) (Interim Supp. 1978). State agencies file their schedules
with the Secretary of State; county agencies, with the clerk of the board of county commissioners;
city agencies, with the city clerk; and all other agencies, with their own clerk, secretary, or clerk to
the board of commissioners in the county in which the agency normally meets. Id.
21. Id. § 143-318.8(b)(1).
22. Id. § 143-318.8(b)(2).
23. Id. § 143-318.8(b)(3). Notice is given either by telephone or by the same method used in
notifying the body's members and must be given immediately after the members have been noti-
fied. In addition, only business related to the emergency can be considered at an emergency meet-
ing. Id.
While the changes in the statute are consistent with the purpose underlying open meetings
laws of providing public access to governmental decisionmaking processes, there are still other
provisions lacking in clarity that seem to undercut this purpose. In 1978, for example, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals held in Godsey v. Poe, 36 N.C. App. 682, 245 S.E.2d 522 (1978), that a
board of education could hold a closed meeting to discuss personnel matters without first voting to
do so in regular open session. The holding was dictated by the curious wording of a provision in
the Open Meetings Law. The introductory language of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.3(a) (Interim
Supp. 1978) sets out a procedure for calling executive sessions that requires a board to vote first to
do so during a regular or special meeting. The subsection, however, lists only certain subject
matters allowed under the statute to be discussed privately. The remainder of the subjects that
may be discussed in a private meeting, including personnel matters, are set out in id. § 143-
318.3(b), (c) (1978 & Interim Supp. 1978), to which the procedure of subsection (a) does not apply.
As a result, meetings concerning subjects listed in subsections (b) and (c), unlike those concerning
subjects listed in subsection (a), can be held with no public evidence that they ever occurred. A
revision of the Open Meetings Law now pending in the General Assembly, however, does away
with this distinction and requires a board to vote during its regular session to hold a closed meet-




The North Carolina campaign finance laws were interpreted for
the first time in Loucheim, Eng & People, Inc. v. Carson,4 a civil case
involving an alleged illegal corporate expenditure. G.S. 163-278.19
(a),2 5 a criminal statute, makes it unlawful for a corporation to make to
a candidate any contribution or expenditure, both of which are defined
to include an advance.26 In Carson, plaintiff, a public relations corpo-
ration hired by state attorney general candidate James H. Carson, Jr.,
sued to recover over $20,000 that Carson allegedly owed it from his
unsuccessful campaign. Plaintiff claimed that, as media campaign
manager, it had been authorized by Carson and his staff to do every-
thing necessary to handle the media portion of the campaign, and had
been assured by Carson that it would be paid fully for all services ren-
dered and money advanced. Plaintiff further asserted that in reliance
on these assurances, it had rendered full services to Carson, including
advancing money for purchases pending receipt by the committee of
campaign funds.2 8 In defense, Carson argued that the debt was an ille-
gal advance within the scope of G.S. 163-278.19(a) and thus should not
be honored as a contractual obligation. 29 The trial court granted Car-
24. 35 N.C. App. 299, 241 S.E.2d 401 (1978).
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.19(a) (1976) provides that, in general:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any corporation, business entity, labor union, professional asso-
ciation or insurance company directly or indirectly;
(1) To make any contribution or expenditure. . . in aid or in behalf of or in oppo-
sition to any candidate or political committee in any election or for any political purpose
whatsoever ....
26. Id. § 163-278.6(6), (9) (1976). The statutes interpreted in Carson are identical in lan-
guage to the provisions of the Federal Campaign Finance Law that prohibit corporate contribu-
tions and expenditures, see 2 U.S.C.A. § 441(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1977), and define them to
include an advance, see id. § 43 1(e), (f). While there have been many cases interpreting the fed-
eral statute, see, e.g., United States v. Lewis Food Co., 366 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1966); United States
v. Chestnut, 394 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aft'd, 533 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1976); Miller v. Ameri-
can Tel. & Tel. Co., 394 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1975), af'd, 530 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1976); United
States v. First Nat'l Bank, 329 F. Supp. 1251 (S.D. Ohio 1971), none of these cases involved the
same issue as presented in Carson, ie., whether a campaign finance law that prohibits corporate
contributions and expenditures, including advances, precludes a candidate's corporate media
manager from paying for the candidate's advertising and later seeking reimbursement.
27. 35 N.C. App. at 300-01, 241 S.E.2d at 403. The candidate had from time to time paid
portions of the amounts outstanding. The remaining outstanding amount was $22,251.65, which
included $10,000 that the candidate had paid by a check that was returned because of insufficient
funds. Id. at 301, 241 S.E.2d at 403.
28. Id. at 301, 303-04, 241 S.E.2d at 403-04.
29. Id. at 302, 241 S.E.2d'at 403. Carson also filed a counterclaim, alleging that plaintiff
damaged his reputation in the amount of $50,000 by knowingly and wilfully violating the law in
arranging an unlawful extension of credit. The trial court's judgment did not dispose of defend-
ant's counterclaim. Id., 241 S.E.2d at 403-04.
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son's motion for judgment on the pleadings.30
In affirming, the court of appeals held that the money the corpora-
tion advanced to the various media for advertising purchases under its
contract to manage the candidate's media campaign was the type of
advance the law was aimed to prevent and that, therefore, it could not
enforce the contract between the corporation and Carson for pay-
ment.3 ' In answer to plaintiff's contention that "advance" so construed
would prohibit normal credit transactions between corporation and
candidate, the court found that this payment for media advertising was
not typical of ordinary extensions of credit, which are not barred by the
statute.32 The court, however, suggested that the part of the debt repre-
senting plaintifi's commissions might be recovered if the commissions
were not earned by plaintiff in connection with the other illegal
advancements.33
The court's application of a broad definition of advance in a con-
text in which the corporation is, in essence, an agent of the candidate
rather than an independent contributor, should be carefully scrutinized
in light of the policies of the campaign finance laws. The purpose of
these laws prohibiting corporate contributions and expenditures is two-
fold: to prevent corporate influence over elections; and to protect
shareholders from the use of corporate funds for a political purpose
without their consent.34 There is, however, a countervailing concern
that must be dealt with when, as here, the corporation is not uncon-
nected with the candidate but, to the contrary, has been hired by him to
render services. As has been recognized in the context of banks loaning
money to candidates, 35 the statute cannot unconstitutionally intrude
into normal business transactions. The Federal Election Commission,
30. Id.
31. Id. at 304, 307, 241 S.E.2d at 405, 406.
32. Id. at 305, 241 S.E.2d at 405. In drawing a distinction between ordinary and extraordi-
nary extensions of credit, the court also rejected plaintiffs argument that the campaign finance
laws infringed its right to contract and to carry on a lawful business in violation of the due process
clause of the United States Constitution and the law of the land clause of the North Carolina
Constitution. Id. at 306-07, 241 S.E.2d at 405-06. For a suggestion that the statute may be uncon-
stitutional on these grounds, see this Survey, Constitutional Law: Fourteenth Amendment: Due
Process.
33. Id. at 306-07, 241 S.E.2d at 406. Work done on a commission basis appears to be a prime
example of a transaction involving an ordinary extension of credit.
34. See, e.g., Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 394 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1975), at'd, 530
F,2d 964 (3d Cir. 1976).
35. In United States v. First Nat'1 Bank, 329 F. Supp. 1251 (S.D. Ohio 1971), the court held
that when construed to prohibit a bank from making a fully secured loan to a candidate the statute




in carrying out the provisions of a federal statute that also prohibits
advances by corporations,36 has attempted to deal with this problem in
the following regulation:
A corporation may extend credit to a candidate, political com-
mittee, or other person in connection with a Federal election pro-
vided that the credit is extended in the ordinary course of the
corporation's business and the terms are substantially similar to ex-
tensions of credit to nonpolitical debtors which are of similar risk
and size of obligation .... 37
Although the court in Carson relied heavily on federal authority,3"
it made no reference to this regulation and applied its interpretation of
the state law prohibiting corporate advances in a manner inconsistent
with the regulation. While recognizing that ordinary, as opposed to
extraordinary, extensions of credit are not barred by the statute, the
court did not, as the federal regulation appears to contemplate, remand
the case for an examination of the ordinary business practices of public
relations corporations nor remand to determine what the ordinary busi-
ness practices of this particular corporation were.39 Instead, the court
concluded that plaintiff had violated the campaign finance law simply
on the basis of inferences drawn from certain language in plaintiff's
complaint. Plaintiff stated in its complaint that it had "advanced
money" for the purchase of advertising4 ° and that "'defendant knew
that the media advertising had to be currently paid and was aware of
the [campaign] laws and regulations concerning media expenses.' "41
From this the court concluded that plaintiff was also aware that "in
paying the defendant's expenses, it was going beyond the mere exten-
sion of credit."42 A plaintiff's interpretation of the law, however,
36. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
37. 11 C.F.R. § 114.10 (1977).
38. 35 N.C. App. at 304, 241 S.E.2d at 404-05.
39. If a particular firm, however, extends credit in such a manner to candidates and non-
candidates alike, then there is no reason to believe the firm is trying to buy political favors-the
concern behind the enactment of the statute prohibiting corporate advances.
40. 35 N.C. App. at 301, 241 S.E.2d at 403.
41. Id. at 305, 241 S.E.2d at 405. It is unclear to what laws and regulations plaintiff was
referring. There are apparently no other laws or regulations prohibiting a public relations firm
from "advancing" payment for a candidate's advertising.
42. Id. It is interesting to note that the former North Carolina Attorney General was appar-
ently also in violation of the statute, since the statute also prohibits candidates from accepting
illegal contributions or expenditures and subjects them to the same penalties as the donor. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.19(c) (1976). The court implicitly recognized the candidate's situation
in its statement that "we regard the worthless check [with which Carson had attempted to pay part
of the debt] as nothing more than an acknowledgment by the defendant that the plaintiff had
advanced money in his behalf," but went on to classify that acknowledgment as only a moral
obligation that the defendant felt compelled to fulfill. 35 N.C. App. at 305, 241 S.E.2d at 405.
1979]
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should not serve as a substitute for reasoned legal analysis.
The danger in the court's analysis is that it fails to recognize the
practicalities in rendering services to a candidate. A public relations
firm, as an agent of the candidate, manages the media portion of his
campaign-an expensive undertaking for which the candidate must
usually pay in periodic installments. In determining whether a particu-
lar "advance" by a public relations firm to a candidate is the type of
activity that the law aims to prevent, the courts should take into ac-
count this practicality and examine whether a firm's particular exten-
sion of credit to a political candidate is consistent with normal business
practices.
C. Regulation of Utilities43
In 1978 the courts were faced with litigation 'arising out of the nat-
ural gas shortage that first affected the nation in the early 1970's. 44 In-
fluenced primarily by the severity of natural gas curtailments to North
Carolina,45 the North Carolina Supreme Court in State ex rel Utilities
Commission v. Edmisten46 upheld a Utilities Commission rule allowing
43. In In re Duke Power Co., 37 N.C. App. 138, 245 S.E.2d 787, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 646,
248 S.E.2d 257 (1978), the court of appeals upheld a Utilities Commission order in the face of an
environmental challenge to Duke Power Company's proposed construction of a nuclear power
plant along the Yadkin River. Based on findings of the need for additional electrical capacity and
of the appropriateness of the proposed plant's site and design, the Commission in 1977 granted
Duke a certificate of public convenience and necessity (a prerequisite to most utility construction)
for the building of a nuclear generating plant. The certificate, however, imposed limitations on
the use of water from the Yadkin River, including the requirements that Duke receive
construction and operating licenses from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the North
Carolina Department of Natural and Economic Resources and that its operations be subject to
periodic review by the Environmental Management Commission. Id. at 139-40, 245 S.E.2d at
789-90.
Petitioner, a nonprofit corporation "organized to promote recreational benefits and property
values," id. at 139, 245 S.E.2d at 789, in an area downstream from the proposed plant site, was
allowed to intervene in the Commission's hearings and appealed the granting of the certificate on
the ground that flaws in the plant's design and placement that would cause pollution of the river
and consume too much of its water were not adequately taken into account. The court, however,
was satisfied that the Commission considered all facts required by law and issued an order
supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 142, 245 S.E.2d at 791. Stating that the purpose of
requiring the certificate-to prevent costly overbuilding-leaves environmental concerns to other
agencies except as they affect the cost and efficiency of a proposed plant, id. at 141, 245 S.E.2d at
791, the court found that the limitations contained within the certificate evidenced the
Commission's concern for the quality of water in the Yadkin River, id. at 142, 245 S.E.2d at 791.
In addition, the court disposed of petitioner's arguments based on the legal rights of riparian
owners by declaring that no "taking" of property rights had occurred. Id.
44. See Harrison & Formby, Regional Distortions in Natural Gas Allocations: A Legal and
Economic.Analysis, 57 N.C.L. REv. 57, 61 (1978).
45. Next to South Carolina, North Carolina experienced more severe curtailments than any
other state. See Harrison & Formby, supra note 44, at 84-85.
46. 294 N.C. 598, 242 S.E.2d 862 (1978).
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state natural gas distributors to engage in exploration and development
programs for new gas supplies and to pass the costs of these programs
directly to their customers in the form of rate increases.47
In Edmisten, the attorney general of North Carolina argued that
the Commission exceeded its statutory authority in allowing the costs
to be charged as operating expenses of the utility, thereby permitting
them to be passed directly to the consumer without the necessity of a
general ratemaking hearing.48 Such an accounting procedure, he main-
tained, assigns a function to the operating expense that it was not in-
tended to bear-attraction of capital-and thus shifts the risks of gas
exploration from willing investors to the consuming public. 49 The at-
torney general proposed that the costs of the programs should- have
been financed instead out of retained earnings or otherwise, and
recouped through a variation in the utility's rate base,50 a procedure
that would require a general ratemaking proceeding to determine
whether the net profits in comparison with the rate base allow the util-
ity a "fair rate of return."" t
Relying on the Commission's unchallenged findings of fact that
natural gas utilities needed additional supplies to render adequate serv-
ice, that exploration programs were the most feasible means of ob-
taining supplies, and that the programs could not be financed through
traditional methods, 52 the court held that the Commission acted within
the authority granted it by the legislature53 to promote adequate, eco-
47. Id. at 612, 242 S.E.2d at 871.
48. Id. at 603, 242 S.E.2d at 866. By statute, a utility is allowed a "fair rate of return" on the
value of its property that is "used and useful" in rendering service to the public. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 62-133(b) (1975). The rate of return may be represented by the formula r = (R-E) + V, in which
r is the rate of return expressed as a percentage, R is the revenues obtained from rates, E is the
operating expenses, and V is the value of the utility's depreciated property, or what is more com-
monly known as the rate base. See E. CLEMENS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 52-53 (1950);
see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977). An increase in operating expenses
can be accompanied by a proportionate increase in rates without disturbing the rate base and rate
of return, and thus, a general ratemaking hearing will not be required. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-
137 (1975). Another way of accounting for costs is by ascertaining the value of the property a
utility is currently using, which will be attributed to the rate base, and the operating expenses
incurred in using that property. These factors are then considered in determining the amount of
an increase in revenues that will produce a fair rate of return. Because all factors in the rate
structure are affected by this method of accounting, a general ratemaking hearing is required. See
id. §§ 62-133, -137.
49. 294 N.C. at 604-05, 242 S.E.2d at 867.
50. Id. at 603, 242 S.E.2d at 866.
51. See note 48 supra. The net profits are represented in the formula by the factor R - E (the
difference between revenues and operating expenses).
52. 294 N.C. at 605-06, 242 S.E.2d at 867.
53. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 62-2, -32, -42, -131(b) (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
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nomical, and efficient utility services and to render reliable supplies. 4
It further found that a strict interpretation of the operating expense
element of the ratemaking formula "would severely limit the ability of
the Commission to act in the best interest of the consuming public in
emergency situations. 55 In a strong dissent,56 Justice Lake argued that
the Commission had no authority "to conscript capital from unwilling
investors. . . in order to finance a. . .prospecting venture" 57 because
the definition of public utility-"a person. . . owning or operating in
this State equipment or facilities for. . .[p]roducing, generating, trans-
mitting, delivering or furnishing .. .piped gas"--does not include
the business of prospecting or exploring for natural gas, particularly
when conducted in another state.59
Although the distinction between production and exploration may
be too slight to negate the Commission's authority to regulate develop-
ment of gas resources, the scope of the Commission's authority should
not go unscrutinized. The majority's opinion is an example of result-
oriented reasoning; a contrary result could have just as easily been
reached had the court not been so willing to label the costs of develop-
ment as operating expenses.6 0 Indeed, capital investment is not nor-
54. 294 N.C. at 606, 242 S.E.2d at 868.
55. Id. at 607, 242 S.E.2d at 868. The court also rejected the attorney general's contentions
that the proceedings in which various utility companies were allowed specific rate increases to
account for the costs of exploration should have been declared to be general rate cases, and that
the failure to do so prejudiced him because it obviated the necessity for the special procedures
provided in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-81 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Characterizing the rate increases as
"permitted" or "allowed" rates that, pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-134(a) (1975), are allowed
to go into effect for good cause without a hearing, the court found good cause for the increases in
the Commission's determination, pursuant to the standards set out in its rule allowing such in-
creases, that the adjustment would not raise the utility's rate of return above the level most re-
cently approved in a general rate case. 294 N.C. at 609-10, 242 S.E.2d at 869. The court found the
attorney general was not prejudiced because N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-132 (1975) subjects these "per-
mitted" or "allowed" rates to later challenge by any interested person, and provides for a hearing
on their "just and reasonable" nature. 294 N.C. at 609-10, 242 S.E.2d at 869-70. In addition, the
court rejected the attorney general's arguments that the orders violated the due process and equal
protection clauses of the United States and North Carolina constitutions. Id. at 610-12, 242
S.E.2d at 870-71.
56, The language used by Justice Lake is indeed strong. For example, see his characteriza-
tion of the facts of the case at id. at 616-18, 242 S.E.2d at 873-74 (dissenting opinion).
57. Id. at 622, 242 S.E.2d at 876.
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-3(23)a.l. (Cum. Supp. 1977).
59. 294 N.C. at 618-22, 242 S.E.2d at 874-76.
60. In so labeling these costs, the court relied on a 1935 Arkansas opinion, which stated that
when a restrictive interpretation of the operating expense element of an act would frustrate the
act's purposes, the element should be given a liberal construction. Id. at 606, 242 S.E.2d at 868
(citing Bourland v. City of Fort Smith, 190 Ark. 289, 78 S.W.2d 383 (1935)). The court could just
as easily have relied on its own language in Little v. Stevens, 267 N.C. 328, 148 S.E.2d 201 (1966):
"If an act is susceptible to more than one construction, the consequences of each are a potent
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mally associated with operating expenses; however, the court felt
justified in holding that operating expenses were involved because of
the abnormal emergency situation. As a short-term measure, allowing
utilities to meet a present emergency by a direct increase in rates may
be necessary. Exploration and development, however, is not a short-
term solution6' to a temporary crisis but rather a long-term approach to
a continuing need for energy supplies. Because of this continuing
"emergency," utility companies that have traditionally been engaged
solely in the business of distributing energy may be permitted in the
future to engage more and more in exploration and development pro-
grams at no risk to themselves. In such a situation, the attorney gen-
erars proposal requiring general ratemaking proceedings to determine
whether a utility should be allowed an increase in rates may be neces-
sary in order to curtail abusive spending. Such a proposal appears to
be a valid compromise: by allowing the utility to calculate the costs of
exploration and development programs into its rate base, the risks in-
volved in the programs are still shifted to the consumer, but only after
public scrutiny of the utility's fair rate of return.
In State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. Public Service Co.,62 the
court of appeals approved a Commission order establishing a new
method for adjusting utility rates to reflect the curtailment of natural
gas supplies. 63 Because curtailment levels had fluctuated making it im-
possible accurately to predict future revenues and expenses, the Com-
mission authorized Public Service Company's use of a formula known
as the Volume Variation Adjustment Factor (VVAF). The VVAF is a
rate set for the future, based on projected volumes of gas, that is
designed to track the effects of increased or decreased curtailment on
revenues and avoid the necessity for a general rate case each time cur-
tailment levels change.'
In June 1976, Public Service sought to revise upwards the VVAF
factor it had submitted less than a month earlier. The factor first sub-
mitted reflected a curtailment estimate based upon five and one-half
months of historical supply levels and six and one-half months of fore-
factor in its interpretation, and undesirable consequences will be avoided if possible." Id. at 336,
148 S.E.2d at 207.
61. In contrast, North Carolina's purchase of large volumes of emergency gas during the
winter of 1977-1978, see Harrison & Formby, supra note 44, at 79 n.160, was a short-term re-
sponse to the curtailment problem.
62. 35 N.C. App. 156, 241 S.E.2d 79 (1978).
63. Id. at 162, 241 S.E.2d at 83.
64. Id. at 156-57, 241 S.E.2d at 80.
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casted future supplies, while the June revision was calculated on the
basis of annualizing the upcoming summer period curtailment level.
Although the Commission had apparently approved use of either
method, it changed its mind after the attorney general intervened on
behalf of the using and consuming public and filed a motion to rescind
approval of the June rate increase.65 Following a hearing on the mat-
ter, the Commission concluded that the historical/future method
should serve as the basis for the WAF calculation and should be
"trued-up" periodically to account for the actual curtailment exper-
ienced. It ordered that the difference between the rate in effect and the
"true" rate be refunded to customers and applied this order to the re-
vised June WAF factor, which had been employed in calculating Pub-
lic Service's rates pending termination of the hearing.66
On appeal, Public Service argued that the refund provisions ex-
ceeded the authority of the Commission because they constituted retro-
active ratemaking, and proposed that instead of refunding it should be
allowed to "true-up" by offsetting its new WAF.6 7 While retroactive
changes in existing rates are not allowed,68 the court concluded that the
VVAF is not an established rate but rather a permitted or allowed rate
under G.S. 62-13269 that can be subject to refund upon a determination
by the Commission that it is unjust and unreasonable.7" In rejecting
Public Service's proposal, the court accurately pointed out that, unlike
the Commission order, the proposal would benefit only those who re-
mained Public Service customers-a group that may not include all
who paid the higher amounts.7'
Another issue arising in the public utility context was whether a
two-way radio service offered to members of a county medical society
as an adjunct to a telephone answering service is a "public utility"
within the meaning of G.S. 62-372 and thus subject to regulation by the
Utilities Commission. In State ex rel Utilities Commission v. Simp-
son,73 the supreme court affirmed a Commission ruling that the service
is a public utility. The decision turned on whether the service was of-
65. Id. at 157-58, 241 S.E.2d at 80.
66. Id. at 158, 241 S.E.2d at 81.
67. Id. at 160-61, 241 S.E.2d at 82.
68. See, e.g., State exrel. Utils. Comm'n v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 451,468, 232 S.E.2d 184, 194
(1977).
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-132 (1975).
70. 35 N.C. App. at 161, 241 S.E.2d at 82.
71. Id., 241 S.E.2d at 83.
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-3(23) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
73. 295 N.C. 519, 246 S.E.2d 753 (1978).
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fered to the "pubic"-a term that the court noted "'does not mean
everybody all the time.' "," Although an earlier North Carolina case
had held that a two-way radio service offered to anyone who applies for
it is "offered to the public,"75 Simpson was more complicated because
the class to whom the service was offered consisted only of physicians
within one county; however, because the class comprised approxi-
mately one-half of the radio communications market in the county, the
court found that regulation of the service as a public utility was
proper.76 In light of the court's admission that a determination of
whether a service is offered to the public is difficult to standardize and
must often be made by resort to the facts of a particular case,7 7 the
decision may prove to be of little guidance in delineating the point at
which a private enterprise becomes subject to regulation as a public
utility.
A final issue affecting utilities involved the continued vitality of
the common law rule that a privately owned utility is required to re-
move or relocate its facilities along a public street at its own expense
when necessary for the public use and convenience.78 In Southern Bell
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Housing Authori y,79 the court of appeals
confronted the issue, raised in North Carolina for the first time,
whether state urban redevelopment laws mandate a result contrary to
the common law when a telephone company is compelled by a city to
relocate its telephone lines from an area undergoing urban redevelop-
ment. The court refused to depart from the common law rule."
The court observed that reimbursement might be authorized by
the urban redevelopment statutes in two possible ways: (1) as com-
pensation for an eminent domain taking under G.S. 160A-512(6),8 1 or
(2) because the cost of removal is an expenditure necessary to carry
out the purposes of the Urban Redevelopment Law82 under G.S. 160A-
74. Id. at 522, 246 S.E.2d at 755 (quoting Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U.S. 252, 255
(1916)).
75. State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 267 N.C. 257, 148 S.E.2d 100
(1966).
76. 295 N.C. at 525, 246 S.E.2d at 757.
77. Id. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 756.
78. See 39A C.J.S.2d Highways § 139c (1976).
79. 38 N.C. App. 172, 247 S.E.2d 663 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 414, 251 S.E.2d 473
(1978).
80. Id. at 176, 247 S.E.2d at 667.
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-512(6) (1976).
82. Id. §§ 160A-500 to -526.
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512(1 1)83 and thus an expenditure that a city's urban redevelopment
commission is empowered to make.84 Finding that Southern Bell had
no property or interest in the land upon which its facilities were lo-
cated, the court held that there was not a taking, and noted that, even if
there were, the situation is analogous to cases in which a leasehold is
condemned and the tenant is required to pay his own relocation costs. 85
On the issue of whether the removal and relocation costs were neces-
sary expenditures under the Urban Redevelopment Law, the court sim-
ply indicated that absent specific legislative language, it felt compelled
to adhere to the established result.8 6
The court's observation that reimbursement would be authorized
if the cost of removal were an expenditure necessary to carry out the
purposes of the Redevelopment Law does not take into account the
ultimate question whether a statutory authorization to make such an
expenditure precludes an urban redevelopment commission from re-
quiring the public utility to bear the expense. Arguably, according to
the court's analysis, reimbursement should be authorized on the ground
that because the power to remove utility lines is by statutory definition
a power necessary to carry out the Act's purposes87 (and thus a power
that the commission can exercise), then an expenditure pursuant to that
power is also necessary to carry out the Act's purposes. Nevertheless,
the court failed to reach this result, maintaining in a conclusory state-
ment that "we cannot hold Southern Bell's relocation expenses to be
'necessary expenditures' . . . since at common law no such reimburse-
ment was required. '8 8 It -is possible, however, that the legislature's
grant of power to an urban redevelopment commission to make neces-
sary expenditures, which as illustrated include those for the removal of
utility lines, indicates an intent to alter the common law.
D. State and Local Government89
1. State Employees
The 1978 General Assembly passed two statutes that will have an
83. Id. § 160A-512(!1) (1976).
84. Id. § 160A-512 (1976); 38 N.C. App. at 174, 247 S.E.2d at 665.
85. 38 N.C. App. at 174, 247 S.E.2d at 666. See, e.g., Williams v. State Hwy. Comm'n, 252
N.C. 141, 113 S.E.2d 263 (1960).
86. 38 N.C. App. at 176, 247 S.E.2d at 667.
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-512(11) (1976).
88. 38 N.C. App. at 176, 247 S.E.2d at 666.
89. The General Assembly took action this year to limit public access to the State Bank
Commissioner's records. See Law of June 16, 1978, ch. 1181, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 1978,
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important effect on state employees. The more significant statute elimi-
nates automatic wage increases for state employees and replaces them
with increases based on merit.9" In the past, North Carolina has taken
a compromise position on wage increases; employees at lower levels
were granted automatic increases and those at higher levels received
increases based on performance. 9' In theory, at least, the elimination
of automatic increases is an attempt to promote efficiency and produc-
tivity in government through a salary incentive.9 2 Because there are
numerous ways to circumvent such a statute,93 however, it remains to
be seen whether the goal will be accomplished.
In addition, the State Personnel Privacy Act94 was amended 9" to
allow state department heads to make public the reasons why an em-
ployee was demoted, suspended or dismissed and to allow public access
to that employee's personnel file. 96 Although the date on which the
at 70 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-99, -117 (Interim Supp. 1978)). An interim measure that
expires on June 30, 1979, the new Act provides that records compiled during state and federal
banking examinations, borrowers' records, and records containing information compiled in
preparation or anticipation of litigation are not subject to public inspection. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 53-99 (Interim Supp. 1978). Any letters, reports, memoranda, recordings, charts or other
documents that would disclose the information in these confidential records are also confidential.
Id.; Law of Apr. 2, 1931, ch. 243, § 10, 1931 Pub. Laws 301 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 53-99 (1975)) (amended 1978). Prior to these amendments the statute was silent about what
records were not available to the public. In addition, the legislature created a commission to study
the area of access and confidentiality of the Bank Commissioner's and State Banking
Commission's records. While the study commission has proposed in effect the retention of the
recent restrictions, it has also recommended that reports containing information about "insider"
transactions be subject to public inspection, see Proposed Bill of the Study Commission on Access
to and Confidentiality of Banking Records (released February 7, 1979) (copy on file in office of
North Carolina Law Review), an important provision in light of the numerous instances involving
such transactions that have allegedly occurred in recent years. Congress recently enacted a similar
statute regarding release of information about insider transactions that applies to any bank,
whether state or national, insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Financial
Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 901, 92 Stat.
3641 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1817).
90. Law of June 16, 1978, ch. 1213, 1977 Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 1978, at 142 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 126-7 (Interim Supp. 1978)).
91. Law of May 20, 1965, ch. 640, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 711 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 126-7 (Cum. Supp. 1977)) (amended 1978).
92. This was also the purpose behind the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,
considered to be the most extensive revamping of the federal employment scheme since the estab-
lishment of the Civil Service System approximately 100 years ago. See 36 CONG. Q. 2945 (1978).
The Act provides for merit pay for employees at levels GS-13 through GS-15. Civil Service Re-
form Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 5402, 92 Stat. 1111.
93. For example, job supervisors who perhaps feel that wage increases should be based on
length of service could recommend merit increases without fully scrutinizing the performance of
each employee.
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 126-22 to -29 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
95. Law of June 16, 1978, ch. 1207, 1977 Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 1978, at 134 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 126-24 (Interim Supp. 1978)).
96. In order to release the information, the department head must first determine that the
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action was taken is public information,97 under the former law what an
employee did to merit the action was not.98 Prior to this amendment,
an employee's statement was the only public information available.
The new statute provides a means for testing the accuracy of employee
statements and for providing the public with more complete informa-
tion concerning the demotion, suspension or dismissal of public
employees.
Also considered in 1978, in Williams v. Greene,99 was the case of a
dismissed state employee who brought a section 1983100 action against
his employer, the North Carolina Highway Patrol, in which he asked
for a preliminary injunction to reinstate him to his position with back
pay pending a hearing before the State Personnel Commission.10' A
preliminary injunction is traditionally granted, pending trial on the
merits, when there is probable cause to believe that plaintiff will be able
to establish his case and when there is reasonable apprehension that he
will suffer irreparable loss without it.10 2 In Williams, the court of ap-
peals announced that the availability to plaintiff of an administrative
remedy would be weighed heavily in determining if plaintiff will suffer
irreparable loss.103 Primarily because the State Personnel Commission
could award Williams reinstatement and back pay, 04 the courts found
release of the information or the inspection and examination of the file is essential to maintaining
the integrity of his department or to maintaining the level or quality of services provided by his
department, and must prepare a supporting statement. Id.
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-23 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
98. Law of May 12, 1975, ch. 257, .1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 249 (formerly codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-24 (Cum. Supp. 1977)) (amended 1978).
99. 36 N.C. App. 80, 243 S.E.2d 156, appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 471, 246 S.E.2d
12 (1978).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
101. Plaintiff, a North Carolina Highway Patrolman, was involved in a roadblock incident in
1976 in which a Virginia State Patrolman, who was being held hostage, was killed. After an
investigation of the incident by the State Department of Transportation, plaintiff was dismissed
from his job on the grounds "that he was imprudent and careless in the use of his weapon ....
that he jeopardized the safety of a hostage ... by firing into a vehicle, and that he used excessive
force while attempting to apprehend a dangerous criminal." 36 N.C. App. at 81-82, 243 S.E.2d at
157-58. Plaintiff promptly requested a hearing before the State Personnel Commission, but none
had been scheduled as of the time he brought his lawsuit. Id. at 82, 243 S.E.2d at 158. In his suit,
plaintiff averred that because of adverse publicity surrounding his dismissal, his professional repu-
tation had been damaged and other job opportunities foreclosed, and that without reinstatement,
irreparable injury to his reputation and livelihood would ensue. Id.
102. N.C.R. Civ. P. 65.
103. The court also held, consistent with the recent trend of authority, see, e.g., McCray v.
Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 365 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 471 (1976), that a party suing
under § 1983 does not have to exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief.
36 N.C. App. at 85, 243 S.E.2d at 160.
104. The State Personnel Commission has the authority to grant reinstatement, back pay and
attorneys' fees under N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 126-4(9), -4(11) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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that he would not suffer irreparable loss of income. 10 5 In reversing a
trial court order granting a preliminary injunction, the court, however,
failed to analyze the issue of irreparable damage to plaintiff's reputa-
tion and simply concluded that "any damage to plaintiff's reputation
. ..must be balanced against the possible harm to the state in retain-
ing plaintiff on the North Carolina Highway Patrol. 0 6
2. Local Government
Numerous challenges to the powers of local government were con-
sidered by the courts in 1978.117 In In re Ordinance of Annexation No.
1977-4,108 a case of first impression, the North Carolina Supreme
Court upheld the power of a city to annex federal property-a power
that has been upheld in other jurisdictions in almost every instance in
which it has been challenged.' 0 9 The court noted that the only limita-
tion on this power is that it be exercised in accordance with the state's
statutes." 0 Asserting that the city did not meet the latter require-
ment,"' plaintiff argued that the statutory requirement that there be a
105. 36 N.C. App. at 86, 243 S.E.2d at 160.
106. Id.
107. In Big Bear, Inc. v. City of High Point, 294 N.C. 262, 240 S.E.2d 422 (1978), the supreme
court upheld the validity of a city ordinance that required business operations to pay a fee for city
garbage collection. Plaintiffs sued to recover fees they had paid in protest on the ground that the
payments were coercive, and thus involuntary and illegal, because the city had threatened to dis-
continue service if payments were not made. Because a section of the ordinance allowed others to
engage in garbage collection with the city's permission, the court concluded that plaintiffs were not
forced to contract with the city, and thus required plaintiffs to pay fees for the city services they
had voluntarily accepted. The holding comports with the decisions of many other states that have
allowed municipalities, in exercising their police powers, and as incident to garbage regulations, to
exact a fee for trash removal, and if reasonable, to charge a business a different rate from that
charged to individuals. See, e.g., Glass v. Fresno, 17 Cal. App. 2d 555, 62 P.2d 765 (1936); Mayor
of Milledgeville v. Green, 221 Ga. 498, 145 S.E.2d 507 (1965); Walker v. Jameson, 140 Ind. 591, 37
N.E. 402 (1894); Harper v. Richardson, 222 Mo. App. 331, 297 S.W. 141 (1927).
108. 296 N.C. 1, 249 S.E.2d 698 (1978). The case involved the City of Goldsboro's power to
annex Seymour Johnson Air Force Base.
109. See, e.g., Howard v. Commissioners of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624 (1953); Flynn v. Steven-
son, 4 111. App. 3d 458, 281 N.E.2d 438 (1972); Kansas City v. Querry, 511 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. 1974);
Wichita Falls v. Bowen, 143 Tx. 45, 182 S.W.2d 695 (1944); County of Norfolk v. City of Ports-
mouth, 186 Va. 1032, 45 S.E.2d 136 (1947).
110. See United States v. Bellevue, 334 F. Supp. 881 (D. Neb. 1971), aft'd, 474 F.2d 473 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973) (federal property could be annexed under state statute, but
annexation violated statutory requirement that it not be for sole purpose of obtaining revenue).
11. Plaintiff, a resident of the annexed area, challenged the ordinance on numerous other
grounds, including (1) that the annexation of federal property was beyond the powers delegated to
the city by legislative authority; (2) that the annexation would allow imposition of an unconstitu-
tionally unequal tax because military personnel are exempted from local taxation; and (3) that the
annexation violated the purposes of the annexation statute because it was inconsistent with "sound
urban development" as required by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-45 (1976). 296 N.C. at 16-18, 249
S.E.2d at 707-08.
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"total resident population" of two persons per acre of annexed land" 2
was not met because military personnel, not subject to taxation in the
annexing unit and thus not eligible to vote therein, were counted as
residents. t13 In rejecting plaintiff's argument, the court distinguished
the words "residence" (a person's actual place of abode, whether per-
manent or temporary) and "domicile" (one's permanent, established
home), and held that a finding of the latter was not required.1 4 A per-
son is properly counted as a member of the "total resident population,"
the court held, if he would have been counted as an inhabitant of the
area under rules governing the last federal census."' Plaintiff also con-
tended that the statutes were not followed because the city did not have
funds budgeted to provide municipal services to the annexed area; 16
however, the court pointed out that the clear intent of the statute is to
require only that the city show how it will provide these services. 17
The powers of a regional council of governments, a quasi-gov-
erning body composed of two or more units of local government, 118
were considered for the first time in Kloster v. Region D Council of Gov-
ernments,119 in which the court of appeals held that a council does not
have the inherent authority to own real estate or construct an office
building. 2 ° Defendant, a council of governments located in western
North Carolina, received a federal grant that it used to purchase land.
It planned to construct an office building on the land, partly for its own
use and partly for rental purposes, and to use the profits from the build-
ing to establish a retirement fund for its employees. Because a state
statute allows a council to occupy space provided by a member govern-
ment at the latter's expense, 12 1 the Council argued that it had the im-
plied power to own and occupy a building constructed by funds from a
112. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-48(c) (1976) requires that "part or all ofthe area to be annexed
must be developed for urban purposes," and sets out as one of the standards for determining if
this requirement has been met that the area have "a total resident population equal to at least two
persons for each acre of land included within its boundaries. .... "
113. 296 N.C. at 13-14, 249 S.E.2d at 705-06.
114. Id. at 15, 249 S.E.2d at 706.
115. Id. Authority for this method of estimating population is found in N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 160A-54(l) (1976).
116. As a prerequisite to annexation, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-47 (1976) requires, in part, that
the municipality prepare a report that includes a statement of "the method under which the mu-
nicipality plans to finance extension of services into the area to be annexed."
117. 296 N.C. at 16, 249 S.E.2d at 707.
118. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-470 to -478 (1976).
119. 36 N.C. App. 421, 245 S.E.2d 180, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 466, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978).
120. Plaintiff, a local taxpayer, challenged the Council's authority. For a discussion of plain-
tiffs standing to bring suit, see this Survey, Civil Procedure. Jurisdiction.
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-476 (1976).
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federal grant it had received. G.S. 160A-475, however, allows only spe-
cific enumerated powers to be conferred on a regional council by char-
ter, and allows member governments to delegate other powers to the
council by resolution. 22 Since the Council did not possess the power to
own real estate or construct an office building by virtue of statutory or
delegated authority, the court, considering these to be the exclusive
means by which a regional council could obtain power, rejected de-
fendant's theory of implied power.
23
In Cooke v. Futrell, 124 the court of appeals clarified the extent of a
municipality's power to impose penalties for failure to pay a municipal
license tax. The municipal resolution in question imposed a one dollar
fine on motor vehicle owners who failed to purchase municipal license
tags by a certain date. In construing the resolution to uphold its valid-
ity, ' 25 the court confined those vehicles subject to the municipal tax and
penalty to only those previously licensed by the state. Plaintiff could
not be forced to pay a municipal license tax penalty before his car was
licensed by the state because, according to state law, the local license
could not be required until the state had licensed the vehicle.' 26 In
reaching this construction, the court relied on two state statutes-G.S.
160A-206,127 which gives cities the power to tax only as specifically pro-
vided by statute and gives them an inherent power to penalize along
with a power to tax, and G.S. 20-97,I28 which authorizes cities and
towns within certain counties to levy at most one dollar annually on the
use of a vehicle licensed by the state. 29
122. Id. § 160A-475(1)-(8). Prior to 1975, the statute allowed councils powers other than those
specifically set out without requiring that the member governments delegate these other powers;
however, the council had applied for the federal grant after the new language requiring delegation
was adopted. 36 N.C. App. at 429, 245 S.E.2d at 185.
123. Id. at 428-29, 245 S.E.2d at 184-85.
124. 37 N.C. App. 441, 246 S.E.2d 65 (1978).
125. Plaintiff alleged that the Town of Rich Square and its agent violated North Carolina
statutory law as well as the North Carolina and United States constitutions, which protect against
unjust taxation.
126. Because it was unclear whether, when plaintiff purchased his state tags the day after he
paid the penalty, this was a new license or delinquent renewal, the court remanded the case for a
factual finding. Id. at 443-44, 246 S.E.2d at 66-67.
127. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-206 (1976) provides in part:
A city shall have power to impose taxes only as specifically authorized. by act of the
General Assembly. Except when the statute authorizing a tax provides for penalties and
interest, the power to impose a tax shall include the power to impose. . . penalties or
interest for failure to pay taxes lawfully due within the time prescribed by law or
ordinance.
128. Id. § 20-97 (1978).
129. 37 N.C. App. at 443, 246 S.E.2d at 66.
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E. Unemployment Compensation
With its decision in In re Sarvis,'3° the North Carolina Court of
Appeals established that striking employees who offer to return to work
but have been replaced by permanent employees are not necessarily
barred from unemployment benefits.' 3' The issue in Sarvis centered on
an interpretation of G.S. 96-14(5) 132 that disqualifies an employee from
benefits during any week in which his unemployment "is caused by a
labor dispute in active progress." In reversing the trial court's conclu-
sion that unemployment originally caused by a dispute is not changed
in respect of its cause by subsequent events, the court focused on the
words "active progress" in the statute and the decisions of other states
that have held a dispute terminated upon replacement of the employees
and/or an unconditional offer to return to work.13 3 The issue whether
the dispute was still in progress was complicated, however, by the em-
ployees' filing, subsequent to their offer to return, of a petition for certi-
fication of a bargaining representative before the National Labor
Relations Board. Holding that the dispute would be deemed over if the
petition were found to be unrelated to the original strike, 134 the court
remanded the case for a determination of this factual issue. 35
F Liquor by the Drink
In 1978 the General Assembly passed legislation 36 to allow cities
130. 36 N.C. App. 476, 245 S.E.2d 176 (1978), rev'd, 296 N.C. 475, 251 S.E.2d 434 (1979).
131. Appellants, 16 employees of the High Point Sprinkler Company, struck the plant in a
dispute over economic benefits and their employer's decision to transfer an employee. Shortly
thereafter, the employer demanded that they return to work the following day or else permanent
replacements would be sought. When the employees offered to return 4 days after the ultimatum
14 of the 16 jobs had been filled. Id. at 477, 245 S.E.2d at 177.
132. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(5) (1975).
133. 36 N.C. App. at 477-78, 245 S.E.2d 178-79 (citing Ruberoid Co. v. California Unemploy-
ment Ins. Appeals Bd., 59 Cal. 2d 73, 378 P.2d 102, 27 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1963); Knight-Morley Corp.
v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 352 Mich. 331, 89 N.W.2d 541 (1958); Sprague & Henwood, Inc. v.
Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 207 Pa. Super. 112, 215 A.2d 269 (1965); Special
Prods. Co. v. Jennings, 209 Tenn. 316, 353 S.W.2d 561 (1961); Texas Employment Comm'n v.
Hodson, 346 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961)). The supreme court agreed that unemployment is
no longer caused by "a labor dispute in active progress" when employees offer to return to work.
296 N.C. at 481, 251 S.E.2d at 438.
134. The employees had also filed unfair labor practices charges before the NLRB that alleged
discrimination in hiring and tenure in order to discourage membership in a labor organization;
however, the court found these charges unrelated to the strike. 36 N.C. App. at 481-82, 245 S.E.2d
at 179-80.
135. The supreme court, holding that the petition pending before the NLRB could not cause
unemployment and thus could not serve as a basis for disqualifying employees from receiving
benefits, reversed this holding of the court of appeals. 296 N.C. at 481-82, 251 S.E.2d at 437-38.
136. Law of June 15, 1978, ch. 1138, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 1978, at 36 (codified at
1979] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 851
and counties with ABC stores to hold elections on the sale of mixed
drinks in restaurants 37 and social establishments. 38 The bill as finally
adopted prohibits "brown-bagging" in restaurants located in cities or
counties that have approved mixed drink sales, raises the tax on liquors
from five dollars to ten dollars a gallon, and provides that nine dollars
of the tax will go to the local unit while one dollar will go to alcoholism
treatment and research.
The regulations concerning mixed drinks, 139 promulgated by the
State ABC Board in conjunction with a special advisory committee,
allow hotels with restaurants to apply for a permit140 and allow quali-
fied restaurants' 4 ' and hotels to operate a lounge separate from the din-
ing area. 142  Strict regulations have been adopted to ensure that a
"social establishment" is bona fide, that is, not open to the general pub-
lic, including the requirement that it have a thirty-day waiting period
for membership. 143
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 18A-2, -8, -15, -25, -29 to -31, -40, -51, -54 (Interim Supp. 1978)) (repealing
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18A-13).
137. A restaurant is required to be "engaged primarily and substantially in preparing and
serving meals." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18A-30(4) (Interim Supp. 1978); see 4 N.C. AD. CODE 2L
§ .0201 (1978). Grills, snack bars, lunch counters and fast food outlets are not considered restau-
rants. Id. While a restaurant must, at a minimum, have an inside dining area with a capacity to
seat at least 36 persons, id., there are numerous other characteristics that will be considered by the
State ABC Board before it issues a permit. These factors include: (I) whether the facility has a
printed menu listing full meals with substantial entrees; (2) whether it has full cooking and refrig-
eration equipment; (3) whether the largest portion of the food sold is prepared in its own kitchen;
(4) whether the largest portion of the food sold is consumed on its premises; (5) whether there are
separate kitchen and service staffs; (6) whether seating for dining is primarily at tables; and (7)
whether only a small portion of the premises is devoted to activities other than dining. Id.
§ .0201(b).
138. A social establishment is a "private facility organized and operated ... solely for a so-
cial, recreational, patriotic or fraternal purpose." Id. § .0301.
139. A copy of the regulations, which are quite extensive, can be obtained from the State ABC
Board, P.O. Box 25249, Raleigh, N.C. 27611.
140. 4 N.C. AD. CODE 2L §§ .0205-.0206. Hotels include "hotels, motels and similar places
which furnish lodging." Id. § .0205. "A hotel with a restaurant is a facility open to the general
public, engaged primarily and substantially in the business of furnishing lodging and including on
its premises a restaurant which has a kitchen and inside seating for at least 36 persons .... To
qualify for a mixed beverages permit as a hotel with a restaurant, a majority of the gross receipts
of the business must come from furnishing lodging." Id. In addition, the eligibility of a restau-
rant within a hotel is dependent on the considerations listed in id. § .0201(b), discussedin note 137
supra.
141. 4 N.C. AD. CODE 2L § .0201 (1978). The lounge in a restaurant must share a common
kitchen and entrance with the dining area, cannot have a separate outside entrance and can re-
main open only so long as the dining area is open. Although the lounge does not have to serve
meals, it must have food available at all times. Id.
142. Id. § .0205(b). A hotel's restaurant and lounge do not have to be connected if the restau-
rant's services are available in the lounge. Sales are also allowed in convention rooms, meeting
rooms and similar places but only during scheduled events and only after a sign indicating the
nature of the event has been posted. No sales, however, are allowed through room service. Id.
143. Id. § .0302(b). Some of the other requirements are: (1) that the facility collect an annual
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Although the regulations are comprehensive,'" questions remain
about administering the liquor by the drink system. Restaurants in a
local unit that has approved mixed drinks can no longer have brown-
bagging,'45 while social establishments are allowed to have both. Yet
seemingly, the rationale behind the bill-that allowing sales of mixed
drinks permits greater control over consumption than brown-bagging
does-should also apply to social establishments. Legislation has been
introduced that would force some social establishments to choose be-
tween the two.' 46 The most serious question, perhaps, concerns who
may hold a mixed drink referendum. The statute allows the local gov-
erning board or twenty percent of the voters in cities and counties with
ABC stores to call a referendum. 47 In those cities that have passed
local laws creating city ABC systems in counties in which there is no
county-wide system, 41 only a city-wide vote may be held. ' 49 If there is
a county-wide ABC system and no separate city system, however, the
statute is ambiguous about whether any city within the county could
call a separate election to vote on mixed drinks. 5 0
G. Health Care
In 1978, only five years after certificate of need legislation was
struck down as unconstitutional by the North Carolina Supreme
Court, -5 the General Assembly again enacted such legislation 52 as re-
membership fee separate from any cover charge; (2) that it maintain a written policy on the grant-
ing of memberships; (3) that it require each prospective member to complete a detailed applica-
tion; and (4) that it have a membership committee of at least three persons to review all
applications and make recommendations to the full membership. Id. § .0302. In addition, there
are numerous other factors that will be considered in determining whether a facility qualifies as a
social establishment. See id. § .0301(b).
144. Other important regulations place strict limits on advertising. See id. §§ .0501-.0505. For
example, restaurants and hotels, but not social establishments, can have a single exterior sign, with
specific size limits, stating "mixed beverages" or "all ABC permits" in letters no higher than five
inches. These words are the only ones allowed in media advertising. In addition, advertisements
of prices and "happy hours" are barred. Interior advertising is restricted to a separate mixed
drink menu and the display of bottles to be used in mixing drinks. When a social establishment
advertises in any manner, the words "not open to the general public" must be included. Id.
145. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18A-31(e) (Interim Supp. 1978).
146. H. 206, N.C. General Assembly, 1979 Sess.
147. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18A-51(b).
148. North Carolina law has traditionally provided only for county-wide ABC elections. See
id. § 18A-51.
149. See Id. § 18A-51(b).
150. Legislation has also been introduced to allow such cities, under certain circumstances, to
hold mixed drink elections. H. 631, N.C. General Assembly, 1979 Sess.
151. In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973).
152. North Carolina Health Planning and Resource Development Act of 1978, ch. 1182, 1977
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quired under the National Health Planning and Resources Develop-
ment Act of 1974"13 as a condition to receiving certain federal health
care funds.
The new state legislation is designed to restrict the unnecessary
capital expenditures in the health care industry that many claim have
contributed to the rising costs of health care 154 by requiring a certificate
of need to be obtained from a state agency before the development of
new health care services and facilities.'-" The statute describes the re-
view process for securing a certificate, assigns reviewing roles to the
North Carolina Department of Human Resources and local health
planning agencies, and sets forth criteria that the reviewing agency
must consider.' 56 Violation of the certificate requirements is ground
for injunctive relief, loss of licensing and public funding, and civil fines
of up to $20,000.157
While certificate of need legislation is widely considered a reason-
able solution to the problem of spiraling health care costs,' 58 it has had
problems in North Carolina. In the 1973 case of In re Certificate of
Need for Aston Park Hospital, Inc.,'5 9 the North Carolina Supreme
Court declared the state's 1971 certificate of need statute to be a depri-
vation of liberty without due process in violation of the North Carolina
N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 1978, at 71 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 131-175 to -188 (Interim
Supp. 1978)).
153. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t (1976). The Act provides for the establishment of agencies and
procedures for implementing a national health planning policy. In order to qualify for funds
under a variety of federally funded programs, a state must meet the detailed criteria of the Act.
Id. § 300m(d). One of the criteria is that the state implement a certificate of need program. Id.
§ 300m-2(a)(4)(B).
154. For a discussion of the background and rationale of certificate of need legislation, see
Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by "Certicate of Need," 59 VA. L. REv.
1143 (1973). In a typical industry, increased capital expenditures normally result from an increase
in consumer demand for the industry's goods and services. Proponents of certificate of need legis-
lation contend that the health care industry, however, is not responsive to these normal market
pressures, but that instead physicians, the suppliers of health services, primarily control the de-
mand for new and larger hospital services by determining if hospitalization is necessary, selecting
the hospital to be used, and deciding what services are needed during the hospitalization. Id. at
1162-63. See also Blumstein & Sloan, Health Planning andRegulation Through Certificate ofNeed
,4n Overview, 1978 UTAH L. REv. 3, 3-7.
155. In general, a certificate of need is required for any capital expenditure over $150,000 by
or on behalf of a health care facility. N.C. GCN. STAT. § 131-178 (Interim Supp. 1978).
156. The criteria include: (1) an area's need for the services; (2) availability of alternatives; (3)
financial feasibility and impact of the proposed services; (4) relationship of the services to the
State Health Plan (required by the federal government in order to receive federal health care
funds); and (5) availability of supporting resources, including medical personnel. Id. § 131-
18 1(a).
157. Id. § 131-187.
158. See text accompanying note 168 infra.
159. 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973).
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Constitution 6 ° because it prohibited the building of health care facili-
ties with private funds on the sole basis of a Medical Commission find-
ing of lack of need. Unconvinced that the health care industry was an
atypical industry in its response to free market competition and suspi-
cious that the statute was special interest legislation for the benefit of
existing hospitals, the court found that there was no rational relation-
ship between certificate of need legislation and the promotion of any
public good.' 6
In light of Aston Park, North Carolina in North Carolina ex rel
Morrow v. Calfano'62 challenged the constitutionality of the federal
Health Planning Act's requirement of certificate of need programs as a
prerequisite to receiving federal funds, claiming the requirement was
an unlawful federal interference with the state because it would compel
the state to amend its constitution in order to qualify for federal mon-
ies.' 63 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the district court
finding that the Act was not coercive but merely put reasonable condi-
tions on obtaining federal aid.' 64 Consequently, North Carolina was
required to enact new certificate of need legislation or lose millions of
federal dollars used to fund over forty state health care programs. 65
The new North Carolina certificate of need legislation which be-
came effective on January 1, 1979, follows generally the regulations
promulgated to implement the federal act and is much more compre-
hensive than the 1971 statute. Nevertheless, its constitutionality is
likely to be challenged. Because the state supreme court found certifi-
160. See N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 19.
161. 282 N.C. at 549-51, 193 S.E.2d at 734-35. The court held that the statute also violated the
provisions of the North Carolina Constitution that forbid exclusive emoluments and monopolies.
Id. at 551, 193 S.E.2d at 736.
162. 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977), afl'dmem., 98 S. Ct. 1597 (1978). The State sought to
enjoin the enforcement of the certificate of need requirement in the Health Planning Act.
163, Acknowledging that the federal government may attach conditions to grants when the
conditions are legitimately related to the grants' purposes, North Carolina argued that the power
to attach conditions did not extend to coercing a state either to amend its constitution or to give up
needed federal aid. Id. at 533-35. The point at which conditional federal appropriation grants
exceed the Congressional spending power and become weapons by which states can be coerced to
act in accordance with the conditions is an issue that has pervaded constitutional law. See, e.g.,
Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947); Stewart Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548 (1937).
164. 98 S. Ct. 1597 (1978). The district court, finding the certificate of need requirement to be
a reasonable condition designed to ensure that federal funds not contribute to the inflation of
health care costs, reasoned that such conditions could not be defeated by "some oddity" of a
state's constitution. 445 F. Supp. at 535. In addition, because North Carolina stood to forfeit less
than $50 million in federal aid compared with state revenues in 1974 of over $3 billion, the court
believed that the degree of coercion was exaggerated. Id.
165. 445 F. Supp. at 535.
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cate of need legislation itself to be unconstitutional, it is unlikely that it
will be able to uphold the new statute without overruling Aston Park.
There are many factors, however, that may justify overruling that deci-
sion. First, while the record in Aston Park did not adequately explain
the need for singling out the health care industry,'66 an extensive legis-
lative study'67 on the need for a certificate of need law with findings of
fact that are incorporated in the statute will make it easier to demon-
strate that the statute is a reasonable response to an important social
problem. That Congress has encouraged certificate of need legislation,
that more than two-thirds of the states have passed such laws,'68 and
that the laws have been upheld in every instance in which they have
been challenged'6 9 further emphasizes the rational basis for certificate
of need legislation. Finally, because of the complexities of the prob-
lem, the new statute is the kind of legislation for which judicial defer-
ence to a legislative judgment is appropriate. If the supreme court does
not overrule its prior decision, however, then North Carolina will be
forced to decide whether to sacrifice approximately $55 million a year
in federal funds or to amend its constitution.
H. Coastal Area Management Act
The North Carolina General Assembly in 1974 passed the Coastal
Area Management Act (CAMA), 170 designed to establish a program for
the orderly development of North Carolina's coastal area, and for the
preservation of its natural resources. t 17  Under the Act, a Coastal Re-
166. The major arguments presented to justify the certificate of need requirement were
(1) that there was a shortage of medical personnel in the area to be served by the proposed
facility that would be aggravated by the presence of another hospital and (2) that there were
costs to society involved in the construction of unnecessary hospital facilities. Brief for Appellant
at 11-12. Similar arguments, however, might apply to other industries.
167. LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON MEDICAL COST CONTAINMENT, INTERIM REPORT TO THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA, SECOND SESSION 80 (1978).
168. See Blumstein & Sloan, sufpra note 154, at 3. In addition, more than twenty of these
states had done so before the enactment of the federal Health Planning Act. See Havighurst,
supra note 154, at 1144.
169. The constitutionality of certificate of need legislation has been affirmed in four other
cases. Goodin v. Oklahoma, 436 F. Supp. 583 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Simon v. Cameron, 337 F.
Supp. 1380 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Merry Heart Nursing & Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Dougherty, 131
N.J. Super. 412, 330 A.2d 370 (1974); Attoma v. State Dep't of Social Welfare, 26 A.D.2d 12, 270
N.Y.S.2d 167 (1966).
170. Law of April 1, 1974, ch. 1284, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d. Sess. 1974,463 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-100 to -128 (1978)).
171. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-102(b) (1978). See generally Schoenbaum, The Management of
Land and Water Use in the Coastal Zone: A New Law is Enacted in North Carolina, 53 N.C.L.
REV. 275, 275-79 (1974).
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sources Commission (CRC) was established, 72 among whose duties
are the promulgation of guidelines for the development of the coastal
zone, 173 and the designation of certain "areas of environmental con-
cern" (AEC) for special protection. 74 In Adams v. North Carolina De-
partment of Natural and Economic Resources,175 the first court test of
the CAMA, the North Carolina Supreme Court found the act to be
constitutional. The court held that there had been no unlawful delega-
tion of legislative power to the CRC, and, for the first time, held that
the presence of procedural safeguards may be considered in evaluating
a delegation of power.
Plaintiffs in Adams were several landowners in two coastal coun-
ties whose lands had been designated as interim AEC's by the CRC. t76
Among other constitutional challenges, 177 plaintiff alleged that in giv-
ing the CRC the authority to promulgate guidelines for the coastal
zone, the General Assembly had unlawfully delegated legislative power
to an administrative agency. 178 In holding that there had been no un-
lawful delegation of legislative power, 179 the supreme court for the first
time explicitly recognized that one policy underlying the nondelegation
doctrine is the prevention of the arbitrary exercise of power by admin-
istrative agencies. Thus the presence of procedural safeguards is rele-
vant in evaluating a delegation of legislative power.
The nondelegation doctrine is derived from two provisions of the
172. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-104(a) (1978). The CRC consists of 15 members, at least 12 of
whom must be experienced in some activity related to the coastal zone, or in local government in
the coastal zone. Id. at § 113A-104(b). The members are all appointed by the Governor, from
among persons nominated by the boards of commissioners of coastal counties. Id. § I 13A-104(c).
173. Id. § 113A-102(b)(4).
174. Id. § I 13A-113(a). The statute lists the types of lands that may be designated as AEC's.
These include coastal wetlands, estuarine waters, fragile or historic areas, and natural hazard
AEC's in land use planning. See Schoenbaum and Silliman, Coastal Planning: The Designation
and Management of ,4reas of Critical Environmental Concern, 13 U RB. L. ANN. 15 (1977).
175. 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978).
176. Id. at 703, 249 S.E.2d at 414.
177. Plaintiffs also argued that the CAMA was a local act prohibited by N.C. CONsT. art. II,
§ 24. 295 N.C. at 689, 249 S.E.2d at 406. The court rejected this argument, holding that the
CAMA was a general law, and noted that a statute that by its terms applies only to a particular
part of the state will be considered a general law if the classification is reasonable and based on
rational distinctions related to the purposes of the statute. Id. at 691, 249 S.E.2d at 407. See this
Survey, Constitutional Law: North Carolina Constitution.
Furthermore, plaintiffs argued that the CAMA and the guidelines adopted by the CRC de-
prived them of property without due process of law, and that the CAMA authorized unconstitu-
tional warrantless searches. 295 N.C. at 702, 249 S.E.2d at 413. In each instance, the court held
that the complaints were premature, as the plaintiffs had failed to show injury resulting from
either of the alleged constitutional defects. Id. at 703-05, 249 S.E.2d at 414-15.
178. 295 N.C. at 689, 249 S.E.2d at 406.
179. Id. at 698, 249 S.E.2d at 411.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
North Carolina Constitution. Article I, section 6 provides: "The legis-
lative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government
shall be forever separate and distinct from each other." Article II, sec-
tion 1 provides: "The legislative power of the State shall be vested in
the General Assembly. . . ." The court has interpreted these provi-
sions to mean that the General Assembly may not delegate its legisla-
tive power to another branch of the government. 80 Nevertheless, it is
generally recognized today that a modern government must delegate a
certain portion of the legislative power to administrative agencies. As a
result, the real issue under the nondelegation doctrine concerns the lim-
its of a valid delegation. In the test that has been applied in North
Carolina, as well as in most other states, courts insist that a delegation
of power be accompanied by standards adequate to guide the agency in
its exercise of power.' 81
In Adams, the court explicitly recognized that the nondelegation
doctrine serves both to prevent the abdication by the legislature of its
policymaking responsibilities, and to guard against the abuse of discre-
tionary power by administrative agencies.' 82 By recognizing the policy
of curbing agency discretionary power, the court for the first time made
the presence of procedural safeguards a relevant consideration in as-
sessing the validity of a particular delegation. 8 3 Thus in addressing
the delegation to the CRC of the power to promulgate guidelines, the
court discussed both the guiding standards and procedural safeguards
supplied by the legislature.
The standards provided to guide the CRC in the promulgation of
guidelines for the coastal zone are contained primarily in the CAMA's
statement of goals;' 84 the court found additional standards in the
CAMA's statement of legislative findings,'85 and in the criteria re-
quired to be considered by the CRC in the designation of AEC's.'86
The court held these standards to be sufficiently clear to guide the CRC
180. Id. at 696, 249 S.E.2d at 410; State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Bank of Statesville, 276
N.C. 576, 589, 174 S.E.2d 551, 561 (1970); Redev. Comm'n v. Security Nat'l Bank, 252 N.C. 595,
608, 114 S.E.2d 688, 697-98 (1960).
181. See, e.g., Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway v. Coastal Turnpike Auth., 237 N.C. 52,74
S.E.2d 310 (1953). See generally 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 54-70 (1965).
182. 295 N.C. at 697-98, 249 S.E.2d at 411.
183. Id. at 698, 249 S.E.2d at 411.
184. The guidelines promulgated by the CRC must be consistent with the goals of the CAMA.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-107(a) (1978). The goals of the Act are set forth at id. § 113A-102(b).
185. 295 N.C. at 700, 249 S.E.2d at 412. These findings are set forth at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 113A-102(a) (1978).
186. 295 N.C. at 700, 249 S.E.2d at 412. These criteria are set forth at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 113A-113(b) (1978).
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in the promulgation of guidelines. The court noted that the standards
were "as specific as circumstances permit,"'18 7 and that the promulga-
tion of guidelines would require considerable expertise, which the CRC
would possess. t8
8
The court then discussed the procedural framework within which
the CRC must operate. The court found four different procedural safe-
guards for the promulgation of guidelines by the CRC: 8 9 those con-
tained within the CAMA;190 those in North Carolina's Administrative
Procedures Act (APA); t9' those provided by the Administrative Rules
Committee of the General Assembly; 9 z and those in North Carolina's
"sunset" legislation. 93 The court then held that since there were suffi-
ciently specific guiding standards and adequate procedural safeguards,
the delegation of power to the CRC was constitutional. 94
The court presented little argument or explanation for the incorpo-
ration of a procedural safeguards criterion into the nondelegation doc-
trine. It stated only that a key purpose of the guiding standards test is
to prevent arbitrary action by an administrative agency, 195 and the pro-
cedural safeguards tend to "encourage adherence to legislative stan-
dards."'196 The court then stated that it was joining the "growing trend
of authority," citing Professor Davis' Administrative Law Treatise. 197
The court was apparently referring to decisions cited by Professor Da-
vis holding that procedural safeguards should be considered in evaluat-
ing a delegation of power. These courts generally have recognized as
187. 295 N.C. at 700, 249 S.E.2d at 412 (quoting North Carolina Turnpike Auth. v. Pine Is-
land, Inc., 265 N.C. 109, 115, 143 S.E.2d 319, 323 (1965)).
188. 295 N.C. at 700-01, 249 S.E.2d at 412.
189. Id. at 701, 249 S.E.2d at 412.
190. Id. at 701, 249 S.E.2d at 413. These procedures are set forth at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-
107 (1978).
191. 295 N.C. at 702, 249 S.E.2d at 413. The court stated that amendments to the guidelines
would be subject to the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 150A-1 to -64 (1978).
192. 295 N.C. at 702, 249 S.E.2d at 413. The Administrative Rules Review Committee is a
committee of the Legislative Research Commission, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-30.26 (Supp. 1977),
which reviews agency rules to "determine whether or not the agency acted within its statutory
authority in promulgating the rule," id. § 120-30.28(a).
193. 295 N.C. at 702, 249 S.E.2d at 413. Under the "'sunset" legislation, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 143-34.10 to .21 (1978), the CAMA will be repealed as of July 1981. Id. § 143-34.12. Prior to its
termination, the CAMA will be reviewed by the Governmental Evaluation Committee, which will
recommend to the General Assembly that the Act be continued, modified, or terminated Id.
§ 143-34.16.
194. 295 N.C. at 702, 249 S.E.2d at 413.
195. Id. at 698, 249 S.E.2d at 411.
196. Id.
197. Id. (citing 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 210 (2d. ed. 1978)).
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underlying the nondelegation doctrine the same policies noted by the
court in Adams.'"8
While the court did not cite any North Carolina authority, the
adoption of a procedural safeguards criterion is consistent with North
Carolina case law. Although the court has never before explicitly ac-
knowledged that a purpose of the nondelegation doctrine is to prevent
arbitrary administrative action, that had been a significant factor in
some cases. 199 With this explicitly stated policy behind the doctrine,
any factors that may limit the ability of administrative agencies to act
in an arbitrary manner become relevant. Procedural safeguards are
probably the most effective restriction on the discretionary power of
administrative agencies."
The court's decision in Adams should provide some guidance to
the legislature in the drafting of future statutes. If the legislature be-
lieves that a broad delegation of power to an administrative agency is
appropriate in a given situation, that delegation should be accompa-
nied by procedural safeguards. It seems clear after Adams that such a
delegation is more likely to survive a constitutional attack if so drawn.
This position is appropriate, since there is a greater potential for arbi-
trary action by an administrative agency when the delegation is broad,
198. See, e.g., William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 213, 346
A.2d 269, 291 (1975); Jennings v. Exeter-West Greenwich Regional School Dist. Comm., 116 R.I.
90, 98-99, 352 A.2d 634, 638-39 (1976).
199. See, e.g., Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway v. Coastal Turnpike Auth., 237 N.C. 52,74
S.E.2d 310 (1953). The court held invalid a delegation of power to the Municipal Board of Con-
trol. The General Assembly had authorized this agency to organize a municipal corporation to
construct a toll road if it determined the road to be "in the public interest." Id. at 56, 74 S.E.2d at
313. The court held that "the power to determine whether the construction ... of a toll road...
will be 'in the public interest' is purely a legislative question to be resolved only in the exercise or
under the direction of legislative powers of guidance and control." Id. at 63, 74 S.E.2d at 315.
The court also noted that the statute attempted to "clothe the members of this administrative
agency with apparent power in their unguided discretion to give or withhold the benefits of the
law in any given case or cases." Id.
For other cases in which the court has apparently been concerned about the abuse of discre-
tionary power by administrative agencies, see State v. Williams, 253 N.C. 337, 117 S.E.2d 444
(1960)(statute requiring that persons soliciting students for schools be licensed because issuance of
license in given situation depended on "unlimited discretion of the administrative body" held
invalid) and Harvell v. Scheidt, 249 N.C. 699, 107 S.E.2d 549 (1959)(delegation to Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles of power to revoke license of any person who was a "habitual violator of the
traffic laws" held unlawful). Other factors appear to have influenced the court in various cases. It
has been suggested that the court will permit a broader delegation of authority when the delega-
tion is to a body with expertise in the subject matter of the delegation. Glenn, The Coastal.4rea
Management Act in the Courts: 4 Preliminary 4nalysis, 53 N.C.L. REv. 303, 319 (1974). In addi-
tion, it seems fairly clear that the court will not insist on more detailed standards than is practica-
ble. In North Carolina Turnpike Auth. v. Pine Island, Inc., 265 N.C. 109, 143 S.E.2d 319 (1965),
the court approved a delegation of power for which the legislature had provided standards that
were "as specific as the circumstances permit."
200. See 1 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 214-15 (2d ed. 1978).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [
and the need for safeguards is greater.2"'
It is also possible, as a result of the decision in Adams, that it will
be more difficult for a constitutional attack based on the delegation
doctrine to succeed. Two of the procedural safeguards the court found
significant, the APA and the Administrative Rules Review Committee,
are presumably of general applicability. The "sunset" legislation also
may be applicable if new statutes are brought under it. These will pro-
vide some procedural safeguards and some legislative oversight of any
new delegation of power, in addition to whatever standards and safe-
guards might accompany the delegation. These factors certainly would
not preclude a successful constitutional attack, but may make one less
likely.
Z Professional Responsibility and Administration of Justice
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States,202 a suit arising
out of a 1974 Eastern Airlines plane crash in Charlotte, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered the question
of when an attorney may represent multiple defendants without violat-
ing the Code of Professional Responsibility of the North Carolina State
Bar. Plaintiffs, having paid claims based on the crash, brought suit in
federal district court203 as subrogees against the United States under
the Federal Tort Claims Act and against four air traffic controllers, em-
ployees of the Federal Aviation Administration, claiming that defend-
ants negligently caused the crash. All defendants were represented by
counsel provided by the United States Department of Justice and by
the United States attorney. On plaintiffs' motion, the district judge dis-
qualified government counsel from representing the air traffic control-
lers. The court found an irreconcilable conflict of interest in the
multiple representation in violation of Disciplinary Rule 5-105(B), 204
201. See City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290, 299 371 N.Y.S.2d 404
(1975).
202. 570 F.2d 1197 (4th Cir. 1978).
203. 438 F. Supp. 886 (W.D.N.C. 1977), rev'd, 570 F.2d 1197 (4th Cir. 1978).
204. NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY DR 5-105(B) provides: "A
lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his independent professional
judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by his representation of
another client, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C)." DR 5-105(C) permits multiple
representation "if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each
consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on
the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of each." Id. EC 5-15 provides,
in pertinent part: "A lawyer should never represent in litigation multiple clients with conflicting
interests and there are few situations in which he would be justified in representing in litigation
multiple clients with potentially conflicting interests."
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which prohibits multiple representation when the attorney's independ-
ent professional judgment in behalf of one client will or is likely to be
impaired by his representation of another client. The court of appeals
reversed, however, finding that defendant's attorneys had met the dual
requirements of DR 5-105(C), which allows an attorney to represent
multiple clients "if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the
interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full dis-
closure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of
his independent professional judgment on behalf of each."2 5
The significance of Aetna lies not in the courts' disagreement over
the applicability of DR 5-105(C),2 °6 but in the scope of review used by
the court of appeals and in the court's consideration of factors not ex-
pressly mentioned in the disciplinary rules. The court declined to limit
the scope of its review to determining whether the district court had
abused its discretion. Following the lead of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, it asserted that it would inquire, "'in [a
case] where the facts are not in dispute, . . . whether the District
Court's disqualification order was predicated upon a proper under-
standing of applicable ethical principles.'"207 This scope of review
would give little deference to the district court opinion.
In its inquiry under this broad scope of review, the court consid-
205. Id. DR 5-105(C).
206. The district court declined to presume that a client's consent could be fully informed
when procured without the advice of a lawyer with no conflict of interest. 438 F. Supp. 886, 888
(W.D.N.C. 1977). The court held that the second requirement of DR 5-105(C), that the attorney
have an "obvious" ability to represent adequately each defendant's interest, was not met because
of the possibility that each defendant might wish to avoid liability by suggesting that one or more
of his codefendants was responsible, to the exclusion of himself. Id. at 887-88. The district court
was also concerned about the possible liability of individual defendants for damages, should they
be found negligent. Md. at 889. Regarding the other defendant, the government, the district court
expressed concern about the right of taxpayers to be represented by a district attorney or attorney
general whose loyalty is not clouded by possible conflicting claims or rights of the controllers
themselves. Id. at 888.
The court of appeals found no authority to support the district court's theory regarding in-
formed consent. It noted that, in any event, counsel for the air controllers' union had participated
in discussions between the individual defendants and the Department of Justice; the court thought
it "reasonable to assume that he was aware of any problems and properly advised the controllers
with respect to their best interests." 570 F.2d at 1202. In rejecting as conjecture the district court's
concern about possible conflicts of interest among the codefendants, the court stressed the assur-
ance by Government counsel that there was no dispute among defendants with respect to the
duties of the controllers or the details of the plane crash. Id. at 1201. Concerning the individual
liability of defendants, the court concluded there was "little or no possibility . . . of personal
liability." Id. The issue of scope of employment was conceded, so a finding of negligence against
the air controllers would be imputed to the Government. A finding ofjoint liability would bar the
entry of any contemporaneous or subsequent judgment against the air controllers. Id.
207. 570 F.2d at 1200 (quoting Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir.
1976)).
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ered several factors in addition to the considerations set out in the disci-
plinary rules. First, the court noted the advantage to the air traffic
controllers of representation by Government counsel with access to
"the reservoir of the Government's expertise. '20 8 Also of considerable
concern to the court was the increasing number of motions to disqual-
ify upon "alleged ethical grounds. '20 9  The court suspected that in
moving to disqualify, plaintiff was motivated "more by [an apparent]
desire to fragmentize the defense than by any sensitivity to the ethical
considerations involved. 21 0
This approach to disqualification on ethical grounds has also been
taken by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which rejected
"'a mechanical and didactic application of the [Disciplinary] Code to
all situations,' "211 and by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
which stated: "A court should be conscious of its responsibility to pre-
serve a reasonable balance between the need to ensure ethical conduct
on the part of lawyers. . . and other social interests, which include the
litigant's right to freely chosen counsel. ' 21 2 By considering factors in
addition to those explicitly the concern of the Code, rigid application of
the disciplinary rules leading to an excessive number of disqualifica-
tions can be avoided. The adoption by the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit of a similarly broad approach should lead to an increas-
ing number of denials of motions to disqualify.
208. Id. at 1202. The court referred also to the "burden upon [the air traffic controllers'] time
and resources incident to the employment of independent counsel." Id. Whether there would
also be a financial burden is not clear. The district court quoted from a Justice Department policy
statement, which stated the Department's intent to "'[play for representation by a private attorney
when several employees, otherwise entitled to representation by the Department, have sufficiently
conflicting interests which in the Department's view preclude representation of each of them by
the Department.'" 438 F. Supp. 886, 890 (W.D.N.C. 1977)(quoting United States Department of
Justice, STATEMENTS OF POLICY: Order No. 683-77 (Jan. 19, 1977)).
209. 570 F.2d at 1202; f Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 819 (5th Cir. 1976)
("Inasmuch as attempts to disqualify opposing counsel are becoming increasingly frequent, we
cannot permit Canon 9 (prohibiting conduct which gives the appearance of impropriety) to be
manipulated for strategic advantage on the account of an impropriety which exists only in the
minds of imaginative lawyers.").
210. 570 F.2d at 1201 n.7. The court also distinguished Canon 4 (preserving confidences and
secrets of a client), which protects the rights of both adversaries in the litigation and provides
firmer ground for a motion to disqualify opposing counsel, from Canon 5 (exercise of independent
professional judgment on behalf of client), which is addressed solely to the relationship between
the attorney and his immediate clients. Id.
211. International Elecs. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1293 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting Amicus
Curiae Brief of the Connecticut Bar Association).
212. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976). The district court
in Aetna had asserted that the ethical principles involved should be considered without regard to
other factors, such as the cost to taxpayers or individuals of private counsel for individual defend-
ants. 438 F. Supp. 886, 889 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
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The North Carolina Court of Appeals considered Aetna's implica-
tions in Swenson v. Thibaut,z1 3 a shareholders' derivative suit in which
defendant moved to disqualify plaintiff's attorney on the basis of al-
leged violations of canons two, four, five and nine."I4 The trial judge
denied these motions. On appeal, defendant, citing Aetna, urged the
court of appeals to look beyond a possible abuse of discretion, and con-
sider whether the trial judge had correctly applied ethical principles to
the evidence before him.2 1 5 The court of appeals interpreted this sug-
gestion as "placing this Court in the position of functionally sitting as a
court of original jurisdiction to consider these ethical questions without
reference or deference to the proceedings below."216 The court ex-
pressed reluctance to follow what it perceived to be the Aetna ap-
proach, indicating that it would not ignore or give only minimal
deference to the trial judge's findings and conclusions in reference to
the ethical questions.21 7 In affirming the trial judge's decisions, how-
ever, the court sounded as if it were applying theAetna scope of review:
"The rulings of the trial judge, upon the evidence before him, are in
complete agreement with the conclusions we reach.upon the same evi-
dence .... ,,218 This language suggests that the court of appeals will
not defer in cases in which it reaches different conclusions from those
of the trial judge.
The Swenson court was more clearly in agreement with the Aetna
court regarding the consideration on a motion to disqualify of practical
factors in addition to the conflict of interest concerns of the disciplinary
rules. It asserted that "the court's inherent power is not limited or
bound by the technical precepts contained in the Code of Professional
Responsibility as administered by the Bar. 219
While the question whether a strict or flexible approach to motions
to disqualify will be followed in North Carolina seems settled at the
court of appeals level by Swenson, the question of the scope of judicial
review may have to await a case in which the court of appeals disagrees
213. 39 N.C. App. 77, 250 S.E.2d 279 (1978).
214. NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 2 (improper solicita-
tion); id. Canon 4 (breach of the confidential attorney-client relationship); id. Canon 5 (improper
interest in the subject matter of the litigation); id. Canon 9 (appearance of professional
impropriety).
215. 39 N.C. App. at 108, 250 S.E.2d at 299.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 109, 250 S.E.2d at 299.
218. Id. at 114, 250 S.E.2d at 302.
219. Id. at 109, 250 S.E.2d at 299.
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with a trial court decision on a motion to disqualify, and must clarify
its holding in Swenson.
Several 1978 North Carolina cases concerned the power of the
courts to discipline attorneys. In In re Palmer,220 a superior court hear-
ing had resulted in a dismissal of a disbarment proceeding against at-
torney Palmer. The attorney general petitioned the court of appeals for
a writ of certiorari to review the dismissal, and the writ was granted.
The court of appeals subsequently found the grant of the writ to have
been improvident on the ground that since G.S. 84-28(h)2 ' precludes
appeal by the State, to grant review on petition for certiorari would be
"to allow by indirect means that which is forbidden by direct
means." 222 The supreme court reversed, holding that by virtue of the
appellate courts' supervisory powers, the State could seek review by
writ of certiorari of judicial disciplinary proceedings.223
Orders suspending the licenses of attorneys for failure to perfect
appeals were vacated in In re Robinson224 and In re Dale.225 In both
cases the court of appeals found that the superior court judge may have
prejudged the attorneys' conduct before hearing any evidence.226
Rather than dismissing the charges or remanding for a new hearing,
however, the court decided to hold the rehearings itself, in the exercise
of its inherent power to discipline attorneys.227 On rehearing both
220. 37 N.C. App. 220, 245 S.E.2d 791 (1978), rep'd, 296 N.C. 638, 252 S.E.2d 784 (1979).
221. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-28(h) (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides for an appeal of right for attor-
neys from an adverse decision, but excludes any mention of the State. Law of April 3, 1933, ch.
210, § 1I, 1933 N.C. Pub. Laws 313 (formerly codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. 84-28(3)(f)
(1975))(amended 1975), provided a right of appeal for both parties in a disciplinary proceeding
against an attorney.
222. 37 N.C. App. at 222, 245 S.E.2d at 793.
223. 296 N.C. 638, 646, 252 S.E.2d 784, 789 (1979).
224. 37 N.C. App. 671, 247 S.E.2d 241 (1978).
225. 37 N.C. App. 680, 247 S.E.2d 246 (1978).
In an address by Harold A. Coley, Jr., counsel to the North Carolina State Bar, to a class in
professional responsibility at the University of North Carolina School of Law (January 25, 1979),
Mr. Coley stated that the largest category of complaints received by his office against practicing
attorneys concerns failure to appear in court and failure to perfect appeals.
226. In his Specifications of Charges No. I, Judge Snepp used the words "negligently and
willfully" in characterizing the alleged conduct of attorney Robinson, 37 N.C. App. at 678, 247
S.E.2d at 245, and the word "negligently" in the specification regarding attorney Dale, 37 N.C.
App. at 681, 247 S.E.2d at 247. Speculating that Judge Snepp's "unfortunate and inappropriate
choice of words came from the idea of necessity for specific allegations in a third party complaint,
rather than from bias or prejudice," 37 N.C. App. at 684, 247 S.E.2d at 249, the court nevertheless
concluded in both cases that it could not allow the orders to stand. 37 N.C. App. at 678, 247
S.E.2d at 246; 37 N.C. App. at 684, 247 S.E.2d at 249.
227. 37 N.C. App. at 679, 247 S.E.2d at 246; 37 N.C. App. at 685, 247 S.E.2d at 249. Judge
Britt, concurring in the Dale result, questioned the power of the court to suspend or disbar an
attorney. Id. at 686, 247 S.E.2d at 250 (concurring opinion).
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Robinson and Dale were suspended from the practice of law.228
In In re Hardy,229 the North Carolina Supreme Court stated in
dictum that it had the power to go beyond a Judicial Standards Com-
mission (JSC) recommendation and order removal of a judge for whom
the JSC had recommended censure. In Hardy, however, the court de-
clined to exercise its newly stated power and followed the JSC recom-
mendation of censure.230 The court based its assertion of power upon
its construction of the Judicial Standards Commission Act, which pro-
vides in pertinent part: "The Supreme Court may approve the recom-
mendation [of the JSC], remand for further proceedings, or reject the
recommendation." 23 ' Construing the Judicial Standards Commission
Act in light of the presumed legislative intent, the court read the op-
tions in the statute as permissive, authorizing the court, unfettered in its
adjudication by the recommendation of the JSC, not only to reject the
recommendation but to make whatever final judgment it deemed
proper.232
The majority's broad interpretation of the statute was answered
with a strong dissent by Justice Lake.233 Justice Lake deemed the ma-
jority's interpretation "a distortion of the plain language of the stat-
ute"'234 and disagreed with the court's characterization of the JSC as
"'[a]n arm of this Court,' "235 describing it instead as an independent
228. In re Dale, 39 N.C. App. 370, 372, 250 S.E.2d 82 (1979); In re Robinson, 39 N.C. App.
345, 349, 250 S.E.2d 79, 82 (1979). Both attorneys were found to have violated NORTH CAROLINA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A), which prohibits lawyers from handling
legal matters that they are not competent to handle, or handling legal matters without adequate
preparation, or neglecting legal matters entrusted to them. Dale was suspended for 90 days and
Robinson for 12 months from practice before the Courts of the Appellate Division and for 6
months from practice in criminal cases.
229. 294 N.C. 90, 240 S.E.2d 367 (1978).
230. Judge Hardy was found to have entered and altered traffic court judgments without the
knowledge or consent of the prosecuting attorney. The court found this case to be similar to three
earlier judicial misconduct cases, and concluded that fairness required a similar result. Id. at 98,
240 S.E.2d at 273.
231. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-377(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
232. 294 N.C. at 97, 240 S.E.2d at 372. The court cited, in support of its holding, decisions
from other jurisdictions that have considered the question: In re Robson, 500 P.2d 657 (Alas.
1972); Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 13 Cal. 3d 778, 532 P.2d 1209, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 841 (1975); Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal. 3d 270, 515 P.2d 1, 110
Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973); In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1970); In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 304 A.2d
587 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974).
233. 249 N.C. at 98, 240 S.E.2d at 373 (dissenting opinion). Justices Branch and Moore joined
the dissent. Justice Lake had dissented from earlier judicial discipline cases, questioning the con-
stitutionality of the statutes creating the JSC. In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 252, 237 S.E.2d 246, 237
(1977) (dissenting opinion); In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597, 605, 223 S.E.2d 822, 827 (1975) (dis-
senting opinion).
234. 294 N.C. at 103, 240 S.E.2d at 376 (dissenting opinion).
235. Id. at 104, 240 S.E.2d at 376 (quoting majority opinion, id. at 97, 240 S.E.2d at 372).
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body created by the legislature.236 According to his dissent the only
function of the supreme court in the procedure is to act as a check and
restraint upon the JSC.237 Under the majority's view, Justice Lake ob-
served, four supreme court judges could remove from office a judge
whom the JSC and the other three supreme court judges thought de-
served no more than censure.238
In re Martin,239 the next judicial misconduct case considered by
the court, presented the court with a challenge to its jurisdiction over
the censure and removal of judges. In 1971, a constitutional amend-
236. Id., 240 S.E.2d at 376.
237. Id. Responding to the majority's statement that other jurisdictions support its conclu-
sion, the dissent maintained that such decisions are less helpful in interpreting statutes than in
resolving questions of common law. Id. at 100, 240 S.E.2d at 374. When the statutory or constitu-
tional language is almost identical in the two jurisdictions, however, a decision from the foreign
jurisdiction interpreting that language can be helpful. An Alaska constitutional amendment pro-
vides that "a justice or judge may be disqualified from acting as such and may be suspended,
removed from office, retired, or censured by the supreme court upon recommendation of the
[Commission on Judicial Qualifications]." ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 10. This language closely
parallels the language of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-376 (Cum Supp. 1977). The Alaska court, in
deciding to publicly censure a judge whom the Commission had recommended be privately repri-
manded, considered that it would be "tantamount to an abdication of our constitutional and statu-
tory obligations if we were to automatically adopt the commission's sanction recommendations."
In re Robson, 500 P.2d 657, 660 (Alas. 1972).
The Maryland Supreme Court decided, four to three, to remove from office ajudge whom the
Commission on Judicial Disabilities had recommended be censured. In re Diener, 268 Md. 659,
304 A.2d 587 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974). The Maryland constitutional amendment
that established the procedure provides: "Upon any recommendation of the Commission, the
Court of Appeals, after a hearing and upon a finding of misconduct. . . may remove the judge
from office or may censure [him]. . . ." CONSTITUTION OF MARYLAND, art. IV, § 4B(b). Al-
though this grant of authority, mandating a second hearing by the court of appeals, seems even
broader than the grants to the Alaska and North Carolina courts, a strong dissent viewed a recom-
mendation for removal as a condition precedent to an order of removal by the court. 268 Md. at
697, 304 A.2d at 607 (Smith, J., dissenting).
238. 294 N.C. at 100, 240 S.E.2d at 374 (Lake, J., dissenting).
239. 295 N.C. 291, 245 S.E.2d 766 (1978). The Martin court, unlike the court in Hardy, did
substitute its judgment for that of the JSC. As the court decided to censure a judge whom the JSC
had recommended be removed, however, the effect of the court's possibly exceeding its power was
not as profound as it would be were the court to reject censure in favor of removal.
The court adopted the findings of the JSC regarding several charges ofex parte disposition of
cases by the judge. Id. at 305-06, 245 S.E.2d at 773-74. Characterizing the judge's conduct in
these matters as strikingly similar to, but no more indiscreet than, the judicial misconduct that
resulted in censure in previous cases, the court cited its conclusion in Hardy that "'fairness re-
quires a similar result here.'" Id. at 306, 245 S.E.2d at 775 (quoting In re Hardy, 294 N.C. at 98,
240 S.E.2d at 373). Concerning the most serious charge, which amounted to suborning perjury,
the court rejected the JSC's findings as unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 307,
245 S.E.2d at 775. The JSC found as a fact that Judge Martin had requested a police officer to
testify under oath that he was not present when a breathalyzer test was administered, although
Judge Martin knew the officer was present. Id. at 295, 245 S.E.2d at 769. The court found the
evidence on this charge to be in sharp conflict. An attorney for the charged party, who was pres-
ent during the encounter between Judge Martin and the police officer, gave testimony before the
JSC tending to show that Judge Martin merely meant to inform the officer that he could not, as an
arresting officer, testify to breathalyzer results. Id. at 307-08, 245 S.E.2d at 776.
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ment was proposed that mandated the creation of a new procedure for
judicial discipline,24 but did not expressly provide for jurisdiction in
the supreme court. Seventeen months before the ratification of the con-
stitutional amendment, the Judicial Standards Commission Act was
passed, which does provide for enforcement of judicial discipline by the
supreme court. Appellant in Martin challenged the jurisdiction of the
court on the ground that because the legislature is not authorized by
the North Carolina Constitution24' to confer appellate jurisdiction on
the supreme court, but rather jurisdiction is conferred directly by the
constitution, there was no constitutional basis for the jurisdiction. The
court nevertheless claimed jurisdiction based upon the "clear implica-
tio" 242 of the new amendment, and upon the Judicial Standards Com-
mission Act.243 The court asserted that ratification of the amendment
with knowledge of the passage of the Act carried with it an expression
of the will of the people that the jurisdiction be conferred. 2 "
240. N.C. CONsT. art. IV, § 17(2) provides in pertinent part: "The General Assembly shall
prescribe a procedure, in addition to impeachment and address set forth in this section, for the
removal of a Justice or Judge ....
241. Id. § 12(1) provides that "Itihe supreme court shall have jurisdiction to review upon ap-
peal any decision of the courts below ...." See also Note, Judicial Disciplne-The North Caro-
lina Commission System, 54 N.C.L. Rav. 1074 (1976).
242. 295 N.C. at 299, 245 S.E.2d at 771.
243. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-376 (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides in pertinent part: "Upon recom-
mendation of the Commission, the Supreme Court may censure or remove any justice or judge for
wilful misconduct in office ....
244. 295 N.C. at 300, 245 S.E.2d at 771. "The effective date of the Act, however, was made
contingent upon the ratification of the amendment . Id.; see Law of June 14, 1971, ch. 560,
§ 3, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 488.
The court buttressed its conclusion with the observation that "it seems both appropriate and
in accordance with the constitutional plan that the Supreme Court, to which the Constitution gives
'general supervision and control over the proceedings of the other courts' should also have final
jurisdiction over the censure and removal ofjudges and justices." 295 N.C. at 299-300, 245 S.E.2d
at 771 (quoting N.C. CONsT. art. IV, § 12(1)).
The court's position does not adequately answer the argument that jurisdiction has not been
conferred by the constitution and cannot be conferred by statute. It has been suggested that the
court may have implicitly determined that the 1972 amendment "overrode" the jurisdiction limi-
tation of article IV, § 12(1), which grants the supreme court jurisdiction to hear only decisions of
courts. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12(1), quoted in note 241 supra; see Note, Judicial Discline-The
Power of the North Carolina Supreme Court to Remove State Judges-In re Hardy, 14 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1187, 1203 n.105 (1978). As the 1972 amendment does not explicitly confer juris-
diction, however, this argument depends upon the court's "will of the people" premise. It is argu-
able that the voters in ratifying the amendment were not thinking of the contingent enactment of
the Judicial Standards Commission Act assigning jurisdiction to the supreme court, but were
merely favoring the creation of a new procedure for judicial discipline. Had the amendment





In two cases involving the ratemaking powers of the Commis-
sioner of Insurance, the supreme court and the court of appeals reaf-
firmed the necessity for administrative agencies to follow statutory
requirements regarding ratemaking. State ex rel Commissioner of In-
surance v. North Carolina Automobile Rate Administrative Office24 in-
volved motorcycle insurance rates set by the Commissioner pursuant to
the enactment in 1975 of G.S. 58-30.3, .4,246 a new classification system
for motor vehicle insurance that prohibits classifications of drivers on
the basis of age or sex. The Commissioner set two rates for motorcycle
insurance based solely on the size of the engine. 47 These rates were
challenged by the Automobile Rate Administrative Office, which
claimed that under the new statute motorcycles were intended to be
classified according to primary use and subclassified according to the
driving experience of the insured, in the same manner as
automobiles. 248
The Commissioner defended the new rates on the ground that the
legislature had in its 1975 enactment implicitly removed motorcycles
from the general classification system of G.S. 58-30.4.249 This argu-
ment was rejected by the court,250 which noted that any doubt that may
have existed about the legislature's intent in 1975 had been removed by
the enactment in 1977 of an amendment to Chapter 58 of the General
Statutes25' that makes clear that motorcycles are to be classified and
subclassified in the same manner as automobiles for insurance
ratemaking purposes. 252 The court took note of the evidence presented
245. 294 N.C. 60, 241 S.E.2d 324 (1978).
246. Law of June 18, 1975, ch. 666, § 1, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 808 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-30.3, .4 (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
247. Before the enactment of§ 58-30.3, .4, the Commissioner had attempted to set new motor-
cycle insurance rates in which all classification and subclassification plans were abolished. The
court of appeals found this conduct to be in excess of his statutory authority. State exrel. Comm'r
of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Administrative Office, 24 N.C. App. 223, 210 S.E.2d 441
(1974), cert. denied, 286 N.C. 412, 211 S.E.2d 801 (1975).
248. 294 N.C. at 63, 241 S.E.2d at 326.
249. The Commissioner's claim was based on his assertion that when H. 28, N.C. Gen. Assem-
bly, 1977 Sess., was initially introduced the word "motorcycles" appeared in that portion of the
bill that later was codified as § 58-30.4. When the bill ultimately was enacted, however, the word
"motorcycles" was deleted from that portion of the bill. See 294 N.C. at 64-65, 241 S.E.2d at 327.
250. See 294 N.C. at 67, 241 S.E.2d at 329.
251. Law of June 30, 1977, ch. 828, § 2, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1119 (codified in scattered
sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-131.35 (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
252. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-131.35 (Cum. Supp. 1977) included motorcycles in its definition of
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by the Commissioner that premiums for motorcycle liability insurance
are higher than they should be, and invited him to institute proper pro-
ceedings to reduce the rates, admonishing him that this could not be
done by "unlawfully abolishing classifications and subclassifications
which are required by statute." '253
The issue of the date of effectiveness of revised automobile medi-
cal payments insurance rates was addressed by the court of appeals in
North Carolina Automobile Rate Administrative Office v. Ingram.25 4 In
1971, the Rate Office had filed with former Commissioner Lanier a
proposed rate reduction in medical insurance premium rates. 5  No ac-
tion was taken on the proposal until 1974, when Commissioner Ingram
approved the reduction. He attempted, however, to put the rate change
into effect immediately,256 rather than sixty days after the change was
announced, as is the standard practice. 7 The court of appeals sus-
tained the Rate Office's challenge of the Commissioner's conduct, find-
ing the Commissioner to be statutorily precluded from changing the
sixty-day rule that had been adopted by the Governing Committee of
the Rate Office without first giving notice, conducting a hearing, and
taking evidence s.2 5  As the proper rulemaking procedures had not been
private passenger motor vehicles. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-30.4 lists the classifications (including
primary use classifications) and subclassifications (including safe driver subclassifications) that are
to be observed regarding coverage of private passenger motor vehicles. This portion of § 58-30.4
was not affected by the 1977 amendments.
Before passage of either of the legislative enactments discussed here, the court of appeals had
held that "automobile" liability insurance includes "motorcycle" liability insurance and that the
same laws apply to both. State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Administra-
tive Office, 24 N.C. App. 223, 226, 210 S.E.2d 441, 443 (1974), cert denied, 286 N.C. 412, 211
S.E.2d 801 (1975).
253. 294 N.C. at 72, 241 S.E.2d at 332.
254. 35 N.C. App. 578, 242 S.E.2d 205 (1978).
255. Because of the similarity in the type of hazard, medical payments insurance premium
rates are determined by reference to bodily injury insurance rates. Although the Rate Office had
filed with the Commissioner's office proposed revisions in bodily injury liability insurance rates,
which were approved in December 1972, the medical insurance premium rates had never been
approved. Id. at 578-79, 242 S.E.2d at 205-06.
256. Id. at 579-80, 242 S.E.2d at 206.
257. Id. at 582, 242 S.E.2d at 207.
If a policy is issued no more than sixty days prior to its effective date, the standard rule of
application generally eliminates the necessity of rewriting or reissuing the policy by per-
mitting the policy to go into effect at its old rate unless the policyholder requests other-
wise. This rule has the effect of protecting the policyholder from insurance rate increases
occurring after the policy is issued if the policy is issued no more than sixty days prior to
its effective date, but it permits the policyholder, if he so requests, to take advantage of
rate decreases occurring after the policy is issued but before the policy's effective date.
Id.
258. Id. at 587, 242 S.E.2d at 210. The court did not identify the relevant statute, but appar-
ently the reference was to § 58-246(1), which assigned to the Rate Office the function of maintain-
ing rules and regulations and fixing rates for automobile bodily injury insurance. Law of April 4,
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followed, the court found the Commissioner's order to be arbitrary and
capricious, and affirmed the superior court in setting it aside.25 9
2. Construction of Policy Terms
In Woods v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. ,26 the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court for the first time showed a willingness to find some
ambiguity in an "apply separately" clause in an insurance policy cover-
ing two or more automobiles, and thereby permit stacking, or pyramid-
ing (multiplying the liability limitation in a policy by the number of
cars covered). When stacking is recognized, a policy with a $1000 med-
ical payments limitation on each of three cars could result in a $3000
claim on a single injury.261 Most jurisdictions recognize stacking of
medical payment insurance when the named insured owns two or more
vehicles, both covered under the same policy. 262 The policy reasons for
stacking include the special purpose of medical payments insurance,
which is to provide a ready fund for the insured without the require-
ment of establishing fault,2 63 and the prevailing rule of resolving any
ambiguous language in the policy in favor of the insured.2"
In a 1970 split decision, Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester
Fire Insurance Co. ,265 the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed a
court of appeals decision that had interpreted the "apply separately"
provision in a multiple-automobile liability insurance policy to allow
the insured to stack his medical payments coverage. Justice Sharp
joined Chief Justice Bobbitt in dissent, agreeing with the court of ap-
peals that the double payment of premiums implied a separate contract
on each insured automobile, with consideration owing from the insurer
1939, ch. 394, 1939 N.C. Pub. Laws 859 (formerly codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-
246(1) (1975)) (repealed 1977).
259. 35 N.C. App. at 588, 242 S.E.2d at 211.
A third case, State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. Motors Ins. Corp., 294 N.C. 360, 241 S.E.2d 332
(1978), was dismissed as moot by the supreme court. This appeal was from a 1975 order of the
Commissioner revising auto collision insurance rates. Since the order had never become effective
because of pending appeals, the new statute and a comprehensive order approving new liability
and collision rates mooted the questions raised on the appeal.
260. 295 N.C. 500, 246 S.E.2d 773 (1978).
261. A single insurance policy on two or more automobiles often contains a clause stating that
the terms of the policy shall "apply separately" to each automobile. The premiums paid reflect
the number of cars covered.
262. See Note, Insurance-Pyramiding Medical Payment Coverages in Automobile Policies, 10
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 737 (1974).
263. Id See also Dyer v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 276 So.2d 6, 7 (Fla. 1973); Jackson v.
Country Mut. Ins. Co., 41 111. App. 2d 300, 305, 190 N.E.2d 490, 492 (1963).
264. See, e.g., Duke v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 286 N.C. 244, 210 S.E.2d 187 (1974).
265. 276 N.C. 348, 172 S.E.2d 518 (1970).
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on each contract.2 66 In Woods the supreme court, in an opinion written
by Chief Justice Sharp, softened the position it had taken in Wachovia.
Two insurance policies were at issue in Woods, each with an "apply
separately" provision. Plaintiff Woods was injured while driving a car
belonging to one Spencer, who carried on his three cars a policy almost
identical to the one construed in Wachovia.267 The court did not allow
stacking under the Spencer policy, reasoning that even if the independ-
ent contract interpretation argued in Wachovia had been accepted, it
would not apply to this policy, because the coverage-limiting clause
referred to injuries to persons "while occupying the owned automo-
bile." The court pointed out that this language unambiguously limits
the coverage to a specific vehicle-the owned automobile occupied at
the time of the collision.268
The second policy was carried by plaintiff Woods' father on two
cars. Under her father's policy, however, plaintiff as a member of the
"named insured's" family was entitled to medical payments for bodily
injury "caused by accident while occupying or being struck by an auto-
mobile. '269 Another clause limited the insurer's liability to $500 per
person, creating an ambiguity that, under its usual practice, 70 the court
resolved against the insurer. Since coverage was not tied to a specific
vehicle, the court allowed stacking under the Woods policy, resulting in
an additional $500 recovery. The court carefully distinguished Wacho-
via as a situation in which the policy tied coverage even of family
members to the specific, occupied car.27'
Policy language so poorly drafted that Justice Lake termed it a
"baffling mystery" led the supreme court to reverse a court of appeals
dismissal of plaintiff's claim in Grant v. Emmco Insurance Co. 272 Plain-
tiff claimed coverage of a leased tractor under a "newly acquired" vehi-
cles provision in an insurance policy covering an owned tractor.
Policies extending coverage to "newly acquired" vehicles that replace
the vehicle named in a policy generally require that the new vehicles be
"owned," which in North Carolina requires a properly executed certifi-
cate of title.273 Plaintifi's policy, however, did not require that the
266. Id. at 361, 172 S.E.2d at 527 (Bobbitt, CJ., dissenting).
267. 295 N.C. at 506, 246 S.E.2d at 777-78.
268. Id. at 507-08, 246 S.E.2d at 778.
269. Id. at 508, 246 S.E.2d at 779 (emphasis by court).
270. See, e.g., Duke v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 286 N.C. 244, 210 S.E.2d 187 (1974).
271. 295 N.C. at 510, 246 S.E.2d at 780.
272. 295 N.C. 39, 44, 243 S.E.2d 894, 898 (1978).
273. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hayes, 276 N.C. 620, 174 S.E.2d 511 (1970).
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newly acquired vehicle be owned; because of this silence about leased
vehicles, the court found that the tractor came within the meaning of
"newly acquired." But, the policy language was ambiguous about
whether the newly acquired vehicle, to be covered, had to replace the
described vehicle. Although the court could simply have construed this
ambiguity against the insurer and found that replacement was not re-
quired, it addressed defendant's argument that the leased tractor did
not replace the described tractor and was therefore not covered. This
argument had convinced two of three judges on the court of appeals.2 74
The supreme court, recalling its frequently cited decision in State Farm
MutualAutomobile Insurance Co. v. Shaffer, 75 applied the rule of that
case to the Grant facts. Under Shaffer, replacement cannot be found if
the described vehicle continues to be owned by the policyholder, under
his control and in operable condition;276 the absence of one of these
factors allows a finding that the described vehicle has been replaced.
The described tractor, although still owned by and under the control of
Grant, was undergoing repairs and was not in operable condition dur-
ing the lease term of the tractor. It therefore did not fall afoul of the
Shaffer rule.277
3. Construction of Statutory Provisions
In Caison v. Nationwide Insurance Co. ,278 the court of appeals con-
sidered whether the term "permission," as used in an insurance policy
provision extending coverage to persons using the vehicle with permis-
sion of the named insured or his spouse, is synonymous with "lawful
possession" as used in G.S. 20-279.21(b)(2), 279 which requires that
"persons in lawful possession" of the insured vehicle be covered under
mandatory liability insurance policies. The policy in Caison provided
274. Grant v. Emmco Ins. Co., 35 N.C. App. 246, 241 S.E.2d 114, rev'd, 295 N.C. 39, 243
SE.2d 894 (1978). Judge Webb dissented, finding the policy terms ambiguous.
275. 250 N.C. 45, 108 S.E.2d 49 (1959).
276. Id. at 52, 108 S.E.2d at 54.
277. The risk to the insurance company of being liable for damages to two vehicles at the same
time, should the described tractor be struck while standing in a garage, was dismissed as minimal.
295 N.C. at 48, 243 S.E.2d at 900.
Defendant's final argument, that ambiguous terms in a collision insurance policy should not
be construed against the insurer, was rejected. Defendant cited no authority, but suggested a
distinction between liability and collision insurance based on the public policy of requiring the
former, as embodied in the Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-309 to
319 (1978). The court took judicial notice of the custom of providing both collision and liability
coverage in the same insurance policy, and said that in both kinds of policies, ambiguous provi-
sions will be construed against the insurer. Id. at 54, 243 S.E.2d at 904.
278. 36 N.C. App. 173, 243 S.E.2d 429 (1978).
279. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(2) (1978).
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coverage for persons using the insured's car, "provided the actual use
of the automobile is by the Named Insured or such spouse or with the
permission of either."28 0 The policy limit on liability for bodily injury
was $25,000 per person, while the statute mandated coverage of the
same class only to a $10,000 limit.28' Plaintiff was injured by the in-
sured vehicle, which was driven by a person who was stipulated to be
in lawful possession. Upon this stipulation, the trial court granted
plaintiff's summary judgment motion and awarded damages in the
amount of $12,000. Defendant appealed, contending that permission
and lawful possession are not synonymous, so that the policy coverage
for one with permission did not apply to one merely in lawful posses-
sion and that plaintiff was therefore limited to a $10,000 recovery.282
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment, concluding that the terms were not synonymous and that
plaintiff could recover an amount in excess of the statutory requirement
only when she established that the use of the insured vehicle was with
the permission of the insured. Since the additional policy coverage was
voluntary, plaintiff had to show that the driver of the insured's car met
the terms of the policy (permission) rather than the terms of the statute
(lawful possession). The court looked particularly at the terms of G.S.
20-279.21(g), 283 which provides that the excess of additional coverage
provided by a policy is governed by the terms of the policy and not by
the terms of the statute. This holding is consistent with cases constru-
ing the term "lawful possession." 284  It encourages insurers to offer
greater coverage than the statute requires, by allowing insurers to limit
the class of persons to whom the excess coverage will apply.
In Turner v. Masias,285 a contest between insurance companies, the
court of appeals was required to interpret the relationship between the
280. 36 N.C. App. at 177, 243 S.E.2d at 43 1.
281. Id. at 176-77, 243 S.E.2d at 430-31. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(2) (1978).
282. 36 N.C. App. at 175-76, 243 S.E.2d at 430. In Packer v. Travelers Ins. Co., 28 N.C. App.
365, 221 S.E.2d 707 (1976), the court of appeals expressly ruled that permission is not an essential
element of lawful possession, so that it is possible to have lawful possession without having
permission.
283. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(g) (1978) provides that "such excess or additional coverage
shall not be subject to the provisions of this Article."
284. See Packer v. Travelers Ins. Co., 28 N.C. App. 365, 221 S.E.2d 707 (1976), discussed in
note 282 supra; c.Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chantos, 25 N.C. App. 482, 214 S.E.2d 438 (1975),
rev'don other grounds, 293 N.C. 431, 238 S.E.2d 597 (1977) (person who had received permission
to use vehicle from the original permittee, son of insureds, was deemed to be in "lawful posses-
sion"); Engle v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 37 N.C. App. 127, 245 S.E.2d 532, cert. denied,
295 N.C. 645, 248 S.E.2d 250 (1978)(reaffirming Chantos as matter of law). The policies in
Chantos and Engle did not provide coverage in excess of the amounts required by statute.
285. 36 N.C. App. 213, 243 S.E.2d 401 (1978).
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statutorily required uninsured motorist provision in a liability insur-
ance policy 86 and the policy's reduction clause, which provided that
payment under the policy should be reduced by the amount paid to the
insured by any other policy of property insurance.287 Turner, who had
collision insurance with American Security Insurance Co. and liability
insurance with Allstate Insurance Co., had recovered under his colli-
sion policy the amount of his damages suffered in an accident, less fifty
dollars deductible. American later discovered that the driver of the car
that had collided with Turner's car was a thief, not in lawful possession
of the car; the "uninsured motorist" provision of Turner's liability cov-
erage with Allstate Insurance Co. arguably therefore required payment
of insured's damages. Allstate refused to reimburse American on the
ground that its reduction clause relieved it of any obligation to pay.
American sued, charging that Allstate's reduction clause was unen-
forceable as violative of the uninsured motorist statute.288
The court held that, although a reduction clause would not be en-
forced if the result would limit an insured's recovery to an amount less
than the actual damages suffered,289 that was not the case here. The
purpose of the statute requiring insurance for damage to property
caused by uninsured motorists is the protection of the insured, who in
this case had already been made whole. Which insurance company
paid was not a concern of the statute or of public policy, so Allstate was
therefore entitled to have its reduction clause enforced.290
The facts of Turner v. Masias made it easy for the court to enforce
the reduction clause; Allstate's deductible was $100, so the insured did
better by collecting from American, whose policy deductible was only
$50.191 Also, American's policy had no reduction clause.
Autry v. Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Co.292 presented the
court of appeals with a question involving the definition of the "unin-
sured vehicle" as used in the uninsured motorist statute, G.S. 20-
279.21 (b)(3),293 the statute providing for mandatory uninsured motorist
coverage in liability insurance policies. At issue in Autry was inclusion
286. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3) (1978) requires that mandatory liability insurance
policies protect the insured against destruction of their property caused by an owner or operator of
an uninsured vehicle.
287. 36 N.C. App. at 214, 243 S.E.2d at 403.
288. Id. at 215, 243 S.E.2d at 403.
289. See Moore v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 270 N.C. 532, 543, 155 S.E.2d 128, 136 (1967).
290. 36 N.C. App. at 217, 243 S.E.2d at 404.
291. Id.
292. 35 N.C. App. 628, 242 S.E.2d 172, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 89, 244 S.E.2d 257 (1978).
293. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.2(b)(3) (1978).
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within the coverage of that statute of a three-wheeled motorcycle pow-
ered by a Volkswagen engine; plaintiff was injured by the vehicle in the
yard of the vehicle's owner.294 The vehicle was not used on public
highways and was therefore not required to be registered.295 The court
concluded that the term "uninsured motor vehicle" was intended to
include motor vehicles that should be insured but are not, or, though
not subject to compulsory insurance, are at some time operated on the
public highways.296 As the vehicle met neither of those criteria, it was
found not to be an uninsured motor vehicle within the meaning of the
statute.297 Plaintiffs liability insurance policy therefore did not provide
coverage. 29
8
4. Proof of Loss
In the area of accident insurance,2 9 9 insurers have a repertoire of
terms that can result in the exclusion of coverage to the disappointment
of the insured or his beneficiaries. Courts interpreting such terms are
faced with choosing among the strict interpretation urged by the in-
surer, the liberal interpretation preferred by the plaintiff, or a moderate
approach that finds an exception for plaintiff but preserves the exclu-
sion. If the facts of the case are persuasive for plaintiff, even a gener-
ally strict court often will follow the third path.
This was the result in both Dixon v. Mid-South Insurance Co. 30 0
and Emanuel v. Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co., 3 1 two cases
decided by the court of appeals in 1978. In Dixon, the insurance policy
provided coverage for "accidental bodily injuries. 3 2 The insured died
as a result of an air embolism following surgery.303 Defendant urged
that this was not an "accidental means" of injury and sought to per-
suade the court to apply the strict rule that is triggered by the term
"accidental means." Under this rule, "[i]f the result, although unex-
pected, flows directly from an ordinary act in which the insured volun-
tarily engages, then such is not deemed to have been produced by
294. 35 N.C. App. at 629, 242 S.E.2d at 173.
295. Id. at 629-30, 242 S.E.2d at 174.
296. Id. at 632, 242 S.E.2d at 175.
297. Id. at 633, 242 S.E.2d at 176.
298. Id.
299. The term "accident insurance" is used to include both accident policies and life insurance
policies with accident features.
300. 37 N.C. App. 595, 246 S.E.2d 561 (1978).
301. 35 N.C. App. 435, 242 S.E.2d 381 (1978).
302. 37 N.C. App. at 596, 246 S.E.2d at 561.
303. Id. at 599, 246 S.E.2d at 563.
19791
876 NORTH CAROLINA L4W REVIEW [Vol. 57
accidental means." 304 Noting that a contract covering only "injury by
accidental means" could easily have been drafted,30 5 the court found
the term "accidental bodily injury" to be synonymous, 3°6 with "acci-
dental injury," a term that requires proof only that the result was unex-
pected.30 7 The court also rejected with little comment defendant's
argument that the cause of death was not even an accidental injury but
a known risk of the surgery undergone by the insured.30 8
In Emanuel, the insurer tried to use another term, "preexisting dis-
ease," to escape coverage. The policy excluded losses that were caused
or contributed to by any preexisting disease. Plaintiffs decedent was
sixty-three when an automobile accident caused fractures of both legs,
necessitating surgery; he died a few weeks later of a myocardial infarc-
tion to which a preexisting arteriosclerotic condition contributed.30 9
Plaintiff sued as beneficiary of decedent's policy and obtained sum-
mary judgment.
Courts are divided on the proper approach in cases in which both
the accident and the disease contribute to the death of the insured.
304. Mehaffey v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 205 N.C. 701, 705, 172 S.E. 331, 333
(1934). The rule has been applied to deny recovery in various medical settings. E.g., Fletcher v.
Security Life & Trust Co., 220 N.C. 148, 16 S.E.2d 687 (1941)(death resulting from spinal anesthe-
sia); Scott v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 208 N.C. 160, 179 S.E. 434 (1935) (death resulting from blood
clot following surgery).
The rule has been criticized by a number of commentators. See, e.g., Clifford, Survey of
North Carolina Case Law-Insurance, 45 N.C.L. REV. 955, 963-64 (1967); Note, Insurance-4cci-
dental Means v. Accidental Death or Tweedledum v. Tweedledee, 46 N.C.L. REV. 178, 187-88
(1967).
305. Defendant Mid-South clearly knew how to draft such a policy, having done so before.
See Mozingo v. Mid-South Ins. Co., 29 N.C. App. 352, 224 S.E.2d 208 (1976).
306. Hicks v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co., 29 N.C. App. 561, 225 S.E.2d 164 (1976), had left
unanswered the question of the relationship between the terms "accidental injury," "accidental
means," and "accidental bodily injury." In Hicks, the insured had fallen from a scaffold, but the
autopsy indicated death was caused by a myocardial infarction. Id. at 563, 225 S.E.2d at 166.
Summary judgment for the defendant, who had insured against "accidental bodily injury," was
affirmed.
307. See, e.g., Henderson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 268 N.C. 129, 132-33, 150
S,E.2d 17, 19-20 (1966); Fletcher v. Security Life & Trust Co., 220 N.C. 148, 150, 16 S.E.2d 687,
688 (1941). See also Survey oDevelopments in North Carolina Law, 1976, 55 N.C.L. REV. 895,
1062 (1977).
308. 37 N.C. App. at 599-600, 246 S.E.2d at 564. The surgery was to remove the insured's left
arm and shoulder, a procedure know as a forequarter amputation. The surgery was necessitated
by a malignancy under the insured's arm. Id. at 598, 246 S.E.2d at 563.
309. The doctor who performed the autopsy stated in deposition that the arteries of Emanuel's
heart were "five or six times their normal thickness," but whether "normal" referred to normal for
a man of his age or for a younger man was not made clear. 35 N.C. App. at 436, 242 S.E.2d at
382. He also stated that the injuries sustained in the accident, combined with the surgery, forced
the heart to increase circulation, and could have caused sufficient stress to initiate the occlusion of
the coronary artery. Id. Other evidence established that Emanuel's prior physical condition was
good, with no history of heart disease. .d. at 442, 242 S.E.2d at 385.
ADMINISTRA4TIVE LAW
Some courts employ a proximate cause analysis, allowing recovery if
the accident injuries accelerate the effect of the disease and cause an
early death;3 1° other courts deny recovery whenever the disease merely
contributes to death.3" North Carolina follows the latter rule.312
When the preexisting condition is arteriosclerosis as in Emanuel,
the problem becomes more complicated because there is a question
whether arteriosclerosis is a disease, or merely a physical characteristic
of aging. The Emanuel court declined to rule as a matter of law on the
categorization of arteriosclerosis. Three previous North Carolina
cases 313 that involved insureds whose accident injuries were minor and
who had been suffering from longstanding, preexisting arteriosclerosis
that in each case at least contributed to death, had all been decided in
favor of insurers. The policy in each case had a preexisting disease
clause similar to the one in Emanuel.
The Emanuel court discussed several cases from other jurisdictions
in which the question whether arteriosclerosis was a preexisting disease
had been submitted to the jury,314 and then set forth the factors the jury
should consider in making its factual determination.315 One factor was
the health of the insured prior to the accident; another was the serious-
ness of the accident. The latter, it seems, should have no bearing on the
determination of whether the insured had a preexisting disease. The
court noted, however, that in cases denying recovery the arteriosclerotic
condition was well-established and the accident usually minor.3 16 Be-
cause application of these factors necessarily involves a factual deter-
mination, an issue of fact existed requiring reversal of plaintifis
310. See, e.g., Preston v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 829
(1949)(applying Illinois law); Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Jones, 230 Ark. 979, 328 S.W.2d 118
(1959). But see Britton v. Prudential Ins. Co., 205 Tenn. 726, 732, 330 S.W.2d 326, 328
(1959)("[In accident insurance contracts the liability is measured by 'the contract, and the doctrine
of proximate cause is applicable only in determining whether or not an injury is caused solely by
the act or accident. . . while in ordinary negligence cases the proximate cause determines the
existence of liability.").
311. See, e.g., Scharmer v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 349 Mich. 421, 84 N.W.2d 866 (1957);
Adkins v. American Cas. Co., 124 S.E.2d 457 (W. Va. 1962).
312. Penn v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 160 N.C. 399, 76 S.E. 262 (1912).
313. Horn v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 265 N.C. 157, 143 S.E.2d 70 (1965); Skillman v. Phoenix
Mut. Ins. Co., 258 N.C. 1, 127 S.E.2d 789 (1962); Hicks v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co., 29 N.C.
App. 561, 225 S.E.2d 164 (1976).
314. Preferred Accident Ins. Co. v. Combs, 76 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1935); Reed v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 176 Colo. 568, 491 P.2d 1377 (1971); Police & Firemen's Ins. Ass'n v. Blunk,
107 Ind. App. 279, 20 N.E.2d 660 (1939); Novick v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n,
203 Misc. 830, 118 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1953).
315. 35 N.C. App. at 449, 242 S.E.2d at 389.
316. Id. at 448, 242 S.E.2d at 389.
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judgment and remand for trial.317
The court was also correct in affirming the denial of defendant's
motion for summary judgment, observing that "to hold otherwise
would allow insurance companies to escape liability under an accident
policy any time an insured dies as a result of injuries. received in an
accident, but is also suffering from even a normal degree of arterioscle-
rosis which may contribute to the accidental death." '318 Considering
the strict North Carolina rule denying recovery whenever a preexisting
disease contributes to death, it is fortunate that the court did not rule as
a matter of law in defendant's favor. Affirming plaintiffs summary
judgment would have taken the court further than other jurisdictions
have gone on this difficult issue.319
K. Workmen's Compensation Law
1. Application of the Compensation Act
It is well settled in North Carolina that, in a claim by an employee
against a workmen's compensation insurance carrier, the carrier may
be estopped from denying that an injury to the employee was within
the coverage of the compensation insurance policy. 320 In Britt v. Colony
Construction Co.,32 the North Carolina Court of Appeals extended this
principle to a situation involving coordination of benefits between two
separate compensation carriers.
Plaintiff's decedent, Britt, was employed by Cumberland Utilities,
317. 35 N.C. App. at 449, 242 S.E.2d at 389. In a later case, McAdams v. Union Security Life
Ins. Co., 36 N.C. App. 463, 244 S.E.2d 692 (1978), the court affirmed a directed verdict for defend-
ant, whose insurance policy excluded coverage of any disability to which a preexisting sickness
contributed. Id. at 464, 244 S.E.2d at 693. Distinguishing Emanuel, the court stressed that all of
the evidence in McAdams indicated a previously diagnosed condition of arteriosclerotic heart
disease with coronary insufficiency, and not simple arteriosclerosis. Id. at 469, 244 S.E.2d at 695-
96. The insurance policy in this case covered installment payments on an automobile in case the
insured, because of disability by accident or sickness, became unable to continue the payments.
The court also rejected plaintiffs argument that his condition was a "disease" and not a
"sickness" within the meaning of the policy exception, citing Glenn v. Gate City Life Ins. Co., 220
N.C. 672, 676, 18 S.E.2d 113, 115 (1942), in which "disease" and "sickness" were deemed synony-
mous absent some indication of the parties' contrary intent. 36 N.C. App. at 468, 244 S.E.2d at
695.
318. Id. at 442, 242 S.E.2d at 385.
319. See Annot., 82 A.L.R2d 611 (1962)(usual conclusion reached is that right of arterioscle-
rotic insured (or his beneficiary) to enforce policy is one for trier of fact).
320. See Aldridge v. Foil Motor Co., 262 N.C. 248, 136 S.E.2d 591 (1964); Pearson v. Newt
Pearson, Inc., 222 N.C. 69, 21 S.E.2d 879 (1942). The theory is that, having accepted premiums
for coverage of the employee, the carrier should not be permitted to disclaim liability after the
employee is injured.
321. 35 N.C. App. 23, 240 S.E.2d 479 (1978).
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Incorporated, a subcontractor of Colony Construction Company on a
highway construction project.3 22 During performance of the work cov-
ered by the subcontract, Utilities paid Britt for work done on other,
unrelated projects, and maintained workmen's compensation insurance
for him.323 Colony paid Britt directly for work done under the subcon-
tract, and withheld funds actually owed to Utilities in order to pay
workmen's compensation premiums on Utilities' employees.324 Britt
died from injuries sustained while working on the Colony project, and
his dependents instituted a proceeding under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act.325
The court of appeals affirmed the Industrial Commission's finding
that Britt was Utilities' employee 326 and that Utilities and its carrier,
Aetna Insurance Company, should pay benefits pursuant to the appli-
cable statute.32 7 But the court also accepted Aetna's contention that
322. Colony was primarily a grading contractor, and subcontracted with Utilities because of
Utilities' expertise in installing water pipe. To avoid the "red tape" involved in making Utilities
an "official" subcontractor under state law, Colony and Utilities entered into a contract under
which Utilities would furnish all labor, equipment, organization and incidental tools, and Colony
would furnish the materials. Colony paid Utilities on a monthly basis for work performed, less
10% retainage, less the gross amount of payroll paid to employees supplied by Utilities, and less a
17% deduction based on the gross payroll to cover payroll taxes, workmen's compensation premi-
ums for Utilities' employees and other insurance paid by Colony. Id. at 25-27, 240 S.E.2d at 480-
81.
323. Id. at 28, 240 S.E.2d at 482.
324. See note 322 supra.
325. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-38, -39 (1972 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
326. Although members of the work crew, including Britt, were listed on Colony's payroll,
reported on Colony's W-2 and W-4 forms, and directly paid by Colony, the Industrial Commis-
sion found that Utilities had hired the crew, that Utilities determined the composition, classifica-
tion, and weekly pay rates of the crew, that Utilities controlled the actual performance of the crew,
and that only Utilities' foreman could hire and fire crew members. 35 N.C. App. at 26-28, 240
S.E.2d at 481-82. The court of appeals found that the only supervision Colony exercised over the
crew was to see that their work met United States Department of Transportation specifications.
Id. at 31, 240 S.E.2d at 484. In cases involving lent employees, or dual employment, liability for
injury to the employee is generally determined by resolving the issue of which employer had the
right to control the employee's work. Lewis v. Barnhill, 267 N.C. 457, 148 S.E.2d 536 (1966). See
IB A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 44.00 (1978). "The traditional test of the
employer-employee relation is the right of the employer to control the details of the work." Id.
See generally id. §§ 48.00-.23.
327. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-38 (Cum. Supp. 1977) bases death benefits for dependents on a
percentage of the deceased employee's average weekly wages at the time of the accident. The
"average weekly wages" are the earnings of the injured employee in the employment in which he
was working at the time of his injury. Id. § 97-2(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Thus, compensation for
an employee who holds two separate jobs must be based exclusively upon his average weekly
wages in the job in which he was injured. See Joyner v. A.J. Carey Oil Co., 266 N.C. 519, 146
S.E.2d 447 (1966); Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Co., 266 N.C. 419, 146 S.E.2d 479 (1966). For criti-
cism of this method of determining average weekly wages, see Note, Workmen's Compensalon-
Average Weekly Wage-Combination of Wages, 44 N.C.L. REv. 1177 (1966). The court of appeals
in Britt agreed with the Commission's finding that Britt held only one job but was paid for that
job on two separate payrolls. 35 N.C. App. at 29, 240 S.E.2d at 483.
J
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Colony and its carrier, Standard Fire Insurance Company, were es-
topped from denying that the employer-employee relationship existed
between Colony and Britt, and that Colony and Standard Fire should
pay a part of the benefits awarded to plaintiffs.328 The court said Stan-
dard Fire could not escape all liability if it had accepted the premiums
collected by Colony for workmen's compensation insurance on Britt's
wages.329 The case was, therefore, remanded to the Industrial Commis-
sion for its finding on Standard Fire's acceptance or nonacceptance of
the premiums.330
The Britt decision represents a pragmatic and equitable response
to an unusual problem. In the ordinary case of dual employment, the
employer that furnishes its employee and equipment to another em-
ployer, and retains control over the employee, remains liable for any
and all injuries to that employee.331 The court in Britt adhered to the
essence of this rule, since it placed the primary responsibility for com-
pensation on Utilities and its insurance carrier.332 Colony's carrier was
to contribute only if it was proved that it had accepted premium pay-
ments withheld by Colony for the benefit of Britt.333 The general rule
governing dual employment was thus made to accommodate the equi-
table principle that a workmen's compensation carrier should not to-
tally avoid a liability that it has been paid to accept.334 Indeed, there is
no reason why a rule that would hold Utilities and its insurance carrier
solely responsible for benefits should not give way when economic real-
ities compel a different'result. Britt's dependents will be fully compen-
328. 35 N.C. App. at 32, 240 S.E.2d at 484. The Industrial Commission had awarded plaintiffs
benefits based on the wages earned by Britt while in the employ of Utilities, including the wages
Utilities paid directly and those paid indirectly through Colony. Id. at 29, 240 S.E.2d at 483.
Thus Utilities' carrier was to pay benefits based on wages Colony actually paid and against which
Colony had taken a deduction for workmen's compensation insurance.
329. Id. at 33, 240 S.E.2d at 485.
330. Id. The formula for Standard Fire's contribution, if the premiums were accepted, is the
proportion that the wages paid Britt by Colony bear to his total wages for the period of time
during which he worked for both employers. Id.
331. Lewis v. Barnhill, 267 N.C. 457, 148 S.E.2d 536 (1966). Butsee N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-51
(1972) (providing that when employee is in joint service of two or more employers at time he is
injured, each employer shall contribute to employee's compensation in proportion to wages each
paid the employee). Britt was not a joint employment case under § 97-5 1, since the Industrial
Commission found, and the court agreed, that Britt was Utilities' employee. This finding fore-
closed the possibility that Utilities and Colony would be jointly liable for benefits to Britt's depen-
dents under § 97.51. 35 N.C. App. at 33, 240 S.E.2d at 485. See also Collins v. James Paul
Edwards, Inc., 21 N.C. App. 455, 204 S.E.2d 873, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 589, 206 S.E.2d 862 (1974).





sated in any event. As a matter of policy, they should be compensated
by those who were paid to accept the risk.
2. Third-Party Liability of Carriers
Under G.S. 97-10.1, once an employer and employee are subject to
and comply with the Workmen's Compensation Act,335 the employee
has no right of action against the employer "at common law or other-
wise" on account of work-related injury or death.336 The employee's
right to sue a third party, however, is unaffected by the Act.337 The
most important legal issue arising in this area of third-party tort liabil-
ity is whether, when the applicable statute neither identifies the insurer
with the employer nor indicates that the insurer should not be treated
as a third party, a workmen's compensation insurance carrier may be
sued for negligence in the performance of such functions as making
safety inspections.3 3 8 In Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 33' a
federal district court, on reconsideration of a prior opinion,340 deter-
mined that under the North Carolina Act, which does not specify the
insurer's status, the insurance carrier is not to be considered a third
party suable for negligence under common law.34' The court held that
tort immunity is conferred upon the insurer by virtue of the provisions
of G.S. 97_9342 and G.S. 97-10.1, 343 which protect both the employer
and those conducting his business. 3
44
Plaintiff in Smith had been seriously injured while operating a
loom at a plant for which Liberty Mutual was the workmen's compen-
sation insurance carrier.345 In her civil suit for damages against Liberty
335. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -101 (1972 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
336. Id. § 97-10.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977). For general rule, see 2A A. LARsON, supra note 326,
§ 65.10 (1976). In some states, an employer subject to a workmen's compensation act may be sued
when the injured employee is an illegally employed minor, or when the employee's injury was
occasioned by the employer's wilful misconduct or failure to provide safety devices. Id. § 67.21.
But see N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-10.3, -12 (1972 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
337. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2 (1972).
338. See Larson, Workmen's Compensation Insurer as Suable Third Party, 1969 DUKE L.J.
1117, 1117-18.
339. 449 F. Supp. 928 (M.D.N.C. 1978).
340. The original opinion appears at 409 F. Supp. 1211 (M.D.N.C. 1976), discussed in Survey
ofDevelopments in North Carolina Law, 1976, 55 N.C.L. REv. 895, 1118-20 (1977).
341. 449 F. Supp. at 934.
342. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-9 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
343. Id. § 97-10.1.
344. 449 F. Supp. at 934. North Carolina courts have held that the employee's exclusive rem-
edy against the employer under the Act is extended to "those conducting [the employer's] busi-
ness" by § 97-9. See, e.g., Weaver v. Bennett, 259 N.C. 16, 129 S.E.2d 610 (1963).
345. 449 F. Supp. at 929.
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Mutual, plaintiff alleged defendant was negligent in failing to exercise
reasonable care in performing safety inspections at the facility. 346 De-
fendant's motion for summary judgment asserted that the exclusive
remedies provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act barred
plaintiff's tort claim.34 7 This assertion was based on defendant's argu-
ment that an insurer is the equivalent of the employer for purposes of
the Act.348
Defendant's argument was rejected when the district court first
heard the case in 1976. 341 At that time, the court could find no control-
ling North Carolina decisions. It therefore examined the relevant
statutory provisions, noting initially that the statute's definition of "em-
ployer" does not include the employer's insurance carrier, which is in-
stead separately defined in another section. 351 The court then noted
that North Carolina courts have extended the employer's tort immunity
to those conducting his business, but have never directly addressed the
issue whether the insurance carrier falls within the employer cate-
gory.352 The district court then declined to decide the issue, stating that
it would be premature to make the findings of fact necessary to resolve
the issue on a motion for summary judgment.353
On reconsideration of defendant's motion, the district court de-
cided to resolve the issue. To determine whether the insured is to be
treated as an employer or one of those conducting his business, and is
thus entitled to the statutory protection of G.S. 97-9 and G.S. 97-10.1,
the court relied on two North Carolina Supreme Court decisions that it
had overlooked when it previously addressed the issue.354 In Hoover v.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 930.
348. Id.
349. 409 F. Supp. 1211, 1218-19 (M.D.N.C. 1976).
350. In several states having statutes similar to the North Carolina Act, courts have read into
the statutes a proscription against third-party tort liability for workmen's compensation insurance
carriers. See Home v. Security Mut. Cas. Co., 265 F. Supp. 379 (D. Ark. 1967). Other courts
considering similar statutes have concluded that if the carriers are to receive the same protection
as employers, it is for the legislature to say so. See Beasley v. MacDonald Eng'r Co., 287 Ala. 189,
249 So. 2d 844 (1971).
351. 409 F. Supp. at 1215.
352. Id. The court noted that North Carolina courts have given § 97-9 protection to employ-
ees, officers and agents of the employer as those conducting the employer's business. See, e.g.,
Altman v. Sanders, 267 N.C. 158, 148 S.E.2d 21 (1966); Essick v. Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 60
S.E.2d 106 (1950). But North Carolina courts have denied the protection of§ 97-9 to independent
contractors performing work on the employer's premises but having no connection with the em-
ployment relationship. See Lewis v. Barnhill, 267 N.C. 457, 148 S.E.2d 536 (1966).
353. 409 F. Supp. at 1216. For the court's treatment of other arguments made by the insurer,
see Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1976, supra note 340, at 1119 nn.28 & 31.
354. 449 F. Supp. at 931.
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Globe Indemnity Co.,"' the North Carolina Supreme Court extended
to the employer's compensation carrier the protection of G.S. 97-26,356
which provides that the employer shall not be liable in damages for the
malpractice of a physician furnished by him. The Smith court read this
case as establishing an identity between the employer and the insurance
carrier.357 Whether Hoover can support such a broad reading is ques-
tionable. The Hoover court decided only that an employee cannot sue
the employer or the carrier for malpractice by a physician furnished to
treat the job-related injury." 8 Hoover should be read, therefore, as
protecting the carrier against suit only when an allegedly negligent
third party, the physician, is involved, because the issue of a carrier's
tort liability for. its independent negligent act was not before the court.
The Smith court, however, not only used Hoover to support the
broader proposition of absolute tort immunity for the carrier, but also
relied on dictum in a second Hoover opinion to buttress its position.
In the second Hoover opinion,359 the North Carolina Supreme
Court observed that were the insurance carrier liable to plaintiff for
malpractice by a physician in the carrier's employ, "it would seem that
the North Carolina Industiral Commission would have jurisdiction
.... "36o Because the Industrial Commission has no jurisdiction over
a claim against a third party, the Smith court concluded that the
supreme court thought the carrier was not a third party suable for neg-
ligence at common law.36 1 The district court insisted that this "hold-
ing" implicitly extended the employer's protection to the carrier, as one
conducting the employer's business. 362 The Hoover court, however, did
not hold that the employee's exclusive remedy against a negligent car-
rier is within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission, because
that issue was not before the court for resolution.3 63
355. 202 N.C. 655, 163 S.E. 758 (1932).
356. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-26 (1972).
357. 449 F. Supp. at 932, 934.
358. 202 N.C. at 657, 163 S.E. at 759. Hoover held that an injury sustained by the employee as
a result of negligent treatment by a physician furnished by the employer or the carrier is a constit-
uent element of the employee's original injury, and is therefore compensable only under the Act.
Id.
359. 206 N.C. 468, 174 S.E. 308 (1934).
360. Id. at 470, 174 S.E. at 309.
361. 449 F. Supp. at 933.
362. Id. at 934.
363. The only issue before the Hoover court was whether the insurer could be liable in tort for
the acts of a negligent agent (a physician) when the agent's wrongful act was outside the scope of
his employment, and was not ratified or authorized by the insurer. 206 N.C. at 470, 174 S.E. at
319.
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The Hoover opinions clearly did not constitute "persuasive au-
thority" to support the district court's conclusion that an insurance car-
rier is not a third party within the meaning of G.S. 97-10.2 and
therefore is immune to suit by virtue of G.S. 97-9 and 97-10.1. Neither
opinion even approached the conclusion that an insurer, as one con-
ducting the employer's business, is generally immune from tort liability
for its own negligent acts. The Smith court, by purporting to derive
that conclusion from the opinions, effectively circumvented its inabil-
ity, on a summary judgement motion, to make an express finding of
fact that an insurer is the employer's agent, rather than an independent
contractor, and thus entitled to the protection afforded those con-
ducting the employer's business.
The Smith decision can be seriously faulted for its reliance on
questionable precedent to construe broadly the term "carrier" in the
absence of any indication that the legislature intended such a broad
construction. 64 Whether the workmen's compensation insurance car-
rier should be liable in tort for negligence in the performance of safety
inspections would, ideally, involve an inquiry into the function of the
insurance carrier, as well as a balancing of public policy objectives.365
The functional analysis would draw a distinction between the insurer
as payor of benefits under the Act, and as provider of other services
related to the Act, such as performing safety inspections.366 It is cer-
tainly arguable that the insurer should be liable in tort for negligence in
performance of its role as safety inspector.367 But this is a public policy
argument and turns on facts that should be investigated by the legisla-
364. Twenty-two state statutes specifically equate employers and their insurance carriers and
exempt both from third-party tort liability. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-42-102 (Cum. Supp. 1976);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2301(8) (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.11 (West 1977); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 114-101 (1973); HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-1 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5 (Smith-Hurd
Cum. Supp. 1978); IND. ANN. STAT. § 22-3-2-5 (Cum. Supp. 1978); IOWA CODE § 85A-15 (Cum.
Supp. 1978-1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 2(6) (1964); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.237 (13)
(Cum. Supp. 1975); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.030.2 (Vernon 1965); NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-111 (1968);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281:2 (1966); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-4(D) (Supp. 1975); OR. REV.
STAT. § 656.018(3) (1973-1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, 501 (Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); S.D. COM-
PILED LAws ANN. § 62-1-2 (1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-902(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978); TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 601(3) (1967);
VA. CODE ANN. § 65-3 (1950); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.03(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1973). The provi-
sions in the Illinois, Michigan and New Hampshire statutes were all added to protect insurance
carriers after court decisions had held the carriers liable as third parties.
365. See 2A A. LARSON, ffuvra note 326, § 72.90 (1976).
366. The distinction is between "paying for services and physically performing them .... It
is virtually impossible to cause physical injury by writing a check. It is very possible to cause
physical injury ... by making a safety inspection." 2A id. The functional approach has been
applied in Sims v. American Cas. Co., 131 Ga. App. 461,206 S.E.2d 121, a 'dpercuriam, 232 Ga.
787, 209 S.E.2d 61 (1974).
367. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 326, § 72.90 (1976).
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ture before subjecting insurers who assume this role to potential tort
liability. 68 One court has speculated, for example, that insurers will
avoid tort liability altogether by not making safety inspections unless
required by law to do so, and that the "ultimate losers will be workmen
and their families." '36 9 This assertion has been countered by the re-
sponse that the insurers' economic self-interest would be great enough
to overcome the fear of potential tort liability.370 Another court has
admonished that no safety inspection at all is preferable to a negligent
one.371 The legislature is uniquely capable of determining whether in-
surance carriers do discontinue safety inspections when confronted
with potential tort liability, and, if so, whether there are other ways to
get the job done.372 It is not too late for a responsible resolution of this
difficult issue.
3. Compensable Injuries
a. By Accident, Arising Out of and In the Course of Employment
To recover under the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation
Act, the claimant must show that an injury resulted from an accident3 73
arising out of and in the course of employment. 374 The accident "arises
out of" the employment when it occurs in the course of employment
and is the result of a risk incident to the employment.3 75 The words "in
the course of" have reference to the time, place and circumstances
368. Id.
369. Kotarski v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 244 F. Supp. 547, 558-59 (E.D. Mich. 1965), a 'dper
curiam, 372 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1967).
370. Mays v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 1963).
371. Fabricius v. Montgomery Elev. Co., 254 Iowa 1319, 1327, 121 N.W.2d 361, 366 (1963).
372. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 326, § 72.90 (1976).
373. "The basic and indispensable ingredient of 'accident' is unexpectedness." IB id. § 6
(1978). North Carolina courts remain in the minority by also requiring that the accident arise
from unusual exertion. Three recent cases apply this minority rule. Curtis v. Carolina Mechani-
cal Sys., Inc., 36 N.C. App. 621, 244 S.E.2d 690 (1978) (compensation denied for hernia suffered
when employee received injury while doing his usual duties in usual way); Searsey v. Perry M.
Alexander Constr. Co., 35 N.C. App. 78, 239 S.E.2d 847, cert. denied, 294 N.C. 736, 244 S.E.2d
154 (1978) (compensation allowed for back injury sustained while employee did unusual task);
Smith v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 35 N.C. App. 105, 239 S.E.2d 845 (1978) (compensation denied
for back injury suffered when employee was doing his customary work in usual way).
374. Bell v. Dewey Bros., 236 N.C. 280, 72 S.E.2d 680 (1952); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6)
(Cum. Supp. 1977).
375. There must be some causal connection between the employment and the injury. Boiling
v. Belk-White Co., 228 N.C. 749, 750, 46 S.E.2d 838, 839 (1948). This does not mean, however,
that the accident must have been caused by the employment. Harless v. Flynn, I N.C. App. 448,
162 S.E.2d 47 (1968). It does require a showing that an injury was caused by an increased risk "to
which claimant as distinct from the general public, was subjected by his employment." 1 A. LAR-
SON, supra note 326, § 6.
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under which the accident occurs.376
In Martin v. Bonclarken Assemby,377 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals affirmed an award to dependents of a fifteen-year old laborer
who drowned while swimming on his employer's premises during his
lunch hour.378 Although the employee had his employer's permission
to use the swimming facitilies when off-duty, regulations prohibited
swimming during the lunch hour because the lifeguard was also off-
duty.379 Because no one had alerted the employee to these regula-
tions,38 ° the court agreed with the Industrial Commission that the death
had occurred under compensable circumstances.38 In allowing recov-
ery, the court distinguished several cases in which recovery had been
denied because the employee had disobeyed express orders of the em-
ployer,38 2 and made it clear that only violations of express prohibitions
376. Harless v. Flynn, 1 N.C. App. 448, 162 S.E.2d 47 (1968). See generally 1 A. LARSON,
supra note 326, § 14; IA id. § 29.
377. 35 N.C. App. 489, 241 S.E.2d 848, cert. granted, 295 N.C. 91, 244 S.E.2d 258 (1978).
378. Recreational injuries during the noon hour on the premises of the employer have been
held compensable in the majority of cases. The presence of the activity on the employer's prem-
ises is of great importance. IA A. LARSON, supra note 326, § 22.11; see Watkins v. City of Wil-
mington, 290 N.C. 276, 225 S.E.2d 577 (1976). But compensation is generally withheld for injuries
received during recreational activities off the employer's premises when the employee was not
required to participate. See Perry v. American Bakeries Co., 262 N.C. 272, 136.S.E.2d 643 (1964);
Burton v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 10 N.C. App. 499, 179 S.E.2d 7 (1971).
379. 35 N.C. App. at 190, 241 S.E.2d at 849.
380. Plaintiffs decedent had actually violated two regulations. One prohibited swimming
when the lifeguard was off-duty; the other required a swimming test before swimming beyond the
chained area of the lake. A sign posted at the lake, which should have been seen by Martin, did
not state that the lake was closed when the lifeguard was off-duty. It did, however, state clearly
that a swimming test was required for swimming beyond the chained area. The court, however,
agreed with the Industrial Commission that Martin could have reasonably assumed he was within
the chained area since he was unfamiliar with the lake and was within the roped area. Id. at 490-
92, 241 S.E.2d at 849-50.
381. Id. at 492-93, 241 S.E.2d at 851. The court concluded that the accident arose out of
decedent's employment because it was the result of a risk incident to the employment and not
from a hazard common to the public. The public was not invited to swim in defendant's lake, but
employees of Assembly were. Id. The court also found that the "time," "place," and "circum-
stance" conditions of the "in the course of employment" test were fulfilled. With respect to time
and place, decedent drowned during his lunch hour on the employer's premises. With respect to
circumstances, decedent was "doing what a man so employed may reasonably do within a time
which he is employed, and at a place where he may reasonably be during that time to do that
thing." Id. at 493, 241 S.E.2d at 851.
382. Id. at 493, 241 S.E.2d at 851 (distinguishing Morrow v. State Highway & Public Works
Comm'n, 214 N.C. 835, 199 S.E.2d 265 (1938) (deceased jumped into river to recover paint brush
after having been told not to do so by his employer); Teague v. Atlantic Co., 213 N.C. 546, 196
S.E. 875 (1938) (employee tried to ride a crate conveyor instead of using the stairs, contrary to the
rules of his employer)).
Generally, an accident is considered to have been in the course of employment even though it
resulted from the employee's violation of an express prohibition or regulation, if that prohibition
or regulation related to the method of accomplishing the employee's job, rather than to the bound-
aries defining the ultimate work to be done. A prohibited overstepping of those boundaries will
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communicated to the employee 3 will preclude recovery for injuries
sustained on the employer's premises in activities that are outside the
employee's regular duties.3 14
The decision should serve to remind employers of their responsi-
bility to warn employees if certain conduct, incidental to accomplish-
ment of their jobs, is prohibited." 5 In light of the practical difficulty of
ensuring that all employees are fully aware of regulations governing
the use of such facilities, the decision may also serve to discourage em-
ployers from providing on-premises recreational facilities for employ-
ees' off-duty use. 386
b. Extent of Incapacityfor Work
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, a claimant's degree of
disability is measured by her capacity to earn the wages she was receiv-
remove the accident from the course of-employment. IA A. LARSON, supra note 326, § 31.00.
Morrow and Teague fall outside these general rules, and serve to illustrate an exception noted by
Larson. That exception recognizes that compensation should be denied in situations where the
employer has taken thorough precautions to keep employees from places of extreme danger, and
the employee's act in subjecting himself to the danger is inexplicable and little related to any
reasonable necessity in connection with the accomplishment of his work. Id. § 31.23.
383. 35 N.C. App. at 492-93, 241 S.E.2d at 851.
384. See IA A. LARSON, supra note 326, § 31.00. ("Violations of express prohibitions relating
to incidental activities, such as seeking personal comfort, as distinguished from activities contrib-
uting directly to the accomplishment of the main job, are an interruption of the course of
employment").
385. The court of appeals denied recovery in Hensley v. Caswell Action Comm., 35 N.C. App.
544,241 S.E.2d 852 (1978), rev'd, 296 N.C. 527, 251 S.E.2d 399 (1979), an employee drowning case
heard the same term as Martin. In Hensley, a 14 year old laborer drowned while wading across a
reservoir to cut weeds on the other side. Because the boy had disobeyed instructions not to go in
the water, the court of appeals found there was no causal connection between the employment and
the accident. The supreme court held that the causal connection had not been severed, and re-
versed, 296 N.C. 527, 251 S.E.2d 399 (1979). The supreme court noted that the young boy was
engaged in his assigned task at the time of the drowning, had received only general instructions
not to go in the water, and had not been confronted with an obvious danger since the water
appeared shallow. Id. at 531, 251 S.E.2d at 401. The court distinguished both Morrow v. State
Highway & Public Works Comm'n, 214 N.C. 835, 199 S.E.2d 265 (1938), and Teague v. Atlantic
Co., 213 N.C. 546, 196 S.E. 875 (1938), as cases in which the employee's misconduct involved
thrill-seeking because of the obvious danger of violating the employer's warning. Id. at 530-31,
251 S.E.2d at 401. Hensley comports with the general rule discussed by Larson--that compensa-
tion will not be denied an employee who violates a rule related to the method of accomplishing
the employee's ultimate task. See note 382 supra. Hensley had been assigned the task of cutting
weeds at the edge of a reservoir, and was to walk around the edge in order to do so. The method
he employed-wading across the reservoir-merely departed from the method prescribed by his
employer.
386. Such difficulties were apparent in Martin. Defendants had both a resident staff and paid
laborers on the premises. All regulations were distributed to the resident staff at an orientation
session. The lake regulations were posted on a sign to reach those who did not attend the orienta-
tion. But the sign suggested that the lifeguard was on-duty at a time when he was not. 35 N.C.
App. at 490, 241 S.E.2d at 849.
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ing at the time of her injury.3 87 A claimant unable to work and earn
any wages is compensated for total disability38 8 unless all her injuries
are included in the schedule set out in G.S. 97-31, in which case com-
pensation is exclusively under that statute.389 A claimant able to work
and earn some wages, but less than she was receiving at the time of her
injury, is considered partially disabled and entitled to compensation
under G.S. 97-31 for any injuries listed in that schedule and to compen-
sation under G.S. 97-30 for any impairment of wage earning capacity
caused by injuries not listed in the schedule.390
Plaintiff in Little v. Anson County Schools Food Service39  chal-
lenged an award for partial loss of use of her back'under G.S. 97-
31(23),392 alleging that she suffered additional impairments. 393 The
North Carolina Supreme Court remanded the case because the Indus-
trial Commission had failed to consider all plaintiffs injuries in its
award,394 and had not heard plaintiffs evidence on total disability.
395
387. Dail v. Kellex Corp., 233 N.C. 446, 64 S.E.2d 438 (1951); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(9)
(1972).
388. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-29 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Disability as used in the North Carolina
Act means impairment of wage earning capacity rather than physical impairment. Priddy v. Blue
Bird Cab Co., 9 N.C. App. 291, 176 S.E.2d 26 (1970).
389. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (Cum. Supp. 1977); see Loflin v. Loflin, 13 N.C. App. 574, 186
S.E.2d 660, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 154, 187 S.E.2d 585 (1972). If an injury is one of those enumer-
ated in the schedule of payments set forth in § 97-31, compensation is made pursuant to that
schedule, without regard to loss of wage earning power and in lieu of all other compensation. Id.
at 578, 186 S.E.2d at 663. But see 2 A. LARSON, supra note 326, § 58.20 (1976), in which the
multiple impairment principle, recognized in a number of newer decisions, is discussed. The prin-
ciple would recognize that "when two or more schedule injuries occur together, the disabling effect
may be far greater than the arithmetical total of the schedule allowances added together." Id. In
Berg v. Sadler, 235 Minn. 214, 50 N.W.2d 266 (195 1), claimant, a road and farm worker, sustained
a 40% disability of one foot and ankle and a 75% disability of the other foot and ankle. Since he
could do no work involving standing or walking or use of his feet, "it seems plain enough that
merely putting end-to-end the fractional schedule allowances for the two feet would be a gross
miscarriage of the concept of compensable disability. The Minnesota Supreme Court, overruling
the Commission, awarded total permanent disability benefits." 2 A. LARSON, supra.
390. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-30, -31 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
391. 295 N.C. 527, 246 S.E.2d 743 (1978).
392. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31(23) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
393. The uncontradicted evidence tended to show that "an injury to plaintiffs spinal cord
ha[d] resulted in weakness in all of her extremities, and numbness or loss of sensation throughout
her body." 295 N.C. at 53 1-32, 246 S.E.2d at 745.
394. Id. at 531, 246 S.E.2d at 746.
395. Plaintiff had not presented evidence of total disability at her first hearing because a dep-
uty commissioner told her such testimony was unnecessary. Id. at 532, 246 S.E.2d at 746. Under
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-84 (1972), a claimant must have a full opportunity to be heard. Because
plaintiff refrained from presenting evidence in reliance on an inaccurate statement by a deputy
commissioner, the right guaranteed by the statute was abridged. In workmen's compensation
cases the claimant generally bears the burden of proving the degree of disability suffered. Hall v.
Thomason Chevrolet, Inc., 263 N.C. 569, 139 S.E.2d 857 (1965). But see 2 A. LARSON, supra note
326, § 57.61, which suggests that the burden of proof shifts in certain circumstances:
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The court made it clear that, if the Commission found that all
plaintiff's injuries were included in the G.S. 97-31 schedule, compensa-
tion was to be exclusively under that statute. If plaintiff was found to
be partially disabled, the Commission was to make an award for both
schedule injuries and nonschedule injuries that impaired wage earning
power. In reference to plaintiff's claim for total disability under G.S.
97-29,396 the court held that the relevant inquiry in a claim for total
disability is whether the particular plaintiff has a capacity to work, not
whether some persons with plaintif's degree of injury are capable of
working.397 Because'an employee's age, education and work experi-
ence may be such that an injury causes her a greater degree of incapac-
ity than it would some other person, these "preexisting conditions"
must be considered by the Industrial Commission.398
Plaintiff in Little was over fifty years of age, somewhat obese, had
an eighth grade education, and had been working as a laborer earning
less than two dollars per hour at the time of her injury.399 The court's
mandate that her personal attributes be given weight in the Industrial
Commission's consideration of her total disability claim is consistent
with decisions in other jurisdictions,4"0 which uniformly reject any pre-
sumption that, merely because a claimant is physically able to do light
work, appropriate employment is regularly available for her.4 ' Be-
cause a claimant's adaptability to the situation created by her physical
If the evidence of degree of obvious physical impairment, coupled with other factors
such as claimant's mental capacity, education, training, or age, places claimant prima
facie in the odd-lot category, the burden should be on the employer to show that some
kind of suitable work is regularly and continuously available to the claimant.
396. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-29 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
397. 295 N.C. at 531, 246 S.E.2d at 746. Although the North Carolina Supreme Court has
never before mandated such an inquiry, the proposition is not altogether novel in this state. See
Mabe v. North Carolina Granite Corp., 15 N.C. App. 253, 189 S.E.2d 804 (1972). In Mabe, a case
involving occupational disease rather than injury, the North Carolina Court of Appeals said that
"[t]he question is what effect has the disease had upon the earning capacity of this particular
plaintiff, not what effect a like physical impairment would have upon an employee of average age
and intelligence." Id. at 255-56, 189 S.E.2d at 806. The North Carolina Court of Appeals has
rejected such an inquiry, however, when all the plaintiff's injuries were encompassed in the sched-
ule set out in § 97-31. See Baldwin v. North Carolina Memorial Hosp., 32 N.C. App. 779, 233
S.E.2d 600 (1977); Dudley v. Downtowner Motor Inn, 13 N.C. App. 474, 186 S.E.2d 188 (1972).
398. 295 N.C. at 532, 246 S.E.2d at 746.
399. Id. at 531, 246 S.E.2d at 746.
400. See Norfolk, Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Bergeron, 351 F. Supp. 348 (D.S.C.
1972) (62 year old claimant with third grade education, unintelligible speech, work history consist-
ing entirely of manual labor and 63% loss of use of arm held to be totally disabled); 2 A. LARSON,
supra note 326, § 57.51. The preexisting condition inquiry is based on the "odd-lot doctrine."
Under that doctrine, "total disability may be found in the case of workers who, while not alto-
gether incapacitated for work, are so handicapped that they will not be employed regularly in any
well-known branch of the labor market." Id. at 10-109.
401. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 326, § 57.51 (1976).
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injury may well be constricted by lack of education, age, and other
factors, the pronouncement of the court in Little is eminently sensible.
It also comports with the principle that claimants are entitled to have
the full extent of their injury taken into consideration in awarding
compensation. °
4. Discharge after Compensation
Under G.S. 97-6 an employer subject to the North Carolina Work-
men's Compensation Act cannot relieve himself of any obligations
under the Act by contract, agreement, rule, regulation or other de-
vice.40 3 The employer may not, for example, substitute an accident pol-
icy in lieu of compensation and other benefits required by the Act.4°4
In Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., plaintiff argued that his discharge,
after having pursued his remedies under the Act, was an attempt by his
employers to create a "device" to relieve them of their obligations.0 6
His complaint alleged a tort theory of "retaliatory discharge," which
the North Carolina Court of Appeals refused to recognize.40 7
The court declined to follow decisions in other jurisdictions that
have allowed a cause of action in tort based on the theory of retaliatory
discharge.40 8 It maintained that such a theory would violate the estab-
lished common law contract rule that employment is terminable at the
will of either party when there is no contract for a definite term.40 9
Although it acknowledged that the facts alleged presented valid public
policy questions, the court emphasized that such questions are for the
legislature.41 0
402. Giles v. Tri-State Erectors, 287 N.C. 219, 214 S.E.2d 107 (1975); see 2 A. LARSON, supra
note 326, § 57.61.
403. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6 (1972).
404. Ashe v. Barnes, 255 N.C. 310, 121 S.E.2d 549 (1961).
405. 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978).
406. Id. at 295, 244 S.E.2d at 274.
407. Id. at 290-300, 244 S.E.2d at 275.
408. The Indiana Supreme Court held retaliatory discharge to be a device within the meaning
of the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act and actionable. Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co.,
260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973). The North Carolina Court of Appeals found the reasoning
of the Indiana opinion inapplicable because of the analogy that opinion drew to retaliatory evic-
tion, which has been rejected by North Carolina courts. 36 N.C. App. at 295-96, 244 S.E.2d at
274-75 (citing Evans v. Rose, 12 N.C. App. 165, 182 S.E.2d 591, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 511, 183
S.E.2d 686 (1971)). The Texas Court of Civil Appeals decision cited by plaintiff, Texas Steel Co.
v. Douglas, 533 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), was based on a statute that, unlike North
Carolina's, specifically creates a cause of action in tort based on the theory of retaliatory dis-
charge. Id. at 296, 244 S.E.2d at 275.
409. 36 N.C. App. at 297, 244 S.E.2d at 275.
410, Id. at 300, 244 S.E.2d at 277.
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There was, however, a suggestion in the opinion that the court's
response would have been different had this plaintiff not received his
benefits pursuant to the statute,4 1' or had he alleged a pattern of activ-
ity by an employer that discouraged employees from claiming benefits
under the statute.4 12 Had either situation prevailed the court might
well have found that the employer was using a device to avoid its statu-
tory obligations.
Since this employee did receive full compensation under the Act,
the court's restraint is understandable. Because an employer who has
paid benefits has not avoided its obligations, the language of G.S. 97-6
is not amenable to a construction that would hold retaliatory discharge
to be a device for avoiding obligations imposed by the Act. This does
not mean, however, that the facts as alleged by this plaintiff should not
sustain a cause of action. Those facts, if true, not only reveal a







The court of appeals decided several major cases dealing with the
411. Id. at 298, 244 S.E.2d at 275-76.
412. Id. at 299, 244 S.E.2d at 276.
1. Pope v. Pope, 38 N.C. App. 328, 248 S.E.2d 260 (1978), involved a suit for arrearages due
under a separation agreement entered into in North Carolina. The court of appeals, holding that
support payments constitute a "thing of value" within the meaning of § 4(5)(c) of North
Carolina's long arm statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75-4 (1969), rejected the nonresident defendant's
challenge to its assertion of in personam jurisdiction over him. This provision allows the exercise
of jurisdiction in any action that "[airises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to
some third party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to deliver or receive within this State,
or to ship from this State goods, documents of title, or other things of value." Although the due
process question was not before the court (defendant conceded that the exercise of in personam
jurisdiction would not violate the fourteenth amendment), the court of appeals in dictum
indicated that parties who had resided, married and separated in North Carolina would be subject
to in personam jurisdiction in any suit involving the settlement agreement, so long as one of the
parties is still a resident of North Carolina. The court stated that due process requirements would
1979]
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due process requirements for the assertion of jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent defendants. In Swenson v. Thibaut,z the court upheld an applica-
tion of North Carolina's corporate director consent statute3 in the face
of a Shaffer v. Heitner4 challenge. Swenson was a shareholders' deriva-
tive suit brought against past and present officers and directors of All
American Assurance Company for breach of fiduciary duties through
be met in such a situation because the defendant has "purposefully [availed] himself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, [and has invoked] the benefits and
protection of its law." 38 N.C. App. at 331-32, 248 S.E.2d at 262 (citing Goldman v. Parkland, 277
N.C. App. 223, 229, 176 S.E.2d 784, 788 (1970)). The court also noted that under a recent United
States Supreme Court decision, Kulko v. Superior Court, 98 S. Ct. 1690 (1978), the assertion of in
personam jurisdiction over defendant was consistent with due process. 38 N.C. App. at 332, 248
S.E,2d at 262.
2. 39 N.C. App. 77, 250 S.E.2d 279 (1978).
3. N.C. GEN STAT. § 55-33 (1975) provides for long-arm in personam jurisdiction over non-
resident directors or officers of a domestic corporation. Id. § 1-74.4(8) defines such jurisdiction as
limited to "any action against a defendant who is or was an officer or director of a domestic
corporation where the action arises out of the defendant's conduct as such officer or director or out
of the activities of such corporation while the defendant held office as a director or officer."
4. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). The North Carolina Court of Appeals followed this landmark
United States Supreme Court decision in Balcon, Inc. v. Sadler, 36 N.C. App. 322, 244 S.E.2d 164
(1978), declaring N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.8(4) (1975) unconstitutional on grounds that the statute,
which authorized quasi in rem jurisdiction based on the attachment of property within the state,
failed to meet the due process standard articulated in Shaffer. 36 N.C. App. at 327, 244 S.E.2d at
167. Plaintiff, a Maryland corporation not doing business in North Carolina, sought to recover
from defendant, a resident of Maryland, a money judgment rendered in Maryland. Because de-
fendant owned real property in North Carolina, plaintiff attempted to invoke the court's quasi in
rem jurisdiction under § 1-75.8(4) by attaching this real property under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
440.1(b) (1969). The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction and
the court of appeals affirmed.
Shaffer extended to in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction the due process standard announced
by the United States Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945): "[Djue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in per-
sonan, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.'" Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 (1940)). The Court
in Shaffer reasoned that because " '[t]he phrase "judicial jurisdiction over a thing," is a customary
elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing,'" the same "mini-
mum contacts" test must be applied to ensure that the exercise ofjurisdiction over such interests is
consistent with the due process clause. 433 U.S. at 207 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56, Introductory Note (1971)).
Applying Shaffer to the facts in Balkon, the court of appeals noted that 'Jurisdiction [can] not
be based on the mere presence of property" in the forum state. 36 N.C. App. at 326, 244 S.E.2d at
167. Defendant's ownership of land in North Carolina was his only contact with the state and the
controversy underlying plaintiff's claim was in no way related to that property. The court, con-
cluding that the "minimum contacts" requirement was not met, held that jurisdiction over the case
was lacking. Id. The court did state, however, that "[wihere real property has some relation to the
controversy, the interest of the State in realty within its borders, and the defendant's substantial
relationship with the forum should support jurisdiction." Id. Although § 1-75.8(4) was found
unconstitutional, the court found § 1-75.8(5) valid despite Shaffer. Id. at 327, 244 S.E.2d at 167.
This latter subsection authorizes jurisdiction in any action "in which in rem or quasi in rem juris-
diction may be constitutionally exercised." Thus quasi in rem jurisdiction remains viable in
North Carolina, but only to the extent that the exercise thereof comports with the due process
standards set forth in International Shoe.
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mismanagement of company finances.' Defendant6 moved to dismiss
for lack of in personam jurisdiction. Although Shaffer involved the
constitutionality of quasi in rem jurisdiction,7 defendant relied on that
decision because of the substantial similarity in the facts of the two
cases: both involved nonresident defendants serving as directors in do-
mestic corporations and in both cases the directorships constituted the
only real contacts between defendants and the forum states.8
In Shaffer, the United States Supreme Court had held that under
these facts there were insufficient contacts to satisfy the due process test
set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.9 Attachment of de-
fendants' property within the state could not provide the needed con-
tacts because the cause of action, breach of fiduciary duties, was
unrelated to the property. 0 Despite its acknowledgement that the state
had an important interest in regulating the affairs of domestic corpora-
tions and that the defendants as directors had been entitled to the bene-
fits and protection of state law, the Shaffer Court concluded that these
considerations, though relevant to choice of law, were not alone ade-
quate for asserting jurisdiction." In commenting on the quasi in rem
jurisdictional statute involved the Court emphasized Delaware's failure
to base expressly its assertion of jurisdiction on its interest in governing
the activities of directors of domestic corporations.' 2 The Court indi-
cated that in the absence of such a statutory expression the director
defendants were not sufficiently on notice that they would be subject to
jurisdiction in the state of incorporation. 3
Dictum in Shaffer thus seems to imply that the manner of wording
a state's jurisdictional statute could have the effect of satisfying due
process requirements under a fact situation that otherwise would fail
the minimum contacts test.14 A state's articulation of its interest in as-
5. 39 N.C. App. at 82-84, 250 S.E.2d at 284-85.
6. The other directors named as defendants made a general appearance by moving to dis-
qualify plaintiffs' attorneys and thus, said the court, waived their defense of lack of jurisdiction
over the person. Id. at 92, 250 S.E.2d at 287.
7. See note 4 supra.
8. 433 U.S. at 189-92; 39 N.C. App. at 92-93, 250 S.E.2d at 290.
9. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). For the International Shoe test, see 326 U.S. at 316; 433 U.S. at 215-
16, quoted in note 4 supra.
10. 433 U.S. at 213.
11. Id. at 215-16.
12. Id. at 214-15. The Court noted that "[alIthough the sequestration procedure used here
may be most frequently used in derivative suits against officers and directors ... the authorizing
statute evinces no specific concern with such actions." Id. at 214.
13. See id; accord, 39 N.C. App. at 93, 250 S.E.2d at 290.
14. See Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U.L. REv. 33, 65-66 (1978).
1979]
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serting jurisdiction over certain individuals serves to give the required
notice. Indeed, the Shaffer court cited G.S. 55-3315 as an example of a
statute "that treats acceptance of a directorship as consent to jurisdic-
tion in the State."' 6 Thus the North Carolina Court of Appeals' up-
holding of an application of this statute in Swenson was not
unexpected.
The notice provided by a jurisdictional statute directed solely to-
ward directors and officers of domestic corporations affects the fairness
of making such an individual defend in the state.'7 Whether the exist-
ence of such a statute should be enough to transform virtually no con-
tacts into sufficient minimum contacts is questionable. G.S. 55-33
looks toward implied consent as a basis for assertion of jurisdiction
although International Shoe laid such fictions to rest.II In light of the
state's obviously important interest in regulating the affairs of domestic
corporations, however, it would seem that an assertion of jurisdiction
pursuant to the consent statute does not "offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice,"' 9 which is the key to the due process
standard.
In Kloster v. Region D Council of Governments,20 the court of ap-
peals considered the question whether a taxpayer has standing to chal-
lenge expenditures made by a regional council of governments.2 ' That
a citizen taxpayer has standing to contest the illegal use of public
money or property has long been recognized by North Carolina
courts.22 Kloster, however, adds an interesting twist: the money to be
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-33 (1975); see 433 U.S. at 216 n.47.
16. 433 U.S. at 216.
17. See id. at 214.
18. See 326 U.S. at 316-17 (1945).
19. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). In applying the minimum contacts test the court of appeals relied on By-
ham v. National Cibo House Corp., 265 N.C. 50, 143 S.E.2d 225 (1965), noting that the following
factors should be considered: whether defendant "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws,"
39 N.C. App. at 94, 250 S.E.2d at 290; whether the case involves some legitimate interest of the
forum state "in protecting its residents with respect to the activities and contacts of the nonresi-
dent," id. (this factor may have had special weight in Swenson, since the corporation involved was
an insurance company, see McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957)); the relative
convenience of the forum to both plaintiff and defendant, 39 N.C. App. at 94, 250 S.E.2d at 290;
and "the extent to which the legislature of the forum state has given authority to its courts to
entertain litigation against non-residents," id. at 93-97, 250 S.E.2d at 290-92.
20. 36 N.C. App. 421, 245 S.E.2d 180, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 466, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978).
21. N.C. GEN STAT. § 160A-470 (1976) authorizes the creation of regional councils of gov-
ernment by concurrent resolution of any two or more units of local government (county, city, or
consolidated city-county).
22. See Shaw v. Asheville, 269 N.C. 90, 152 S.E.2d 139 (1967); Wishart v. Lumberton, 254
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used by defendant came not from local taxes but from a federal grant.23
Although noting decisions to the contrary,24 the court of appeals fol-
lowed the reasoning in Shipley v. Smith25 and held that a taxpayer's
interest in the use of public funds is sufficient to confer standing regard-
less of their source.26 The court rejected an argument by defendant
that, because it is not a taxing authority, it should not be treated as a
municipality subject to suit by taxpayers.27 In holding that the tax-
payer here did have standing to contest the use of public funds by the
council, the court indicated that standing would arise not only in situa-
tions involving the use of local or federal money or property, but also
in situations involving "activities [which] may later require support by
tax monies."28 This latter pronouncement would seem to extend tax-
payer standing to include challenges to almost every conceivable activ-
ity of state and local governmental units.
B. Notice and Service of Process
In Wiles v. Welparnel Construction Co.,29 the North Carolina
Supreme Court, overruling prior case law, held that service of a sum-
mons directed to a person designated as the agent of a corporation is
sufficient service of process on the corporation so long as the corpora-
tion is named as the defendant in both the complaint and the caption of
the summons.30 In reaching its decision the court reinterpreted the re-
N.C. 94, 118 S.E.2d 35 (1961); Merrimon v. Southern Paving & Constr. Co., 142 N.C. 539,55 S.E.
366 (1906).
23. The funds were provided by the Economic Development Administration of the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce. 36 N.C. App. at 422, 245 S.E.2d at 181.
24. Id. at 425, 245 S.E.2d at 183; see, e.g., Andrews v. City of South Haven, 187 Mich. 294,
153 N.W. 827 (1915) (taxpayers lack standing to enjoin activities totally funded with nontax or
donative funds).
25. 45 N.M. 23, 107 P.2d 1050 (1940). The New Mexico court held that a taxpayer had
standing to seek an order restraining the use of public funds although the money was received as a
donation rather than through taxation. Comparing the taxpayer to a shareholder in a private
corporation, the court noted that just as corporate directors have no more right to waste money
received by the corporation as a gift than to waste money paid in by shareholders through stock
purchases, a municipality cannot waste public funds regardless of their origin.
26. 36 N.C. App. at 426, 245 S.E.2d at 183.
27. Id. Noting that councils of government are set up to coordinate governmental functions
best undertaken on a regional level, the court stated: "[We] do not believe that the General As-
sembly, in establishing the framework for such councils, intended that it would be a means by
which local governmental functions would be isolated from local taxpayer suits designed to con-
test the legality of council action." Id. at 427, 245 S.E.2d at 184.
28. Id. at 427, 245 S.E.2d at 184.
29. 295 N.C. 81, 243 S.E.2d 756 (1978).
30. In so holding, the court expressly overruled a line of cases represented by Russell v. Bea
Staple Mfg. Co., 266 N.C. 531, 146 S.E.2d 459 (1966); Hassell & Co. v. Daniels' Roanoke River
Line Steamboat Co., 168 N.C. 296, 84 S.E. 363 (1915); Plemmons v. Southern Improvement Co.,
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quirements of North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b),31 which
provides that the name appearing in the directory paragraph of the
summons should be that of the defendant rather than that of a process
officer being ordered to summon the defendant. Up to this point North
Carolina case law strictly required that the summons be directed to the
defendant; a summons directed to an individual described as an agent
or officer of the defendant was fatally defective.32 Examining the ra-
tionale behind requirements regarding sufficiency of process, the court
noted that rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,33 which is
similar to North Carolina's rule, is intended "to provide the mecha-
nisms for bringing notice of the commencement of an action to defend-
ant's attention and to provide a ritual that marks the court's assertion
of jurisdiction over the lawsuit. 34 The court, after considering the
summons before it on appeal 5 in light of this purpose of giving notice
to defendant, found that the naming of the corporation as defendant in
both the caption of the summons and the accompanying complaint 36
eliminated any confusion that might arise from the agent being named
in the directory paragraph, thus giving defendant adequate notice.37
Although a literal application of rule 4(b) would require finding
the summons in question insufficient, the court was willing to look be-
yond the language of the rule to its purpose of providing notice. This
more realistic approach indicates an increased willingness on the part
of the court to apply the Rules of Civil Procedure, not as stumbling
blocks in the path of an unwary party,38 but as a means of facilitating
litigation on the merits.
The court of appeals in Great Dane Trailers, Inc. v. North Brook
108 N.C. 614, 13 S.E. 188 (1891); and Carl Rose & Sons Ready Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Thorpe Sales
Corp., 30 N.C. App. 526, 227 S.E. 2d 301 (1976). These cases held that a court lacks jurisdiction
over the person if the summons is not directed to the defendant.
31. N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(b).
32. 295 N.C. at 83, 243 S.E.2d at 757; see, e.g., Carl Rose & Sons Ready Mix Concrete, Inc. v.
Thorpe Sales Corp., 30 N.C. App. 526, 227 S.E.2d 301 (1976).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
34. 295 N.C. at 84, 243 S.E.2d at 758 (quoting 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 1063 (1969)).
35. The summons was directed to "Mr. T.T. Nelson, Registered Agent/Welparnel Construc-
tion Company, Inc./ [address]." Id. at 82, 243 S.E.2d at 756.
36. N.C.R. Civ. P. 4 requires that the summons and complaint be served together.
37. 295 N.C. at 85, 243 S.E.2d at 758; see 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1088 (1969).
38. If the court had found the summons defective plaintiffwould have lost forever his oppor-
tunity to bring suit, because defendant then would not have been subjected to in personam juris-
diction before the running of the statute of limitations. See 295 N.C. at 82, 243 S.E.2d at 757.
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Poultry, Inc.39 held that a corporate defendant was properly served
with process when copies of the summons and complaint were left at
the home and with the wife of its registered agent. Under rule
4(j)(6)(b) process may be served upon a corporation "[b]y delivering a
copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by
appointment or by law to be served or to accept service of process or by
serving process upon such agent or the party in a manner specified by
any statute."'  Since a registered agent for a corporation may thus be
served in the same manner as an individual, service of process may be
made pursuant to rule 4(j)(1)(a),4' which permits service by leaving
copies of the summons and complaint at an individual's home with a
person of suitable age and discretion. Although the result in Great
Dane Trailers was clear under the statutes involved, it is noteworthy
because it calls attention to the difference between rule 4(j)(6)(b) and
its federal counterpart. Under federal rule 4(d)(7) service may be made
on a corporation "in the manner prescribed by any statute of the
United States."'42 The courts have interpreted this rule as referring only
to those statutes providing for service on corporations; 43 because serv-
ice on a registered agent is thus not available pursuant to rule 4(d)(1), 44
the federal rules would not support service of process in the manner
approved in Great Dane Trailers. Parties bringing suit in North Caro-
lina against corporate defendants thus can make use of an alternative
means of serving process not available to those using the federal forum.
39. 35 N.C. App. 752, 242 S.E.2d 533 (1978).
40. N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j)(6)(b).
41. Id. 4(j)(1)(a).
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7). In the North Carolina rule the words "in any manner specified
by any statute" refer to service on the agent of the corporation, as well as service on the corpora-
tion itself.
43. See Tyson v. Publishers Co., 223 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Bard v. Bemidji Bottle
Gas Co., 23 F.R.D. 299 (D. Minn. 1958); In re Eizen Furs, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 137 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1). This subdivision provides for service upon an individual "by
delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally or by leaving copies
thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discre-
tion residing therein."
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C. Amendments45
In Gro-Mar Public Relations, Inc. v. Billy Jack Enterprises, Inc. ,46
the court of appeals found an abuse of discretion in the trial court's
denial of plaintiffs motion to amend its complaint to show jurisdic-
tional grounds. Defendant had moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdic-
tion over the person;47 after holding a hearing the court granted the
motion and instructed defendant's attorney to submit an order to that
effect. The following day plaintiff moved under rule 15(a)48 to amend
its complaint to allege that it and defendant were parties to a contract
to be performed in North Carolina.49 The trial court denied plaintiffs
motion and signed the order submitted by defendant granting its mo-
tion to dismiss. From the denial of its motion, plaintiff appealed.50
The court of appeals held that under rule 15(a)51 the trial court
should have granted plaintiffs motion to amend its complaint. Support
for this conclusion was found in Vernon v. Crist,52 in which the North
Carolina Supreme Court noted that "leave to amend should be 'freely
given when justice so requires' and that the burden is on the party ob-
jecting to the amendment to show that he would be prejudiced
45. In Turner Halsey Co. v. Lawrence Knitting Mills, Inc., 38 N.C. App. 569, 248 S.E.2d 342
(1978), the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment on the same day it granted plaintiff's motion to amend its complaint. N.C.R.
Civ. P. 15(a) provides that "a party shall plead in response to an amended pleading.. . , unless
the court otherwise orders." The court of appeals interpreted the rule to require that defendants
be given an opportunity to answer before the court hears plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment. 38 N.C. App. at 572-73, 248 S.E.2d at 345. N.C.Rt Civ. P. 56(c) provides that summary
judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." If in amending its
complaint a party makes some material alteration to its previous contentions the trial court cannot
know before the other party has answered whether this alteration has given rise to a genuine issue
about any material fact. Thus it seems that a simultaneous grant of leave to amend a complaint
and summary judgment will be improper if the amendment is one that could give rise to a genuine
issue about any material fact.
46. 36 N.C. App. 673, 245 S.E.2d 782 (1978).
47. Id. at 675, 245 S.E.2d at 783. Defendant also based his motion to dismiss on alleged
insufficiency of summons and service of process. The court of appeals, following the decision in
Wiles, found both summons and service of process sufficient. Id. at 675-76, 245 S.E.2d at 784.
48. N.C.R. Civ. P. 15(a).
49. N.C. GCN. STAT. § 55-145(a)(1) (1975) provides that a foreign corporation is subject to
suit in North Carolina on any cause of action arising "[o]ut of any contract made in this State or to
be performed in this State," regardless of whether the corporation has ever transacted business in
the state. Defendant in this case was a foreign corporation. 36 N.C. App. at 674, 245 S.E.2d at
783.
50. 36 N.C. App. at 675, 245 S.E.2d at 783.
51. Under N.C.R. Civ. P. 15(a), when amendment is not allowed as a matter of course, "a
party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party;
and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires."
52. 291 N.C. 646, 231 S.E.2d 591 (1977).
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thereby.'5  In addition the court relied on Poman v. Davis,54 a United
States Supreme Court decision that mandated granting leave to amend,
subject to certain exceptions, and warned that a denial of leave to
amend without justification would constitute an abuse of discretion.55
There are several problems with the court's analysis in Gro-Mar.
In the first place, the North Carolina rules do not require that grounds
for jurisdiction be set forth in the complaint.56 If an amendment is
superfluous, it is difficult to understand how denial of the amendment
could constitute an abuse of discretion. Second, plaintiff had an oppor-
tunity to present arguments in favor of a finding of jurisdiction at the
hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss. In considering how to rule
on defendant's motion, the trial court must have weighed any grounds
plaintiff had put forth in support of in personam jurisdiction. Thus the
trial court's grant of defendant's motion indicated a finding that
grounds for jurisdiction were lacking. Consequently, its denial of leave
to amend to allege grounds for jurisdiction could hardly be considered
an abuse of discretion.
The Gro -Mar court's endorsement of Foman v. Davis has far-
reaching implications. Language in Foman indicates that a court
abuses its discretion if it denies leave to amend without specifically set-
ting forth its grounds for denial, unless the reasons for denial are other-
wise apparent.57 Thus, in Gro-Mar the court pointed out that "the trial
court failed to state a reason [for denying leave to amend]" and added
"nor do we perceive that there are any 'apparent' reasons for denial of
leave to amend."5 8 Although it would seem that reasons for denial
were clear in this case, the court's use of Foman indicates that in future
cases a court's failure to specifically set forth its rationale in denying
leave to amend may constitute an abuse of discretion.
53. Id. at 654, 231 S.E.2d at 596. Defendant had made no such showing.
54. 371 U.S. 178 (1962). FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) is almost identical to North Carolina's rule.
55. 371 U.S. at 182. In the language of the Court:
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith or
dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of al-
lowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as the
rules require, be "freely given." Of course, the grant or denial of an opportunity to
amend is within the discretion of the District Court, but outright refusal to grant the
leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discre-
tion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal
Rules.
Id.
56. N.C.R. Civ. P. 8.
57. See note 55 supra.
58. 36 N.C. App. at 679, 245 S.E.2d at 785.
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A denial of leave to amend a complaint to add a party defendant
worked a harsh result upon the plaintiff in Callicutt v. American Honda
Motor Co.5 9 Plaintiff had brought suit against American Honda Motor
Company to recover for injuries sustained as a result of alleged negli-
gence and breach of warranty. In its answer defendant admitted manu-
facturing and selling the motorcycle involved but denied negligence
and breach of warranty.60 After the statute of limitations had run de-
fendant sought leave to amend its answer, asserting that it had recently
become aware that Honda Motor Company, Ltd. was the actual manu-
facturer of the motorcycle. The trial court granted defendant's motion.
Shortly thereafter plaintiff moved to amend its complaint to add
Honda Motor Company, Ltd. as a party defendant. The motion was
denied, and plaintiff appealed.61
The court of appeals found no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's denial of leave to amend. Noting that Foman v. Davis acknowl-
edged futility of amendment as sufficient justification for denying leave
to amend, the court considered whether the proposed amendment
would relate back; if relation back were precluded, the statute of limita-
tions would be a complete defense to a suit by plaintiff against Honda
Motor Company, Ltd., thus rendering amendment futile. The court
held that under rule 15(c) 62 relation back could not be had because the
original complaint did not give notice to Honda Motor Company,
Ltd.63
Although the court of appeals concluded that the record contained
nothing indicating any relationship between the two motor companies,
59. 37 N.C. App. 210, 245 S.E.2d 558 (1978).
60. Id. Partial summary judgment for defendant was subsequently granted on the breach of
warranty claim. Id.
61. Id. at 210-11, 245 S.E.2d at 559.
62. N.C.R. Civ. P. 15(c):
A claim asserted in an amended pleading is deemed to have been interposed at the time
the claim in the original pleading was interposed, unless the original pleading does not
give notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, to be
proved pursuant to the amended pleading.
Although the language of this rule is arguably not applicable to amendments adding new parties,
the court of appeals relied on Teague v. Asheboro Motor Co., 14 N.C. App. 736, 189 S.E.2d 671
(1972), which interpreted 15(c) to require "that the claim asserted in the amendment must be
against one given notice in the original pleading of the transactions to be proved." Id. at 739, 189
S.E.2d at 673; f FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) (provides for relation back of amendment changing a party
if claim asserted arose out of same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in original plead-
ing and if new party "(1) has received such notice [before the running of the statute of limitations]
of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the
merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the
proper party, the action would have been brought against him").
63. 37 N.C. App. at 211-13, 245 S.E.2d at 560.
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arguably judicial notice could have been taken of what would seem a
possible parent/subsidiary or manufacturer/distributor arrangement. 64
Alternatively, the court could have held American Honda Motor Com-
pany, Inc. to be equitably estopped from denying that it manufactured
the car, since information relating to manufacture was solely within its
knowledge and its timing in releasing this information worked to de-
prive plaintiff of a substantial part of his cause of action 5.6  The court's
failure to look beyond a technical application of procedural rules led to
this unnecessarily harsh result.
.D. Local Rules
Rule 40 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that the senior resident superior court judge of each judicial district
"may provide by rule for the calendaring of actions for trial in the su-
perior court." 66 Once a local rule is promulgated the question arises
whether the court has discretion to deviate from its provisions. This
issue was addressed, at least obliquely, by the North Carolina Court of
Appeals in Forman & Zuckerman v. Schupak.67 Plaintiff, after the non-
appearance of defendants in an action for unpaid legal fees, filed a mo-
tion for judgment by default together with a request that the motion be
calendared for hearing.68 Defendants responded by letter to the calen-
daring clerk indicating that the request for hearing was one day late
under local rules and therefore could not be considered.69 Plaintiff
then wrote the calendaring clerk, forwarding a copy to defendants, in-
dicating that the hearing appeared on the final calendar on the date
requested.7 ° When the hearing was held as scheduled and defendants
did not appear, the judge entered judgment by default against them.71
64. If such a relationship were found to exist, it could provide not only a potential basis for
liability of Honda Motor Company, Ltd., see Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 1343 (1966), but could also be
indicative of whether Honda Motor Company, Ltd. was put on notice through American Honda
Motor Company.
65. Cf. Zielinski v. Philadelphia Piers, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. Pa. 1956) (defendant
made inaccurate answer which it knew, or had within its control the means of knowing, was
inaccurate; held: defendant estopped from taking advantage of statute of limitations when its con-
duct has thus misled plaintifi).
66. N.C.R. Civ. P. 40(a).
67. 38 N.C. App. 17, 247 S.E.2d 266 (1978).
68. Id. at 18, 247 S.E.2d at 268.
69. Id. The request was made 13 days prior to the requested hearing date. The local rule
provided that "[riequests for pretrial hearings on motions will be considered by the Calendar
Committee if filed by 5:00 p.m. on Monday two (2) weeks prior to the beginning of the session
requested." Id. at 21, 247 S.E.2d at 269.
70. Id. at 18, 247 S.E.2d at 268.
71. Id. at 18-19, 247 S.E.2d at 268.
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On appeal defendants argued that the court erred by calendaring
plaintiff's motion in violation of local rules.72 In its opinion, the court
of appeals interpreted the local rule not toprohibit the calendaring of a
motion if the request is late, but merely to allow the calendar commit-
tee not to consider late requests if it so chooses.73 The court also inti-
mated, however, that even if the rule does prohibit calendaring of a
hearing if the request is tardy, the trial court has wide discretion to
decide whether to apply local rules in any given instance.74 The court
indicated that the two considerations in the trial judge's exercise of this
discretion are actual harm to the complaining party and efficient court
administration.7 5 Thus, under the court's opinion a trial judge can
choose to ignore a local rule if the complaining party is not harmed and
if the efficient administration of the court is not impeded.76
This view of the force of local rules is not shared by the federal
courts. Their view is that although a trial judge can interpret an ambig-
uous rule, he cannot refuse to apply an applicable rule simply because
the complaining party was not harmed nor court efficiency impeded.
72. Id. at 20, 247 S.E.2d at 269. Defendants also argued that failure to abide by the local rule
denied them due process. Id. at 19, 247 S.E.2d at 268. The court of appeals rejected this argument
because defendants had actual notice of the hearing. Id.
73. Id. at 21, 247 S.E.2d at 269. It is equally plausible to read the language of the rule as
prohibiting the calendaring of a motion on late request. See note 69 supra. When the language of
a local rule is ambiguous, as it was in this case, the promulgating court is usually the best source of
interpretation. See 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 37, § 3153 (1973). The trial court in
this case, however, did not have the opportunity to interpret the local rule involved because de-
fendant was defaulted for failure to appear and hence was not present to argue its interpretation of
the local rule. Thus, in absence of a trial court's interpretation of its own rule, the court of appeals
should be a proper interpreter. Moreover, under North Carolina's rule 40 local calendaring rules
are promulgated, not by a majority vote of the local judges as in federal courts, Fed. R. Civ. P. 83,
but by the senior resident superior court judge acting alone. Thus, it can be argued that even if
there is a trial court interpretation by a nonpromulgating judge, the appellate court is at least as
proper an interpreter as that judge. For this reason it is arguable that the court of appeals need
not give as much deference to an interpretation by a lower court as do the federal courts.
74. 38 N.C. App. at 21, 247 S.E.2d at 269.
75. Id. at 20-21, 247 S.E.2d at 269. The conclusion that judges have discretion to avoid local
rules in the interest of efficient court administration is clearly implied in the court's attempt to
distinguish the administrative law rule that requires government agencies to follow their self-
promulgated procedures even though the procedures did not originally arise from any constitu-
tional requirement. See id. The court reasoned that administrative rules, unlike local court rules,
"generally take on certain aspects of both procedural and substantive law," while local rules of
court are adopted solely to promote effective administration of justice. Id. at 20, 247 S.E.2d at
269. The court does stop short of saying that local rules are only concerned with court administra-
tion by finding that the defendants in this case were in no way harmed by the calendaring of the
motion despite the late request. Id. at 21,247 S.E.2d at 269. This inquiry into harm indicates that
not only court efficiency but also the procedural and reliance interests of the parties are considera-
tions in the trial court's exercise of discretion.
76. The court of appeals' interpretation that the language of the local rule did not prohibit
the calendaring of late requests was sufficient to dispose of the case. Therefore, the court's further
discussion of the trial court's discretion to apply local rules is dictum.
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"Because local rules do have the force of law, they should be held to be
binding upon parties and upon the court that promulgated them
. . ." This principle has special application in North Carolina be-
cause a single judge should not have the power to refuse to apply a rule
promulgated by his senior superior court judge pursuant to specific leg-
islative authority. Thus, while the trial court and the appellate courts
have authority to interpret the language of local rules, any suggestion
in the court's opinion in Schupak that the trial court has discretion in
its application of an unambiguous rule should be ignored.
E. Dismissal of Actions-Rule 41
North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) provides that a
plaintiff can dismiss his own action at any time before resting his case
without having the dismissal operate as an adjudication on the merits. 78
If plaintiff has already rested his case, a dismissal without prejudice can
be obtained only by order of the judge pursuant to rule 41(a)(2). 79 Rule
41(a)(2), therefore, is often invoked to avoid adjudication on the merits
77. 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 37, § 3153. See also Woods Constr. Co. v. Atlas
Chem. Indus., Inc., 337 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1964). But see Frankel v. Alan Wood Steel Co., 31
F.R.D. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
78. N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(l). Rule 41(d), however, formerly required that a plaintiff, having
taken a voluntary dismissal under 41(a)(1), pay defendant's costs in the action previously dis-
missed before bringing a second suit on the same claim. The court was required, upon motion of
the defendant, to dismiss the second suit if brought before those costs were paid. N.C.R. CIv. P.
41(d), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1 (1969); see Thigpen v. Piver, 37 N.C. App. 382, 246 S.E.2d 67, cert.
denied, 295 N.C. 653, 248 S.E.2d 257 (1978). Effective January 1, 1978, this rule has been
changed. Law of May 2, 1977, ch. 290, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 296. No longer is the court immedi-
ately required to dismiss the nonpaying plaintiff's second suit, but
the court, upon motion of the defendant, shall make an order for the payment of such
costs by the plaintiff within 30 days and shall stay the proceedings in the action until the
plaintiff has complied with the order. If the plaintiff does not comply with the order, the
court shall dismiss the action.
N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(d). This new provision is still quite different from the federal rule, which gives
a federal court discretion to decide whether to require payment of costs. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(d).
This discretion is necessary in federal court because, unlike the North Carolina rule 41(d), the
federal rule provides no exception for plaintiffs who are financially unable. Because North Caro-
lina has such an exception it is not necessary to give state judges the discretion enjoyed by their
federal counterparts. The old North Carolina rule, however, was too harsh in requiring immedi-
ate dismissal of the second action for failure to pay the costs, because many times there may have
been good reason beyond plaintiffs' control that forced taking a voluntary dismissal. See 9 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 37, § 2375 n.41. Thus, the North Carolina version of rule 41(d)
now requires the payment of costs without being overly harsh to either the indigent plaintiff or the
plaintiff who had good reason to take a voluntary dismissal. Furthermore, the nondiscretionary
nature of North Carolina rule 41(d) provides a stronger discouragement to plaintiffs considering a
41(a)(1) voluntary dismissal than does the federal version. Such a disincentive is needed because
in contrast to federal rule 41(a)(1), which permits a voluntary dismissal to be taken only up to
service of an answer or motion for summary judgment, North Carolina rule 41(a) allows such a
dismissal anytime before plaintiff rests his case.
79. N.C.R Civ. P. 41(a)(2).
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when the trial judge has intimated an intention to grant an adverse
directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict."0 A plaintiff
who dismisses pursuant to rule 41(a)(1) or (2) is allowed an additional
year in which to refile.1' As illustrated in West v. Reddick, Inc.,8 z a rule
41(a)(2) motion can be made after a previous dismissal to convert that
previous dismissal into one under rule 41(a)(2), thus allowing the addi-
tional time to refile. The West court, however, failed to recognize that
to effect such a result the 41(a)(2) motion must be made within ten days
of the previous dismissal.
Plaintiff in West commenced a personal injury action within the
limitation period.8 3 Defendant then moved for and received a dismis-
sal of plaintiff's claim for lack of personal jurisdiction.14 Such a dismis-
sal is normally without prejudice,85 but in this case, the statute of
limitations had expired between the time plaintiff filed his complaint
and the time of the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.86 Plaintiff
could have preempted the impending dismissal for lack of personal ju-
risdiction by taking a voluntary dismissal under rule 41(a)(1), which
would have given him an additional year in which to bring another
suit.87 After the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, however, plaintiff
could no longer take a voluntary dismissal under 41(a)(1).88 Alterna-
tively, had plaintiff asked the court at the time of the dismissal for a
80. W. SHUFORD, NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL PRAcrICE AND PROCEDURE § 41-5 (1975 & Supp.
1978).
81. N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(a). If the 41(a) dismissal is pursuant to a stipulation by all the parties
or to an order of the court the stipulation or order can specify an amount of time shorter than one
year in which to refile the claim.
82. 38 N.C. App. 370, 248 S.E.2d 112 (1978).
83. See id.
84. Id. at 370, 248 S.E.2d at 113.
85. N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(b) states: "Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies,
. . . any dismissal. . . , other than a dismissal for lack ofjurisdiction ... operates as an adjudi-
cation upon the merits."
86. Although the opinion does not mention that the statute had run, from the dates given it
appears that although the complaint was filed in time, the statute had expired before the dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction. A three year limitation period is applicable for personal injury due to
negligence. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977); see Sheppard v. Barrus Constr. Co., 11
N.C. App. 358, 181 S.E.2d 130 (1971). The injury occurred July 25, 1974, the complaint was filed
July 22, 1976, and the dismissal for lack ofjurisdiction occurred September 12, 1977.
87. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1). The one year extension is available under rule 41(a)(l) even
though the court is later found to have lacked personal jurisdiction. "If an action commenced
within the time prescribed therefor ... is dismissed without prejudice under this subsection, a
new action based on the same claim may be commenced within one year after such dismissal
." Id. (emphasis added). "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court."
N.C.R. CIv. P. 3 (emphasis added). Thus, it is clear that it is the filing of a complaint and not the
obtaining of personal jurisdiction through a valid summons that is the prerequisite to a 41(a)(1)
dismissal and the additional year in which to refile provided thereunder.
88. See Wood v. Wood, 37 N.C. App. 570, 246 S.E.2d 549 (1978).
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voluntary dismissal under 41(a)(2), the court could have granted his
motion, allowing him an additional year in which to refile his claim. 89
Plaintiff did in fact move for a 41(a)(2) voluntary dismissal, but not
until three days after being dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction. Nonethe-
less, the trial judge granted the motion.9"
On appeal, defendant argued that it is incongruous to allow a trial
judge to dismiss a case a second time after he has already dismissed it
once.91 The court of appeals curtly dismissed this argument by saying,
"Rule 41 places no time limit on the right of a plaintiff to move for a
voluntary dismissal under 41(a)(2)."92 Taking this reasoning to its ex-
treme reveals its shortcomings: if there is no time limit on when a dis-
missed plaintiff may ask the court to grant a dismissal pursuant to rule
41(a)(2), which allows him an additional year to bring suit, the defend-
ant in such a situation will never be secure from suit on the claim de-
spite the running of the statute of limitations. Although it does not
seem unreasonable for a plaintiff to ask the trial judge three days after
being dismissed to convert his dismissal into one pursuant to rule
41(a)(2), thus avoiding any statute of limitations bar to another suit,
there must be a time limit on such a request.
To set a limit on this practice, perhaps a motion by a plaintiff for a
41(a)(2) voluntary dismissal made after already having been dismissed
for another reason should be viewed as a motion to convert the first
dismissal into one pursuant to 41(a)(2).93 Under this approach the year
extension of time in which to bring a second suit would begin to run,
not at the time of the 41(a)(2) motion, but at the time of the original
dismissal. Therefore, a 41(a)(2) motion made more than one year after
a previous dismissal would be of no avail in extending the time in
which to bring a second suit.
There is, however, an even more restrictive time limit that should
89. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Unlike a voluntary dismissal under 41(a)(1) the judge must
take affirmative action to grant a 41(a)(2) dismissal. In view of this distinction it can be argued
that while personal jurisdiction is not a prerequisite for a 41(a)(l) dismissal, see note 87 supra, it is
for a 41(a)(2) dismissal. Rule 41(a)(2), however, like rule 41(a)(l) appears to condition the addi-
tional year in which to refile only on commencement of the first suit within the statute of limita-
tions. Because filing of a complaint constitutes commencement of a suit, it would appear that
failure to obtain personal jurisdiction would not preclude the judge's granting a 41(a)(2) dismissal.
90. 38 N.C. App. at 371, 248 S.E.2d at 113.
91. See also Wood v. Wood, 37 N.C. App. 570, 246 S.E.2d 549 (1978).
92. 38 N.C. App. at 372, 248 S.E.2d at 113.
93. See Wood v. Wood, 37 N.C. App. 570, 246 S.E.2d 549 (1978). "Obviously, a voluntary
dismissal under Rule 41 will lie only prior to entry of final judgment. After final judgment, any
correction, modification, amendment, or setting aside can only be done by the court." Id. at 575,
246 S.E.2d at 552.
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be applicable to a motion for a 41(a)(2) voluntary dismissal made after
a previous dismissal. Rule 59(e) provides that "[a] motion to alter or
amend the judgment ... shall be served not later than 10 days after
entry of the judgment. ' 94 It is clear that rule 59(e) can be invoked to
alter or amend not only a judgment on the merits but an order termi-
nating an action prior to any trial, although not an adjudication on the
merits.95 Thus, a motion under rule 59(e) would have been appropriate
in West when plaintiff sought to convert dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction into a 41(a)(2) dismissal and thereby gain additional time
to refile his claim.96 Therefore, the court of appeals was correct in af-
firming the trial judge's allowance of plaintiffs 41(a)(2) dismissal, not
because such motions can be made "at any time," but because it was
made within the ten day limit of rule 59(e). 97
94. N.C.R. Ctv. P. 59(e).
95. In Graddy v. Bonsai, 375 F.2d 764, 765 (2d Cir. 1967), plaintiff's motion to vacate an
earlier dismissal for lack of federal jurisdiction was regarded as a motion "'to alter or amend the
judgment' under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)." In Silk v. Sandoval, 435 F.2d 1266 (1st Cir. 1971), plain-
tiffs motion to vacate an earlier dismissal for nonjoinder, which like a dismissal for lack of juris-
diction is not an adjudication on the merits, was also subject to the 10 day limit under rule 59(e).
See also 6A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 59.12[l], at 59-247 (2d ed. 1974) ("Relief may be
sought under Rule 59(e) on a timely motion to amend the judgment to alter the dismissal from one
without prejudice to a dismissal with prejudice, and vice versa. ... ); W. SHUFORD, supra note
80, 59-18 ("This section will be applicable in situations where ... relief is sought from an order
terminating the action prior to trial."). But see Myers v. Westland Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 667
(D.N.D. 1949). In Myers plaintiffwas dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction. The court granted plain-
tiffs motion to add the words "without prejudice" to the dismissal although the motion was made
six months after the dismissal. Professor Moore calls this result "clearly untenable" because the
motion should not have been granted unless made within the 10 day limit of rule 59(e). 6A
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra, 59.12[l], at 59-244 n.17.
96. If plaintiff does not make the 10 day time limit he might attempt to argue that the motion
.to alter the dismissal is a motion for rule 60(b)(1) relief on the grounds of mistake or excusable
neglect. Plaintiff can attempt to show an excuse for not asking for a 41(b)(2) at the time of the
original motion or within 10 days thereafter. Alternatively, he can argue that the court made a
mistake by not dismissing pursuant to 41(b)(2). Any attempt, however, to utilize 60(b) to avoid
the 10 day time limit of rule 59(e) should be a last resort. See Silk v. Sandoval, 435 F.2d 1266 (1st
Cir. 1971) (court refused to give broad interpretation to rule 60(b)(1) and permit avoidance of rule
59(e)'s 10 day time limit).
97. The court's reliance on King v. Lee, 279 N.C. 100, 181 S.E.2d 400 (1971), for the "no time
limit" idea is inapposite. In King the supreme court remanded the case to the trial court to permit
a motion for a voluntary dismissal. This holding, which dealt with a case on appeal that was
remanded to the trial court, cannot support the idea that once an action leaves the trial court on a
final ruling the losing party can, without appealing, ask the trial court for a 41(a)(2) voluntary
dismissal at any time in the future.
Fifteen days after the trial judge in West granted plaintiffs 41(a)(2) voluntary dismissal the
judge entered a supplemental order stating that the previously allowed motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction was a mistake, and therefore void, and that the order granting plaintiffs 41(a)(2)
was what he actually intended. 38 N.C. App. at 371, 248 S.E.2d at 113. The court of appeals held
that this supplemental order "is of no effect" because (1) when the supplemental order was entered
defendant had already filed an appeal of the previous order allowing the 41(a)(2) dismissal and (2)
the term of court had expired. Id. at 372, 248 S.E.2d at 114. The rule that a party cannot seek to
amend a judgment after the expiration of the term of court is old law and has been supplanted by
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In North Carolina there are two ways to take an appeal from an
order determining less than all the claims for relief in an action. Such
an appeal lies if the trial judge certifies the appeal by entering a final
judgment on one or more but fewer than all of the claims pursuant to
his authority under rule 54(b) 99 An appeal is also allowed under G.S.
1-277 or 7A-27 without the trial judge's certification"o if the interlocu-
tory order "affects a substantial right.""'' Justice Exum in Waters v.
Qualffed Personnel, Inc. 10 2 admitted that this "'substantial right' test
for appealability of interlocutory orders is more easily stated than ap-
plied." 10 3 Yet an examination of that case in comparison with a previ-
ous supreme court case on the issue of appealability suggests a general
proposition that in many circumstances should be helpful in analyzing
the substantial right issue: the right to avoid one trial on the disputed
issues is not normally a substantial right that would allow an interlocu-
the 10 day period of rule 59(e). W. SHuFoRaD, supra note 80, § 59-18, at 502. If, however, an
appeal is taken before a 59(e) motion is made to transform a previous dismissal into one pursuant
to rule 41(a)(2), the trial court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the motion. See Bowen v.
Hodge Motor Co., 292 N.C. 633, 234 S.E.2d 748 (1977). Thus, if the party adversely affected by
the original dismissal or judgment appeals that order before moving to amend it under rule 59(e),
the trial court will not have jurisdiction to consider amending its order. If, on the other hand, the
adversely affected party moves to amend under 59(e), the time period for giving notice of appeal
does not begin to run until the trial court grants or denies the 59(e) motion. 6A MooRE's FED-
ERAL PRACTICE T 59.12[2], at 59-253 (2d ed. 1974).
98. In Herff Jones Co. v. Allegood, 35 N.C. App. 475, 241 S.E.2d 700 (1978), the court of
appeals held that the question of the propriety of a preliminary injunction to enforce a one year
agreement not to compete is rendered moot when during the pendency of the appeal of the order
granting the injunction, the one year period had expired. Plaintiff corporation had obtained a
preliminary injunction to restrain defendants, its former salesmen, from competing against
plaintiff in violation of their employment contracts. Justice Exum issued a writ of supersedeas
that had the effect of denying enforcement of the preliminary injunction pending appeal. Id. at
477, 241 S.E.2d at 701. By the time the appeal was heard the one year period had expired, thus
making the issue moot.
Judge Clark in dissent suggested that the writ of supersedeas should have the effect not only
of staying the enforcement of the preliminary injunction but of suspending the running of the
noncompetition clause as well. "[O]therwise, the supersedeas in effect would determine the
substantive rights of the parties . . . to injunctive relief . Id. at 481, 241 S.E.2d at 704
(dissenting opinion).
99. N.C.R. Civ. P. 54(b). The trial judge "may enter a final judgment as to one or more but
fewer than all of the claims or parties only if there is no just reason for delay and it is so deter-
mined in the judgment." Id.
100. See Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976).
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277 (Cum. Supp. 1977); id. § 7A-27 (1969). In addition to orders
"affect[ing] a substantial right" these statutes allow an appeal of an interlocutory order that "in
effect determines the action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken," or
"discontinues the action" or "grants or refuses a new trial."
102. 294 N.C. 200, 240 S.E.2d 338 (1978).
103. Id. at 208, 240 S.E.2d at 343.
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tory appeal, while the right to avoid the possibility of two trials on the
same issues can be such a substantial right.
In Waters, defendant's grant of summary judgment was later set
aside by the trial judge because of procedural irregularity.""° The
supreme court ruled that "an order setting aside without prejudice a
summary judgment on the grounds of procedural irregularity .. .is
not immediately appealable."' 5 This decision was based on "both rea-
son and analagous [sic] cases."'0 6 The analogous cases were those
holding that orders denying summary judgment and other similar in-
terlocutory orders are not appealable.0 7 Viewing "substantial rights"
from the perspective of what the defendant loses if there is no immedi-
ate appeal the court reasoned that
[a]ll defendant suffers by its inability to appeal [the order setting
aside summary judgment] is the necessity of rehearing its motion.
The avoidance of such a rehearing is not a "substantial right" enti-
tling defendant to an immediate appeal. Neither, for that matter, is
the avoidance of trial which defendant might have to undergo should
its motion ... be denied. 10
Thus, the court indicates that the opportunity to avoid an initial trial is
not a substantial right so as to allow an immediate appeal.
The court also reasoned that defendant's rights are "fully and ade-
quately protected" by assigning error on appeal. 109 As shown by Oes-
treicher v. American National Stores, Inc., "I the "fully and adequately
protected" concept, however, is by no means a test for determining
when there is no right to appeal. In Oestreicher the trial court granted
summary judgment for defendant on two of plaintiffs three related
claims for relief. Although plaintiff theoretically could have protected
his rights to recover under the two eliminated claims by assigning error
on appeal after the trial of the third claim, the supreme court held that
there was an immediate right of appeal because plaintiff had a substan-
tial right to have all three related claims tried at one time."' The dis-
104. Id. at 206-07, 240 S.E.2d at 342-43.
105. Id. at 208, 240 S.E.2d at 343.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 208-09, 240 S.E.2d at 344.
108. Id. at 208, 240 S.E.2d at 344.
109. Id.
110. 290 N.C. 118, 225 $.E.2d 797 (1976).
111. Because virtually any order by a trial court can be assigned as error on appeal it can be
argued that there are few situations other than a final judgment or injunction in which the party
will not be fully and adequately protected despite an inability to appeal immediately. Thus if
adequate protection is the test for a substantial right then the substantial right statutes add nothing
to rule 54(b)-in other words, all interlocutory appeals must be certified. This is the federal posi-
[Vol. 57
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tinction between Oestreicher and Waters is that in Oestreicher, if an
appeal was not immediately allowed, plaintiff would be faced with a
trial of the one remaining claim and then, if successful in overturning
the summary judgment against his other two related claims, a second
trial would be necessary. 1 2 In Waters, on the other hand, denial of the
right to appeal the setting aside of defendant's summary judgment ne-
cessitates only a rehearing of the summary judgment and at most one
trial. Thus, a comparison of Waters with Oestreicher suggests that
while the opportunity to avoid an initial trial is not a substantial right,
the right to avoid the possibility of two trials is." 3
tion and that of North Carolina before Oestreicher. See Survey of Developments in North Carolina
Law, 1976, 55 N.C.L. REv. 895, 929 (1977).
112. See also Hudspeth v. Bunzey, 35 N.C. App. 231, 241 S.E.2d 119, cert. denied, 294 N.C.
736, 244 S.E.2d 154 (1978). The court held that the denial of a motion to amend the answer to
assert a compulsory counterclaim affects a substantial right and is immediately appealable under
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277 (1969). Id. at 234, 241 S.E.2d at 121. The court noted that "failure to
assert a compulsory counterclaim will ordinarily bar future action on the claim." Id. at 233, 241
S.E.2d at 121. Although it seems that future action should not be barred if the denial of the
amendment is later found to be error, an immediate appeal should be allowed to avoid having to
try the same issues twice. Thus the substantial right affected in this case is not the bar of a future
action on the compulsory counterclaim but the possibility of two trials.
113. The significance of allowing an appeal in order to avoid a possible second trial is appar-
ent in Tennessee-Carolina Traasp., Inc. v. Strick Corp., 291 N.C. 618, 231 S.E.2d 597 (1977), and
recognized in Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1977, 56 N.C.L. REV. 874, 908-09
(1978) ("When an order is made that is destined to affect significantly the later conduct of the trial
and that could form the basis for awarding the adversely affected party a new trial, the more
economical course to take might well be immediate resolution of the question in the appellate
courts."). While the Waters court views substantial rights from the perspective of what a party
will lose by the inability to appeal, the above view is from an economic perspective.
The one-trial/two-trial distinction should have been employed by the court of appeals in
Jones v. Clark, 36 N.C. App. 327, 244 S.E.2d 183 (1978), to avoid a piecemeal appeal of a third-
party claim. In Jones the defendant/seller in a breach of warranty action impleaded as third-
party defendants the manufacturer and a firm that had inspected the goods. The trial court
granted summary judgment for the inspection firm and the defendants/third-party plaintiffs ap-
pealed. The court of appeals, without fully resolving whether defendant had a right to an immedi-
ate appeal under the substantial rights statutes, decided the case on the merits. Id. at 329-30, 244
S.E.2d at 185. Allowing this uncertified piecemeal appeal was not only a waste of judicial efforts
but wrong under the law. Defendant's substantial rights as defined in Oestreicher and Waters
would not have been affected by the inability to immediately appeal the adverse summary judg-
ment on his third-party complaint. If the trial on the underlying claim continues while the third-
party claim is appealed, the defendant will unavoidably endure two trials if his appeal on the
third-party complaint succeeds. Therefore, because defendant can protect his third-party claim by
assigning error in the grant of summary judgment, and because an immediate appeal win not
avert the possibility of a second trial, defendant has no substantial right that would allow an
uncertified appeal.
The key to this analysis is that the trial on the underlying claim will continue during the
appeal of the third-party claim. Section 1-294 states:
When an appeal is perfected as provided by this article it stays all further proceeding in
the court below upon the judgment appealed from, or upon the matter embraced therein;
but the court below may proceed upon any other matter included in the action and not
affected by the judgment appealedfrom.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-294 (1969) (emphasis added). Although it is not entirely clear whether the
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In Parrish v. Cole114 the court of appeals considered the question
whether a notice of appeal bars a subsequent but timely motion under
rule 52(b)115 to amend findings of fact. Under the general rule, a timely
notice of appeal terminates the jurisdiction of the trial court and places
the case in the appellate court;" 6 thus the trial court would be pre-
cluded from amending its findings of fact. The Parrish court rejected
this result, however, and held that notice of appeal does not bar a 52(b)
motion. 17 The court distinguished Wggins v. Bunch,"' in which the
North Carolina Supreme Court found a 60(b) motion barred by a prior
notice of appeal, by pointing out that a 60(b) motion may be made up
to one year after entry of judgment and does not toll the time for filing
notice of appeal, while a 52(b) motion must be made within ten days
after entry of judgment and does toll the time for filing notice of ap-
italicized portion of the statute will allow the court to try the underlying claim while the third-
party claim is appealed, the few cases interpreting this provision indicate that the court below may
proceed if the subject matter of the appeal is not the same as that in the underlying action. See
Safle Mfg. Co. v. Arnold, 228 N.C. 375, 387,45 S.E.2d 577, 585 (1947) (citing Herring v. Pugh, 126
N.C. 852, 36 S.E. 287 (1900)). Under rule 14, defendant/third-party plaintiff can only implead a
third-party defendant "who is or may be liable to [the third-party plaintiff] for all or part of the
plaintiffs claim against him." N.C.R. Ciw. P. 14(a). To recover on a third-party claim the defend-
ant/third-party plaintiff must show (I) he is liable on the plaintiff's claim and (2) the third-party
defendant is in turn liable to defendant for indemnification or contribution because of their partic-
ular relationship. A determination of nonliability on a third-party claim before the underlying
action is resolved necessarily means that the court has determined that the requisite relationship
between defendant/third-party plaintiff and third-party defendant did not exist. Such a determi-
nation has nothing to do with the subject matter of the underlying claim but only with the rela-
tionship between the third-parties plaintiff and defendant. Thus, the underlying claim may
proceed under § 1-294. Any holding to the contrary would invite the potential abuse of allowing
defendant to delay a trial by simply making many unsubstantial third-party claims and appealing
the summary judgments.
The situation involved in Jones is clearly distinguishable from Oestreicher in which an appeal
from a summary judgment on two of plaintiff's three claims for relief was allowed. Because all
three claims in Oestreicher involved the same subject matter (a breach of a lease agreement) the
trial on the remaining claim was stayed under § 1-294 while the appeal was taken. Thus, unlike
Jones, an appeal in Oestreicher could avert the possibility of two trials.
114. 38 N.C. App. 691, 248 S.E.2d 878 (1978).
115. N.C.R. Cw. P. 52(b) provides in part: "upon motion of a party made not later than 10
days after entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and
may amend the judgment accordingly."
116. See American Floor Mach. Co. v. Dixon, 260 N.C. 732, 133 S.E.2d 659 (1963). There are
several exceptions to this rule: the trial court has jurisdiction to settle the case during pendency of
appeal, and the trial court may adjudge whether the appeal has been abandoned. Id. at 735-36,
133 S.E.2d at 662; see Bowen v. Hodge Motor Co., 292 N.C. 633, 234 S.E.2d 748 (1977).
117. 38 N.C. App. at 694, 248 S.E.2d at 879. In so holding the court relied on Elgen Mfg.
Corp. v. Ventfabrics, Inc., 314 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1963): "[A] quick filing of notice of appeal by one
party [cannot] defeat the adverse party's right to have the district court consider the merits of a
timely filed motion under Rule 52(b)." Id. at 444. FED. R. Cw. P. 52(b) is equivalent to North
Carolina's rule.
118. 280 N.C. 106, 184 S.E.2d 879 (1971).
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peal.I 9 In reaching its decision the court noted that "the primary pur-
pose of Rule 52(b) is to enable the appellate court to obtain a correct
understanding of the factual issues determined by the trial court."' 120
The use of rule 52(b) can also help avoid the need for remand by the
appellate court for further findings of fact, which may in turn eliminate
the possibility of multiple appeals. Because a 52(b) motion must be
made within ten days after entry of judgment any disruption in the
appellate process will be slight.'21 And as the court correctly pointed
out, although an appeal will still be available should either party object
to the findings, it is possible that these new or amended findings will
satisfy the parties and thus remove the need for an appeal.' 22
G. New Trial-Excessive Damages-Rule 59
If the jury returns a verdict awarding an amount of damages unac-
ceptable to the trial judge, subsections (6) and (7) of rule 59(a) author-
ize a grant of a new trial1 23 on the grounds of: "(6) Excessive or
inadequate damages appearing to have been given under the influence
of passion or prejudice; [or] (7) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify
the verdict or that the verdict is contrary to law."' 24 Although histori-
cally the decision of the trial judge whether to grant a new trial because
of excessive or inadequate damages was not reviewable on appeal, 2
today federal as well as North Carolina courts recognize that such a
new trial order is reviewable for abuse of discretion.'26 Until the 1978
119. 38 N.C. App. at 695, 248 S.E.2d at 880. As the court noted, "a Rule 60(b) motion has a
greater potential for disrupting the appellate process because an appeal may have been substan-
tially advanced at the time the motion is made." Id. Another basis for distinction is that in
Wiggins the same party who made the 60(b) motion had filed the notice of appeal, while in Par-
rish plaintiff made the 52(b) motion after defendant had filed his notice of appeal. 280 N.C. at
107, 184 S.E.2d at 879; 38 N.C. App. at 692, 248 S.E.2d at 879.
120. 38 N.C. App. at 694, 248 S.E.2d at 879 (quoting C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 96 (3d ed. 1976)).
121. Id. at 694, 248 S.E.2d at 880.
122. Id.
123. When the error relates solely to the amount of damages, the new trial is frequently lim-
ited to that issue; however, it may be necessary to order a new trial on both liability and damages
when the two issues are closely interwoven. Survey of Developmrents in North Carolina Law, 1977,
56 N.C.L. REV. 843, 909 (1978).
124. N.C.R. Crv. P. 59(a)(6), (7).
125. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 37, § 2820, at 127-28.
126. "While the Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled on the question, all eleven Circuits,
are today committed to a doctrine that there should be some appellate supervision over the size of
jury verdicts." 6A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 59.08[6], at 59-182 (2d ed. 1974). For North
Carolina's recognition, see 12 STRONG'S NORTH CAROLINA INDEX 3D Trial§§ 52, 52.1 (1978) and
cases cited therein.
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court of appeals decision Howard v. Mercer,2 7 however, there had
been no reported North Carolina decision in which an appellate court
found such an abuse of discretion.' 28 The Howard jury, in a personal
injury action in which plaintiff had shown $5,645 of special damages,
returned a total verdict of $20,000, which the trial judge set aside as
"excessive and contrary to the weight of the evidence."' 129 The court of
appeals found that it was not unreasonable to award the 59-year-old
handyman general damages of $14,355 for pain, suffering and perma-
nent partial disability in addition to the special damages of $5,645.
They therefore held "that the able trial judge abused his discretion in
setting aside the verdict."' 130
The court recognized one trial court and two appellate court stan-
dards for determining whether a jury verdict is excessive. These stan-
dards were first articulated in Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co.,131
from which the court quoted extensively. According to the Taylor
analysis, adopted by the court of appeals, the trial judge should deter-
mine a "maximum limit of a reasonable range" and if the jury verdict
is obviously outside that maximum he should grant a new trial or a
remittitur.132 The scope of appellate review of the trial level decision is
limited in two respects, deference to the trial judge's opportunity to ob-
serve witnesses and evidence at trial and deference to the jury's finding
of fact. 33 The standard used in appellate review depends on the force
of these two factors. If the trial judge agrees with the jury's verdict and
therefore denies a new trial both factors "press in the same direction,"
hence the "appellate court should be certain indeed that the award is
contrary to all reason" before finding an abuse of discretion. ' 34 If, on
the other hand, the trial court sets aside a jury verdict as excessive, the
judge factor and the jury factor are at odds, hence the appellate court
can find an abuse of discretion if the jury's verdict is clearly within the
appellate court's maximum reasonable range. 35 Therefore the two fac-
127. 36 N.C. App. 67, 243 S.E.2d 168, cert. granted, 295 N.C. 466,246 S.E.2d 9 (1978) (No. 132
PC).
128. See Settee v. Charlotte Elec. Ry., 170 N.C. 365, 86 S.E. 1050 (1915), quotedin Setzer v.
Dunlap, 23 N.C. App. 362, 208 S.E.2d 710 (1974); W. SHUFORD, supra note 80, § 59-9.
129. 36 N.C. App. at 67, 243 S.E.2d at 169.
130. Id. at 73, 243 S.E.2d at 172.
131. 409 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969).
132. 36 N.C. App. at 71, 243 S.E.2d at 171 (citing Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409
F.2d at 147-49).
133. Id. at 70, 243 S.E.2d at 170.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 71, 243 S.E.2d at 171.
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tors limiting appellate review necessitate two standards for that review,
the choice between which depends upon whether the new trial was
granted or denied.
Howard's significance is not the articulation of these "standards."
Indeed, the language of the standards does not show clearly the differ-
ence between the "obviously outside a reasonable range" standard, the
"contrary to to all reason" standard and the "clearly within a reason-
able range" standard. Rather, the significance of the opinion is that
while North Carolina courts in the past have given lip service to the
notion that the trial judge could abuse his discretion by denying or
granting a new trial for an excessive verdict, they never before have
indicated when or even if such a situation could arise.
The Howard decision has revealed that in some situations it is eas-
ier for the trial judge to abuse his discretion than in others. Thus, if the
trial judge sets aside a jury verdict, allowing a new trial or remittitur,
he will have abused his discretion if the verdict is clearly within what
the appellate court perceives to be a reasonable range, but if he denies
the new trial he can only be overturned if the verdict is contrary to all
reason. The court makes it clear that there is a difference between these
two standards and under the latter, the trial judge's determination is
less apt to be reversed.136 This case, therefore, will have the effect of
making trial judges wary of setting aside jury verdicts even if they think
they are excessive. It is ironic that this first affirmative exercise of the
court of appeals's right to review the amount of jury awards could lead
to more excessive awards. It is hoped, however, that the court of ap-
peals, having taken the necessary first step, will also be willing to find
136. This decision should not be read to imply that a trial judge should only under the most
extraordinary circumstances be found to have abused his discretion if he denies a new trial. In-
deed, many federal appellate courts have reversed trial court denials of a new trial when they
thought the verdict was excessive. See I 1 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 37, § 2820, at 128-
29 nn. 84 & 85 (1973 & Supp. 1978). Some courts view a reversal of the trial court's denial of a
new trial as tantamount to finding that the trial judge abused his discretion in not finding the jury
abused their discretion. See, e.g., Miller v. Maryland Cas. Co., 40 F.2d 463, 465 (2d Cir. 1930)
(Learned Hand, J.). Under such a "discretion squared" argument it seems there could be no
appellate reversal of a trial judge's denial to grant a new trial on grounds of an excessive verdict.
The better view, however, is that such a reversal, although rare, can occur in the appropriate case.
The "contrary to all reason" standard for reversal of a denial of a new trial, announced in the
Taylor case, seems to give little help in discerning the instances when a denial of a new trial
should be reversed. Perhaps the "contrary to all reason" standard can be likened to the "clearly
within the reasonable range" standard except the reasonable range would be larger if the trial
judge agreed with the jury (and hence denied a new trial) than if he disagreed (and hence ordered
a new trial or a remittitur).
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abuse of discretion in the denial of a new trial when it is convinced a
verdict is excessive.
H. Re/ie/from Judgments-Rule 60(b)
Rule 60(b) provides that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding."' 37 Among the reasons for al-
lowing this relief are "excusable neglect" and "any other reason justify-
ing relief from the operation of the judgment." 138 Three cases last year,
Standard Equoment Co. v. Albertson,139 Sides v. Reid,4  and Texas
Western Financial Corp. v. Mann, 4 ' indicate that the court of appeals is
misapplying rule 60(b) by minimizing the trial judge's discretionary
power to set aside judgments.
In all three cases a default judgment was initially entered against
one of the parties but later set aside by the trial judge under rule 60(b).
In Standard Equpment and Texas Western, the court of appeals re-
versed the trial judge's order to set aside because it did not agree that
the conduct leading to default was excusable.' 42 In Sides, the court of
appeals reversed a trial judge's reopening a judgment under the "any
other reason" provision of rule 60(b) because it did not think the rea-
sons were sufficiently compelling. 4 3 These decisions can be criticized
137. N.C.R. CIV. P. 60(b).
138. Id. There are four other reasons for relief set out in rule 60(b). In addition to finding one
of the appropriate reasons, the trial court, in order to set aside a judgment, must also find that the
movant has a meritorious claim or defense. Sawyer v. Sawyer, 1 N.C. App. 400, 161 S.E.2d 625
(1968); W. SHUFORD, supra note 80, § 60-2, at 504.
139. 35 N.C. App. 144, 240 S.E.2d 499 (1978).
140. 35 N.C. App. 235, 241 S.E.2d 110 (1978).
141. 36 N.C. App. 346, 243 S.E.2d 904 (1978).
142. 35 N.C. App. at 147, 240 S.E.2d at 501; 36 N.C. App. at 349, 243 S.E.2d at 907.
143. 35 N.C. at 238, 241 S.E.2d at 112. The court in the Sides case refused to consider the
motion as one under rule 60(b)(1) for excusable neglect, but rather interpreted the motion as one
under 60(b)(6) which allows relief from ajudgment for "any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment." Id. at 237, 241 S.E.2d at 112. This refusal was because "defendant
did not assert excusable neglect as a grounds for relief nor did the trial court find the same as fact
in its order setting aside the judgment." Id. at 237, 241 S.E.2d at 112. The movant, however, need
not specify in his motion which 60(b) ground he is proceeding under, Brady v. Town of Chapel
Hill, 277 N.C. 720, 178 S.E.2d 446 (1971), nor is the trial judge required to find the facts upon
which he bases his order absent a request to do so, Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Atwater
Motor Co., 35 N.C. App. 397, 241 S.E.2d 334 (1978). Furthermore, defendant's motion to set
aside asserted that he did not properly answer the complaint because "not being familar with the
legal requirements and not having the financial resources to employ counsel" he thought that a
letter to the Clerk of Superior Court setting forth his defenses would be a sufficient answer. Rec-
ord on Appeal at 21. This motion is easily interpretable as asserting an excuse for defendant's
default. Thus, the court of appeals' conclusion that "defendant did not assert excusable neglect as
a grounds for relief" appears unjustified.
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because it is questionable whether a grant of a 60(b) motion is immedi-
ately appealable and because the determination of whether a set of
facts constitutes "excusable neglect" should be within the sound discre-
tion of the trial judge and reviewable only for abuse of discretion.
Under the federal rules a grant of a 60(b) motion to reopen a judg-
ment is usually an interlocutory order and hence unappealable. 144
North Carolina, however, unlike the federal courts, allows an immedi-
ate appeal of a grant of a new trial.145 Frequently it is necessary for the
trial judge to hold a hearing to determine damages before entering the
default judgment."4 Vacating such a default judgment may be analo-
gized to a grant of a new trial thus allowing an immediate appeal. If,
on the other hand, a default judgment has been entered without a hear-
ing, for example, when the damages are a sum certain and the opposing
party has failed to appear, 47reopening this judgment would not be
analogous to an order of a new trial because there was no first "trial."
Appealability might be found nevertheless under the North Carolina
statutes that allow an immediate appeal from orders that affect a "sub-
stantial right."' 48 The supreme court, however, has held that the set-
ting aside of a summary judgment is not immediately appealable
because the possibility of avoiding a trial if the summary judgment is
reinstated is not a "substantial right."' 49 It is difficult to see why the
setting aside of a default judgment should be treated any differently.}1
Thus, although the court of appeals has been allowing 60(b) appeals
144. 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcrIcE § 60.30[3], at 431 (2d ed. 1978).
145. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277 (Cum. Supp. 1977); id. § 7A-27 (1969).
146. A hearing may be necessary "to take an account or to determine the amount of damages
or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to take an investigation of any other
matter." N.C.R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
147. The clerk can enter a default judgment "[w]hen the plaintiff's claim against a defendant
is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain" and the defendant
who is not an infant or incompetent has failed to appear. Id. 55(b)(1). The default judgments in
Texas Western and Sides were granted pursuant to this rule. See 36 N.C. App. at 347, 243 S.E.2d
at 905; 35 N.C. App. at 236, 241 S.E.2d at 111.
148. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277 (Cum. Supp. 1977); id. § 7A-27 (1969).
149. See Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 240 S.E.2d 338 (1978), discussed in
text accompanying notes 99-113.
150. When the "substantial rights" test is viewed from the perspective of what a party will
suffer or lose if an appeal is not allowed, as did the court in Waters, it would seem that appealabil-
ity of a setting aside of a default judgment is even less compelling than that for the setting aside of
a summary judgment. To win on summary judgment the prevailing party makes an adversary
presentation after discovery leading to the conclusion that there are no remaining issues of mate-
rial fact. For a default judgment, on the other hand, all that is often required is an ex parte
showing that the defendant has been properly served with process. Thus, it can be argued that a
party who loses a default judgment loses only a windfall whereas a party who loses a summary
judgment loses a ruling obtained at considerably more effort. Therefore, if losing a summary
judgment does not affect a "substantial right," afortiori, losing a default judgment does not.
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without discussion, the reopening of a default judgment entered with-
out a hearing should not be appealable as a grant of a new trial or as
affecting a substantial right.
Not only has the court of appeals improvidently accepted these
60(b) appeals, it has not shown proper deference to the trial judge's
discretion to reopen a judgment for excusable neglect. The court con-
sistently holds in cases in which a default judgment has been set aside
that the determination of whether a particular set of facts constitutes
excusable neglect is a matter of law that is reviewable on appeal rather
than a discretionary ruling reviewable only for abuse. 15  According to
the court of appeals' interpretation of rule 60(b), it is only when the
facts constitute an excuse as a matter of law, and there is a meritorious
defense, that the trial judge may exercise his discretion and set aside a
judgment. 52 Although the federal rule 60(b) is virtually identical to
North Carolina's, the federal courts, unlike our court of appeals, re-
spect the trial judge's discretion in the determination of excusable ne-
glect. The federal practice is summarized by Professor Moore:
If the District Court has power to grant relief, then its determination
to grant or deny relief normally involves a discretionary appraisal of
the facts of the particular case and the relief, if any, to be granted:
This matter, then, is largely within the judicial discretion of the trial
court.
Where timely relief is sought from a default judgment and the
movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if any, should be resolved
in favor of the motion to set aside the judgment so that cases may be
decided on their merits. . . . [although 1]itigants and their counsel
may not properly be allowed to disregard process or procedural rules
with impunity.' 3
Under the federal interpretation the threshold question in deter-
mining whether the trial judge has discretionary power to set aside a
judgment is whether the motion states any reason for relief under
60(b).15 4 Thus, if the movant offers no excuse for his neglect nor any
other reason for reopening the judgment, the trial judge does not have
151. The rule that excusable neglect is a question of law is traceable to Ellison v. White, 3
N.C. App. 235, 164 S.E.2d 511 (1968), cert. denied, 275 N.C. 137 (1969). Ellison in turn relies on 2
A. MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1717 (2d ed. 1956), which, at id. §
1717(b) n.69, cites four supreme court cases from the early 1900's. These four cases rely on earlier
supreme court precedent, the earliest being Powell v. Weith, 68 N.C. 342 (1872).
152. See 2 A. MCINTosH, supra note 151, § 1717.
153. 7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 60.19, at 227-35 (2d ed. 1978).
154. Id. at 226. The motion also must have been made within the maximum time period
allowed in the rule.
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the power to exercise his discretion to set it aside. In all three cases
above, however, the movants did offer colorable excuses for their de-
faults.155 Therefore, under the federal interpretation, the trial judge
would have had discretionary power, reviewable only for abuse, to set
aside the judgments. A mere disagreement with the trial judge about
the validity of the excuse should not be a sufficient reason to reverse a
discretionary trial court ruling. 156
The court of appeals' interpretation of rule 60(b) is inconsistent
with that of federal courts. Although the North Carolina Supreme
Court has specifically stated that it will look to federal decisions under
rule 60(b) "for interpretation and enlightenment,"' 57 the court of ap-
peals judges have seemingly not consulted those interpretations of
60(b), assuming instead that rule 60(b) continued the prior North Caro-
lina law on excusable neglect. 58  The supreme court, however, has
never made such a determination. 5 9
The supreme court cases ultimately relied on by the court of ap-
peals for the proposition that excusable neglect is a matter of law re-
viewable on appeal date from the early part of this century. Because
the North Carolina Court of Appeals interpretation of recently enacted
rule 60(b) is vastly different from the federal interpretation of a virtu-
ally identical rule, the supreme court should consider whether the fed-
eral interpretation should be the law of North Carolina.
155. It did not appear that the movants disregarded the process and procedure rules with
impunity. In Standard Equipment, plaintiff's excuse for default was that he had no notice of trial
because he did not receive the trial calendar after discharging his attorney of record. 35 N.C. App.
at 145, 240 S.E.2d at 500. Defendant's excuse in Texas Western was that plaintiffs attorney had
misrepresented to defendant that defendant would be allowed to iaspect plaintiffs fies (appar-
ently before answering). 36 N.C. App. at 347, 243 S.E.2d at 905. Defendant's excuse in Sides was
that he thought a letter to the Clerk of Superior Court sufficed as an answer. See note 143 supra.
156. It cannot be argued that the court of appeals is actually finding an abuse of discretion in
reversing these 60(b) grants of relief in StandardEquipment and Texas Western. Ellison v. White,
3 N.C. App. 235, 164 S.E.2d 511 (1968), cert. denied, 275 N.C. 137 (1969), relied on by the court of
appeals in both Standard Equopment and Texas Western (indirectly in Standard Equipment), spe-
cifically states that because the court of appeals did not think there was excusable neglect as a
matter of law, they "do not reach the question as to whether there was an abuse of discretion by
the trial judge." Id. at 242, 164 S.E.2d at 515-16.
157. Wiggins v. Bunch, 280 N.C. 106, 110, 184 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1971).
158. See Doxol Gas, Inc. v. Barefoot, 10 N.C. App. 703, 179 S.E.2d 890 (1971).
159. The supreme court did deny certiorari in Kirby v. Asheville Contracting Co., 11 N.C.
App. 128, 180 S.E.2d 407, cert. denied, 278 N.C. 701, 181 S.E.2d 602 (1971), which stated that the
cases under former North Carolina excusable neglect law are still applicable under rule 60(b).
In Brady v. Town of Chapel Hill, 277 N.C. 720, 178 S.E.2d 446 (1971), the supreme court said
that the procedure under rule 60(b) is analogous to that under prior law. Id. at 724, 178 S.E.2d at
448 (emphasis added). In the context of that case this statement should be taken to mean only that
relief from an irregular judgment is obtainable through a motion to the trial court, not through
appeal.
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There are strong arguments for the federal interpretation of rule
60(b). First, the federal interpretation is fairer to the parties involved.
Only the trial judge is aware of the many nuances that could lead to a
decision to reopen ajudgment because of excusable neglect. To allow a
detached appellate court to reverse that determination deprives the los-
ing party of a firsthand determination of his rights only to reinstate a
windfall for his opponent. Second, the federal approach saves judicial
time. There are an infinite number of factual settings that could give
rise to excusable neglect. Allowing an appellate court to review each
situation to determine the sufficiency of an excuse is a time consuming
process yielding little precedential value because of the unique factual
settings. Finally, a major consideration in determining whether an is-
sue should be a matter of law fully reviewable on appeal or a discre-
tionary determination reviewable only for abuse is the desirability of a
fixed legal standard that can be relied on in the planning of future con-
duct. If a fixed legal standard for excuse exists, arguably the conduct of
litigants will tend to be just on the excusable side of this legal limit,
whereas if there were no precise legal formulation of excusable neglect,
litigants would tend to be more cautious, not knowing whether a partic-
ular trial judge in his discretion would find their conduct excusable.
Thus, a discretionary standard for excusable neglect is preferable to a
fixed legal standard because the former will encourage litigants to be
more cautious by not providing a sure escape from certain legally ex-
cusable, neglectful conduct.' 60
H. BRYAN IVES, III
PENNI LEIGH PEARSON
160. Just as the court of appeals in Standard Equipment and Texas Western underemphasized
the trial judge's discretion in the excusable neglect determination, the court in Standard Equip-
ment and Sides did the same to the trial judge's determination of what is "any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of thejudgment." Furthermore, just as with excusable neglect,
the federal interpretation of the "other reasons" clause is that if the trial judge has the power to
grant relief then his determination is reversable only for abuse of discretion. 7 MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 60.27[l], at 351-52 (2d ed. 1978). It is true that even under the federal interpretation
"absent exceptional and compelling circumstances, a party will not be granted relief from a judg-
ment under the [any other reason] clause." Id. at 348. Once, however, the trial judge grants such
relief it should not be permissible for an appellate court to reverse merely because it does not
think that as a matter of law the situation was exceptional or compelling enough.
Additional Developments. In Wachovia Mortgage Co. v. Autry-Barker-Spurrier Real Estate,
Inc., 39 N.C. App. 1, 249 S.E.2d 727 (1978), the court of appeals held that the party opposing a
motion for summary judgment cannot create an issue of fact simply by filing an affidavit contra-
dicting his testimony taken via deposition. In this situation the only issue possibly raised by the
affidavit is the affiant's credibility. Id. at 9, 249 S.E.2d at 732. The court of appeals followed the
rationale of the federal court's decision in Perma Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer, Co., 410 F.2d




A. The Un/form Commercial Code
1. Negotiable Instruments
a. Treatment of Branches as Separate Banks
In North Carolina National Bank v. Rarwell,1 the North Carolina
Court of Appeals faced for the first time the question of the applicabil-
ity and effect of G.S. 25-4-106,2 which deals with the status of branch
and separate bank offices as separate banks for certain purposes under
Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code.3 In Harwell, a
check was drawn on the drawer's account with the Wilmington branch
of North Carolina National Bank (NCNB) and was presented at that
branch by defendant for deposit to his account in the High Point
branch of NCNB.4 The check was subsequently dishonored because of
insufficient funds and the amount of the check was charged back
against the provisional credit that had been entered on defendant's ac-
count.5 Prior to the time he received the notice of dishonor, defendant
drew a check on his account that caused the bank's subsequent charge-
deposition could raise an issue of fact simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting his own
prior testimony, this would greatly diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for
screening out sham issues of fact." Id. at 578. For the reasons stated by the Perma court, the
adoption of this rule by the North Carolina court is sensible.
A trial court's entry of default judgment as a sanction for defendant's failure to attend a
scheduled deposition was approved by the court of appeals in Cutter v. Brooks, 36 N.C. App. 265,
243 S.E.2d 423 (1978). N.C.R. Civ. P. 37(d) authorizes the imposition of certain sanctions upon
any party who fails to "appear before the person who is to take his deposition, after being served
with proper notice." (These sanctions, enumerated in 37(b)(2)(a)-(c), range from an order that
certain facts be deemed established to an order for entry of default judgment.) In ruling on the
propriety of the trial court's action, the court of appeals cited the comment to 37(d), which sug-
gests that the flexibility of sanctions available "eliminates any need to retain the requirement that
the failure to appear or respond be 'willful' .... [I]n view of the possibility of light sanctions,
even a negligent failure should come within Rule 37(d)." See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note 38, §§ 2281, 2284. The court of appeals indicated its concurrence in this interpretation of
37(d) by finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering a default judgment even
though defendant's failure to appear was not wilful. 36 N.C. App. at 267-68, 243 S.E.2d at 424;
see 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 2291. The decision in Cutter may foreshadow a move-
ment toward increased use of sanctions as a means of streamlining the litigation process.
1. 38 N.C. App. 190, 247 S.E.2d 720 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 410, 251 S.E.2d 468
(1979).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-4-106 (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides: "A branch or separate office of
a bank is a separate bank for the purpose of computing the time within which and determining the
place at or to which action may be taken or notices or orders shall be given under this article and
under article 3."
3. Id. §§ 25-3-101 to -4-407 (1965 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
4. 38 N.C. App. at 191, 247 S.E.2d at 721.
5. Id.
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back to result in an overdraft.6 After defendant refused the bank's re-
quest for reimbursement, NCNB brought an action to recover the over-
draft.7 Defendant appealed from the trial court's summary judgment
for the bank.
On appeal, defendant argued that the bank's charge-back was im-
proper because notice of dishonor was not sent within the midnight
deadline from the time defendant presented the check for deposit,8 as is
required under the Code when the bank qualifies as both the "payor"
and "depositary" bank.9 The bank argued, however, that the Wilming-
ton and High Point branches qualify as separate payor and depositary
banks pursuant to G.S. 25-4-1061° and that notice of dishonor was sent
to the customer by the High Point branch well within the time period
prescribed by the Code section governing the right to charge-back of a
nonpayor bank.1' The court of appeals held that the two branches,
6. Defendant had written a $3,300 check on his account with the High Point branch. The
subsequent charge-back of the $3,356.32 dishonored check resulted in an overdraft in defendant's
account of $3,282.98. Id.
7. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-4-212(1) (1965).
8. The "midnight deadline" with respect to a bank "is midnight on its next banking day
following the banking day on which it receives the relevant item or notice or from which the time
for taking action commences to run, whichever is later." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-4-104(h) (1965).
The check was presented for deposit at the Wilmington branch on a Friday, but since it was
presented after the bank's "cutoff hour" it was treated for purposes of the notice requirements as
being presented at the opening of the banking day on the following Monday. 38 N.C. App. at 191,
247 S.E.2d at 724; see N.C. GEM. STAT.§ 25-4-107 (1965). The check was dishonored on Tuesday
and notice of dishonor and the dishonored check itself were sent to the High Point branch. Notice
of dishonor was not sent to defendant, however, until Wednesday. Thus, under one construction,
notice was not sent to defendant until a day after the running of the midnight deadline. 38 N.C
App. at 191, 247 S.E.2d at 721.
9. A payor bank is a "bank by which an item is payable as drawn or accepted," while a
depositary bank is "the first bank to which an item is transferred for collection even though it is
also the payor bank." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-4-105(a), (b) (1965). If a bank is both the depositary
and payor bank, its right to charge-back is governed by Id. § 25-4-212(3), which provides that the
charge-back must be "in accordance with the section governing return of an item received by a
payor bank for credit on its books." The relevant section states that the bank, in order to revoke
credit or recover any amount withdrawn, must return the check or send notice of dishonor before
final payment is made and before its midnight deadline. Id. § 25-4-301(1), (2).
10. Quoted in note 2 supra.
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 254-212(1) (1965), governing the right to charge-back of the
nonpayor, collecting bank, provides:
If a collecting bank has made a provisional settlement with its customer for an item and
itself fails by reason of dishonor. . . to receive a settlement for the item which is...
final, the bank may revoke the settlement given by it, charge-back the amount of any
credit given for the item to its customer's account or obtain a refund from its customer
: * , if by its midnight deadline or within a longer reasonable time after it learns the facts
it returns the item or sends notification of the facts. These rights to revoke, charge-back
and obtain refund terminate if and when a settlement for the item received by the bank
is or becomes final ....
If the High Point branch is treated as the separate collecting bank, plaintiff correctly argued
that the High Point branch preserved its right to charge-back by sending notice of dishonor on
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whose ledgers were administered at separate operations centers,1 2
should be treated as separate banks and that the High Point branch had
preserved its right to charge-back when it sent notice of dishonor
within the midnight deadline after it learned of the dishonor from the
Wilmington branch.13 The decision is apparently the first in the coun-
try in which section 4-106 of the Uniform Commercial Code has been
utilized to reach a result favorable to a bank in a case involving the
timeliness of notice of dishonor. 14
In support of its application of G.S. 25-4-106 the court of appeals
pointed to several factors. First, the court thought that the 1967
Wednesday. A provisional credit was entered in defendant's High Point account, and the High
Point branch failed to receive a final settlement of the item by reason of dishonor. 38 N.C. App. at
191, 247 S.E.2d at 721. No final payment of the item occurred under the separate bank construc-
tion of the transaction since the Wilmington branch sent notice of dishonor to the collecting High
Point branch within the midnight deadline from the time it received the item. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25-4-213 (1) (1965). Finally, the High Point branch sent notice of dishonor to defendant
on the same day it learned of the dishonor from the Wilmington branch, well within its midnight
deadline. 38 N.C. App. at 191, 247 S.E.2d at 721.
12. The drawer's account with the Wilmington branch was administered through NCNB's
Eastern Operations Center in Raleigh. Defendant depositor's account with the High Point branch
was administered through NCNB's Western Operations Center in Charlotte. 38 N.C. App. at 194,
247 S.E.2d at 723.
13. Id. at 195, 247 S.E.2d at 723. The court also noted that the High Point branch received
no final settlement on the item that would terminate its right to charge-back since the Wilmington
branch acted within its midnight deadline. Id. at 198, 247 S.E.2d at 725. It is unclear from the
court's opinion when the Wilmington branch's midnight deadline began to run. Presumably it
would begin to run from the day the check was presented for payment at the Wilmington branch.
Defendant presented the check in Wilmington for deposit to his High Point account and a provi-
sional credit was wired to defendant's High Point ledger from the Eastern Operations Center. The
court treated the High Point branch as the collecting bank and transferor of the check for pay-
ment, although it did not have physical possession of the check until after it was dishonored and
sent to High Point from the Eastern Operations Center. Id. at 196, 247 S.E.2d at 724. The court
apparently construed presentment for payment by the High Point branch as occurring on Monday
when the provisional credit was wired from Wilmington. Under this construction, the legal date
of presentment for deposit by defendant payee and presentment for payment by the collecting
bank both occurred on Monday. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-4-107; note 8 supra. Thus, it is not
clear if the running of the midnight deadline for the payor bank's right to send notice of dishonor
began when it came into physical possession of the check or when the legal presentment for pay-
ment was made. In a more typical collecting transaction this problem would not occur because
the payor bank does not come into physical possession of the check until presentment for payment
is made; yet it could be important in a case such as Harwell if physical possession and presentment
for payment were to occur on different days. The better rule would seem to be that the deadline
should begin to run when the payor bank comes into physical possession of the instrument even if
it precedes legal presentment for payment by the collecting branch, because this is the event that
begins the collection process.
14. The few other reported decisions that could have applied the section in such cases either
refused to apply it or found it unnecessary for the decision. See Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co. v. Akpan, 91 Misc. 2d 622, 398 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1977) (refusing to apply § 4-106 to
preserve branch bank's right to charge-back when notice of dishonor was sent to branch by central
office two days after midnight deadline); Kirby v. First & Merchant's Nat'l Bank, 210 Va. 88, 168
S.E.2d 273 (1969) (decided on ground that check that bank attempted to dishonor and charge-
back had been finally paid over the counter for cash).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57
amendment to G.S. 25-4-106'1 deleting the provision requiring mainte-
nance of separate ledgers for qualification as a separate bank was indic-
ative of legislative intent to encourage a more liberal application of the
section.' 6 In addition the court noted that the two branches, operating
through separate operation centers, functioned as two separate banks in
the collection process and therefore presented a situation for which
G.S. 25-4-106 was drafted.' 7
The decision seems sound; it provides consistent support for the
legislature's encouragement of statewide branch banking 8 without
greatly sacrificing the interests of the customer.' 9 The question of how
far courts will be willing to extend the application of Harwell and G S.
25-4-106 remains.20 The Harwell holding is limited to its facts and
leaves open the question of the applicability of G.S. 25-4-106 to situa-
tions involving two branches operating through the same operations
center.2 ' Careful examination of the court's reasoning suggests, how-
ever, that although the section probably will not be applied in timeli-
15. Law of May 23, 1967, ch. 562, § 1, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 603. The former version of§ 25-
4-106 stated:
A branch or separate office of a bank maintaining its own deposit ledgers is a separate
bank for the purpose of computing the time within which and determining the place at
or to which action may be taken or notices or orders shall be given under this article and
under article 3.
Law of May 26, 1965, ch. 700,;§ 1, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 768 (emphasis added). The 1967 amend-
ment deleted the italicized phrase, an optional provision in the official version of the Uniform
Commercial Code. See U.C.C. § 4-106. For the current version of § 25-4-106, see note 2 supra.
16. 38 N.C. App. at 194, 247 S.E.2d at 723.
17. Id. at 194-95, 247 S.E.2d at 723.
18. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-62 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977). The record suggests that the
bank needed the extra time in sending notice of dishonor provided by separate bank status be-
cause it operated through two separate operations centers. A requirement of processing checks as
quickly as if it had only one processing center would create hardships for the bank and discourage
the growth of statewide branch banking. See 38 N.C. App. at 194, 247 S.E.2d at 723.
19. Although defendant received notice one day later than would be required if the whole
NCNB branch system were treated as one bank for purposes of notice, use of the extra time was
reasonable. Two branches, operating through separate administration centers, required longer to
process the check. The dishonor notice had to be sent from the payor Wilmington branch to the
collecting High Point branch, and then to the customer. If defendant had wanted quicker verifica-
tion of the sufficiency of funds in the drawer's account he could have presented the check for
payment at the Wilmington branch. Instead, defendant chose to deposit the check in his High
Point account by presentment in Wilmington. The customer benefited from the convenience of
the statewide branch banking system and should not be heard to complain when he must wait an
extra day for verification of the validity of the check.
20. The court made clear that application of § 25-4-106 is not mandatory. 38 N.C. App. at
193, 247 S.E.2d at 722.
21. "Since each branch operates through a different operations center, it is not necessary to
determine whether two branches operating through the same operations center should be entitled
to separate bank status." 38 N.C. App. at 195, 247 S.E.2d at 723. The court, however, placed
strong emphasis on the functionally separate nature of the two branches as justification for the
longer time period for sending notice of dishonor. Id. at 194, 247 S.E.2d at 723. This logic would
COMMERCIAL LAW
ness of notice cases involving branches administered through the same
operations center, the court may apply G.S. 25-4-106 for other purposes
regardless of the presence of a common center.22
b. Proof of Loss Sustainedfrom Wrongful Payment of a Check
Pursuant to G.S. 25-4-403(1) the drawer of a check has the right to
prevent payment of the check by sending a timely stop payment order
to the drawee bank.23 If the check is paid in violation of a binding
order, the drawer may proceed against the bank, but has the burden
under G.S. 25-4-403(3) of establishing "the fact and amount of loss re-
sulting from the payment."24 In Mitchell v. Republic Bank & Trust
Co.,25 the North Carolina Court of Appeals for the first time faced the
issue of what constitutes such proof of loss.
Defendant bank paid a check contrary to its customer's valid stop
payment order and deducted the amount of the check from the
drawer's account.2 6 The drawer's appointed receiver brought an action
seeking damages in the face amount of the check plus interest.2 7 Ad-
mitting payment of the check contrary to the stop payment order, the
bank, as subrogee to the rights of the payee28 pursuant to G.S. 25-4-
407,29 denied that plaintiff had suffered any loss by payment. The trial
court then granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment before de-
fendant had received answers to its interrogatories concerning the facts
underlying the transaction between the drawer and payee of the
not support application of§ 25-4-106 in dishonor notice timeliness cases involving common oper-
ations centers.
22. For text of statute, see note 2 supra. Perhaps a stop payment order delivered to one
branch should not function as notice to other branches of the same bank that are'administered
through the same operations center to prevent the bank from making payment on the check with-
out incurring liability for wrongful payment over a valid stop payment order. See generally N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 25-4-106, Official Comment (1965).
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-4-403(1) (1965).
24. Id. § 25-4-403(3).
25. 35 N.C. App. 101, 239 S.E.2d 867 (1978).
26. Id. at 102, 239 S.E.2d at 868.
27. Id. at 103, 239 S.E.2d at 869.
28. Id. at 102, 239 S.E.2d at 868.
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-4-407 (1965) provides for this subrogation right as follows:
If a payor bank has paid an item over the stop payment order of the drawer. . . , to
prevent unjust enrichment and only to the extent necessary to prevent loss to the bank by
reason of its payment of the item, the payor bank shall be subrogated to the rights
(a) of any holder in due course on the item against the drawer or maker, and
(b) of the payee or any other holder of the item against the drawer or maker either
on the item or under the transaction out of which the item arose ....
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check.3" On appeal the bank argued that the summary judgment was
erroneous because a genuine issue of material fact-the "fact and
amount of loss"-remained. In support of its position the bank noted
that the answers to the interrogatories would possibly reveal that the
payee had a claim against plaintiff up to the face amount of the check
on either the underlying transaction 3l or the drawer's engagement.3 2
Therefore, the bank concluded, plaintiff, by alleging no more than the
payment of the face amount of the check, had failed to establish his
right to recover.33
The court of appeals agreed with the bank's conclusion and va-
cated the trial court's grant of summary judgment. The court held that
if a bank pleads non-loss by the customer, the customer "must show
some loss other than the mere debiting of his bank account in the
amount of the check" in order to recover for payment contrary to a
valid stop payment order.3 4 The court reasoned that because the bank
was subrogated to the rights of the payee pursuant to G.S. 25-4-407(b),
through which it may have reduced the amount of its liability, it would
be improper to define the term "loss" in G.S. 25-4-403(3) to mean the
face amount of the check.35 The court stated further that a drawer-
customer can establish a prima facie case under G.S. 4-403 by showing
that the bank paid a check in violation of a valid stop payment order.
"Then the bank, exercising its subrogation rights created by G.S. 25-4-
30. 35 N.C. App. at 102, 239 S.E.2d at 868.
31. The Code provides that the taking of a check for payment suspends the underlying obli-
gation until presentment and that if the check is dishonored, action may be maintained on either
the instrument or the underlying obligation. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-802(1)(b) (Cum. Supp.
1977).
32. "The drawer engages that upon dishonor of the draft and any necessary notice of dis-
honor or protest he will pay the amount of the draft to the holder or to any indorser who takes it
up." Id. § 25-3-413(2) (1965).
33. See Appellant's Brief at 4-6.
34. 35 N.C. App. at 103, 239 S.E.2d at 869.
35. Id. Even though the defendant may have a good defense to plaintiff's claim under § 25-
4-403 for the face amount, payment of the check may still result in damages for which plaintiff
may recover under the Code. For example, payment of a check over a valid stop payment order
may create a deficiency in the drawer's account causing subsequently drawn checks to be dishon-
ored for insufficient funds and may give rise to an action under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-4-402
(1965), which provides: "A payor bank is liable to its customer for damages proximately caused
by wrongful dishonor of an item." The dishonor of the subsequently drawn checks is wrongful if
the condition of insufficient funds in the customer's account was created by improper conduct on
the part of the bank. The customer's statutory right to stop payment of a check is not grounded in
the customer's assertion of a valid claim against the payee and, as such, payment in violation of a
valid stop payment order is considered improper payment regardless of the merits of the underly-
ing transaction. See id. § 254-403, Official Comment No. 8. See also Sunshine v. Bankers Trust
Co., 34 N.Y.2d 404, 413 n.5, 314 N.E.2d 800, 865 n.5, 358 N.Y.S.2d 113, 121 n.5, modfled, 34
N.Y.2d 994, 318 N.E.2d 608, 360 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1974).
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407, has the burden of coming forward and presenting evidence of an
absence of actual loss sustained by the customer. When the bank meets
the burden of coming forward, the customer must sustain the ultimate
burden of proof."36
The holding in Mitchell gives meaning to the proof of loss require-
ment in G-S. 25-4-403(3). A proceeding under G.S. 25-4-403(1) re-
quires a showing that the bank paid a check contrary to the customer's
order, an event that necessarily involves debiting the amount of the
check to the customer's account. Surely, therefore, the proof of loss
language contained in subsection (3) was intended to require that the
customer show more than the mere debiting to his account of the face
amount of the check before the customer is allowed to recover for vio-
lation of his stop payment order.
It is still unclear, however, what should be considered sufficient
proof of "actual loss" by the customer. Presumably a defendant bank
may assert, as was done in Mitchell, that the payee has a valid claim to
which defendant is subrogated for all or part of the face amount of the
check and the customer will be required to show actual loss by estab-
lishing that he has a valid defense to payment. A customer might, how-
ever, be required to show that he has exhausted his remedy of
recovering payment from the payee.37 Thus, a customer could be re-
quired to litigate against the payee,38 reduce the claim to judgment, and
demonstrate that the payee is "judgment proof' before the customer
would be held to have established "actual loss" due to payment of the
check in violation of the stop payment order. While not discussed by
the court, this additional litigation requirement should not be placed on
the customer since it would appear to conflict with the overall policy
expressed in G.S. 25-4-403 that the customer's right to stop payment "is
a service to which he is entitled without regard to any inconvenience or
occasional loss to the bank, and such right need not be predicated on
proof of sound legal grounds" arising out of the underlying
transaction.39
36. 35 N.C. App. at 104, 239 S.E.2d at 869 (citing Thomas v. Marine Midland Tinkers Nat'l
Bank, 86 Misc. 2d 284, 381 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1976)).
37. This requirement might be pressed by a defendant bank on the ground that absent such a
showing the customer has failed to demonstrate that his economic position has actually been dam-
aged by the payment.
38. The customer could bring suit against the payee under a theory of unjust enrichment.
39. Thomas v. Marine Midland Tinkers Nat'l Bank, 86 Misc. 2d 284, 287, 381 N.Y.S.2d 797,
800 (1976) (citations omitted).
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2. Letters of Credit
The North Carolina Supreme Court had an opportunity in
O'Grady v. First Union NationalBank40 to discuss the issue of the rights
of a customer to prevent the issuing bank from honoring a letter of
credit when presented with a draft by a credit beneficiary. Plaintiff
O'Grady, as guarantor of a note executed by a group of land develop-
ers to obtain a loan from First Union bank, caused a letter of credit to
be issued by the Bank of North Carolina in favor of defendant First
Union.41 The letter of credit conditioned the honor of drafts upon the
presentation of a "[c]ertified and true photostatic copy of each instru-
ment causing this establishment of credit to Thomas O'Grady to be
called upon. ' ' 42 First Union presented a draft for honor under the let-
ter of credit and, in accordance with the stated condition, attached a
note upon which the land developers had defaulted as evidence of
O'Grady's guarantor liability.43 In an action involving numerous other
parties and claims, O'Grady brought suit to enjoin the issuing Bank of
North Carolina from honoring the draft and to cancel the letter of
credit.44 O'Grady asserted that the attached note did not conform with
the note that he had agreed to guarantee in that the note presented did
not contain the signature of one of the principals O'Grady claimed had
been present on the earlier draft of the instrument, and whose signature
was a condition of the credit.45 Therefore, O'Grady argued, he should
be allowed to prevent honor of the draft.4 6 Although the court of ap-
peals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs suit, the supreme
court reversed and remanded the case for further factual
determination.47
In reaching its decision the court assumed that the note presented
as documentation of O'Grady's liability was, as O'Grady contended,
materially different from the note that O'Grady had intended to guar-
antee.48 The court acknowledged that under the provisions of article 5
of the Uniform Commercial Code, the issuer generally has a duty to
40. 296 N.C. 212, 250 S.E.2d 587 (1978).
41. Id. at 216, 250 S.E.2d at 591.
42. Id. at 229, 250 S.E.2d at 598-99.
43. Id. at 234, 250 S.E.2d at 602.
44. Id. at 215, 250 S.E.2d at 590-91.
45. Id. at 230, 250 S.E.2d at 593.
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-5-114(2)(b) (1965) expressly recognizes the power of a court of
appropriate jurisdiction to enjoin the honor of a draft when one of the § 25-5-114(2) exceptions is
shown. For a list of exceptions, see note 50 infra.
47. 296 N.C. at 217, 236, 250 S.E.2d at 592, 602.
48. 296 N.C. at 230, 250 S.E.2d at 599. Because the trial court failed to enter a finding of
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honor drafts upon presentation by the beneficiary regardless of disputes
that may exist between the beneficiary of the letter of credit and the
issuing bank's customer, so long as conditions of credit are fulfilled.49
G.S. 25-5-114(2), however, provides certain limited exceptions to the
general rule regarding the stringent duty of honor,5" and the supreme
court sought to determine whether O'Grady's contentions, if proved,
would allow him relief under that statute.
Citing extensive authority from other jurisdictions, the court held
that "knowing and intentional attachment of a guaranty letter of credit,
as collateral security, to a negotiable instrument which that letter was
not intended to secure, and the eventual presentation of these docu-
ments to the issuing bank for purposes of honor of the letter of credit"
constitutes presentation of "fraudulent documents" as contemplated by
G.S. 25-5-114(2) and, given adequate proof of the contention, would
allow the plaintiff to enjoin honor of the draft.-'
The decision seems to comport with the interpretation of the ma-
jority ofjurisdictions. 52 Moreover, the court's opinion represents a cau-
tious and proper balance of interests of the customer and beneficiary in
the letter of credit scheme. The court's extensive discussion of the is-
suer's generally stringent duty to honor the letter of credit in spite of
alleged infirmities in the underlying transaction reflects an important
purpose of letters of credit, which is to eliminate the risk that the cus-
tomer will refuse or halt payment because of alleged deficiencies in the
beneficiary's performance. 53 On the other hand, the court, by recogniz-
ing the possibility of an injunction when the documents presented dif-
fer materially from the ones in the underlying transaction, properly
acknowledged that the policy favoring stringent duty of honor will not
be carried so far that it will promote fraud upon the customer.
facts on the issue the court was forced to assume O'Grady's factual contention in order to address
the legal question.
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-5-114(1) (1965) provides: "An issuer must honor a draft or de-
mand for payment which complies with the terms of the relevant credit regardless of whether the
goods or documents conform to the underlying contract for sale or other contract between the
customer and the beneficiary. ... See also Courtaulds N. America, Inc. v. North Carolina
Nat'l Bank, 387 F. Supp. 92 (M.D.N.C.), rev'd on other grounds, 528 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975).
50. "These exceptions are: (1) the failure of certain documents to conform to certain speci-
fied warranties, (2) the presentment of forged or 'fraudulent' documents, and (3) 'fraud in the
transaction." 296 N.C. at 232, 250 S.E.2d at 600 (construing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-5-114 (1965)).
51. Id. at 234-35, 250 S.E.2d at 601-02 (citing, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens &
S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. v. Banco Del
Pais, S.A., 261 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
52. See, e.g., cases cited note 51 supra.
53. See J. WHITE & R. SuMMERs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE § 18-4, at 616 (1972).
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3. Secured Transactions
a. Commercial Reasonableness in the Disposition of Collateral
A secured party, upon default, may dispose of collateral by public
or private sale, but G.S. 25-9-504 provides that "every aspect of the
disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms must
be commercially reasonable."5 4 When suing for a deficiency, 5 a credi-
tor has the burden of proving the sale was conducted in a commercially
reasonable manner.56 If the creditor disposes of collateral at a public
sale, the North Carolina version of the Uniform Commercial Code al-
lows a creditor to prove compliance with the commercial reasonable-
ness requirement by demonstrating that the sale was conducted in
"substantial compliance" with the procedures contained in part 6 of
article 9.57 G.S. 25-9-601 provides that proof of "substantial compli-
ance" with the public sale procedures in part 6 raises a conclusive pre-
sumption that the sale was commercially reasonable. 58  Failure to
substantially comply with the procedures in part 6 in conducting a pub-
lic sale of collateral does not preclude a finding that the sale was com-
mercially reasonable,59 but does deprive the secured party of the
conclusive presumption and raises a question of fact whether the public
sale was otherwise conducted in a commercially reasonable manner.60
If the disposition of collateral is made in a private proceeding the sale
must also be commercially reasonable, but the North Carolina version
of the Code does not provide the creditor who disposes of his collateral
by private sale a means of obtaining a conclusive presumption of com-
mercial reasonableness.
Failure to demonstrate that a public or private sale of collateral
was conducted in a commercially reasonable fashion, however, does
not necessarily prevent a secured party from obtaining a deficiency
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-504(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
55. The Code provides: "If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party
must account to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for
any deficiency." Id. § 25-9-504(2).
56. ITT-Industrial Credit Co. v. Milo Concrete Co., 31 N.C. App. 450, 458, 229 S.E.2d 814,
820 (1976).
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-601 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Graham v. Northwestern Bank, 16 N.C.
App. 287, 293, 192 S.E.2d 109, 113, cert. denied, 282 N.C. 426, 192 S.E.2d 836 (1972). The proce-
dures, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-9-601 to -607 (Cum. Supp. 1977), are not part of the official text of
the Uniform Commercial Code and are apparently peculiar to North Carolina. ITT-Industrial
Credit Co. v. Milo Concrete Co., 31 N.C. App. 450, 457, 229 S.E.2d 814, 819 (1976).
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-601 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
59. Hodges v. Norton, 29 N.C. App. 193, 196-97, 223 S.E.2d 848, 850 (1976).
60. ITT-Industrial Credit Co. v. Milo Concrete Co., 31 N.C. App. 450, 457-58, 229 S.E.2d
814, 819-20 (1976).
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judgment in North Carolina. 1 As a remedy for a noncommercially
reasonable sale, G.S. 25-9-507(1) merely allows the debtor to offset any
deficiency judgment by the amount of damages the debtor has suffered
as a result of the secured party's failure to dispose of collateral in a
commercially reasonable manner. 2 In establishing his claim the
debtor has the benefit of a presumption that the "collateral was worth
at least the amount of the debt" and the creditor must prove "market
value of the collateral by evidence other than the resale price."' 63
(i) Public Sale of Collateral
Several cases in 1978 presented the North Carolina courts with the
opportunity to further clarify a secured party's duty to dispose of collat-
eral in a commercially reasonable manner. Plaintiff creditor in North
Carolina National Bank v. Burnette, 4 after a public sale of collateral,65
brought suit to obtain a deficiency judgment. Defendant debtor's an-
swer averred that the sale was not conducted in a commercially reason-
able manner as required by G.S. 25-9-504.66 The jury found for the
debtor on the issue of commercial reasonableness and offset plaintiff's
award by the total amount of the deficiency.67 The trial court granted
plaintiffs motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and defend-
ant appealed.68
Evidence presented at trial indicated that plaintiff posted and
mailed notice of the sale within the time prescribed by G.S. 25-9-603,69
61. Hodges v. Norton, 29 N.C. App. 193, 198, 223 S.E.2d 848, 851 (1976).
62. "Tlhe debtor. . . has a right to recover from the secured party any loss by a failure to
comply with the provisions of this part." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-507(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
63. Hodges v. Norton, 29 N.C. App. 193, 198-99, 223 S.E.2d 848, 851-52 (1976). See also
Associates Discount Corp. v. Cary, 47 Misc. 2d 369, 262 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Civ. Ct. 1965).
64. 38 N.C. App. 120, 247 S.E.2d 648 (1978), cert. granted, 296 N.C. 410, 251 S.E.2d 468
(1979) (No. 116 PC).
65. Two separate sales were conducted. Id. at 121, 247 S.E.2d at 649-50. Plaintifis conduct
in the second sale, involving the disposition of some road grading equipment, was the focal point
of the commercial reasonableness section of the court's opinion.
66. Id. at 122, 247 S.E.2d at 650.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 123, 247 S.E.2d at 650.
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-603 (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides:
Posting and mailing notice of sale-() In each public sale conducted hereunder, the
notice of sale shall be posted on a bulletin board provided for the posting of such legal
notices, in the courthouse, in the county in which the sale is to be held, for at least five
days immediately preceding the sale.
(2) In addition to the posting of notice required by subsection (1), the secured
party or other party holding such public sale shall, at least five days before the date of
sale, mail by registered or certified mail a copy of the notice of sale to each debtor obli-
gated under the security agreement:
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but that the notice was mailed to the wrong address7° and did not reach
defendant until after the sale had been conducted.7 The court of ap-
peals held that in light of this evidence the trial judge erred in granting
plaintiffs judgment N.O.V. motion.72  Extending its decision in 1TT-
Industrial Credit Co. v. Milo Concrete Co.,73 the court held that the
creditor has the burden of proving that notice was properly sent to the
debtor.74 Because there was contradictory evidence concerning notice,
the jury might reasonably have found that plaintiff creditor failed to
meet the burden of adequate notice and therefore the court reasoned
that granting the judgment N.O.V. was improper.7 ' The court further
stated that "the notice requirement under G.S. 25-9-603 is mandatory
and is a distinct and separate requirement from the requirement for
commercial reasonableness." 76 The court based its decision on the lan-
guage employed in the various sections of part 6 of article 9. While
G.S. 25-9-602, dealing with the contents of notice, mandates that notice
"shall substantially" include certain items of information and G.S. 25-
9-604 and 25-9-605 dealing with exceptions for perishable property and
(a) at the actual address of the debtors, if known to the secured party, or
(b) at the address, if any, furnished the secured party, in writing, by the debtors, or
otherwise at the last known address.
(3) In the case of consumer goods, no other notification need be sent. In other
cases, in addition to mailing a copy of the notice of sale to each debtor, the secured party
shall also mail a copy of said notice by registered or certified mail to any other secured
party from whom the secured party has received (before sending the notice of sale to the
debtor(s)) written notice of a claim of an interest in the collateral.
70. The evidence indicated that the notice was sent to Route 1, Little Switzerland, North
Carolina, even though a different address appeared on the security agreement, that notice of sale
of other collateral securing the indebtedness had been sent to the correct address, and that plain-
tiff's agent responsible for sending the notice admitted that he knew there was no Route 1, Little
Switzerland. 38 N.C. App. at 126, 247 S.E.2d at 652.
71. The notice for the sale scheduled for October 31, 1974, was mailed October 24, 1974, and
did not reach defendants until November 7, 1974. Id. at 125-26, 247 S.E.2d 652.
72. Id. at 125, 247 S.E.2d at 652.
73. 31 N.C. App. 450, 229 S.E.2d 814 (1976). The Milo court held that a creditor, when suing
for deficiency, has the burden of proving the sale was conducted in a commercially reasonable
manner. Id. at 458, 229 S.E.2d at 820. For additional authority holding that the creditor also has
the burden of proving that reasonable notice was sent to the debtor see Universal C.I.T. Credit
Co. v. Rone, 248 Ark. 665, 669, 453 S.W.2d 37, 39 (1970).
74. 38 N.C. App. at 125, 247 S.E.2d at 651.
75. Id. The court noted that the test for determining the appropriateness of a judgment
N.O.V. is the same as applied on a motion for directed verdict. Id. at 124, 247 S.E.2d at 651
(citing Snelling v. Roberts, 12 N.C. App. 476, 183 S.E.2d 872, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 727, 184
S.E.2d 886 (1971)). Because the North Carolina Supreme Court in Cutts v. Casey, 298 N.C. 390,
180 S.E.2d 297 (1971) held that the granting of a directed verdict in favor of the party with the
burden of proof will be more closely scrutinized than for the party without the proof burden, the
Burnelte court considered it significant that plaintiff movant had the burden of proof on the issue
of notice. 38 N.C. App. at 124, 747 S.E.2d at 651.
76. 38 N.C. App. at 127, 247 S.E.2d at 653.
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postponement of public sale use the discretionary word "may,' ' 77 the
court noted that G.S. 25-9-603 governing notice uses the unmodified
word "shall" and should be interpreted as a separate and mandatory
requirement.78
While the court appears to have reached the correct result in the
case,79 its reasoning is troublesome. The Burnette court's reasoning
that strict compliance with G.S. 25-9-603 is required for the purpose of
the separate notice requirement because of the use of "mandatory" lan-
guage in the section may also be used to support an argument that be-
cause G.S. 25-9-603 is contained in the provisions of part 6, strict
compliance with this section is necessary to meet the substantial com-
pliance test of G.S. 25-9-601 governing application of the statutory pre-
sumption of commercial reasonableness. Such a reading, however,
would conflict with the statutory language and prior case law and
would undermine the purpose of part 6.
Prior conflicting authority is found in Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.
v. Murphy,8° a case before the court of appeals earlier in 1978, in which
the notice publication procedures of G.S. 25-9-603 were in issue. In
Murphy plaintiff creditor brought suit to recover the deficiency remain-
ing on the balance of defendants' 81 indebtedness following the public
disposition of collateral.82 At the close of all the evidence the trial
judge directed a verdict for plaintiff in the amount prayed.83 Defend-
ant debtors appealed, alleging that the sale was not conducted in sub-
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-602, -604, -605 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
78. 38 N.C. App. at 127, 247 S.E.2d at 653. For text of § 25-9-603, see note 69 supra.
79. The court could have easily concluded that the evidence demonstrated as a matter of law
that plaintiff creditor had not substantially complied with the mailing of notice requirement con-
tained in § 25-9-603, could not benefit from the statutory presumption of commercial reasonable-
ness provided by § 25-9-601, and therefore would be required to prove the sale was otherwise
commercially reasonable, a burden that was not sustained by the evidence. See generally ITT-
Industrial Credit Co. v. Milo Concrete Co., 31 N.C. App. 450,229 S.E.2d 814 (1976). In Hodges v.
Norton, 29 N.C. App. 193, 223 S.E.2d 848 (1976) the court of appeals held that when a creditor
posts notice on the courthouse door but fails to send written notice to the debtor, the creditor has
not substantially complied with the notice requirement of G.S. 25-9-603. Id. at 197, 223 S.E.2d at
850-51. It would not stretch the imagination to extend the holding in Hodges to a case like Bur-
nette in which notice was sent to the wrong address and was not received by the debtor until after
the sale.
80. 36 N.C. App. 760, 245 S.E.2d 101, appealdismissed, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 557, 248 S.E.2d
734 (1978).
81. Three persons were liable for the debt. Donnie Murphy executed a note and security
agreement to obtain funds for the purchase of a dump truck and as further condition for receipt of
the loan he had his mother and father, Charles and Louise Murphy, sign the note and security
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stantial compliance with part 6 and therefore plaintiff was not entitled
to the conclusive presumption that the sale was commercially reason-
able in all respects. 4 Defendants' only claim was that the creditor
failed to comply with the requirement that notice of sale be mailed to
"each debtor obligated under the security agreement."85 Defendants'
evidence showed that notice was mailed to two of the debtors collec-
tively at their common address and that the return receipt was signed
by only one of them.8 6 The court of appeals, speaking through Chief
Judge Brock, concluded that while "the better practice would be for the
secured party to make separate mailings of notice to each debtor...
the mailing of a joint notice to husband and wife at the residence ad-
dress where they both lived was substantial compliance within the
meaning of G.S. 25-9-601." 87 Thus, while the court did not specifically
state that substantial compliance with G.S. 25-9-603-and the other
provisions of part 6-is all that is necessary to obtain the statutory pre-
sumption of commercial reasonableness, such a conclusion is clearly to
be implied from the court's language.8
Additional support for the argument that strict compliance with
the notice procedures of G.S. 25-9-603 is not required for a secured
party to benefit from the conclusive presumption of commercial rea-
sonableness is found in the language of G.S. 25-9-601. While it is true
that G.S. 25-9-603 contains mandatory language unmodified by any
phrase contained in the section, the mandate must be read in conjunc-
tion with the prefatory provision of G.S. 25-9-601 that modifies the re-
mainder of part 6 with language indicating that substantial compliance
with each provision is all that is necessary for purposes of the statutory
presumption. Thus, in light of the plain language of G.S. 25-9-601 and
the implicit conclusions derived from Murphy, Burnelle should not be
interpreted as requiring strict compliance with procedures of G.S. 25-9-
84. Defendants also chaUenged the constitutionality of § 25-9-601 on the ground that it vio-
lates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. The court pointed to the protection
provided the debtor through the notice requirements and concluded that the procedures comport
with due process. Id. at 762-63, 245 S.E.2d at 103.
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-603(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
86. The return receipt was signed for debtor Charles Murphy by his mother but it was not
signed by or for Murphy's wife Louise. 36 N.C. App. at 764, 245 S.E.2d at 104.
87. Id.
88. The same conclusion can be drawn from the court's language in ITT-Industrial Credit
Co. v. Milo Concrete Co., 31 N.C. App. 450, 229 S.E.2d 814 (1976). Although the court in Milo
thought the evidence presented was insufficient to establish that the secured party had substan-
tially complied with the requirements of §§ 25-9-602, -603, the court's language suggests that only
substantial compliance with the procedures of § 25-9-603 and with the other sections of part 6 is
required to give rise to the presumption of commercial reasonableness. Id. at 457, 229 S.E.2d at
819.
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603 before a secured party can benefit from the conclusive presumption
of commercial reasonableness in a public sale. 9
(ii) Private Sale of Collateral
The court of appeals faced a question of commercial reasonable-
ness in a case involving a private sale of collateral in Ahlis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Davis.90 Plaintiff creditor brought an action to recover a defi-
ciency. Defendant debtors denied deficiency liability and counter-
claimed for damages under G.S. 25-9-507, alleging that the secured
party did not sell in a commercially reasonable manner as required by
G S. 25-9-504.91 Choosing not to contest the commercial reasonable-
ness of the method, manner or time of the disposition, defendants ar-
gued solely that the secured party had accepted an unreasonably low
price for the collateral.92 At the close of all the evidence, the trial court
granted plaintiffs motion for a directed verdict on its deficiency claim
and on defendant's counterclaim; defendants appealed.93
Ruling that price is one of the "terms" of sale falling under the
commercial reasonableness requirement of G.S. 25-9-504(3), 94 the
court of appeals held that when a private sale is otherwise commer-
cially reasonable the price received for the collateral is presumed to be
commercially reasonable, 95 but when the debtor offers independent evi-
dence of a "gross inadequacy in price"96 a question of commercial rea-
89. In most cases, however, a creditor will probably have to present evidence of notice that
approaches strict compliance or its functional equivalent before a court will find that the creditor
is entitled to the statutory presumption.
90. 37 N.C. App. 114, 245 S.E.2d 566 (1978).
91. Id. at 116, 245 S.E.2d at 568.
92. Id. at 117, 245 S.E.2d at 569.
93. Id. at 116, 245 S.E.2d at 568.
94. Ird. at 117, 245 S.E.2d at 569. This is apparently the first time a North Carolina court has
held that price is one of the terms of sale that must be commercially reasonable pursuant to the
provisions of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-504 (Cum. Supp. 1977). This interpretation seems to be
accepted in most other jurisdictions. J. WHiTE & R. SumMERS, supra note 53, § 26-11, at 986; see,
e.g., Associates Fin. Co. v. Teske, 190 Neb. 747, 212 N.W.2d 572 (1973).
95. 37 N.C. App. at 119,245 S.E.2d at 570. The court cited Community Management Ass'n,
Inc. v. Tousley, 32 Colo. App. 33, 505 P.2d 1314 (1973). The Tousley court held that when value is
in issue there is an initial presumption that collateral has the same value as the outstanding debt,
but that when the creditor demonstrates that the sale was otherwise commercially reasonable a
presumption arises that the price received was the fair market value of the collateral. Id. at 36,
505 P.2d at 1316-17.
96. The collateral, an Allis-Chalmers 615 loader and backhoe, was purchased subject to the
security agreement in October 1972 for $14,971.32. When the collateral was repossessed in Sep-
tember 1974 a balance of $6,282.64 was owed on the debt. The collateral was sold at wholesale to
Godley Auction Co. for $3,500 in April 1975. Defendants presented the following evidence to
support their claim that the price accepted by plaintiff was unreasonably low: (a) testimony by
defendant Davis that in his opinion the machine had a fair market value of $8,500; (b) testimony
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sonableness sufficient to avoid a directed verdict is raised.97 The court
rejected plaintiffs argument that various provisions found in G.S. 25-9-
507(2) preclude an inquiry into the commercial reasonableness of
price.98 First, the court ruled that the language in the section that pro-
vides "[t]he fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale
at a different time or in a different method from that selected by the
secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not
made in a commercially reasonable manner"99 does not give the se-
cured party "unbridled discretion" in the price that is accepted for the
collateral.100 While the opinion suggests that a price that is "slightly
inadequate" might be protected, G.S. 25-9-507(2) will not serve to bar
examination of the commercial reasonableness of the resale price when
the debtor presents evidence that might lead a jury to conclude that the
price accepted was "grossly inadequate."10' Second, the court ruled
that the language of G.S. 25-9-507(2), which states that if a secured
party "has otherwise sold in conformity with reasonable commercial
practices among dealers in the type of property sold he has sold in a
commercially reasonable manner,""0 2 offered no benefit to the creditor
since a sale for a commercially unreasonable price does not conform
with "reasonable commercial practices among dealers." 0 3
While not specifically mentioned in the court's opinion, the hold-
ing in the recent case of First Union National Bank v. Tectamar, Inc."°
is clarified by Allis-Chalmers. Defendant debtor in Tectamar, like de-
fendant in Allis-Chalmers, argued that plaintiff accepted an unreasona-
by Michael Duckett, a disinterested witness, that he saw a similar backhoe (which he believed to
be the machine in question) on the lot of Godley Auction Co. and that Godley was asking $6,500
for the machine; and (c) testimony by Duckett that he believed the value of the backhoe to be
between $6,500 and $7,000 in that area of the state in April 1975. 37 N.C. App. at 115-16, 245
S.E.2d at 568.
97. Id. at 117-18, 245 S.E.2d at 569. The court, extending the application of its reasoning in
ITT-Industrial Credit Co. v. Milo Concrete Co., 31 N.C. App. 450, 229 S.E.2d 814 (1976), noted
that the creditor has the burden of proving that the price was commercially reasonable in order to
fulfill the mandate of § 25-9-504(3). The court's language seems to suggest that this burden is
fulfilled in a private sale situation when the creditor offers proof that the sale was otherwise com-
mercially reasonable; when the debtor offers evidence of a gross inadequacy in price, however, the
presumption is rebutted and the burden must be fulfilled by independent evidence that the price
was reasonable.
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-507(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
99. Id.
100. 37 N.C. App. at 118, 245 S.E.2d at 569.
101. Id.
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-507(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
103. 37 N.C. App. at 118, 245 S.E.2d at 570.
104. 33 N.C. App. 604, 235 S.E.2d 894 (1977).
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bly low price for the collateral at a private sale.'0 5 The court of appeals
refused to reverse on the basis of this argument the trial court's grant of
summary judgment for plaintiff.10 6 Citing G.S. 25-9-507(2), the court
held that defendant's evidence concerning price when combined with
the lack of evidence disputing the commercial reasonableness of any
other aspect of the sale was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact."°1 It was unclear whether the court meant by this holding to
exclude all inquiries into the inadequacy of price in cases in which no
other aspect of the private sale is challenged. 08 Allis-Chalmers makes
clear that when evidence of a "gross inadequacy" in price is presented,
neither the provisions of G.S. 25-9-507(2) nor an absence of dispute
concerning the commercial reasonableness of any other aspect of the
private disposition preclude a debtor from reaching the jury on the is-
sue of commercial reasonableness of the sale.
The opinion in Allis-Chalmers seems consistent with the need to
provide greater protection to debtors in deficiency suits when the collat-
eral has been disposed of in a private sale. If the secured party in a
public sale situation follows the requirements in part 6, the debtor and
the market are adequately informed and the debtor can protect his in-
terest in seeing that the collateral reaps as high a price as possible by
"paying the debt, finding a buyer, or being present at the sale to
bid."' 0 9 The debtor in a private sale situation, on the other hand, must
rely more heavily upon the selling efforts of the secured party. The
commercial realities of the private sale, therefore, demand that the
debtor be given the protection of contesting the adequacy of the price
when the debtor's evidence suggests the need for such an inquiry even
if other aspects of the sale are uncontested. This reasoning suggests
that the holding in Allis-Chalmers should be applied to the public sale
situation when the secured party fails to show substantial compliance
with the procedures in part 6.110
105. Id. at 604-05, 235 S.E.2d at 895.
106. The judgment of the lower court was reversed on other grounds. Id. at 606-07, 235
S.E.2d at 896.
107. Id. at 606, 235 S.E.2d at 896.
108. It seems that the court may simply have been unpersuaded by the quality of defendant's
evidence, which consisted principally of the rebutted testimony of an arguably interested witness.
See id. at 604-06, 235 S.E.2d at 895-96.
109. Hodges v. Norton, 29 N.C. App. 193, 197, 223 S.E.2d 848, 850 (1976).
110. If a creditor is able to show that a public sale was conducted in substantial compliance
with the procedures in part 6 the conclusive presumption of commercial reasonableness provided
in § 25-9-601 will preclude any inquiry into the commercial reasonableness of the resale price,
although the procedures in part 6 are not designed to govern directly the price accepted. Graham
v. Northwestern Bank, 16 N.C. App. 287, 293, 192 S.E.2d 109, 113, cert. denied, 282 N.C. 426, 192
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Although the decision in Allis-Chalmers was well reasoned, several
questions regarding the application of the holding to future cases re-
main unanswered. First, the court failed to define what considerations
should be employed in determining whether a price is "grossly inade-
quate." Such a concept is difficult to define, however, and trial judges
should be given the discretion to apply equitable judgment according
to the facts of each case." Second, the court did not specify whether
the resale price should be judged against evidence of the retail or
wholesale market value of the collateral. Some authority suggests that
the comparison should vary depending upon whether the creditor has
the facilities to reach the retail or wholesale market with the lest mar-
keting and administrative costs." 2 Finally, it is unclear what sort of
evidence will satisfy the debtor's burden of production. There is au-
thority to support the acceptance of three types of evidence: expert tes-
timony,' 1 3 market guidebooks,"' and evidence of a second resale
price." t 5
b. Statute of Limitations Applicable to Security Agreements Under
Seal
In North Carolina National Bank v. Holshouser,116 the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals addressed the question of which statute of limita-
SE.2d 836 (1972). If a secured party does not substantially comply with those procedures no
conclusive presumption is raised and the commercial reasonableness of the sale must be proven.
ITT-Industrial Credit Co. v. Milo Concrete Co., 31 N.C. App. 450, 457-58, 229 S.E.2d 814, 819-20
(1976). A debtor in such a situation should have the same right to question the commercial rea-
sonableness of the price as he would if the collateral were sold in a private proceeding.
111. There is authority that suggests that in deciding whether a resale price is unreasonably
low, the trial court should examine evidence concerning the creditor's good faith and the extent of
the creditor's efforts in disposing of the collateral. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 53, § 26-
II, at 991. Interestingly, the court of appeals in Allis-Chalmers seemed unpersuaded by the credi-
tor's extensive efforts to locate a buyer for the collateral. See 37 N.C. App. at 115-16, 245 S.E.2d
at 568, and Record at 20 (testimony of James M. Dixon, Central Credit Manager for Allis-Chal-
mers Credit Corp.).
112. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 53, § 26-11, at 990-91. Although the retail market
will normally yield the higher price, creditor efforts should not be judged against an estimated
retail market value if it appears that the marginal gains of entering the retail market are out-
weighed by the creditor's administrative costs incurred in entering this market.
113. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 53, § 26-11, at 989. Proof by expert testimony may
have been presented in Allis-Chalmers. Although it is unclear from the opinion, the testimony of
Michael Duckett, see note 96 supra, may have qualified as expert testimony.
114. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 53, § 26-11; see, e.g., Atlas Constr. Co. v. Dravo-
Doyle Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 124 (Pa. C.P. 1965). This type of evidence may have limited
application, however, since many markets lack such guidebooks and the guidebooks are usually
incapable of adjusting price according to the condition of the collateral.
115. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 53, § 26-11, at 989.
116. 38 N.C. App. 165, 247 S.E.2d 645 (1978).
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tions applies to a deficiency action brought after the repossession and
sale of collateral by the holder of a purchase money security agreement
under seal. Plaintiff, assignee of a purchase money security agreement
executed under seal by defendant for the purchase of an automobile,
brought this deficiency action a little more than four years after the
collateral was repossessed and disposed of by public sale' 17 The trial
court granted judgment on the pleadings for defendant on the ground
that the action was barred by the four year statute of limitations appli-
cable in actions for breach of any contract of sale contained in article 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code." 8 On appeal plaintiff contended
that the four year statute of limitations is inapplicable to deficiency ac-
tions brought pursuant to a security agreement governed by article 9.119
Since the action was brought on a sealed security instrument plaintiff
averred that the ten year limitations period for actions on sealed instru-
ments provided by G.S. 1-471 0governed and, therefore, the suit was
timely.12 1
A majority of the court of appeals agreed with plaintiff and re-
versed the trial court's judgment. The court based its decision on "the
plain language of Article 2" and certain legislative action pertinent to
G.S. 1-47.122 Acknowledging that the purchase money security agree-
ment executed by defendant acted as both a sales contract and a secur-
ity instrument, the court held that the language in G.S. 25-2-102123 and
117. Id. at 165-66, 247 S.E.2d at 645. The purchase money security agreement was executed
on June 25, 1970. Defendant defaulted immediately and the automobile was repossessed. The
vehicle was sold by public sale on September 28, 1970 but the deficiency suit was not filed until
November 1, 1974. Id.
118. Id. at 166, 247 S.E.2d at 645, citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-725(1) (1965) ("An action for
breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has
accrued.").
119. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code covers secured transactions.
120. The statute only governs actions against the principal obligees on a sealed instrument.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-47 (1969) provides:
Ten Years-Within ten years an action-
(2) Upon a sealed instrument against the principal thereto. Provided, however, that
if action on a sealed instrument is filed, the defendant or defendants in such action may
file a counterclaim arising out of the same transaction or transactions as are the subject
of plaintiff's claim, although a shorter statute of limitations would otherwise apply to
defendant's counterclaim.
121. 38 N.C. App. at 166, 247 S.E.2d at 645.
122. Id. at 171, 247 S.E.2d at 648.
123. The statute provides:
Scope: certain security and other transactions excluded from this article.-Unless the
context otherwise requires, this article applies to transactions in goods; it does not apply
to any transaction which although in the form of an unconditional contract to sell or
present sale is intended to operate only as a security transaction nor does this article
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its related comments1 24 defining the scope of provisions contained in
article 2 indicates that the provisions of article 2 govern the pure sales
aspects and the provisions of article 9 govern the security aspects of the
transaction. 25 Since the deficiency action was brought on the security
agreement pursuant to rights provided in article 9,126 the court rea-
soned that G.S. 25-2-725, the four year statute of limitations found in
article 2, was inapplicable. 27 Because article 9 contains no limitations
provision the court looked to prior law and determined that the ten
year limitations period for actions on sealed instruments provided by
G.S. 1-47(2) governed the suit. 128
In addition to analysis of the statutory language the court of ap-
peals noted that in 1969 the legislature amended G.S. 1-47129 to allow
principals sued on sealed instruments to assert claims or defenses they
might have by joinder of third parties even though the applicable stat-
utes of limitations may otherwise have barred such third party claims.
The court argued that the amendment was enacted to ameliorate the
"potential for harsh results in the situation where a financial institution
could wait to sue for deficiency after repossession and sale of collateral
security until after the buyer's rights of action against sellers for any
breach of warranty were barred" and was indicative of legislative ac-
knowledgement that the ten year statute was to apply to actions on
impair or repeal any statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers or other specified
classes of buyers.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-102 (1965).
124. The Official Comment states: "The Article leaves substantially unaffected the law relat-
ing to purchase money security such as conditional sale or chattel mortgage though it regulates the
general sales aspects of such transactions. . . ." Id., Official Comment.
The North Carolina Comment provides further clarification: "This section sets out the scope
of the Code, limiting it to transactions in goods. . . and indicates that the article on sale does not
apply to transactions intended as security even though in the form of an unconditional contract of
sale or to sell. . . ." Id., North Carolina Comment.
125. 38 N.C. App. at 169, 247 S.E.2d at 647. Furthermore, the court noted that the "four year
limitation of actions found in G.S. § 25-2-725(1) applies on its face only to actions for breach of
any contract for sale." Id. (construing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-725(l) (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
126. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-504(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides for the right to bring a defi-
ciency action.
127. 38 N.C. App. at 169, 247 S.E.2d at 647 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-725 (Cum. Supp.
1977)). In addition the court noted that the provision of "G.S. § 25-2-203, which makes seals of
no effect on contracts for sale, is similarly limited in its effects to the pure sales aspects of the
transactions, and is not relevant to purchase money security agreements ... regulated by Article
9 generally." Id. (construing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-203 (1965)).
128. Id.
129. Law of June 11, 1969, ch. 810, § 1, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 862. Although the language of
§ 1-47(2) allows such defendants in sealed instrument actions to file counterclaims that might
otherwise be untimely, the court apparently interpreted the statute as also saving third-party
claims. 38 N.C. App. at 170, 247 S.E.2d at 647.
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purchase money security agreements under seal.' 30
Although a strict reading of the language of the Code and com-
ments may provide support for the holding in Holshouser, the result
seems unduly harsh to the consumer-debtor and persuasive argument
for a contrary holding can be found. First, the opinion ignores the es-
sential similarities of deficiency suits to suits for breach of contract for
sale and, therefore, creates a potential for inconsistent statute of limita-
tions treatment for very similar actions. A deficiency suit is an in per-
sonam action for the excess of the debtor's obligation unpaid after the
sale of collateral, an action to enforce the buyer's obligation to pay the
full sale price. Thus at least one court has concluded on this sparsely
litigated question that a deficiency action is more closely related to the
sales aspect of a combination sales-security agreement than to its secur-
ity aspect and should be controlled by the four year limitations pe-
riod. 131 If a seller, holding a combination sales-security instrument
ignored the security and brought an action for the unpaid price, the
four year limitations period would surely apply.'32 It seems inconsis-
tent to hold, as the court in Holshouser did, that if the buyer pursued a
similar remedy by bringing a deficiency action under the security
agreement affixed with a seal that he would have the benefit of a ten
year limitations period.
Second, the court's conclusion that the amendment to G.S. 1-47 is
indicative of legislative approval of the application of the ten year stat-
ute of limitations period to deficiency actions on sealed purchase
money security agreements is questionable. A deficiency action on a
sealed purchase money security agreement is not the only situation in
130. 38 N.C. App. at 170, 247 S.E.2d at 647.
131. Associates Discount Corp. v. Palmer, 47 N.J. 183, 187-88, 219 A.2d 858, 861 (1966) (ap-
plying Pennsylvania law). The court in Holshouser rejected the analysis of the New Jersey
Supreme Court and distinguished the Palmer holding on the ground that the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture expressed an intention in the comments to § 2-102 to have article 2 govern all aspects of a
combination sales-security instrument. 38 N.C. App. at 170-71, 247 S.E.2d at 648. The language
cited by the court, however, does not clearly indicate a contrary intent to that expressed in the
North Carolina Comment, note 124 supra. The Pennsylvania Comment does not specifically
state, as the court of appeals seems to believe, that all aspects of a combination agreement are to
be governed in Pennsylvania by article 2; if read as consistent with the Official Comment, note 124
supra, it provides that the sales aspects of such an instrument are subject to article 2 and the
secured transactions aspects are subject to article 9. Therefore, the argument made by the court in
Palmer that a deficiency suit is more closely akin to the sales aspects of the instrument and should
be subject to the four year limitations period cannot be disregarded as being unique to the Penn-
sylvania legislature's intent and inconsistent with the North Carolina Comment. Indeed, the
North Carolina Comment does not preclude a court from reaching the conclusion of the Palmer
court based on a recognition of the essential nature of a deficiency suit.
132. Associate Discount Corp. v. Palmer, 47 N J. 183, 193, 219 A.2d 858, 864 (1966) (Hall, J.,
concurring).
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which the amendment could provide protection,'33 and, therefore,
without more, the amendment should not be viewed as an indication of
legislative support for the application of a ten year statute of limitations
to such situations. Moreover, while the amendment would certainly
grant some protection to the debtor from the potential harsh results of
the ten year statute of limitations,13 4 other interests favoring applica-
tion of a shorter limitations period, such as preservation of witness
memories, are unaffected by the legislation. It appears that the holding
in Holshouser is based on a questionable interpretation of statutory
language and legislative intent and, therefore, could be subject to fur-
ther scrutiny in future litigation.
B. Contracts
1. Relationship of Contract and Tort
In North Carolina State Ports Authority v. Fry Roofing Co.' 35 the
North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the troublesome question of
when a breach of contract may also be a tort. The court rejected the
holding of the court of appeals 36 that a promisee's allegation of breach
of contract against the promisor may also support an action in tort
whenever the breach is negligent. In disallowing the action in tort the
supreme court distinguished prior cases holding a promisor liable in
tort for the negligent performance of his contract as involving more
than the simple failure to discharge a contractual obligation. 137
Plaintiff in Ports Authority contracted with Dickerson, Incorpo-
rated, a general contractor, to construct a shed and warehouse. Four
years after the buildings were completed and delivered to plaintiff, the
roofs began to leak.'38 Plaintiff sued Dickerson for breach of the build-
ing contract and in tort for its negligent performance-the failure to
exercise reasonable care in supervising the installation of the roofs-
133. For example, it would apply to actions brought in connection with real property sealed
deeds of trust. See Serls v. Gibbs, 205 N.C. 246, 171 S.E. 56 (1933).
134. See text accompanying note 129 supra.
135. 294 N.C. 73, 240 S.E.2d 345 (1978).
136. 32 N.C. App. 400, 232 S.E.2d 846 (1977), af'don other grounds, 294 N.C. 73, 240 S.E.2d
345 (1978). "Appellant petitioned [the supreme court] for review of [the court of appeals'] judg-
ment 'in part and only as to that Court's reversal of the Trial Court judgment dismissing Plaintiff's
action in tort as to the Defendant Dickerson."' 294 N.C. at 86, 240 S.E.2d at 353. The supreme
court concluded that the appeals court had reached the right result but was wrong in holding that
the complaint alleged an action in tort. Id. at 83, 86, 240 S.E.2d at 350, 352.
137. 294 N.C. at 81-82, 240 S.E.2d at 350.
138. Id. at 75, 240 S.E.2d at 347.
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and sought to recover the cost of repairing the roof. 39 The court held
that in cases in which defendant promisor contracts to construct build-
ings, including roofs, in accordance with certain plans and specifica-
tions, and plaintiff alleges that defendant did not so construct the roofs,
the only injury suffered is a loss of the benefit of the promised perform-
ance, which is purely contractual in nature.' 40 In other words, because
there was no extra-contractual duty, common law or otherwise, to do
the thing agreed to be done, it was immaterial that the breach was due
to negligence.
The Ports Authority rule, simply stated, is that a suit should pro-
ceed for all substantive and procedural purposes on a contract theory
when it appears from the facts set out in the complaint and the prayer
for relief that the plaintiff is suing for loss of the benefit of his bar-
gain. 141 The distinction between contract related injuries that can sup-
port an action in tort for the violation of a common law duty of due
care and those that cannot is thus based on the nature of the injury as
characterized by the particular facts alleged. 1
42
The Ports Authoriy tort preclusion rule is sound for several rea-
sons. As a matter of substantive law, it seems only fair that a plaintiff
should not be permitted to transform a breach of contract action into
139. Id. at 75, 240 S.E.2d at 346.
140. Id. at 83, 240 S.E.2d at 351.
141. The court rejected plaintif's argument that, regardless of the existence of a contract,
Dickerson had committed the tort of misfeasance by failing to exercise reasonable care in the
construction of the buildings, see Brief for Plaintiff Appellee at 11, and thus declined to follow the
traditional nonfeasance-misfeasance doctrine for determining when a tort remedy is cumulative.
See Prosser, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS
380 (1954). Consequently, the rule that "accompanying every contract is a common-law duty to
perform with ordinary care the thing agreed to be done," Pinnix v. Toomey, 242 N.C. 358, 362, 87
S.E.2d 893, 898 (1955), was inapplicable in PortsAuthority. 294 N.C. at 81-83, 240 S.E.2d at 350-
51.
142. The court explained, 294 N.C. at 82, 240 S.E.2d at 350-51, that the cases constituting
exceptions to the general rule that an injury arising out of the performance of a contract does not
constitute a tort fall into four categories: (1) The injury so caused was to the person or property of
a third party. See generally Pinnix v. Toomey, 242 N.C. 358, 87 S.E.2d 893 (1955); Council v.
Dickerson's, Inc., 233 N.C. 472, 64 S.E.2d 551 (1951). (2) The injury so caused was to the property
of the promisee other than the property that was the subject of the contract, or was a personal
injury to the promisee. See generally Firemen's Mut. Ins. Co. v. High Point Sprinkler Co., 266
N.C. 134, 146 S.E.2d 53 (1966); Jewell v. Price, 264 N.C. 459, 142 S.E.2d 1 (1965); Toone v.
Adams, 262 N.C. 403, 137 S.E.2d 132 (1964); Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957).
(3) The injury consisted of loss or damage to the promisee's property, which was the subject of the
contract, and the promisor was charged by law, as a matter of public policy, with the duty to use
care in the safeguarding of the property from harm, as in the case of a common carrier, an inn-
keeper or other bailee. See generally Miller's Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Parker, 234 N.C. 20, 65
S.E.2d 341 (1951). (4) The injury so caused was a wilful injury to or conversion of the property of
the promisee, which was the subject of the contract, by the promisor. See generallo Williamson v.
Dickens, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 259 (1844); Simmons v. Sikes, 24 N.C. (2 Ired.) 98 (1841).
1979]
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an action in tort and thereby avail himself of such advantages as a
more liberal measure of damages or a more favorable standard of lia-
bility. Second, because many procedural and substantive issues such as
conflict of laws, jurisdiction, limitations, and survival of actions turn on
whether the plaintiff has in fact brought his suit in contract or tort,
confining the plaintiff to one theory of recovery at the outset of the
litigation facilitates efficient suit administration. Moreover, such an ap-
proach is consistent with the conceptual distinction between contract
and tort that has evolved from the divergence of the action of assumpsit
from trespass on the case.' 43
In CF Industries v. Transcontinental Gas Ppe Line Corp.'" the
United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina
confronted a slightly different version of the Ports Authority question-
whether a third party may sue in tort on a negligent performance of
contract theory to recover profits lost because of the promisor's failure
to discharge a contractual obligation. Defendant Transcontinental Gas
Pipe Line Corporation (Transco), a wholesale supplier of natural gas,
failed to fully deliver on its contract to supply gas to a retail distribu-
tor.' 4- CF Industries (CFI), a customer of the retail distributor, suf-
fered production curtailments as a result of inadequate gas supplies,
and sued Transco in tort for negligence as well as in contract as a third-
party beneficiary. 46 The district court denied Transco's motion for
summary judgment on both claims and held not only that as an in-
tended third-party beneficiary CFI could maintain an action in tort for
negligence, 47 but that CFI's allegations that Transco undertook to per-
143. See generally T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 284 (5th ed.
1956).
144. 448 F. Supp. 475 (W.D.N.C. 1978). For discussion of the facts of the case, see notes 157-
163 and accompanying text infra.
145. Id. at 479.
146. Id. at 477.
147. The cases involving suits by a third party against a promisor for breach of contract or its
negligent performance have not provided a consistent rule of decision concerning the question
whether the third party may sue in contract or tort. The following rules espoused in the North
Carolina cases, although not necessarily inconsistent, suggest some of the uncertainty surrounding
third party rights: (1) A qualified third-party beneficiary of a contract may sue in contract for its
simple breach. See Gorrell v. Greensboro Water Supply Co., 124 N.C. 328, 32 S.E. 720 (1899).
(2) A qualified third-party beneficiary of a contract may sue in tort for negligence as well as in
contract for breach. See generally Toone v. Adams, 262 N.C. 403, 137 S.E.2d 132 (1964). (3) A
qualified third-party beneficiary may sue in contract, but only if the breach was due to negligence.
See Potter v. Carolina Water Co., 253 N.C. 112, 116 S.E.2d 374 (1960). (4) A third party may
maintain an action in tort for negligence against a promisor irrespective of its status as a qualified
third-party beneficiary. See Pinnix v. Toomey, 242 N.C. 358, 87 S.E.2d 893 (1955); Jones v. Otis
Elevator Co., 234 N.C 512, 67 S.E.2d 492 (1951); Council v. Dickerson's, Inc., 233 N.C. 472, 64
S.E.2d 551 (1951).
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form the contract and performed negligently, resulting in foreseeable
injury to CFI, stated a tort claim independent of third-party beneficiary
status. 148
The CFIndustries holding that a third party injured by the negli-
gent performance of a contract may sue the promisor in tort is signifi-
cant in two respects. Aside from the fact that plaintiff in CFInduasries
was not a party to the contract, the case is virtually indistinguishable
from Ports Authority-the injury alleged was the loss of the benefit of
Transco's promise to supply gas. 149 The cases relied upon by the dis-
trict court that had permitted a third party to maintain a tort action for
the negligent performance of a contract' 50 were not inconsistent with
the Ports Authori y tort preclusion rule, because those cases involved
injury to person or property outside the scope of the contract. Thus,
under the Ports Authority refinement, the district court holding that a
qualified third-party beneficiary could sue in tort for an injury arising
out of the promisor's negligent failure to discharge a contractual obli-
gation was error.
Second, CF Industries is the first case to permit a plaintiff not a
party to a contract to sue on a negligence theory for the recovery of a
pure economic loss-lost profits.151 The North Carolina cases finding
liability for negligence in the absence of privity of contract and in-
dependent of any third-party beneficiary relationship have been limited
to actions for personal injury or property damage. 152 Although there
were no cases prior to CF Industries that had barred such a claim, a
subsequent case has cast doubt on the precedential value of the district
court decision. In McKinney Drilling Co. v. Nello L. Teer Co.,1 53 the
148. 448 F. Supp. at 483.
149. Nothing in Parts Authority suggested that the rule of that case should not be equally
applicable to suits by third parties.
150. Council v. Dickerson's, Inc., 233 N.C. 472, 64 S.E.2d 551 (1951), involved an action
brought by an automobile driver against a highway contractor for personal injuries and property
damage caused by the contractor's failure to adequately warn the motorist of its paving activity.
In Pinnix v. Toomey, 242 N.C. 358, 87 S.E.2d 893 (1955), another case relied upon by the court, a
building contractor sought damages against a plumbing contractor who had negligently per-
formed a contract with the Mecklenberg Board of Education resulting in water damage to plain-
tifrs building under construction. Thus, unlike CFIndustries, these cases involved more than an
injury consisting of the loss of the benefit of the promised performance, but rather an injury to
person and property beyond the scope of the contract.
151. Economic loss as opposed to personal injury or property damage may be defined as a
pecuniary loss consisting of one or both of the loss of bargain (the difference between what one
has paid and the actual value of what has been received), and the consequential loss of profits.
152. See McKinney Drilling Co. v. Nello L. Teer Co., 38 N.C. App. 472, 476,248 S.E.2d 444,
447 (1978).
153. 38 N.C. App. 472, 248 S.E.2d 444 (1978).
1979]
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North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld dismissal of a subcontractor's
claim against a consulting engineer for damages caused by a negligent
inspection and said that "we have been cited to no North Carolina de-
cisions and have found none allowing for loss of profits to a third party
injured from the negligent breach of contract."' 54 The district court's
extension in CFlndustries of the liability of a promisor to a third party
for foreseeable economic loss not connected with personal injury or
property damage was questionable under the Erie'5 5 mandate in light
of the North Carolina courts' historical reluctance to discard the privity
requirement. 156
2. Third-Party Rights
In CF Industries v. Transcontinental Gas ]ipe Line Corp.,' the
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina adopted the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts standard15 for the determination of
when a third party may maintain an action for breach of contract.
Plaintiff built a fertilizer plant'5 9 in northeastern North Carolina after
securing assurances from defendant Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line
Corporation (Transco), a major interstate gas transmission company,
that the plant's natural gas requirements would be satisfied.'60 Because
of Transco's policy of not competing with intrastate retail distribu-
tors,' 6' North Carolina Natural Gas (NCNG) was procured to serve as
intermediary. 162 Transco sold gas under contract to NCNG who in
154. Id. at 476, 248 S.E.2d at 447.
155. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
156. See Hodge, Products Liabiliy: The State of the Law in North Carolina, 8 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 481 (1972).
157. 448 F. Supp. 475 (W.D.N.C. 1978).
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973).
159. In 1973, Farmer's Chemical Association, Inc. (FCA), an agricultural cooperative corpo-
ration and owner of the plant, turned the management of the operation over to CF Industries, Inc.
(CFI). In 1976 the agreement was transformed into a lease in which FCA assigned to CFI all its
rights under the gas contract with North Carolina Natural Gas (NCNG). FCA and CFI, as co-
plaintiffs, brought this diversity action against Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation
(Transco) on May 18, 1977. 448 F. Supp. at 477 & n.l.
160. Id. at 478-79. FCA constructed the plant in 1969 in Tunis, North Carolina, after four
years of investigation and study. Because the manufacture of nitrogen-based fertilizer requires
large quantities of natural gas as a raw material, FCA's primary concern was to locate in an area
where it could obtain an uninterruptible natural gas supply. Transco actively sought the location
of the plant in northeastern North Carolina in order to make profitable a proposed pipeline exten-
sion into the area. Id. at 478.
161. This policy was dictated by certain tax considerations and because Transco's tariffs filed
with the Federal Power Commission did not qualify it to sell directly to retail customers. Id. at
478.
162. Apparently the search and selection of an intermediary retailer was undertaken jointly by
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turn sold to plaintiff. 63 Beginning in 1971 Transco cut back its supply
of gas to NCNG, leading to curtailments in plaintiff s production. In
the suit brought by CFI, the court denied defendant Transco's motion
for summary judgment on plaintiffs claims for breach of contract as
third-party beneficiaries of the Transco-NCNG agreement.
The district court found that while the North Carolina Supreme
Court had adopted the analytical framework of the Restatement (First)
of Contracts,'"4 which recognizes third-party rights of action for donee
and creditor beneficiaries and excludes incidental beneficiaries, 165 the
general principle underlying North Carolina decisions was that the in-
tention of the contracting parties, as manifested by all the surrounding
circumstances, determined a third party's right to sue on the con-
tract.1 66 The court concluded that the North Carolina cases had not
treated "the words 'donee' and 'creditor' and 'incidental'. .. as words
of art but as ways to describe the result."'
' 67
Assuming the existence of the requisite intent to benefit plaintiff,
the court perceived an obstacle to a literal application of the Restate-
ment (First) framework-the requirement that the promisor render the
promised performance directly to the beneficiary and not merely en-
able the promisee to satisfy his obligation to the beneficiary.168 Rather
FCA and Transco. Although NCNG was ultimately selected to serve the entire area, it had previ-
ously been agreed that FCA would organize a shell company to serve only the FCA plant. Id.
163. A factor that bore heavily on the court's consideration of the summary judgment motion
was the highly dependent or conditional nature of each contract to the other. In an October 3,
1967, letter to NCNG, Transco agreed to the sale of certain additional gas volumes to be supplied
to the new service area, conditioned upon NCNG's obtaining a firm commitment from the FCA
plant to buy gas, and upon Transco's obtaining a certificate of public convenience and necessity.
On November 10, 1967, FCA and NCNG entered into an agreement providing for a daily maxi-
mum supply to FCA of 50,000 Mcf of gas, conditioned upon the finalization of the Transco-
NCNG service contract. The FCA plant was by far the largest user of gas in the new service area,
receiving approximately one-third of the agreed additional gas volume. An NCNG officer later
characterized the FCA-NCNG contract as a "transportation agreement drafted in the form of a
purchase and sale." Id.
164. See, e.g., Matternes v. City of Winston-Salem, 286 N.C. 1, 12, 209 S.E.2d 481, 487 (1974);
Vogel v. Reed Supply Co., 277 N.C. 119, 127, 177 S.E.2d 273, 278 (1970). See also Chicago Title
Ins. Co. v. Holt, 36 N.C. App. 254, 244 S.E.2d 177 (1978); Philco Fin. Corp. v. Mitchell, 26 N.C.
App. 264, 215 S.E.2d 823 (1975).
165. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (1932).
166. 448 F. Supp. at 479-80; see, e.g., Vogel v. Reed Supply Co., 277 N.C. 119, 177 S.E.2d 273
(1970); Potter v. Carolina Water Co., 253 N.C. 112, 116 S.E.2d 374 (1960). The court's discussion
of the issue of whether evidence other than the contract itself can be considered to determine the
parties' intention is instructive. The court concluded that the rule that when a contract's terms are
clear and unambiguous extrinsic evidence may not be adduced to explain or amplify the contract
provisions is inapplicable to cases involving claims to third-party beneficiary status. 448 F. Supp.
at 479-80.
167. 448 F. Supp. at 479.
168. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 133(l)(b), illustration 9 (1932). But see id.,
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than "undermine the overriding emphasis in the North Carolina cases
.. . placed on the intention of the parties,"'16 9 the district court en-
dorsed the Restatement (Second) of Contracts reformulation of third-
party beneficiary theory. Accordingly, a party may qualify as a third-
party beneficiary "if recognition of a right to performance in the benefi-
ciary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and...
the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the benefi-
ciary the benefit of the promised performance."' 170 "Although the
North Carolina courts have not expressly accepted this revision of the
Restatement (First)," the court noted that "its treatment of third party
beneficiaries is fully consistent with the decided cases."'' Applying
this standard, the court held that the allegations created a material fac-
tual issue of whether plaintiff was intended to receive the benefit of the
promised performance.
On its face, the court's approval of a strict "intention to benefit"
test irrespective of the beneficiary's status as a "donee" or "creditor,"
and irrespective of the identity of the recipient of the promised per-
formance represents a significant broadening of the protected category.
Given the extensive dealings between plaintiff and Transco, the evi-
dence of representations and reliances thereon, and the special "paper
distributor" character of NCNG, however, "refusal of [a] remedy
would have been out of harmony with generally prevailing ideas of
justice and convenience."' 172 Moreover, a standard that excludes from
the protected class third parties who are intended by the promisee to be
the ultimate beneficiaries of the promisor's performance even though
that performance will be rendered directly to the promisee would be
difficult to justify on contract principles. Thus, the district court's en-
dorsement of a strict "intention to benefit" test was necessary and
proper in order to allow enough flexibility to reach the only sound re-
Comment d ("A contract for the benefit of a third person usually provides that performance shall
be rendered directly to the beneficiary, but this is not necessarily the case"). Obviously, the
Transco-NCNG-FCA relationship does not comport with the traditional third-party beneficiary
alignment, see Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859). Defendant Transco was sued for breach of
its promise to sell a given quantity of gas to NCNG, the promisee, and not for breach of a promise
made to NCNG to deliver gas directly to plaintiff FCA. See also 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 779D (1951); 2 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 402 (3d ed. 1959).
169. 448 F. Supp. at 481.
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973). Id., Com-
ment a expressly states that "neither promisee nor beneficiary is necessarily the person to whom
performance is to be rendered, the person who will receive economic benefit, or the person who
furnished the consideration."
171. 448 F. Supp. at 481.
172. 4A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 772, at 2 (1951).
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sult on the facts. 73
However justified on the particular facts, the result in CF Indus-
tries, by discarding the Restatement (First)'s basic framework and sub-
stituting a broad "intention to benefit" test, creates an intolerable
danger that a court will subject a promisor to liability without justifica-
tion. As a rule of law, the test offers a court little guidance in a-ny par-
ticular fact situation and requires a court to undertake the difficult task
of ascertaining on whom the contracting parties intended to confer ben-
efits. These objections are not persuasive, however, because the North
Carolina courts, while expressly purporting to follow the Restatement
(First) approach, have consistently looked to the parties' intention as
the controlling and decisive factor.'74 Thus, the change effected in CF
Industries was more of form than substance-making the ostensible
rule of decision comport with the actual one. Moreover, if the facts of
CF Industries are used as the standard for requisite intent, the likeli-
hood of a court unjustifiably extending liability is minimal and does
not outweigh the potential for fairness and convenience in a particular
case. 175
The authority of CF Industries was bolstered by the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals in Johnson v. Wall.176 Plaintiffs in Johnson con-
tracted to purchase a house on the condition that the vendor submit a
negative termite report. 177 Terminix Service II, Incorporated, inspected
the house and delivered a written report to the vendor that stated that
173. A general statement of the test and one that is consistent with the approach taken in CF
Industries is found in MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 279, at 571 (2d rev. ed. 1974): "When it appears
from all of the circumstances surrounding the transaction that the main purpose of thepromisee
was to exact the promisoer's performance for the benot of the third party, such third party has a
right to enforce the promisoer's correlative duty."
174. See, e.g., Matternes v. City of Winston-Salem, 286 N.C. 1, 209 S.E.2d 481 (1974); Vogel
v. Reed Supply Co., 277 N.C. 119, 117 S.E.2d 273 (1970).
175. An issue not discussed by the court but clearly raised by the factual allegations was
whether plaintiff could maintain an action based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel or under
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973) which provides: "(1)
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the
part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is bind-
ing if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." The existence of not only a
promise made directly to plaintiff that Transco should have reasonably expected to induce action,
but also a binding promise made to NCNG for the benefit of plaintiff suggests that such a claim
would have been actionable. The considerations a court must make to determine liability under a
theory of third-party beneficiary are strikingly similar to those required under a theory of reliance
upon a promise made to one party for the benefit of a third party (Id., Comment c). Moreover,
the latter theory requires only that the beneficiary foreseeably rely on the promise, rather than the
more rigorous showing of an intention to benefit required by the former.
176. 38 N.C. App. 406, 248 S.E.2d 571 (1978).
177. Id. at 407, 248 S.E.2d at 572.
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there was no evidence of termite infestation, past or present, and no
structural weakness. 178 Vendor gave the report to plaintiffs, who relied
on it in purchasing the house. Plaintiffs later discovered extensive
structural damage caused by a previous termite infestation, and sued
Terminix for the cost of repairing the house. At the close of all the
evidence, the trial court allowed Terminix' motion for a directed ver-
dict, two of the reasons being that plaintiffs had not produced evidence
of privity of contract between plaintiff and Terminix or evidence of any
legal duty Terminix owed plaintiff.179
The court of appeals overruled the trial court and held that be-
cause vendor's unquestioned intent in engaging Terminix was to bene-
fit plaintiff purchasers, and because Terminix knew or had reason to
know the wood infestation report would be relied upon by a potential
purchaser, plaintiffs could recover for breach of the vendor-Terminix
contract. 180 Without saying so, the Johnson court followed the CFIn-
dustries81 rule of determining plaintiff's right of action by ascertaining
the intention of the contracting parties to benefit the plaintiff as evi-
denced by all the circumstances under which the contract was made,
with special regard to the main purpose of the entire transaction.1
82
The court did not cite the Restatement (First), realizing perhaps that to
178. The findings showed that an employee of Terminix inspected the house and reported by
radio to a secretary of Terminix that the termite damage was the same as that found in an earlier
inspection, and that there was no present infestation. The written report introduced into evidence,
however, stated there was no sign of either a present or past infestation. The report did indicate
the existence of damage to structural items, but explained those items had been replaced and that
there were presently no structural weaknesses. Id. at 408-09, 248 S.E.2d at 572-73.
179. Id. at 409, 248 S.E.2d at 573.
180. The court relied mainly on two factors in holding that Terminix could be held liable to
the third-party buyer of the house. It emphasized that the seller-buyer contract expressly made
the sale conditional on the seller's provision of a negative wood infestation report. Thus, it was
clear that the principal purpose of the vendor, or promisee, in hiring Terminix was to obtain an
inspection and report for the benefit of the buyer, the seller receiving only a nominal benefit.
Second, the court noted that the Terminix-seller contract itself implied that Terminix was aware
that the report was for the benefit of a third party. Id. at 410-11, 248 S.E.2d at 575.
181. See notes 157-175 and accompanying text supra.
182. It is uncertain from the opinion whether on remand plaintiff may sustain his burden of
proof by merely showing that he received a false or inaccurate infestation report, or whether
plaintiff must prove that defendant was negligent. The standard of liability issue is further ob-
scured by the Johnson court's cryptic holding that plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to raise an
issue of negligence on the part of defendant Terminix. 38 N.C. App. at 412-13, 248 S.E.2d at 575.
Possible interpretations of the holding and its relation to plaintiff's contract action as a third-party
beneficiary include (1) that the court was merely stating the well-settled rule that a qualified third-
party beneficiary may sue ex delicto as well as ex contractu, Toone v. Adams, 262 N.C. 403, 407,
137 S.E.2d 132, 135 (1964); (2) that although the suit was in contract, the exterminator's contrac-
tual duty to the promisee or third party was one of ordinary care and diligence. See note 187
infra. Absent any express warranty as to the accuracy of the report, and assuming that no implied
warranty attached because the inspection and report is a service, see Jones v. Clark, 36 N.C. App.
327, 330, 244 S.E.2d 183, 185 (1978), it is unlikely that the court intended that plaintiff recover
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deny plaintiffs cause of action because he was not a donee, creditor or
direct recipient of the promised performance was unjustifiable in light
of the clear evidence that the vendor had exacted Terminix' perform-
ance for the benefit of the plaintiff. The Johnson decision not only
lends support to CF Industries and its eschewal of a categorical ap-
proach, but also illustrates the need for North Carolina expressly to
discard the Restatement (First) and adopt the Restatement (Second)
test. 18
3
In Chicago Title Insurance Company v. Holt,184 the North Carolina
Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of a third-party breach of con-
tract action against an attorney who had certified title to real property
and undertaken to close a five-party transaction185 on the property. As
a condition to insuring the mortgagee against any loss arising from a
defect in the title to a group of newly constructed condominiums, plain-
tiff insurer required an indemnification agreement from the builder of
the project. Relying on the attorney's certification of title to plaintiff,
the general contractor signed the agreement and thereby warranted
there were no unpaid materialmen or subcontractors, and agreed to in-
demnify plaintiff should it incur liability because of mechanics' liens
having priority over the deeds of trust held by the mortgagee. Subse-
quently, plaintiff satisfied a judgment lien held by one of the builder's
suppliers and instituted an action against the builder for indemnifica-
tion. Defendant builder cross-claimed against the seller's attorney,
who had handled the closing, for failure to exercise reasonable care in
determining the existence of unpaid lien creditors. 186
Addressing this issue of first impression, the court of appeals at the
without a showing of negligence. The court did not discuss whether plaintiff could maintain a tort
action independently of its third-party beneficiary status.
183. In holding that an exterminating company is liable to a person who purchases property in
reliance upon a false or inaccurate wood infestation report provided to the vendor, North Caro-
lina joins only a few jurisdictions that have so held. See Hardy v. Carmichael, 207 Cal. App. 2d
218, 24 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1962); Wice v. Shilling, 124 Cal. App. 2d 735, 269 P.2d 231 (1954); Hamil-
ton v. Walker Chem. & Exterminating Co., 233 So. 2d 440 (Fla. Ct. App. 1970); Ruekenkorf v.
McCartney, 121 So. 2d 757 (La. Ct. App. 1960).
184. 36 N.C. App. 284, 244 S.E.2d 177 (1978).
185. Interested parties included the buyer, seller, lender, mortgagee's insurer, and the general
contractor. Id. at 285-86, 244 S.E.2d at 178-79.
186. Holt, the general contractor, set forth two other grounds for relief in his complaint: (1)
that defendant attorney was liable to Holt for any loss because of his undertaking to represent
multiple parties at the closing; and (2) that the attorney was negligent in advising Holt to sign the
indemnification agreement without first exercising his affirmative duty to discover the existence of
any materialmen's or mechanics' liens. Id. at 286, 244 S.E.2d at 179. The court held the claims
insufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted on the ground of lack of privity
between Holt and the attorney. Id. at 288, 244 S.E.2d at 180.
1979]
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outset decided that an action for attorney malpractice sounds in con-
tract rather than tort, and thus may properly be brought only by those
in privity of contract with the attorneys. 187  Because the attorney's
client was the seller,'88 defendant builder's claim was barred unless he
qualified as a third-party beneficiary of the attorney-seller employment
contract.
The court purported to follow the third-party beneficiary categori-
zation of the Restatement (First) ' 9 and summarily dismissed the claim
because the builder was neither a donee nor creditor beneficiary. The
court proceeded, however, to consider whether the vendor and attorney
intended to benefit the builder and concluded that because the builder
did not allege that the attorney promised to, or did in fact, certify the
title to the builder, the builder had failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.' 90
Although not entirely clear, the Chicago Title holding suggests that
as a matter of law a party to a real estate closing, who is not in privity
187. The court supported its decision with the following statement of the general rule as set
forth in 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 140, at 978:
Although the liability of an attorney on the ground of negligence is ordinarily enforced
by an action on the case for negligence in the discharge of his professional duties, the
liability in reality rests on the attorney's employment by the client and is contractualin its
nature. Hence, before the attorney can be made liable, it must appear the loss for which
he is sought to be held arose from his failure or neglect to discharge some duty which
was fairly within the purview of his employment. Moreover, an attorney is liable for
negligence in the conduct of his professional duties to his client alone, that is, to the one
between whom and the attorney the contract of employment and service existed, and not
to third parties.
Quoted in 36 N.C. App, at 287, 244 S.E.2d at 180 (emphasis added by court).
The preceding excerpt is instructive because it explains the relationship between negligence
and breach of contract in the case of an action for malpractice. Thus, there is nothing inconsistent
about defining a breach of contract in terms of an allegation of negligence because the contractual
standard is essentially an implied representation to the client that the attorney "will exercise rea-
sonable and ordinary care and diligence in the use of his skill and in the application of his know-
ledge to his client's cause." Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 519, 80 S.E.2d 144, 146 (1954).
188. The court's conclusion that the attorney represented the seller at the closing is contrary to
common practice and the normal expectations of the parties. The court did not articulate what
factors determined the attorney-client relationship, and, therefore, the Chicago Title dictum cre-
ates uncertainty concerning whether the payment of attorneys' fees and being in the position of
the party who naturally desires the assurances that title to the property is free and clear of encum-
brances is enough to establish privity with the closing attorney.
189. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (1932).
190. Apparently the materialiman's lien constituting the title defect was unrecorded at the time
of the recording of the deed of trust. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-12(b) (1969) permits such liens to be
filed within four months of the work's completion. The lien is deemed to take effect from the time
of the first furnishing of materials to the property, id., which explains the insurer's liability for the
lien. Defects not discoverable by an examination of the public records are generally either ex-
pressly or impliedly excluded from such certifications. Therefore, absent an allegation that the
attorney purported to certify that no unrecorded liens existed, it is unlikely that the builder would
have prevailed had the claim been actionable.
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of contract with the certifying attorney, may sue the attorney only if the
party is a recipient of the certification. 9' On third-party beneficiary
principles the rule is problematic in that it conclusively presumes that
only the parties to whom a certification was addressed were intended to
benefit from it, and thus potentially distorts the realities of a particular
real estate closing. Moreover, there seems to be no valid justification,
in policy or otherwise, for precluding liability in the case of an attorney
who furnishes a title certification to one party for the benefit of a third
party, when an exterminating company that provides an infestation re-
port under the same circumstances may be liable as in Johnson v.
Wall."'2 In addition, the rule may constitute a treacherous pitfall to
the real estate buyer who unsuspectingly relies on a title certification
issued to his lender, and subsequently brings a malpractice action
against the certifying attorney for failure to discover a title defect. The
problem is compounded-bythe common practice of one attorney clos-
ings, and the consequent failure to define the attorney-client
relationship. 93
C. Unfair Trade
In Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. Hunsucker,194 the North Carolina
Court of Appeals held that the federal Commodity Exchange Act' 95 as
amended by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act19 6 pre-
empted the application of the state unfair trade practices law, G.S. 75-
1.1,197 to transactions involving the purchase or sale of commodity fu-
tures contracts. Plaintiff, a stock and commodities broker, sued to re-
cover a deficit balance in defendant's commodities account. Defendant
counterclaimed that Bache had committed unfair and deceptive acts in
191. Although there is language in the opinion that indicates-the court was applying a strict
"intention to benefit" test to the complaint to ascertain whether the seller (promisee) intended that
the contractor benefit or rely on the title certification, the court's affirmation of the dismissal of the
claim in the face of allegations that the attorney advised the contractor to sign the lien waiver
suggests that intention was not determinative. The disposition of the case indicates that only
parties to whom a certification was delivered, or promised to be delivered, may qualify as a third-
party beneficiary.
192. See notes 176-183 and accompanying text supra.
193. See general, Whitman, Transferring North Carolina Real Estate Part P: How the Present
System Functions, 49 N.C.L. Rav. 413 (1971).
194. 38 N.C. App. 414, 248 S.E.2d 567 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 583,- S.E.2d -(1979).
195. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976).
196. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 7 U.S.C.).
197. The statute at issue was the former § 75-1.1(a) that provided as follows: "Unfair methods
of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce
are hereby declared unlawful." Law of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 930 (formerly
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (1975)) (amended 1977).
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violation of G.S. 75-1.1 by making unauthorized sales and purchases of
commodities in defendant's name, and subsequently liquidating de-
fendant's accounts. 198
Because the Commodity Exchange Act granted exclusive jurisdic-
tion' 99 to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to hear cus-
tomer complaints and award monetary damages" 0 for the activities
alleged,20 ' the court inferred that Congress sought to regulate unfair
and deceptive practices in the commodity trading field to the exclusion
of the states. The court was not persuaded that a private action under
G.S. 75-1.1 was merely an action at common law not in conflict with
the federal regulatory scheme.20 2 The court reasoned that because a
finding that plaintiff had violated G.S. 75-1.1 could expose it to a host
of legislatively created sanctions in addition to those sought, the private
action was tantamount to state regulation, and thus preempted. 3
The Bache holding that state regulation of commodities trading is
preempted is in line with the few decisions that have addressed the
question. 20 4  Language in the Commodity Exchange Act that "the
198. 38 N.C. App. at 417, 248 S.E.2d at 568.
199. The jurisdiction of the Commission is set out in 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) and provides in part
as follows:
Provided, That the Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to ac-
counts, agreements. . . an4 transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for
future delivery, traded or executed on a contract market designated pursuant to section 7
of this title or any other board of trade, exchange, or market, and transactions subject to
regulation by the Commission pursuant to section 15a of this title: Andprovidedfurther,
That, except as hereinabove provided, nothing contained in this section shall (i) super-
sede or limit the jurisdiction at any time conferred on the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission or other regulatory authorities under the laws of the United States or of any
State, or (ii) restrict the Securities and Exchange Commission and such other authorities
from carrying out their duties and responsibilities in accordance with such laws. Noth-
ing in this section shall supersede or limit the jurisdiction conferred on courts of the
United States or any State ....
200. Id. § 18.
201. Federal courts have held it a violation of the Commodity Exchange Act for an account
executive in the commodity brokerage business to intentionally carry on trading transactions not
authorized by his customers. Haltmier v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 554 F.2d 556 (2d
Cir. 1977); Silverman v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 549 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977).
202. Several courts have held that a purpose of the language in 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) that
"[n]othing in this section shall supersede or limit the jurisdiction conferred on courts of the United
States or any State" is to preserve a court's jurisdiction over claims arising out of a violation of the
common law. See Arkoosh v. Dean Witter & Co., 415 F. Supp. 535 (D. Neb. 1976); E.F. Hutton
Co. v. Lewis, 410 F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
203. Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-14 (1975) the attorney general may obtain injunctive relief
against violations of§ 75-1.1. In addition, he is entitled to seek a court order to restore money or
property or cancel any contracts obtained through violation of the statute. Id. § 75-15.1.
204. See International Trading, Ltd. v. Bell, 556 S.W.2d 420 (Ark. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
941 (1978); State v. Money Int'l, Ltd., 527 S.W.2d 804 (rex. Civ. App. 1975). See also SEC v.
Univest, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1057 (D.C. 11. 1975), remanded, 556 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1977) (SEC
preempted from suing dealer in commodity options). The Bache court found the Bell case partic-
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Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to accounts,
agreements. . . and transactions involving contracts of sale of a com-
modity for future delivery"2 °5 evinces a clear intent on the part of Con-
gress to vest in the Commission exclusive jurisdiction over the
regulation of transactions involving commodity futures contracts, and
to supersede state regulation of the same subject matter.20 6 Assuming
that G.S. 75-1.1 and its concomitant enforcement provisions20 7 are reg-
ulatory in nature, some uncertainty still remains about whether a pri-
vate action pursuant to a regulatory statute is likewise preempted.20 8
The court's conclusion that a G.S. 75-1.1 private action could poten-
tially frustrate the federal scheme was sound given the structure of the
statute and Congress' objective of providing a centralized regulatory
authority designed to establish relatively consistent and uniform stan-
dards of conduct in commodity markets. Moreover, the Act's provision
of a complete administrative procedure for the hearing of customer
complaints and the awarding of monetary damages implies that Con-
gress intended that the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction extend to
private actions pursuant to substantive regulatory law.209
ularly persuasive. In that case, the Arkansas securities commissioner sought an injunction against
a commodities investment firm under ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1236(a) (Repl. 1966), a state statute
designed to prevent fraud or deceit in the trading of securities. The Arkansas Supreme Court held
that the trial court had no jurisdiction under the state securities law to regulate conduct in the area
of commodity futures in light of a pervasive federal regulatory scheme and congressional intent to
give the Commission exclusive jurisdiction.
205. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
206. The Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee explained the meaning of the "exclusive
jurisdiction" language of 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) as follows:
The House bill provides for exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission over all fu-
tures transactions. However, it is provided that such exclusive jurisdiction would not
supersede or limit the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission or other
regulatory authorities.
The [Senate] Committee amendment retains the provision of the House bill but adds
three clarifying amendments. The clarifying amendments make clear that (a) the Com-
mission's jurisdiction over futures contract markets or other exchanges is exclusive and
includes the regulation of commodity accounts, commodity trading agreements, and
commodity options; (b) the Commission's jurisdiction, where applicable, supersedes
State as well as Federal agencies ....
S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5843, 5848. The Senate provision was accepted by the Conference Committee. H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 93-1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5894, 5897.
207. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1 to -29 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
208. See Johnson, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act: Preemption as Public Pol-
icy, 29 VAND. L. REv. 1, 32-36 (1976).
209. The court stressed that the customer could nevertheless maintain a traditional common
law action in state court. The court construed the second proviso of the jurisdictional grant,
quotedin note 199 supra, as authorizing state and federal courts to adjudicate claims arising out of
a violation of the common law. 38 N.C. App. at 420-21, 248 S.E.2d at 570.
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In another case involving former G.S. 75-1.1, the court of appeals
decided whether certain instances of false advertising violated that stat-
ute's prohibition of "unfair methods of competition and unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce."
Plaintiff in Harrington Manufacturing Co. v. Powell Manufacturing
Co.210 alleged that Powell, a competitor, had violated G.S. 75-1.1 by
advertising that "only the Powell Combine primes lugs through t s"
when, in fact, plaintiff's combine also primed lugs through tips.2 I De-
fendant Powell counterclaimed that plaintiff had similarly violated the
statute by falsely advertising that plaintiffs tobacco primer was "years
ahead of any other tobacco harvester on the market,"212 and that plain-
tiff's loading rack and curing barns were "stronger than Powell's" and
had a greater loading capacity.213 The court of appeals upheld dismis-
sal of both claims on the ground that the representations, even if
proved false, "did not. . . go so far beyond the tolerable limits of puf-
fing as to constitute unfair acts proscribed by G.S. 75-1.1. ' ' 14 Whether
false representations exceed the bounds of fairness in any particular
case depends upon the extent to which the typical buyer would rely on
such advertising in making a purchase. The court reasoned that when
the advertisement concerned an expensive product and was aimed at a
group of knowledgable buyers, prospective purchasers would not nor-
mally rely solely upon a magazine advertisement or media broadcast,
especially when accurate technical information was available.215
Although the court's ruling that puffing is not deceptive or unfair
within the meaning of G.S. 75-1.1 was sound,21 6 such a conclusion on
the particular facts of this case may be criticized on several fronts.
First, it is a close question whether representations of specific fact that
imply that the representer has personal knowledge of the truth of the
assertions (e.g., "greater loading capacity," "the only harvester that
primes lugs through tips") constitute mere puffing, no matter how so-
210. 38 N.C. App. 393, 248 S.E.2d 739 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 411, 251 S.E.2d 469
(1979).
211. Id. at 397, 249 S.E.2d at 742.
212. Id. at 402, 248 S.E.2d at 744.
213. Id. at 402, 248 S.E.2d at 745.
214. Id. at 403, 248 S.E.2d at 745.
215. Id. at 400-01, 248 S.E.2d at 744.
216. See E. KINTNER, A PRIMER ON THE LAW OF DECEPTIVE PRACTIcEs 319-325 (1971).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977) is a copy of the language of § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)-(9) (1976); the Federal Trade Commission and the
reviewing courts have recognized that puffing and sales talk are not unlawful, and those decisions
are generally consistent with state law definitions of puffing. See Carlay Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 493
(7th Cir. 1946); Kidder Oil Co. v. FTC, 117 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1941).
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phisticated purchasers may be.2 17 It seems that a prospective purchaser
could justifiably rely on such an advertising claim.
Second, although the court's rationale is not entirely clear, it
seemed to reason alternatively that because buyers of tobacco farming
machinery do not rely on advertising claims in making their purchases,
no deception had occurred.218 Such a conclusion represents a question-
able excursion into fact-finding and arguably the issue of customer reli-
ance should have been remanded for a determination by the trier of
fact.219 Moreover, the wisdom of this rationale from a policy stand-
point is questionable in that it sanctions virtually any advertising repre-
sentation made in this market no matter how untrue or deceptive it
appears to be. To this extent, the result undermines G.S. 75-1.1's pur-
pose of promotion of commercial honesty and competition on the
merits.220
The court further held that averments in the counterclaim that
plaintiff had "passed off" a piece of Powel's tobacco harvesting ma-
chinery as plaintiff's own product alleged an unfair or deceptive act
under former G.S. 75-1.1.221 Plaintiff incorporated Powell's "Cut-
terBar" (a defoliator) into one of its automatic tobacco harvesters and
demonstrated the harvester to prospective purchasers without identify-
ing the blade assembly as having been manufactured by Powell.222 Al-
217. Whether a representation is puffing or sales talk depends on the nature of its language.
Traditionally, puffing has consisted of glittering general statements rather than specific representa-
tions of fact. See E. KiNTNER and cases cited note 216 supra.
218. See 38 N.C. App. at 401, 248 S.E.2d at 744.
219. For a statement of proper role ofjudge in an action under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1, see
Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975).
220. Law of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 930 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 75-1.1(b) (1975)) (repealed 1977), provides:
The purpose of this section is to declare, and to provide civil legal means to main-
tain, ethical standards of dealings between persons engaged in business, and between
persons engaged in business and the consuming public within this State, to the end that
good faith and fair dealings between buyers and sellers at all levels of commerce be had
in this State.
221. The court recognized that this form of passing off differed from the traditional common
law action for the passing off of one's goods as those of a competitor. 38 N.C. App. at 404, 248
S.E.2d at 746. See generally Aycock, Antitrust and Unfair Trade Practice Law in North Carolina-
Federal Law Compared, 50 N.C.L. REv. 199 (1972).
222. In August 1974 Harrington purchased a Powell "CutterBar" and incorporated it into one
of its automatic tobacco harvesters. The patented "CutterBar" (Powell's trade name for the
mechanical harvesting device generically known as the "splinter knife" type defoliator) was
unique in that it consisted of a blade assembly with upward revolving blades. Harrington added a
hydrosynchronizer, a device that had been invented by Harrington's engineers that synchronized
by hydraulics the timing of the knife of the blade assembly with the forward motion of the har-
vester. Harrington demonstrated this innovation to about 300 farmers without identifying the
blade assembly as Powell-made. 38 N.C. App. at 399, 248 S.E.2d at 743.
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though plaintiff had a license to produce the CutterBar,223 the court
held that by using Powell's actual product in its demonstrations plain-
tiff had misappropriated a variety of values flowing from the quality of
the product, including the large investment that Powell had made in
experimentation, engineering and development to bring its CutterBar
to a high level of quality and efficiency.224
In upholding Powell's allegation that the use of its CutterBar in
plaintiff's harvester demonstration without so notifying prospective
purchasers constituted an unfair method of competition under G.S. 75-
1.1, the court did not identify the exact nature of the interest being
protected. The injury alleged was actually a mixture of two distinct
wrongs: (1) the plaintiff obtained an unfair advantage over its competi-
tors by doing demonstrative advertising without having to incur the
investment and manufacturing costs required for producing its own
CutterBar;225 and (2) plaintiffs failure to fully disclose the defoliator's
make amounted to a representation that plaintiff had manufactured
that particular defoliator with that degree of quality, causing prospec-
tive harvester buyers to purchase from plaintiff when they may not
have otherwise.226 The former type of appropriation, that of Powell's
"production" value, appears de minimis because plaintiff would eventu-
ally have to duplicate Powell's investment in order to fulfill its sales
contracts. Thus, while the advertising short-cut taken by plaintiff may
have enabled it to make some sales a few months before it could have
otherwise, the absence of any long-term crippling effect on competitors
minimizes its importance.
Whether the alleged wrong consisting of plaintiff's failure to iden-
tify the defoliator as that of a competitor is legally sufficient to support
a private action for the recovery of monetary damages under G.S. 75-
223. In 1962, Powell obtained a nonexclusive license to manufacture and sell the CutterBar.
On November 15, 1974, the patentee granted a nonexclusive license to Harrington to produce its
own device. Harrington demonstrated its harvester with the incorporated CutterBar in September
and October of 1974. Apparently, Harrington was using a Powell CutterBar in its demonstrations
until it began producing its own.
224. 38 N.C. App. at 404, 248 S.E.2d at 746.
225. See generally International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
226. The difference between the two is made apparent by positing that plaintiff had fully dis-
closed to its customers that the defoliator demonstrated was a Powell CutterBar. Plaintiff's cus-
tomers would not then have attributed any desirable characteristics of the product as deriving
from plaintiff and Powell could hardly be heard to complain that plaintiff was diverting custom-
ers. But despite full disclosure of the defoliator's source a misappropriation would nevertheless
exist consisting essentially of plaintiff's demonstrating its harvester with the CutterBar without
having incurred the investment and manufacturing costs required to produce a CutterBar.
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1.1227 is difficult to assess in light of the lack of case law and extra-
statutory expressions of legislative intent. Powell's argument was that
plaintiff, by using Powell's actual product in its advertising demonstra-
tions, misappropriated to its own benefit certain values of "quality"
and "efficiency" inhering in the CutterBar that deceived prospective
purchasers into incorrectly attributing such desirable characteristics to
plaintiff's initiative.
Although plaintiff's act strikes one as unfair in that the alleged
wrongdoer is reaping where he has not sown, the essence of the misap-
propriation in this instance was plaintiff's misrepresentation to poten-
tial purchasers that the demonstrated harvester and blade assembly was
of its own manufacture. While a misappropriation that tends to
deceive customers into confusing the wrongdoer's goods with those of a
competitor would clearly be actionable, an inherent difficulty of proof
arises when what is alleged to have been misappropriated is other than
an identifying mark or characteristic. 228 Because a finding of liability
subjects the wrongdoer to treble damages, 229 and because the language
in the private remedy statute is compensatory,230 on remand it should
not be sufficient for Powell to show merely that plaintiff's sales of har-
vesters were proximately caused by its use of Powell's CutterBar; in-
stead, Powell should be required to show, that customers were actually
diverted.23 ' Factors that militate against the existence of actual injury
to Powell are that the CutterBar was a component of the entire product
being demonstrated and that plaintiff possessed a license to make the
227. If any person shall be injured or the business of any person, firm or corporation shall
be broken up, destroyed or injured by reason of any act or thing done by any other
person, firm or corporation in violation of the provisions of this Chapter, such person,
firm or corporation so injured shall have a right of action on account of such injury done,
and if damages are assessed by a jury in such case judgment shall be rendered in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the verdict.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
228. Judge Clark in California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of Cal., Inc., 162 F.2d 893 (2d Cir.
1947), stated the general common law rule:
To recover damages or to receive protective relief against the actions of these defendants,
plaintiffs must therefore show not only a representation by defendants which is false and
deceitful in the sense of luring customers to their doors wrongfully, but also that plain-
tiffs have lost their own rightful custom thereby.
Id. at 900.
229. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (Cum. Supp. 1977), quoted in note 227 supra.
230. Id.
231. Merely because the nondisclosure is couched in terms of a misappropriation, Powell
should not be relieved of the burden of proving diversion. The theory underlying such a "misrep-
resentation" is essentially no different from that of the traditional common law tort of passing off.
When a seller palms off his wares as those of a competitor, he diverts customers by appropriating
to his own use a competitor-created value, namely, customer recognition of a mark or other identi-
fying feature.
1979]
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defoliator. Thus, given the evanescence of the values alleged to have
been misappropriated and the conjectural nature of any injury, absent
an allegation that plaintiff's customers were confused about the source
and therefore would have purchased from Powell but for the misappro-
priation, the claim should arguably be dismissed. 2 To permit a jury
to speculate on the nature and extent of Powell's injury would, it seems,
be to punish plaintiff for the act of using Powell's CutterBar and thus





A. Full Faith and Credit
In Vincent v. Vincent,' the North Carolina Court of Appeals up-
held a district court ruling that an Alabama court's judgment modify-
ing a North Carolina alimony decree2 terminated plaintiff's rights
under the North Carolina decree as of the date the Alabama judgment
was entered. 3 Recognizing a split in authority on whether defendant is
relieved of his obligation when the foreign judgment is entered or only
when he obtains a judgment in North Carolina that gives full faith and
credit to the foreign decree, the court held that in order to give the
Alabama decree the same effect it would have in Alabama, as is re-
quired by the full faith and credit clause,4 the entry of the foreign judg-
232. Had Powell alleged that plaintiffs use of its CutterBar amounted to a representation that
plaintiff was not selling Powell CutterBars and thus purchasers of plaintiff expected to get a Pow-
ell-made blade assembly on their harvesters, the element of diversion would have been made out.
Without a customer associating the misappropriated values with the complainant (or the nonexis-
tence of other factors indicating that the purchasers would have bought from the complainant but
for the misrepresentation, e.g., only two firms) such a claim seeking monetary damages is
deficient.
1. 38 N.C. App. 580, 248 S.E.2d 410 (1978).
2. The Alabama court could modify the North Carolina decree to the same extent that a
North Carolina court could, and the Alabama court's finding of changed circumstances (regarding
health and financial resources of defendant husband) was sufficient under North Carolina law to
allow it to modify the decree. Id. at 582-83, 248 S.E.2d at 412.
3. Id. at 581, 248 S.E.2d at 411.
4. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
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ment must immediately terminate plaintiffs rights under the North
Carolina decree.5
B. First Amendment
A federal district court, in Radford v. Webb, 6 declared unconstitu-
tional a North Carolina statute prohibiting the use of profane, indecent
and threatening language over a telephone.7 A virtually identical Vir-
ginia statute had been declared unconstitutionally overbroad by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit because included
in the prohibition was language that was not obscene but was protected
by the first amendment.' The court of appeals found that the statute
could be more narrowly drawn to meet the legitimate state interest in
proscribing the use over the telephone of obscene language without in-
fringing constitutionally protected speech.9 The district court in Rad-
ford viewed the Virginia and North Carolina statutes as virtually
indistinguishable, 10 and found no North Carolina cases construing the
language of the statute that restricted its meaning to an allowable pro-
hibition against obscene phone calls." Without such a limitation by
judicial decision, the terms "profane, indecent and threatening" could
include mere "heat of the moment" threats and words with an offensive
connotation that are protected by the first amendment.1 2 The statute
was thus held to be overbroad and an unconstitutional infringement on
5. 38 N.C. App. at 583, 248 S.E.2d at 412.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals also considered the effect of the full faith and credit
clause in Sainz v. Sainz, 36 N.C. App. 744,245 S.E.2d 372 (1978). Plaintiffwife obtained a specific
performance decree in a New York court under an extrajudicial separation agreement. The de-
cree was enforceable by civil contempt proceedings in New York. Id. at 745, 245 S.E.2d at 373.
The court held that although the specific performance decree was entitled to recognition in North
Carolina, the full faith and credit clause did not bind the state to enforce the decree by civil
contempt proceedings. Because such proceedings would constitute imprisonment for debt, which
is prohibited by N.C. ColsT. art. I, § 28, the decree would not be so enforced. Id. at 747-48, 245
S.E.2d at 374-75.
6. 446 F. Supp. 608 (W.D.N.C. 1978).
7. The statute provides that it is unlawful "[tlo use in telephonic communications any words
or language of a profane, vulgar, lewd, lascivious or indecent character, nature or connotation"
and "Itlo use in telephonic communications any words or language threatening to inflict bodily
harm to any person." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-196(a)(1)(2) (1969).
8. The Virginia statute challenged for overbreadth in Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 916 (1975), provided: "If any person shall curse or abuse anyone, or
use vulgar, profane, threatening or indecent language over any telephone in this State, he shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor. . . !' VA. CODE § 18.1-238 (1975) (repealed 1975).
9. Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3, 5-6 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 906 (1975).
10. 446 F. Supp. at 610.
11. Id. at 611.
12. Id. at 610-11.
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first amendment freedom of speech. 13 In so holding the district court
refused to follow a North Carolina Court of Appeals case, In re Sim-
mons,14 which had held that G.S. 14-196(a)(1)" 5 was not unconstitu-
tionally overbroad.16  The district court's decision not to follow
Simmons is understandable in light of the inadequate analysis of the
statute in Simmons.
The court of appeals in Simmons failed to analyze the statute ac-
cording to the accepted test for overbreadth of a statute regulating
speech: whether the statute is drawn to prohibit only speech not pro-
tected by the first amendment (for example, obscenity).' 7 The court
reasoned that because the state could prevent intrusion by telephone on
individuals' privacy in some situations, i" it could prohibit the use of
language that was clearly "lewd, lascivious and indecent."'19 Although
the court was correct that the state can regulate some speech, the con-
clusion that lewd speech can be prohibited fails to consider whether
speech that is lewd and indecent, though morally and socially objec-
tionable, is also protected by the first amendment and therefore not
properly subject to regulation. The district court's finding in Radjord
that the statute prohibited such language protected by the first amend-
ment supplied the overbreadth analysis that the North Carolina Court
of Appeals had omitted in upholding the statute in Simmons.2 °
C. Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection
In Spencer v. Spencer,2 ' defendant husband claimed that the
North Carolina privy examination statute22 violated the equal protec-
13. Id. at 611.
14. 24 N.C. App. 28, 210 S.E.2d 84 (1974).
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-196(a)(1) (1969).
16. 446 F. Supp. at 611.
17. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (statute proscribing the use of abusive
language in presence of others held unconstitutionally vague).
18. Statutes may, for example, proscribe the use of obscene language, which is not protected
by the first amendment. Id.
19. 24 N.C. App. at 30-31, 210 S.E.2d at 86.
20. In another first amendment case, a federal district court, in Hart Book Stores, Inc. v.
Edmisten, 450 F. Supp. 904 (E.D.N.C. 1978), declared N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.11 (Cum. Supp.
1977) unconstitutional. The court held that the statute, which limited the number of adult estab-
lishments in a building to one, violated equal protection and infringed plaintiff's first amendment
freedom of speech without advancing the state's interest in preventing community decay. 450 F.
Supp. at 908. For a thorough discussion of this case, see Survey of Developmentsin North Carolina
Law, 1977, 56 N.C.L. REV. 843, 944-46 (1978).
21. 37 N.C. App. 481, 246 S.E.2d 805, cert. denied, 296 N.C. 106, 249 S.E.2d 804 (1978).
22. Law of Feb. 12, 1872, ch. 193, § 27, 1871-72 N.C. Pub. Laws 336 (formerly codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-6 (1976)(repealed 1977).
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tion clauses of the United States and North Carolina constitutions.'
The statute provided that contracts between husband and wife that ef-
fected a change in the wife's real estate or income from that real estate
were invalid unless the wife was examined by a judicial officer to deter-
mine that the contract was not unreasonable or injurious to the wife.
The trial court rejected defendant's constitutional challenges,24 and the
court of appeals affirmed.
In defense to an action by plaintiff wife under the terms of a sepa-
ration agreement, defendant asserted that the statute was unconstitu-
tional because it did not afford men as well as women the protection of
the exam.25 The court of appeals concluded that defendant did not
have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute because
the appropriate remedy upon a finding of unconstitutionality would be
elimination of the privy exam altogether and would not affect defend-
ant.26 The court premised this conclusion on the fact that the privy
exam requirement is an impermissible restriction on the right to con-
tract rather than a valuable right of itself.2 Thus its application should
be abrogated entirely rather than extended. Despite denial of standing
to defendant, the court undertook an historical and constitutional anal-
ysis of the statute and concluded that were the issue properly before it
the court's finding would be that the statute was unconstitutional.28
D. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
1. Pursuit of Lawful Occupation
In Duggins v. North Carolina Board of Certfied Public Accountant
23. 37 N.C. App. at 484, 246 S.E.2d at 807; see U.S. CONST. art. XIV; N.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 19.
24. 37 N.C. App. at 483, 246 S.E.2d at 807.
25. Id. at 486-88, 246 S.E.2d at 809-10.
26. Id. at 488-89, 246 S.E.2d at 810. The court also noted that defendant, due to his high
level of education and experience would not have benefited from an exam if it were available to
him, and therefore defendant had suffered no injury. Id. at 489, 246 S.E.2d at 811.
27. Id. at 488, 246 S.E.2d at 810.
28. Id. at 488-89, 246 S.E.2d at 810. In another equal protection case, the North Carolina
Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Edmisten, 294 N.C. 598, 242 S.E.2d 862
(1978), held that a Utilities Commission order allowing natural gas companies to obtain direct rate
increases to cover the costs of gas exploration without bringing general rate cases did not violate
equal protection. Id. at 611-12, 242 S.E.2d at 810-11. The court said that because the entire
public would benefit from increased gas supplies, the rates did not have to be applied only to
customers who would benefit directly from the exploration or who were responsible for the
shortages. Id. For a discussion of the due process claims raised by plaintiff, see notes 55-62 and
accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the administrative issues raised in this case, see this
Survey, Administrative Law: Regulation of UiIMes.
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Examiners,2 9 the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld against a due
process challenge the North Carolina statutory requirement that an ap-
plicant for a CPA license must have had two years of experience with a
CPA in the "public practice."30 The statute defines a person engaged
in the public practice of accounting as one who holds himself out to the
public as an accountant offering to perform any or all of the services
ordinarily performed by those who are accountants.31 Plaintiff Dug-
gins had passed the CPA exam and had worked with a CPA in a law
firm, mostly on tax accounting matters, for four years.32 The Board of
Examiners refused to issue a license to Duggins. 33 Because a lawyer
dealing with tax matters does not hold himself out to the public as an
accountant, performing solely accountant's services, Duggins did not
have the requisite experience with an accountant in the "public
practice."34
Duggins challenged the requirement that the experience be with a
CPA in public practice as bearing no rational relationship to the state's
objective of ensuring that only capable, qualified, experienced people
be certified.35 He argued that experience with an accountant in a law
firm dealing with accounting matters provided the same or equivalent
experience and met the state objectives.3 6 The supreme court rejected
plaintiff's contention, holding instead, as did the Board of Examiners,
that work with a CPA in the public practice may expose an accountant
to a wider range of experience than work with an accountant in a law
firm on more narrowly defined tax matters.37 Therefore the statute is
constitutional since the experience requirement in the statute is ration-
ally related to the state's objective in maintaining the quality of
CPA's. 38
The North Carolina statute that prohibits advancements of money
29. 294 N.C. 120, 240 S.E.2d 406 (1978).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93-12(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The statute also requires that an appli-
cant pass the CPA exam before being licensed.
31. Id. § 93-1(5) (1975).
32. 294 N.C. at 123, 240 S.E.2d at 409.
33. Id. at 124, 240 S.E.2d at 409.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 129, 240 S.E.2d at 412-13.
36. Id. at 127-28, 240 S.E.2d at 411.
37. Id. at 129-30, 240 S.E.2d at 413.
38. The court applied the same finding of a rational relationship between the statutory expe-
rience requirement and the state's desire to regulate the quality of CPA's in upholding the statute
against Duggins' equal protection claim that the statute unreasonably discriminated between those
persons with two years' experience with a CPA in the public practice and those without such
experience. Id. at 130-33, 240 S.E.2d at 413-14.
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to political candidates by a corporation, business, or union39 was chal-
lenged by a public relations firm in Louchheim, Eng & People, Inc. v.
Carson,' the first North Carolina case to interpret the corporate cam-
paign contribution statute. Plaintiff had been hired by defendant can-
didate for state attorney general to carry on his media campaign and
had purchased about $22,000 worth of advertising.4" Plaintiff sued to
collect the money after defendant had written a bad check for the
amount.42 The North Carolina Court of Appeals agreed with defend-
ant that the $22,000 was an illegal campaign contribution under G.S.
163-278, which prohibits "any contribution or expenditure... in and
on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate or political committee in
any election or for any political purpose whatsoever,"43 and so refused
to allow plaintiff recovery.44
Interpreting the statute as barring all credit transactions, plaintiff
challenged the statute as an unreasonable infringement on the right to
contract and carry on a lawful occupation.45 The court in upholding
the statute correctly stated that the money that plaintiff spent was
clearly an advancement, which is specifically prohibited under the stat-
utory definition of "contribution and expenditure." 46 Plaintiff argued
that if its payments for advertising costs were prohibited under the stat-
ute,-nten all credit transactions between business and political candi-
dates would be barred.47 The court stated that if it construed the
statute to prohibit all such credit transactions the statute might indeed
39. "[I]t shall be unlawful for any corporation, business entity, labor union, professional as-
sociation or insurance company directly or indirectly:
(1) to make any contribution or expenditure (except a loan of money by a national
or State bank made in accordance with the applicable banking laws and regulations and
in the ordinary course of business) in aid or in behalf of or in opposition to any candi-
date or political committee in any election or for any political purpose whatsoever
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.19(a)(1976).
40. 35 N.C. App. 299, 241 S.E.2d 401 (1978). For further discussion of this opinion, see this
Survey, Administraive Law: Campaign Finance.
41. 35 N.C. App. at 301, 241 S.E.2d at 403.
42. Id.
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.19(a) (1976).
44. 35 N.C. App. at 304, 241 S.E.2d at 405.
45. Id. at 306, 241 S.E.2d at 406. Plaintiff attacked the restriction on the right to engage in
business activity as violative of the fourteenth and fifth amendments to the United States Consti-
tution, and the "law of the land" clause of the North Carolina Constitution, which has been
interpreted to have the same meaning as the federal due process clause. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19;
see State v. Collins, 169 N.C. 323, 324, 84 S.E. 1049, 1050 (1915).
46. 35 N.C. App. at 307, 241 S.E.2d at 406. Contribution and expenditure are defined in
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.6(6), (9) (1976) to include advertisements.
47. 35 N.C. App. at 306, 241 S.E.2d at 406.
1979]
NORTH CA4ROLINA LAW REVIEW
be unconstitutional.4" In the court's view, however, the advancement
of money for an advertising campaign was clearly distinguishable from
an "ordinary extension of credit to a client for services rendered, 49
which is not barred by the statute. The court, however, does not pro-
vide a basis for making this distinction. Moreover, the language of the
statute might well be construed otherwise to cover normal credit trans-
actions. First, the definitions of "contribution" and "expenditure" in
the statute include not only advancement, but also "any. . .transfer of
funds, loan, payment, gift, pledge or subscription of money or anything
of value whatsoever."50 Additionally, an important policy behind the
statute as articulated by the court is the prevention of any activity by a
corporation that would "encourage favored treatment by an official
once he is elected. '51 Given the expansive inclusiveness of the defini-
tion of "expenditure" and the policy against businesses currying politi-
cal favor, arguably the statute may prohibit any credit transactions with
political candidates. Further, the definition of a contribution and ex-
penditure goes on to say that "[tihese terms include, without limitation,
such contributions as labor or personal services."52 This language com-
bined with a broad reading of the definition of contribution contradicts
the court's finding that extensions of credit on personal services are not
prohibited by the statute.53 When the statute is so interpreted to pro-
hibit all credit transactions between business and candidates, an inter-
pretation supported by the language of the statute itself, the restriction
on a plaintiffs right to contract and carry on a lawful business is not
minimal; rather, in the court's words, this interpretation "might well
involve unreasonable intrusions on constitutional rights."54 Such a
prohibition on credit transactions clearly restricts the ability of business
to function and therefore may unconstitutionally infringe the right to
carry on a lawful occupation.
2. Freedom of Contract
In State ex rel Utilities Commission v. Edmisten 55 the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court considered plaintiffs' claims that an order of the
48. Id. at 306-07, 241 S.E.2d at 406.
49. Id. at 305, 241 S.E.2d at 405.
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-278.6(6), (9) (1976).
51. 35 N.C. App. at 304, 241 S.E.2d at 405.
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.6(6) (1976).
53. 35 N.C. App. at 305, 241 S.E.2d at 405.
54. Id. at 307, 241 S.E.2d at 406.
55. 294 N.C. 598, 242 S.E.2d 862 (1978).
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State Utilities Commission that allowed natural gas companies to ob-
tain direct rate increases to cover costs of natural gas exploration with-
out a general ratemaking hearing was a violation of the due process
clause and its state analogue, North Carolina's law of the land clause.56
The attorney general, in attacking the granting of the rate increases,
argued that the rate increases were forced investments that violated
customers' freedom of contract.17 Plaintiff relied on a 1974 North Car-
olina Supreme Court case, Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distributors,
Inc. ,8 which held that protection of manufacturers of trademarked
goods against price cutting and unauthorized use of the trademark was
an insufficient benefit to the public to justify the infringement on the
freedom to contract that resulted from the non-signer clause of the
North Carolina Fair Trade Act.59 The supreme court in Bulova, recog-
nizing that the freedom to contract is a constitutionally protected right
that can be infringed only on a showing of the furtherance of a legiti-
mate state interest,60 believed that the nonsigner clause added little pro-
tection for the manufacturer that the trademark laws did not already
provide, and so the infringement on nonsigners' freedom to resell at
their own prices was unjustifiable.61 Although the court in Utilities
Commission agreed with plaintiff that the rate increase did constitute
forced investment in gas exploration, it also decided that the public's
need to be protected from gas shortages was crucial to the state's econ-
omy and individual well being and so, unlike Bulova, justified the in-
fringement on the right to contract.62
In another contract case, Mazda Motors ofAmerica, Inc. v. South-
western Motors, Inc. ,63 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that
56. Id. at 610, 242 S.E.2d at 870; see note 45 supra. The statute was also attacked as viola-
tive of the equal protection clause of the United States and North Carolina constitutions.
57. Id. at 611, 242 S.E.2d at 870.
58. 285 N.C. 467, 206 S.E.2d 141 (1974).
59. Id. at 475, 206 S.E.2d at 146. The nonsigner clause provided that selling a manufac-
turer's trademark goods at a price below his list price, in violation of a contract provision not to do
so, is unfair competition, whether or not the person selling the goods below list price is a party to
the contract. Law of March 22, 1937, ch. 350, § 6, 1937 N.C. Pub. Laws 683 (formerly codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-56 (1975)) (repealed 1975).
60. 285 N.C. at 478, 206 S.E.2d at 149. The court cited Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934), which held that a state could place a maximum and minimum price on the sale of a
commodity (milk) when the economic welfare of the public required it.
61. The additional policy of fostering free competition by prohibiting manufacturers from
controlling all resale prices may also have been present in Bulova. The fostering of competition in
Buloya coincided with the protection of a competitor's right to contract, which was the stated basis
for the court's decision. 285 N.C. at 478, 206 S.E.2d at 149.
62. 294 N.C. at 611, 242 S.E.2d at 870.
63. 36 N.C. App. 1, 243 S.E.2d 793 (1978), aft'dinpar, rev'd in part, 296 N.C. 357 (1979).
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a state statute requiring motor vehicle manufacturers or distributors to
notify the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles before any attempt to re-
voke a dealer's franchise 6 did not unconstitutionally impair the obliga-
tions of contracts.15  The court approved the state's interest in
preventing the harm to the economy and the general public inherent in
unilateral contracts of adhesion, which often result from unequal bar-
gaining power between distributors and dealers. 6
The court of appeals adopted the approach taken by the United
States Supreme Court67 to determine whether the statute unreasonably
impaired the obligations of contract. The test begins with a determina-
tion whether the statute involves a "disturbance of essential or core ex-
pectations arising from the particular type of contract. '68  Those
expectations are not disturbed unless the statute so greatly discourages
the making of such contracts as to amount to a taking without compen-
sation in violation of due process. 9 Applying this test, the court rea-
soned that the restrictions imposed by G.S. 20-30(6),70 requiring only
sixty days notice to the Commissioner, did not so discourage franchise
dealership contracts as to be a taking (of the financial benefits obtained
from such contracts) in violation of due process.71 The court concluded
that the restrictions imposed by the statute, because they did not restrict
the right to contract to the extent of an unconstitutional taking, and
because they advanced the state interest of protecting the public and
dealers from the effects of contracts of adhesion, were reasonable re-
strictions on the obligation of contract.72
3. License Revocation
In In re Harris,73 the North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld
against a void for vagueness challenge a North Carolina statute that
provided for revocation of a driver's license for repeated violations of
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-305(6) (1978).
65. 36 N.C. App. at 10, 243 S.E.2d at 800; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
66. 36 N.C. App. at 7, 243 S.E.2d at 798-99.
67. City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974) (city ordinance imposing
20% tax on gross receipts from nonresidential parking establishments held valid as not constituting
a taking without compensation); City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965) (statute provid-
ing for termination of land sales contracts for nonpayment of interest and limiting reinstatement
right of purchaser held valid as advancing state interest in clarifying land titles).
68. 36 N.C. App. at 9-10, 243 S.E.2d at 800.
69. Id. at 10, 243 S.E.2d at 800.
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-305(6) (1978).
71. 36 N.C. App. at 10, 243 S.E. 2d at 800.
72. Id.
73. 37 N.C. App. 590, 246 S.E.2d at 532 (1978).
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the liquor laws.74 Petitioner's driver's license had been revoked after
his third conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol.75 He
sought reinstatement of his license three years after his last D.U.I. con-
viction, but the Division of Motor Vehicles refused to reinstate the i-
cense because petitioner had been convicted of public drunkenness
within those three years. 76 The Division construed the prohibition in
G.S. 20-19(e)77 against reissuance of a license within three years of a
liquor law violation to include a conviction for public drunkenness.78
The trial court held that "liquor laws" as used in G.S. 20-19(e) was
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 79 The court of appeals re-
versed holding that the statute was not overbroad because it only pro-
hibited conduct violative of liquor laws, conduct not constitutionally
protected. 0
The court's analysis of petitioner's vagueness argument was cur-
sory at best. After citing Surplus Store, Inc. v. Hunter,"1 a North Caro-
lina Supreme Court case, for the rule that a statute is unconstitutionally
vague only if" 'men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning,' the court summarily held that the term was so clear
"that no further discussion is necessary.58 3 Nevertheless the court went
on to discuss at length the question whether public drunkenness was a
violation of the liquor laws, and based on the legislative intent as evi-
denced by the use of the expansive terms "motor vehicle laws," "liquor
laws," and "drug laws" in G.S. 20-19(e), the court held that a convic-
tion for public drunkenness was a violation of a "liquor law."84
74. The statute provides that a license may be revoked because of a third or subsequent
conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. If such a revocation occurs due to a
conviction within five years of a prior conviction, the revocation is permanent. Even ifthe revoca-
tion is permanent, a new license may be issued, if after three years from the date of revocation the
licensee has not been convicted of a violation of a motor vehicle law, a drug law, or a liquor law.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-19(e) (1978).
75. Id. at 591, 246 S.E.2d at 533.
76. Id. The misdemeanor of public drunkenness is defined in Law of Feb. 13, 1897, ch. 57,
1897 N.C. Pub. Laws 109 (formerly codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-335(a) (1969))
(repealed 1978).
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-19(e) (1978).
78. 37 N.C. App. at 595, 246 S.E.2d at 535.
79. Id. at 591, 246 S.E.2d at 533.
80. Id. at 593-94, 246 S.E.2d at 534.
81. Id. at 593, 246 S.E.2d at 534 (citing 257 N.C. 206, 125 S.E.2d 764 (1962)).
82. Id. (quoting 257 N.C. 206, 211, 125 S.E.2d 764, 768 (1962)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 594-95, 246 S.E.2d at 53435.
In another license revocation case, a doctor challenged for vagueness and overbreadth both
the state statute under which his medical license was revoked and the order of the Board of Medi-
cal Examiners suspending the revocation. In re Wilkins, 294 N.C. 528, 242 S.E.2d 829 (1978).
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4. "Peeping Tom" Statute
The North Carolina statute that makes it a misdemeanor to "peep
secretly into any room occupied by a female person," 5 popularly
known hs the "Peeping Tom" statute, was attacked as unconstitution-
ally vague and overbroad and violative of due process in In re Banks.86
The United States Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Stone87 had held
that the Florida "crime against nature" statute was not unconstitution-
ally vague when read against a background of the common law and
prior state court decisions giving crime against nature a specific narrow
definition. 8 Based on Wainwright, the supreme court stated that the
words of the statute were ambiguous, so they must be read in light of
judicial construction given them in prior cases and in light of legislative
intent.89 The court, relying on State v. Banks,90 which held that "to
peep secretly" connoted spying to invade one's privacy, interpreted the
terms "peep secretly" to prohibit "the wrongful spying into a room
upon a female with the intent of violating the female's legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy." 91 The statute therefore was sufficiently definite,
when read in light of prior cases, to give defendants fair notice of the
prohibited conduct.92 The overbreadth argument also failed because
the statute, under the court's narrowing construction, does not prohibit
any legitimate, constitutionally protected conduct, such as an uninten-
tional glance into a window. 93
Pursuant to Law of Feb. 3, 1933, ch. 32, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 25 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-14 (1975)) (repealed 1975), which provides for revocation of a physician's license for
"unprofessional or dishonorable conduct unworthy of, and affecting, the practice of his profes-
sion," respondent's license was revoked after he was convicted of preparing a false and fraudulent
medical bill and physician's report. 294 N.C. at 530, 242 S.E.2d at 830-31. The Board suspended
the revocation on condition that respondent "conduct his practice of medicine in accordance with
proper professional and ethical standards." Id. at 530-31, 242 S.E.2d at 831. Respondent was
later charged by the Board with prescribing highly dangerous drugs to strangers without examin-
ing them first, and the Board therefore withdrew the suspension and revoked respondent's license.
Id. at 532, 242 S.E.2d at 831-32. Stating that the proper test for vagueness is "whether a reason-
ably intelligent member of the profession would understand that the conduct in question is forbid-
den," the supreme court concluded that respondent's conduct was clearly unprofessional and
unethical; therefore both the statute and the order to the Board were constitutional as applied to
respondent. Id. at 548-49, 242 S.E.2d at 841.
85. 85 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202 (1969).
86. 295 N.C. 236, 244 S.E.2d 386 (1978).
87. 414 U.S. 21 (1973).
88. Id. at 22-23.
89. 295 N.C. at 240-41, 244 S.E.2d at 389.
90. 263 N.C. 784, 140 S.E.2d 318 (1965).
91. 295 N.C. at 242, 244 S.E.2d at 390.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 243-44, 244 S.E.2d at 391.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals struck down another criminal statute for vagueness in
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E. North Carolina Constitution
1. Coastal Area Management Act
In Adams v. Department of Natural and Economic Resources94
plaintiff claimed that the Coastal Area Management Act of 1974
(CAMA)95 was a local law and, as such, was prohibited by the North
Carolina Constitution, which provides that "[tihe General Assembly
shall not enact any local, private, or special act or resolution" relating
to certain subjects, including trade, health, sanitation and abatement of
nuisances. 96 The Act provides for the Coastal Resources Commission
to promulgate guidelines, oversee land use plans adopted by each
county in the coastal area, designate special areas of environmental
concern and issue special use permits for those areas, with the objective
of protecting and preserving the delicate, unique ecosystem of the
coastal area.
The Coastal Resources Commission had designated an "interim"
area of environmental concern, that limited plaintiff's use of his land.97
Plaintiff argued that the North Carolina Constitution's prohibition
against local laws prohibited statutes that are limited in geographical
coverage without any legitimate reason for the limitation.98 Arguing
that the coastal area of North Carolina is no more unique in terms of
its need for environmental protection and land use control than is any
other area of the state, plaintiff concluded that the statute was a prohib-
ited local law.99
State v. Sanders, 37 N.C. App. 53, 245 S.E.2d 397 (1978). Sanders was convicted under N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-186 (1969) for occupying a motel room for "immoral purposes." Because § 14-186 had
received no limiting construction that defined "immoral purposes" to be illicit sexual intercourse
as the state argued, the statute was unconstitutionally vague. 37 N.C. App. at 54-55, 245 S.E.2d at
398.
In another due process case, a federal district court held in Fowler v. Williamson, 448 F.
Supp. 497 (W.D.N.C. 1978), that a high school student had no property interest in participation in
a graduation ceremony. The court, finding no North Carolina law on whether such an interest
was a property right, held that because plaintiff was not denied an education or even a diploma,
but only participation in a ceremony (due to violation of the school dress code), he was not de-
prived of property in violation of due process. Id. at 502.
94. 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978).
95. Ch. 1284, 1973 Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 1974,463 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-100 to
-128 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977)).
96. N.C. CONsT. art. H, § 24. Plaintiffs also claimed that the statute violated the U.S. CONsT.
amend. IV prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 295 N.C. at 705, 249 S.E.2d at
415. For a discussion of plaintiff's claim that the statutory authorization for the promulgation of
guidelines by the Coastal Resources Commission was a prohibited delegation of legislative au-
thority, see this Survey, Administrative Law: CoastalArea Management Act.
97. 295 N.C. at 703, 249 S.E.2d at 414.
98. Id. at 691, 249 S.E.2d at 407.
99. Id.
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The supreme court disagreed, citing Mclntyre v. Clarkson,1' °
which held that a North Carolina statute that provided for appoint-
ment procedure for justices of the peace in twenty-eight North Carolina
counties was invalid as local legislation.1 1 The court in Mclntyre
stated that a law is "local" if" 'the persons or things subject to the law
are not reasonably different from those excluded.' "102 The court in
Adams reasoned that the coastal counties of North Carolina are suffi-
ciently different from the other counties to warrant special attention. 103
Justice Copeland in dissent took issue with the majority's finding
of a unique need of the coastal area's ecosystem for environmental pro-
tection.'4 He saw the Act as designed to regulate land use and not to
protect the special attributes of the coastal environment. 0 5 In arguing
that the Act was a prohibited local law because its stated objectives
applied to all of North Carolina, Justice Copeland cited language in the
proposed 1973 Mountain Area Management Act,"°c which was rejected
by the 1973 General Assembly, that urged uniqueness of the state's
mountains in much the same language as the CAMA uses in describing
the North Carolina coast.10 7 Because the state's coast is no more in
need of protection than the mountains, the dissent concluded, the Act
was unconstitutional local legislation.0 8
In rejecting plaintiff's argument that the classification of the
coastal area as distinct from the mountains and piedmont was unrea-
sonable, the court seems merely to assume that the coastal counties
have a special need for protection of the environment. The court says
that once the class to which the statute applies is found to warrant spe-
cial attention, the existence of other areas that also could be included is
immaterial to the statute's constitutionality. 0 9 Plaintiff's argument,
however, was not that other areas should also be included under the
100. 254 N.C. 510, 119 S.E.2d 888 (1961).
101. Id. at 525, 119 S.E.2d at 899.
102. Id. at 518, 119 S.E.2d at 894 (quoting Cloe & Marcus, Special and Local Legislation, 24
Ky. U. 364 (1935-1936)).
103. 295 N.C. at 691-93, 249 S.E.2d at 407-08.
104. Id. at 707-08, 249 S.E.2d at 416-17 (dissenting opinion).
105. Id. at 707, 249 S.E.2d at 416.
106. S. 973, N.C. Gen. Assembly, 1973 Sess. (proposed N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-137).
107. 295 N.C. at 707-08, 249 S.E.2d at 416-17 (dissenting opinion).
108. Id. at 707-09, 249 S.E.2d at 416-17.
109. Id. at 693, 249 S.E.2d at 408. "'[T]here is no constitutional requirement that a regula-
tion, in other respects permissible, must reach every class to which it might be applied-that the
legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all or none .... It is enough that the
present statute strikes at the end where it is felt, and reaches the class of cases where it most
frequently occurs.'" Id. (quoting Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 123-24 (1929)).
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Act. Plaintiff's attack was directed at the reasonableness of the Act's
classification of the coastal region as an area warranting special atten-
tion. A statute may "'classify conditions, persons, places and things,
and classification does not render a statute "local" if the classification is
reasonable and based on a rational difference of situation and condi-
tion.' "110 Admittedly the coastal area is distinct from the mountains
and piedmont in that the valuable resources in the coastal area are in
major respects of a different kind than those in the mountains."' The
supreme court, however, did not show why the coastal resources, all of
which are subject to pressures from increases in population and devel-
opment, 11 2 are more in need of protection than the mountain resources.
Such a comparison is necessary to provide a convincing basis for classi-
fication of the coastal area as unique within the state. Instead, such a
comparison might show that the resources of the mountains of North
Carolina are as valuable and are subject to the same pressures from
development in the area as the coastal area. 3 The resources such as
undeveloped land and fresh, unpolluted water, which the CAMA states
are to be protected, are present and in need of protection throughout
the state; arguably therefore, the CAMA is limited to an area without a
rational basis for the limitation and should be declared unconstitu-
tional local legislation.
2. Taxation
Taxpayer in Hughey v. Cloniger1 4 sought to enjoin the use of pub-
lic funds appropriated by the General Assembly for the use of a school
for dyslexic children in Gaston County.1 5 The school was operated by
a nonprofit corporation." 6 Taxpayer claimed that payments of public
revenues to a private corporation, regardless of the ultimate benevolent
purpose to which the money is put, is not a public use and violates the
North Carolina Constitution. 17
The court of appeals stated, relying on Stanley v. Department of
110. Id. (quoting High Point Surplus Co. v. Pleasants, 264 N.C. 650, 656, 142 S.E.2d 697, 702
(1969)).
Ill. Id. at 692-93, 707, 249 S.E.2d at 408, 416.
112. Id.
113. 295 N.C. at 707-08, 249 S.E.2d at 416-17.
114. 37 N.C. App. 107, 245 S.E.2d 543, cert. granted, 295 N.C. 734, 248 S.E.2d 863 (1978).
115. Id., 245 S.E.2d at 544.
116. Id. at 108, 245 S.E.2d at 545.
117. Id. at 107, 245 S.E.2d at 544; see N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(l) (power of taxation shall be
exercised for "public purpose" only).
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Conservation & Development, 18 which invalidated a North Carolina
statute that authorized the creation of county agencies to finance pollu-
tion control facilities for private industries by tax exempt bonds,1 9 that
public use is determined not merely by the benevolent purposes to
which the money is put, but also by the means of attaining those pur-
poses.120 Because some funds were going to the corporation to operate
the school and not only to pay the tuition of the children, the monies
were not going to a public use.12 ' The court upheld the statute under
which the funds were appropriated; 122 however, because appropriation






In Mullaney v. Wilbur,I the United States Supreme Court held that
due process requires the State "to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is
properly presented in a homicide case."'2 This result invalidated North
Carolina's use of the presumptions of unlawfulness and malice arising
upon proof by the State of an intentional killing that had effectively
shifted the burden of disproving these presumed elements to the de-
fendant. Two years later, in Hankerson v. North Carolina,4 the United
118. 284 N.C. 15, 199 S.E.2d 641 (1973).
119. Id. at 41, 199 S.E.2d at 658.
120. 37 N.C. App. at 112-13, 245 S.E.2d at 547.
121. Id.
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 159-7 to -40 (1976 & Supp. 1977).
123. 37 N.C. App. at 113, 245 S.E.2d at 548.
1. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
2. Id. at 704.
3. In State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632, 220 S.E.2d 575 (1975), rev'd, 432 U.S. 233 (1977),
the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that, in light of Mullaney, the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment prohibited the use of the state's "long-standing rules in homicide cases that
a defendant in order to rebut the presumption of malice must prove to the satisfaction of the jury
that he killed in the heat of a sudden passion and to rebut the presumption of unlawfulness, that
he killed in self defense." Id. at 643, 220 S.E.2d at 584. The court declined, however, to give
retroactive effect to Mullaney. Id.
4. 432 U.S. 233 (1977).
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States Supreme Court ruled that the holding in Mullaney applied retro-
actively.' The Hankerson Court, however, indicated in a footnote that
a state may limit the retroactivity of Mullaney by the use of the normal
state procedural rule that failure to object to an erroneous jury instruc-
tion is a waiver of that error.' In applying this limit on Mullaney's
retroactivity to collateral attacks on convictions, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals and the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina have adopted different interpretations of this
footnote.
Petitioner in State v. Abernathy7 applied for post-conviction relief
from his 1974 conviction of second degree murder. The trial court
found the waiver rule of footnote eight in Hankerson inapplicable
under North Carolina appellate procedure and ordered a new trial.'
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that when a
defendant could have challenged the jury charge respecting the proof
burden on direct appeal and did not, he was not entitled to attack his
conviction on that ground in a post-conviction collateral proceeding.9
The court based its decision on previous holdings that the Post Convic-
tion Hearing Act1° does not provide a substitute for appeal and is avail-
able only for raising matters that factors beyond the defendant's
5. Id. at 240. This decision raised the possibility of the release of numerous convicted mur-
derers from the North Carolina prisons due to improper allocation of the burden of proof at their
trials.
6. The Court stated:
Moreover, we are not persuaded that the impact on the administration ofjustice in those
States that utilize the sort of burden-shifting presumptions involved in this case will be as
devastating as respondent asserts. If the validity of such burden-shifting presumptions
were as well settled in the States that have them as respondent asserts, then it is unlikely
that prior to Mullaney many defense lawyers made appropriate objections to jury in-
structions incorporating those presumptions .... The North Carolina Supreme Court
passed on the validity of the instructions anyway. The States, if they wish, may be able
to insulate past convictions by enforcing the normal and valid rule that failure to object
to a jury instruction is a waiver of any claim of error.
Id. at 244 n.8 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 30).
7. 36 N.C. App. 527, 244 S.E.2d 696, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 552 (1978). The basis of Aberna-
thy's claim was that the trial judge erroneously placed upon him the burden of proving self de-
fense and of disproving malice.
8. Id. at 528, 244 S.E.2d at 697. The trial court ruled footnote eight inapplicable because
North Carolina does not have the contemporaneous objection rule described by the Supreme
Court in the footnote.
9. Id. at 531, 244 S.E.2d at 698.
10. Abernathy was decided under the old Post-Conviction Hearing Act, Law of Apr. 14, 1951,
ch. 1083, § 1, 1951 N.C. Sess. Laws 1085 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222)
(repealed 1977).
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control prevented him from claiming earlier."
The decision in Abernathy is consistent with the North Carolina
Supreme Court's ruling in a group of cases decided after Hankerson.
In those cases the court held that failure to raise on appeal the error in
the trial court's instructions resulted in a waiver of that claim of error.' 2
The effect of these cases is that a defendant is foreclosed from both
direct and collateral attack on his conviction in the state courts unless
he foresaw the Mullaney decision and preserved the error on appeal.
Relief in federal court may be available, however, in light of the recent
decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina in Cole v. Stevenson.13
In Cole, petitioner sought federal habeas corpus relief from his
second degree murder conviction on the ground that the trial judge er-
roneously placed on him the burden of proving self defense and the
absence of malice.' 4 The State argued that, according to Hankerson's
footnote eight, petitioner's procedural default in failing to raise the is-
sue of the trial judge's instructions at any time during the original ap-
peals period barred him from raising that issue on federal habeas
corpus.' 5 In rejecting this contention the court narrowly construed the
reach of footnote eight. The court determined that North Carolina
does not require the objection at trial described in footnote eight and
held "if petitioner was not obligated to object at trial and a constitu-
tional right (unacknowledged during his first appeals period) was retro-
actively applied to [his] case," there was no reason to foreclose federal
habeas review because such a proceeding is independent of foreclosure
11. 36 N.C. App. at 531,244 S.E.2d at 698; see State v. White, 274 N.C. 220, 162 S.E.2d 473
(1968); Branch v. State, 269 N.C. 642, 153 S.E.2d 343 (1967); State v. Graves, 251 N.C. 550, 112
S.E.2d 85 (1960); State v. Wheeler, 249 N.C. 187, 105 S.E.2d 615 (1958); State v. Cruse, 238 N.C.
53, 76 S.E.2d 320 (1953); Miller v. State, 237 N.C. 29, 74 S.E.2d 513 (1953); 4 STRONG'S NORTH
CAROLINA INDEX 3d Criminal Law § 181, at 911-12 (1976).
12. i State v. Brower, 293 N.C. 259, 243 S.E.2d 143 (1977); State v. Crowder, 293 N.C. 259,
243 S.E.2d 143 (1977); State v. Jackson, 293 N.C. 260, 247 S.E.2d 234 (1977); State v. May, 293
N.C. 261, 247 S.E.2d 234 (1977); and State v. Riddick, 293 N.C. 261, 247 S.E.2d 234 (1977), the
North Carolina Supreme Court in denying rehearing petitions ruled that the defendants had
waived their right to claim as error the failure of the trial judge properly to place the burden of
proving the absence of self defense or the absence of heat of passion when the defendants did not
assign that error on appeal. In two cases, however, petitioners were granted new trials by the court
when they had properly raised the error in the instructions in the original appeals from their
convictions. State v. Sparks, 293 N.C. 262, 248 S.E.2d 339 (1977); State v. Wetmore, 293 N.C. 262,
248 S.E.2d 338 (1977).
13. 447 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D.N.C. 1978).
14. Id. at 1269.




in state courts by state procedural default. 16
In addition, the court went on to hold that the recent United States
Supreme Court decision in Wainwright v. Sykes 17 dictated that, even if
North Carolina had a contemporaneous objection rule, defendant Cole
would not be denied his right to federal habeas corpus review. 8 In
Wainwright, the United States Supreme Court had held a state proce-
dural default may be an adequate and independent state procedural
ground that would bar federal habeas corpus review absent a showing
of cause for the default and actual prejudice to petitioner's rights. 19
Applying Wainwright, the Cole court concluded that this petitioner met
the cause-prejudice test. The "cause" element was met because no at-
torney would have considered objecting to an instruction that had been
upheld for over one hundred years. The "prejudice" element was satis-
fied by defendant having to bear the burden of negating malice and
proving he acted in self defense.2 °
In finding Wainwright applicable, the district court apparently dis-
regarded a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Frazier v. Weatherholz2' rendered less than a month
before Cole.22 The court of appeals in Frazier held that federal habeas
review of a petitioner's Mullaney claim was barred by Wainwright and
Hankerson's footnote eight when he failed to comply with Virginia's
contemporaneous objection rule.23 Although the court of appeals did
16. Id.
17. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
18. 447 F. Supp. at 1272-74.
19. 433 U.S. at 87. Defendant in Wainwright had received federal habeas corpus relief from
his state conviction because certain inculpatory statements made by him were illegally obtained
and used at his trial. The Florida courts had refused to review this alleged error because of de-
fendant's failure to comply with Florida's contemporaneous objection rule. The United States
Supreme Court considered the issue in the case to be the adequacy of a state procedural ground to
bar federal habeas corpus review. In reversing, the Supreme Court effectively overruled the inter-
pretation of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), that would allow federal review of state cases
limited only by a showing of a deliberate by-pass or knowing waiver of the state procedural rule.
The Supreme Court explicitly left the determination of the precise content of the cause-prejudice
test to case by case development. At least one commentator has interpreted this decision and
Hankerson's footnote eight as barring federal review of a Mullaney-based claim when the defend-
ant has failed to comply with a state contemporaneous objection rule with respect to jury instruc-
tions. Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural.Default andthe Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 473,
508 n.181 (1978).
20. 447 F. Supp. at 1272-74.
21. 572 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1978).
22. The decision in Frazier was handed down on February 27, 1978, 572 F.2d at 994; the
Cole decision was rendered on March 14, 1978, 447 F. Supp. at 1268.
23. 572 F.2d at 997-98. Petitioner in Frazier had failed to object to the trial judge's instruc-
tions on the burden of proof at his murder trial. His Mullaney-based petition was denied review
by the Virginia state courts on both direct and collateral attack on grounds that he failed to coin-
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not expressly apply the cause-prejudice test, the implication of the deci-
sion is that failure to anticipate the unconstitutionality of the jury in-
structions is not sufficient cause under Wainwright and Hankerson.24
Such a reading would invalidate the alternative holding in Cole. Relief
in federal courts by state prisoners would then rest on the validity of
the Cole court's determination that footnote eight is inapplicable be-
cause North Carolina does not have a contemporaneous objection
rule.25
Although Abernathy would seem to foreclose relief in state court,
leaving recourse only to the federal courts under Cole, the recent adop-
tion of a new post-conviction relief procedure in North Carolina26 pro-
vides a basis for state relief and may require that Abernathy be limited
to actions brought under the old post-conviction relief Act.2 The new
post-trial relief statute, effective July 1, 1978, appears to overrule the
holding in previous post-conviction decisions that a change in the law,
although retroactive in application, is not a ground for post-conviction
ply with the Virginia contemporaneous objection rule. Subsequently, a petition for habeas corpus
relief was reviewed by a federal district court and relief granted on the basis of the Mullaney
claim. The court of appeals, in reversing, never reached the merits of the claim, holding review by
the federal district court barred by Hankerson and Wainwright.
24. See Spritzer, supra note 19, at 508-09.
25. The absence of a contemporaneous objection rule in North Carolina was admitted by the
A4bernathy court: in reaching its decision the court of appeals noted North Carolina appellate
procedure does "not require [that] an objection to [a jury instruction] be made at the time of the
trial to preserve the exception." 36 N.C. App. at 531, 244 S.E.2d at 698 (citing N.C.R. App. P.
10(b)(2)). In State v. Watson, 37 N.C. App. 399, 246 S.E.2d 25 (1978), the court of appeals fol-
lowed Abernathy and reversed a trial court's grant of post conviction relief for a Mullaney claim.
The court acknowledged that North Carolina does not adhere to the precise rule referenced in
Hankerson's footnote eight, but held the analogous North Carolina rule recognizes the same prin-
ciple, i.e., a failure to take some affirmative step to preserve the error on appeal results in a waiver.
Id. at 405, 246 S.E.2d at 28.
The new North Carolina appellate review statute permits review regardless of the absence of
an objection or a motion at the trial level, based on the following grounds:
(7) The conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution of the United States or
the Constitution of North Carolina.
(13) Error of law in the charge to the jury.
(19) A significant change in law, either substantive or procedural, applies to the pro-
ceedings leading to the defendant's conviction or sentence, and retroactive application of
the changed legal standard is required.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1446(d)(7), (13), (19) (1978).
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1411 to -1422 (1978).
27. The old Post-Conviction Hearing Act, Law of Apr. 14, 1951, ch. 1083, § 1, 1951 N.C.
Sess. Laws 1085 (formerly codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222), was re-
pealed in 1977 by the new Act.
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relief if not raised as error either at trial or on direct appeal.28 The
statute lists several grounds for collateral relief that may be asserted
without time limitation. The two relevant to a Mullaney-based claim
are:
(3) The conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution of
the United States or the Constitution of North Carolina.
(7) There has been a significant change in the law, either substan-
tive or procedural, applied in the proceedings leading to the defend-
ant's conviction or sentence, and retroactive application of the
changed legal standard is required.29
The statute appears further to excuse the waiver of a claim of error
for failure to bring it up on direct appeal by allowing the court "in the
interest of justice and for good cause shown" to grant a post-conviction
motion if meritorious.3 0 This discretion in the state court should allow
it to find good cause to excuse a waiver by procedural default of a Mul-
laney claim because the defense counsel could not be expected to antic-
ipate the unconstitutionality of the trial judge's instructions. Thus, it
appears that the legislature has given the state courts the opportunity to
avoid Abernathy and to hear Mullaney-based claims on collateral at-
tack notwithstanding that the error was not brought up on direct ap-
peal. Such state court review seems particularly reasonable in light of
the federal courts' willingness, as in Cole, to grant habeas corpus relief
if the state refuses to review the Mullaney claim."
B. Kdnapping3 2
In 1975 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted this state's
28. See note 12 and accompanying text supra. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1415(b)(7) (1978)
specifically states that a change in the law may be a ground for post-conviction relief.
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1415(b)(3), (7) (1978).
30. Id. § 15A-1419(b).
31. See Reeves v. Reed, 452 F. Supp. 783 (W.D.N.C. 1978), in which the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of North Carolina granted habeas corpus relief on a Mullaney-
based claim similar to the one in Cole.
32. In a related area the court of appeals, in State v. Walker, 35 N.C. App. 182,241 S.E.2d 89
(1978), held that in the absence of a custody order in favor of the mother, neither the father of a
child, nor anyone acting with his consent, can be guilty of child abduction. In this case defendant
agreed to help his son abduct the son's two children, who had been living with their mother since
the couple was divorced. While carrying out the abduction, the two men discovered that one of
the children they had taken was not defendant's grandchild and returned her. Because all the
evidence in this case pointed to defendant acting in concert with his son, defendant could not be
found guilty of abducting his grandson. See State v. Burnett, 142 N.C. 577, 55 S.E. 72 (1906).
Further, if defendant agreed to abduct his son's daughter, but abducted the wrong child because
of a mistaken belief about the identity of the child he abducted, criminal intent could be negated.
Such mistake of fact could negate defendant's criminal intent provided that the mistake under
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first statutory definition of kidnapping. 33 The North Carolina Court of
Appeals subsequently determined that the statute presented constitu-
tional problems by potentially permitting the conviction of a defendant
twice for the same offense.34 In 1978, the North Carolina Supreme
Court rejected two distinct challenges to the statute based primarily on
the contention that the statute permitted multiple convictions for the
same offense.
In State v. Fulcher,35 the court addressed that portion of G.S. 14-
3936 providing that anyone who unlawfully restrains, confines, or
removes another for one of three specified purposes, including facilitat-
ing the commission of a felony, commits the crime of kidnapping. Re-
lying on the intent of the legislature in enacting G.S. 14-39, the court
construed this provision to require no substantial restraint, confinement
or removal to constitute the offense.37 The court of appeals had pro-
posed that substantiality be required in order to avoid the potential due
process and equal protection problems of subjecting a defendant to
punishment for two crimes, kidnapping and the underlying felony,
when only one had been committed. 38 The supreme court determined
that because it is not unconstitutional to convict a defendant for two
which the defendant was acting was made in good faith and with due care. See State v. Powell,
141 N.C. 780, 53 S.E. 515 (1906); Dominguez v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 92, 234 S.W. 79 (1921).
Consequently, in such a case, an instruction to the jury on the requisite criminal intent necessary
to sustain a finding of guilty of the offense of child abduction is required.
33. N.C. GaN. STAT. § 14-39 (Cum. Supp. 1977) krovides in pertinent part:
(a) Any person who shall unlawfully confine, restrain, or remove from one place to
another, any other person 16 years of age or over without the consent of such person, or
any other person under the age of 16 years without the consent of a parent or legal
custodian of such person, shall be guilty of kidnapping if such confinement, restraint or
removal is for the purpose of:
(I) Holding such other person for ransom or as a hostage or using such other per-
son as a shield; or
(2) Facilitating the commission of any felony or facilitating flight of any person
following the commission of a felony; or
(3) Doing serious bodily harm to or terrorizing the person so confined, restrained
or removed or any other person.
(b) Any person convicted of kidnapping shall be guilty of a felony and shall be pun-
ished by imprisonment for not less than 25 years nor more than life. If the person kid-
napped, as defined in subsection (a), was released by the defendant in a safe place and
had not been sexually assaulted or seriously injured, the person so convicted shall be
punished by imprisonment for not more than 25 years, or by a fine of not more than ten
thousand dollars ($10,000), or both, in the discretion of the court.
34. See State v. Gunther, 38 N.C. App. 279, 248 S.E.2d 97 (1978); State v. Fulcher, 34 N.C.
App. 233, 237 S.E.2d 909 (1977), ai'd, 294 N.C. 503, 243 S.E.2d 338 (1978).
35. 294 N.C. 503, 243 S.E.2d 338 (1978).
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-39 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
37. 294 N.C. at 522, 243 S.E.2d at 351.
38. 34 N.C. App. 233, 240, 237 S.E.2d 909, 914 (1977), aft'd, 294 N.C. 503, 243 S.E.2d 338
(1978).
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distinct and separate crimes even if they grow out of the same act or
transaction, the statute was not unconstitutional on its face.39
Defendant in Fulcher forced his way into a motel room occupied
by two women, and after making them lie down, he bound their wrists
and forced them to have oral sex with him.4" Defendant was convicted
of two counts of crime against nature and two counts of kidnapping.4'
On appeal he challenged G.S. 14-39 as violative of the due process and
equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution on the
ground that the statute permitted his conviction of two crimes when
only one had been committed. By finding that each victim was bound
and restrained for a substantial period of time, and that the restraint
was not merely incidental to the commission of the crime against na-
ture because the restraint was applied to one victim while the crime
against nature was committed upon the other, the court of appeals
found two distinct crimes.42 Nevertheless, to avoid future constitu-
tional challenges, the court of appeals, relying on prior North Carolina
decisions43 and the Model Penal Code4 for support, concluded that the
statute had to be construed to require substantiality, in terms of time or
distance, as an essential element of kidnapping.45
The supreme court rejected the court of appeals interpretation on
39. 294 N.C. at 523-25, 243 S.E.2d at 351-52.
40. 34 N.C. App. 233, 234, 237 S.E.2d 909, 910-11 (1977).
41. Defendant was sentenced to two consecutive 10 year sentences on the crime against na-
ture charges, to run concurrently with a 28-40 year sentence on the consolidated kidnapping
charge. Id. at 235, 237 S.E.2d at 910-11.
42. Id. at 240-41, 237 S.E.2d at 914-15; see Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law,
1977, 56 N.C.L. REV. 843, 965-70 (1978).
43. See State v. Roberts, 286 N.C. 265, 210 S.E.2d 396 (1974); State v. Dix, 282 N.C. 490, 193
S.E.2d 897 (1973).
44. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (1962) provides in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another from his place of
residence or business, or a substantial distance from the vicinity where he is found, or if
he unlawfully confines another for a substantial period in a place of isolation, with any
of the following purposes:
(a) to hold for ransom or reward, or as shield or hostage; or
(b) to facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter, or
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another, or
(d) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function.
Kidnapping is a felony of the first degree unless the actor voluntarily releases the
victim alive and in a safe place prior to trial, in which case it is a felony of the second
degree. A removal or confinement is unlawful within the meaning of this Section if it is
accomplished by force, threat or deception ....
The Model Penal Code is similar to the North Carolina statute, except that it expressly qualifies
both "asportation" and "confinement" with "substantial."
45. 34 N.C. App. 233, 239-40, 237 S.E.2d 909, 914 (1977). The court of appeals stated that, in
future trials, the judge must instruct that any restraint, confinement or removal must be substan-
tial, and not merely incidental to the commission of another crime. Id. at 241, 237 S.E.2d at 915.
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the ground that G.S. 14-39 had been enacted to overrule statutorily the
prior North Carolina decisions requiring substantiality as an element
of kidnapping. 6 In State v. Dix,4 7 the court had rejected the former
rule that any carrying away is sufficient4" and required more than a
mere technical asportation.49 In State v. Roberts,5" similarly, the court
had required a holding of the victim for "some appreciable period of
time" and a carrying away "beyond the immediate vicinity." 51 The
Fulcher court concluded that the legislature's intent in passing G.S. 14-
39 was to make "resort to a tape measure or a stop watch unnecessary
in determining whether the crime of kidnapping has been
committed."52
Addressing the double jeopardy problem, the court noted that
some restraint is an inherent, inevitable feature of certain felonies.5 3
This restraint, in contrast to restraint that is "separate and apart
54
from the commission of the other felony, cannot be punished as kid-
napping.5 5 The court acknowledged, however, that two or more pun-
ishable offenses may grow out of the same course of action, as when
one offense is committed with the intent to commit the other and is
46. 294 N.C. at 522, 243 S.E.2d at 351.
It is. . .clear that the Legislature rejected our determinations in State v. Dix...
and in State P. Roberts,. . . to the effect that, where the State relies upon asportation of
the victim to establish a kidnapping, the asportation must be for a substantial distance
and where the State relies upon "dominion and control," i.e., "confinement" or "re-
straint," such must continue "for some appreciable period of time."
Id.
47. 282 N.C. 490, 193 S.E.2d 897 (1973).
48. See, e.g., State v. Ingland, 278 N.C. 42, 178 S.E.2d. 577 (1971). The Fulcher court also
noted that the legislature rejected its decision in Ingland that there must be both detention and
asportation. No asportation is required now when there exists the requisite confinement or re-
straint. 294 N.C. at 522, 243 S.E.2d at 351.
49. 282 N.C. at 501-02, 193 S.E.2d at 904. In Dix, the court reversed the kidnapping convic-
tion of a defendant who took a jailer 62 feet through a jail at gunpoint and locked him in a cell.
The court held the asportation and detention were only incidental to the primary offense.
50. 286 N.C. 265, 210 S.E.2d 396 (1974).
51. Id. at 277, 210 S.E.2d at 404. In Roberts, the court reversed the kidnapping conviction of
a defendant who had dragged a seven year old girl 80-90 feet.
52. 294 N.C. at 522, 243 S.E.2d at 351.
53. Id. at 523, 243 S.E.2d at 351 (suggesting, e.g., forcible rape and armed robbery).
54. Id. In State v. Vert, 39 N.C. App. 26, 249 S.E.2d 476 (1978), the court of appeals defined
when, under Fulcher, the crimes are "separate and apart." Adopting the test enunciated in Block-
burger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), the court held that multiple crimes are distinct and
separate offenses when one crime has elements in addition to and not included within the other
crime. See Note, Waiver of Double Jeopardy Right, The Impact of Jefers v. United ates, 14
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 842 (1978). Defendant in Vert robbed a store, forced the clerk into a hall,
shot her in the hip and tied her hand to a shopping cart. Noting that the kidnapping was unneces-
sary to the robbery, the court rejected defendant's argument that the restraint was not separate
and apart under Fulcher. 39 N.C. App. at 30, 249 S.E.2d at 479.
55. 294 N.C. at 523, 243 S.E.2d at 351.
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actually followed by the commission of the other.56 Therefore, the
court found no constitutional barrier to convicting a defendant both of
kidnapping and of another felony that the kidnapping facilitates, pro-
vided the restraint is an act independent of and apart from the other
felony. 7 Under the court's construction of G.S. 14-39 in Fulcher, that
restraint need not be substantial in time.58 The court thus found no
double jeopardy problems in the conviction of defendant on two counts
of crimes against nature and on two counts of kidnapping.
In State v. Williams,59 the court was asked to determine whether
G.S. 14-3960 defines a single offense of kidnapping, or as has been
widely thought,61 two grades of the offense. The court construed the
statute to create a single offense, defined in subsection (a). Subsection
(b) then prescribes a sentence of not less than twenty-five years and not
more than life for the offense of kidnapping, and sets forth mitigating
factors that, if present, permit a lesser punishment.62 The court found
that this construction permits a conviction for kidnapping, as well as
for another felony that negates the presence of mitigating factors, with-
out violating the double jeopardy clause.63 The court also outlined sen-
tencing procedures to be followed in applying this interpretation of
G.S. 14-39.
Defendant in Williams abducted a man and woman as they were
leaving work. After taking them to a deserted spot, he robbed them,
shot the man and raped the woman. He was subsequently convicted of
first degree rape, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to inflict
serious bodily injury, two counts of armed robbery and two counts of
kidnapping.' On appeal, defendant argued that the State had ob-
tained the convictions for aggravated kidnapping, carrying the harsher
56. Id. at 523-24, 243 S.E.2d at 351-52 (suggesting, e.g., a breaking and entering with intent
to commit larceny, followed by commission of larceny).
57. Id. at 524, 243 S.E.2d at 352.
58. Id.
59. 295 N.C. 655, 249 S.E.2d 709 (1978).
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-39 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
61. See note 67 infra.
62. 295 N.C. at 664, 249 S.E.2d at 716.
63. Id. at 668, 249 S.E.2d at 718.
64. 295 N.C. at 657, 249 S.E.2d at 712. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the
rape, one of the kidnappings and one of the armed robberies, to 40 years for the other armed
robbery, and to 20 years for the felonious assault, all to be served consecutively. He also received
a life sentence for the other kidnapping to be served concurrently with the first. The court rejected
defendant's argument that this sentence, amounting to 300 years (see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14.2
(Cum. Supp. 1977)), constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and
fourteenth Amendments. 295 N.C. at 679-80, 249 S.E.2d at 725.
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sentence, by using the facts of the assault and rape, and that the court
could not therefore properly enter judgment on the assault and rape
charges without punishing him twice for one offense.65 This contention
was based on the premise that G.S. 14-39 creates two offenses of kid-
napping-simple and aggravated-with the State required to prove, for
a conviction of the latter, not only the restraint, confinement or re-
moval for one of the purposes designated in G.S. 14-39(a), but also, as
an element of the aggravated offense, that the victim was either as-
saulted, seriously injured or not released in a safe place, as provided in
G.S. 14-39(b). 66
In rejecting this construction, the court recognized that "[s]upport
for [it] abounds everywhere but in the language of the statute itself."67
65. 295 N.C. at 659-60, 249 S.E.2d at 713. Defendant relied on the principle that when a
criminal offense in its entirety is an essential element of another offense a defendant may not be
punished for both, based on the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. U.S. CONST.
amend. V, XIV; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 284 N.C. 67, 199 S.E.2d 409
(1973); State v. Carroll, 282 N.C. 326, 193 S.E.2d 85 (1972); State v. Midyette, 270 N.C. 229, 154
S.E.2d 66 (1967).
66. 295 N.C. at 663, 249 S.E.2d at 715. Defendant also raised two other double jeopardy
arguments. One was that the charges of armed robbery, the felonious assault and the rape were
essential elements of kidnapping as defined under § 14-39(a)(2). Id. at 659-60, 249 S.E.2d at 713.
The court had previously rejected this argument in State v. Dammons, 293 N.C. 263, 237 S.E.2d
834 (1977), on grounds that such charges are alleged as the purpose for which a defendant con-
fined or restrained a victim, and not as elements of the offense that the State need prove. 295 N.C.
at 660, 249 S.E.2d at 713-14.
Defendant also contended, in an argument new to the court, that the State and the judge had
made the assault and the rape elements of kidnapping by treating them as such in the indictment
and jury instructions. Id. at 661, 249 S.E.2d at 714. The court rejected this contention stating that
an "[a]llegation of a matter [that] is not an element of the crime and not necessary to be proved
may be treated as surplusage even if the State and the trial judge mistakenly believe the matter to
be an essential element." Id. at 663, 249 S.E.2d at 715. See also State v. Stallings, 267 N.C. 405,
148 S.E.2d 252 (1966). The court distinguished the present situation from that in State v. Midy-
ette, 270 N.C. 229, 154 S.E.2d 66 (1967). In that case the court stated: "By the allegations it elects
to make in an indictment, the State may make one offense an essential element of another, though
it is not inherently so. . . ." Id. at 233, 154 S.E.2d at 70. The Williams court concluded that the
Midyetue language refers only to those situations in which the State elects to prosecute on a legal
theory that necessarily includes another offense as an element of the offense being prosecuted,
although some other theory may have been available. 295 N.C. at 663, 249 S.E.2d at 715.
67. 295 N.C. at 663, 249 S.E.2d at 715. This construction was adopted by a divided panel in
State v. Gunther, 38 N.C. App. 279, 248 S.E.2d 97 (1978) (holding that State has burden of proof
concerning those factors that would subject a defendant to increased punishment, and that after
entering the greater sentence, court may not enter judgment on charge of assault with intent to
commit rape that was the same sexual act that provided the basis for the more severe punishment;
supreme court reversed, however, 296 N.C. 578, 251 S.E.2d 462 (1979)). See also S. CLARKE, M.
CROWELL, J. DRENNAN & D. GILL, NORTH CAROLINA CRIMES ch. 8, at 9-11 (Institute of Govern-
ment, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1977); D. GILL & M. CROWELL, ARREST
WARRANT FORMS (Institute of Government, University of North Carolina at Chap.l Hill, 1978).
Although the court has itself used the term "aggravated kidnapping" in prior cases, see, e.g., State
v. Barrow, 292 N.C. 227, 232 S.E.2d 693 (1977), in Banks v. State, 295 N.C. 399, 245 S.E.2d 743
(1978), the court stated without elaboration:
We note in passing that some of our opinions refer to the crime defined in G.S. 14-
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Relying on the statutory language, the court determined that subsection
(b), rather than creating elements of an aggravated offense, presumes a
conviction under subsection (a) and merely prescribes the punishment
on conviction. 68 Relying on the purpose of the legislature in enacting
subsection (b) to maximize a kidnapper's incentive to return the victim
unharmed by offering a reduction in sentence, the court determined
that the provision (b) factors are sentence-mitigating in nature rather
than sentence-enhancing. 69 The court concluded that when the same or
similar evidence tends to show both the absence of these factors and the
commission of another crime, as in Williams, punishing a defendant for
the other crime while not reducing his punishment for the kidnapping
does not violate double jeopardy.7v
The court, in outlining procedures to be followed under its con-
struction of G.S. 14-39, noted that a jury need normally determine only
whether a defendant committed the substantive offense as defined in
subsection (a).71 The existence or nonexistence of the mitigating fac-
tors in subsection (b) is to be determined by the judge,72 either from the
evidence adduced at trial, or at a post-trial hearing provided by G.S.
15A-1334,73 or both.7 4 The court, relying on the rationale of Patterson
39A as "aggravated kidnapping." This is a misnomer. The proper term for the crime
there defined is "kidnapping." Subsection (b) of the statute states the punishment for
kidnapping as well as a lesser punishment when certain mitigating circumstances appear.
Id. at 406-07, 245 S.E.2d at 749.
68. 295 N.C. at 664, 249 S.E.2d at 716. The court noted that other courts have interpreted
similar statutes as creating a single offense. Id. at 665, 249 S.E.2d at 716-17; see, e.g., Smith v.
United States, 360 U.S. 1 (1959); Pyles v. Boles, 148 W. Va. 465, 135 S.E.2d 692, cert. denied, 379
U.S. 864 (1964). But see State v. Sewell, 342 So. 2d 156 (La. 1977).
69. 295 N.C. at 667, 249 S.E.2d at 717-18. The court assumed that the legislature's intent was
the same as that of the drafters of the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1,
Comment at 19 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
70. 295 N.C. at 668, 249 S.E.2d at 718.
71. Id. at 669, 249 S.E.2d at 719.
72. Id. Because the factors in § 13-49(b) are sentence-reducing only and do not constitute an
element of the offense, the court concluded that a defendant is not entitled to a jury determination.
Id. at 673, 249 S.E.2d at 721.
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1334(b) (1978) provides:
Proceeding at Hearing. The defendant at the hearing may present witnesses and argu-
ments on facts relevant to the sentencing decision and may cross-examine the other
party's witnesses. No person other than the defendant, his counsel, the prosecutor, and
one making a presentence report may comment to the court on sentencing unless called
as a witness by the defendant, the prosecutor, or the court. Formal rules of evidence do
not apply at the hearing.
Noting that § 15A-1334(b) makes "formal rules of evidence" inapplicable at this hearing, the
court left to a case by case resolution the extent to which the rules may be relaxed and yet stay
within the confines of due process. Williams does require that the judge make findings of fact in
the sentencing hearing. 295 N.C. at 670-71, 249 S.E.2d at 720.
74. As the court indicated, the present case illustrated one circumstance in which the sentenc-
ing hearing was not necessary. When the existence of mitigating factors is determined by the jury
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v. New York,75 placed on the defendant the burden of satisfying the
court by the preponderance of the evidence that the victim was released
in a safe place and neither sexually assaulted nor seriously injured.76
The court's construction of G.S. 14-39 in Fulcher and Williams is a
new step in the sporadic evolution of kidnapping law in North Caro-
lina.77 The practical effect of the decisions is to permit the imposition
of substantial additional sanctions when commission of a felony is ac-
companied by an seemingly insignificant movement or detention of the
victim.7 8 For example, a defendant who in the course of a robbery
takes a clerk into the hall and ties her hand to a cart,79 may after
Fulcher be convicted for kidnapping as well as for the robbery. After
Williams such a defendant faces a sentence of twenty-five years to life
for the kidnapping alone unless he can satisfy the trial judge of the
existence of the mitigating factors set out in subsection (b) that require
a sentence of less than twenty-five years.
This present state of kidnapping law creates a potential for grave
prosecutorial abuse by permitting in such circumstances a choice of
prosectuion for kidnapping, for the offense that the kidnapping over-
laps, or for both.80 Although the court in Fulcher noted that equal pro-
tection is not necessarily violated when a defendant who commits the
same acts as another is prosecuted for two crimes while the other is
prosecuted for only one, or because sentences are made to run consecu-
tively for one defendant while concurrently for another, the court did
recognize that there are serious problems with G.S. 14-39 as presently
construed.8 ' Rather than attempting to cure these problems through
judicial interpretation, however, as other courts have done,8 2 the court
in the course of trying separate criminal charges that have been joined to the kidnapping case,
there is no need for a judge to make separate findings. 295 N.C. at 679, 249 S.E.2d at 725.
75. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
76, Id. at 674, 249 S.E.2d at 722. The State may in any case stipulate to the presence of all
mitigating factors and thereby avoid determination of the issue. Id. at 670, 249 S.E.2d at 719.
77. See Note, Kidnapping in North Carolina-A Statutory Derfnitionfor the Offense, 12 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 434 (1976).
78. See generaly Note, A Rationale of the Law of(Kidnapping, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 540 (1953).
79. See note 54 supra.
80. A caloused [sic] concept of kidnapping creates the potential for abusive prosecutions
since virtually every false imprisonment, assault, battery, rape, robbery, escape or jail
delivery will involve some movement or intentional confinement. When kidnapping, by
definition overruns other crimes for which the prescribed punishment is less severe, a
prosecutor has the "naked and arbitrary power" to choose the crime for which he will
prosecute.
State v. Dix, 282 N.C. 490, 501, 193 S.E.2d 897, 903-04 (1973).
81. 294 N.C. at 525-26, 243 S.E.2d at 353.
82. See, e.g., State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203, 547 P.2d 720 (1976) (noting that legislature had
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chose to leave reform to the legislature."3 The court did suggest that
relief might be available for a defendant when, through prosecutorial
abuse, his criminal charges arising out of the same incident are "arbi-
trarily stacked like pancakes," resulting in a disproportionate sentence
that violates fundamental fairness. Furthermore, the court invited the
legislature to restore substantial asportation as an essential element of
kidnapping.8 4 Such a change would at least restore a more reasonable
definition of kidnapping--one that does not permit the imposition of
punishment for kidnapping unless an asportation significantly increases
the dangerousness or undesirability of a defendant's conduct.8 5
C. Rape
The constitutionality of North Carolina's new short-form rape in-
dictment statute86 was affirmed by the North Carolina Supreme Court
in State v. Lowe.87 The statute permits an indictment for first-degree
rape without an averment of two essential elements of the crime: that
the offense was perpetrated with a deadly weapon or by the infliction of
serious harm, and that the defendant's age was greater than sixteen.88
purposely not used "substantial" language of Model Penal Code, court nevertheless held word
"facilitate," as used in "facilitate the commission of any felony," to mean more than a technical
taking or confining). See also People v. Daniels, 71 Cal. 2d 1119, 459 P.2d 225, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897
(1969); People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159, 204 N.E.2d 842, 256 N.Y.S.2d 793, cert. denied, 381 U.S.
938 (1965).
83. 294 N.C. at 527, 243 S.E.2d at 354; accord, State v. Morris, 281 Minn. 119, 160 N.W.2d
715 (1968). See also Comment, Keeping Kidnapping in Its Place: When Does the Kentucky Exemp-
tion Apply?, 66 KY. L.J. 448 (1977); Note, supra note 77.
84. 294 N.C. at 526-27, 243 S.E.2d at 353.
85. See Note, supra note 78, at 556 n.99 (suggesting that if penalties for primary offenses are
thought to be inadequate then proper solution is to raise them rather than to superimpose an
additional penalty under guise of kidnapping). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1, Comment
at 19 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-144.1(a) (1978) provides in pertinent part:
In indictments for rape. . . in the body of the indictment, after naming the person
accused, the date of the offense, the county in which the offense of rape was allegedly
committed, and the averment "with force and arms," as is now usual, it is sufficient in
describing rape to allege that the accused person unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously
did ravish and carnally know the victim, naming her, by force and against her will and
concluding as is now required by law.
The term "short-form" indictment means an indictment that does not require an allegation of all
essential elements of the crime.
87. 295 N.C. 596, 247 S.E.2d 878 (1978).
88. The elements of first degree rape, the victim being 12 years of age or older, are: (1) carnal
knowledge of a female person, (2) by force, (3) against the will of the victim, (4) by a defendant
over the age of 16, (5) who procures the submission or overcomes the resistance of the victim by
the use of a deadly weapon or the infliction of serious bodily harm. State v. Perry, 291 N.C. 586,
231 S.E.2d 262 (1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (Cum. Supp. 1977). In Perry, the North Carolina
Supreme Court held the old form of indictment for rape insufficient to support a conviction for
first degree rape because it failed to require an allegation that the defendant was over 16 years of
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Defendant in Lowe challenged the statute on the ground that an indict-
ment prepared in accordance with the statute does not provide the ac-
cused with notice of the offense sufficient to prepare his defense and
protect him from double jeopardy.89 In sustaining the statute, the court
held that precisely those interests defendant asserted were not protected
by the statute-sufficient notice of the crime to permit preparation of a
defense and avoidance of subsequent prosecution for the same crime-
are those that an indictment must protect to pass constitutional mus-
ter.90 In finding these requirements met by the rape indictment statute,
the court relied on decisions upholding the validity of the state's short-
form homicide indictment.9' This case reaffirms the power of the legis-
lature to enact an indictment statute relieving the State from the com-
mon law requirement that an indictment allege every element of the
offense charged.
Applying this constitutional standard, the court noted that an in-
dictment prepared according to the new statute identifies the accused,
the date, and location of the offense and uses words of "precise legal
import" to specify the charged offense.92 The court further pointed out
that a defendant may always ask for a bill of particulars to obtain in-
formation in addition to that contained in the indictment in order to
clarify the charge and prevent surprise at trial.93 Because the function
of a motion for a bill of particulars is to allow the defense to obtain
information regarding the specific occurrences to be investigated at
trial,94 liberal grants of such motions will minimize any adverse effects
the Lowe decision may have on the preparation of a defense. With the
expansion of criminal discovery procedures,9" Lowe emphasizes that
age and that he used deadly force to commit the crime. The new rape indictment statute was a
reaction to this decision and allows the omission of the very elements found necessary in Perry.
89. 295 N.C. at 599, 247 S.E.2d at 881.
90. Id. at 603, 247 S.E.2d at 883. "In all criminal prosecutions, every person charged with
crime has the right to be informed of the accusation .... " N.C. CotsT. art. I, § 23. In addition,
the Lowe court ruled an indictment must also enable the court to know what judgment to pro-
nounce in case of conviction. 295 N.C. at 603, 247 S.E.2d at 883.
91. 295 N.C. at 600-03, 247 S.E.2d at 881-83; see State v. Duncan, 282 N.C. 412, 193 S.E.2d
65 (1972); State v. Kirksey, 227 N.C. 445, 42 S.E.2d 613 (1947); State v. Moore, 104 N.C. 743, 10
S.E. 183 (1889). The short-form homicide indictment, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-144 (1978), allows an
indictment for first degree murder without an averment of the essential elements of premeditation
and deliberation.
92. 295 N.C. at 604, 247 S.E.2d at 883.
93. Id, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-925 (1978) (bill of particulars).
94. State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 838, 226 S.E,2d 652 (1976); State v. Spence, 271 N.C. 23, 155
S.E.2d 802 (1967), vacatedon other groundsper curiam, 392 U.S. 649 (1968); State v. Overman, 269
N.C. 453, 153 S.E.2d 44 (1967); State v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 149 N.C. 508, 62 S.E. 1088 (1908).
95. See N.C. GN. STAT. §§ 15A-901 to -919 (1978) (criminal discovery procedure).
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the purpose of the indictment is only to give notice to the defendant of
the alleged criminal offense.
In State v. Bailey, 96 the North Carolina Court of Appeals was
presented with the question whether the "force" necessary for the crime
of rape is that which reasonably induces fear of serious bodily harm.97
In Railey, defendant was indicted and convicted of second-degree
rape.98 On appeal from his conviction, defendant argued that the trial
judge had erred in failing to instruct the jury that the force necessary to
constitute an element of rape must be force that "reasonably induces
fear of serious bodily harm."99 The court of appeals affirmed the con-
viction, rejecting the contention that the North Carolina Supreme
Court had adopted this objective test. 1°°
The decision in Bailey affirms the rule in North Carolina that
there is no objective test with respect to the force involved in a rape.
Such a rule comports with the view in the majority of jurisdictions. 10
North Carolina cases indicate "force" is a broadly defined concept and
the requisite amount to support a conviction for rape need only be that
which is sufficient to overcome the will of the victim. 10 2 The continua-
tion of this subjective standard by which force is to be measured is
proper because a defendant should not escape punishment for rape by
reason of his victim's unreasonable fears of violence.10 3 To hold other-
wise would be to punish the victim for her noncomformity to the stan-
dard set by the "reasonable" victim. Moreover, the likelihood of unfair
96. 36 N.C. App. 728, 245 S.E.2d 97 (1978).
97. Id. at 732, 245 S.E.2d at 100.
98. Id. at 728-29, 245 S.E.2d at 98.
99. Id. at 732, 245 S.E.2d at 100. The basis for defendant's argument was one sentence in
State v. Burns, 287 N.C. 102, 214 S.E.2d 56, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 933 (1975). The contested
sentence read, "A threat of serious bodily harm which reasonably induces fear thereof constitutes
the requisite force and negates consent." Id. at 116, 214 S.E.2d at 65. The authorities cited by the
Burns court in support fail to mention the word reasonable with respect to the force element. See
State v. Henderson, 285 N.C. 1, 203 S.E.2d 10 (1974), death penalty vacated, 428 U.S. 902 (1976);
State v. Bryant, 280 N.C. 551, 187 S.E.2d 111, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 995 (1972).
100. 36 N.C. App. at 733, 245 S.E.2d at 100.
101. See 65 AM. JUR. 2d Rape § 4 (1972).
102. See State v. Armstrong, 287 N.C. 60, 212 S.E.2d 894 (1975) (fear, fright or coercion may
take the place of physical force); State v. Henderson, 285 N.C. 1, 203 S.E.2d 10 (1974), death
penalty vacated, 428 U.S. 902 (1976); State v. Primes, 275 N.C. 61, 165 S.E.2d 225 (1969); State v.
Thompson, 227 N.C. 19, 40 S.E.2d 620 (1946); State v. Johnson, 226 N.C. 671, 40 S.E.2d 113
(1946); 11 STRONG'S NORTH CAROLINA INDEX 3d Rape and41lied Oeffnses § 1 (1978) ("The
'force' necessary to constitute the offense need not be actual physical force; constructive force is
sufficient, and the female's submission under fear or distress takes the place of actual physical
force.").
103. This was the view of the draftsmen of the Model Penal Code provision for rape. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 207.4, Comments (rent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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convictions is not increased by the use of a subjective standard because
in most rape trials the jurors will inject some degree of objectivity into
their determination of the force element. 1' 4
. Public Intoxication105
In response to the growing concern over the public drunkenness
problem and acceptance that alcoholism is the real cause of the large
number of drunkenness arrests 0 6 a proposal of the attorney general
intended to deal with public drunks was enacted into law. 7 A new
offense of "intoxicated and disruptive in public" is created by the stat-
ute, 08 and provision is made for giving assistance to persons intoxi-
cated in public without the necessity of first arresting them.109
The new legislation made several fundamental changes in the pub-
lic drunkenness law.1 0 The new offense of intoxicated and disruptive
104. If the victim's submission seems higbly contradictory to that of the ordinary person under
the circumstances, the jury will most likely disbelieve the victim's contention that force was in-
volved. See Note, Recent Statutory Developments in the Defnition of Forcible Rape, 61 VA. L.
REv. 1500 (1975).
105. In 1978 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted an amendment to N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-179(a), effective March 1, 1979, to increase the punishment for driving under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic drugs, or other impairing drugs. Law of June 16, 1978,
ch. 1222, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 1978, at 171. Under this amendment, a first offense
remains punishable in the discretion of the court by a fine of not less than $100 nor more than
$500, by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both fine and imprisonment. For
second and subsequent convictions, however, the judge is required to impose a mandatory
sentence of three days, which is not subject to suspension or parole, and to impose a fine. A
second conviction is punishable by. imprisonment for not less than three days nor more than one
year, and a fine not less than $200 nor more than $500; a third or subsequent conviction is
punishable by imprisonment for not less than three days nor more than two years and a fine of not
less than $500. The jail sentence may, however, be suspended for a second offender if the
defendant successfully completes an alcohol or drug rehabilitation program approved by the
Department of Human Resources.
The effect of this amendment will not become apparent for some time. The statute contains
certain provisions that mitigate its potential severity: no convictions occuring prior to July 1, 1978,
are to be considered prior offenses, and to be a prior conviction, the offense must occur within
three years of the current offense.
106. Drunkenness arrests in North Carolina have averaged approximately 50,000 per year.
For a discussion of the background against which this new legislation was enacted, see Crowell,
The New Law of Public Drunkenness, AD. J. MEMORANDA, Sept. 1978, at 1.
107. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-443 to -447, 15A-534(c), 122-58.22, .23, -65.10 to .13 (Interim
Supp. 1978).
108. Id. § 14-444. Section 14-443(2) defines intoxicated as "the condition of a person whose
mental or physical functioning is presently substantially impaired as a result of the use of alco-
hol." Id. § 14-443(2). Section 14-443(3) defines public place as "a place which is open to the
public, whether it is publicly or privately owned." Id. § 14-443(3).
109. Id. § 122-65.11 (Interim Supp. 1978).
110. The General Assembly repealed several drunkenness statutes. The former statutes of
public drunkenness, Law of Feb. 13, 1897, ch. 57, 1897 N.C. Pub. Laws 109 (formerly codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-335); drunk and disorderly, Law of March 9, 1921, ch. 211,
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requires the additional element of disruptiveness"' for the drunk to
violate the law; no longer may a person be prosecuted solely for being
intoxicated in a public place.1 2 The new legislation further provides
that alcoholism" 3 is to be considered a defense to the charge of drunk
and disruptive." 4 Moreover, G.S. 14-145(b) requires that the trial
judge consider alcoholism as a defense to the charge even if the defend-
ant does not raise it, and empowers the judge to request additional in-
formation in making the determination whether the defendant is
suffering from alcoholism." 5
Another provision changing prior law allows a law enforcement
officer, after making the determination that a person to be arrested
would benefit from the care of a shelter as provided for in G.S. 122-
65.11,116 to transport and release the person to the facility after issuing
him a citation for the offense of drunk and disruptive." 7
The offense of drunk and disruptive is a misdemeanor punishable
by a fine of not more than fifty dollars, or imprisonment of not more
than thirty days; a magistrate is not empowered to accept a plea of
guilty and enter judgment for this offense."' If the defendant is acquit-
ted on the defense of alcoholism, the court must then determine if the
defendant is an alcoholic in need of care as defined by G.S. 122-
58.2211 or G.S. 122-58.23.120 This determination is to be made at a
1921 N.C. Pub. Laws 503 (formerly codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-334); detention
of public drunks, Law of May 23, 1973, ch. 696, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 1038 (formerly codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-335.1); and the statutory provisions dealing with chronic al-
coholics, Law of July 6, 1967, ch. 1256, § 2, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 1894 (formerly codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-65.8 to .9) were repealed by the new Act.
111. Disruptive conduct includes interfering with traffic, blocking sidewalks, grabbing, push-
ing, fighting, cursing, shouting, or begging for money. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-444(a) (Interim
Supp. 1978).
112. Id. § 14-447(a). A person who is intoxicated in a public place and is not disruptive may
be assisted as provided by id. § 122-65.11. See text accompanying notes 123-33 infra.
113. Alcoholism is defined as "the state of a person. . . who habitually lacks self control as to
the use of intoxicating liquor, or uses intoxicating liquor to the extent that his health is substan-
tially impaired or endangered or his social or economic function is substantially disrupted." N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-443(1) (Interim Supp. 1978).
114. Id. § 14-445(a).
115. Id. § 14-445(b). Application of this provision may raise constitutional questions. If the
defendant or his attorney affirmatively refuses the defense and the judge still insists upon it, due
process may be abridged or the sixth amendment right to counsel denied. Crowell, supra note 106,
at 4.
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-65.11 (Interim Supp. 1978); see text accompanying notes 123-33
infra.
117. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-447(b) (Interim Supp. 1978).
118. Id. § 14-444(b).
119. Id. § 122-58.22; see text accompanying note 137 infra.
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.23 (Interim Supp. 1978); see text accompanying note 137 infra.
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district court hearing, which may be held at the time defendant is
found not guilty by reason of alcoholism or within a fifteen day period
after such finding is made.21
The portion of this statute that provides for assistance to an intoxi-
cated person without the necessity of first arresting him is the most sig-
nificant reform made in existing law. The type of assistance that will
be provided by law enforcement officers under G.S. 122-65.11 depends
upon the condition of the intoxicated person.1 22 If the person is only
intoxicated, he may be taken home 23 or to the home of anyone willing
to accept him; 24 if he is in need of medical care, he will be taken to an
appropriate facility or doctor's office;1 25 if he is in need of food and
shelter, he will be taken to a shelter approved by the Department of
Human Resources.
126
The shelter contemplated by this provision is a "social setting" de-
toxification center, which would provide the alcoholic with food, shel-
ter, and medical care by referral. 127 Significantly absent from the Act is
any provision for funding these facilities. Although many localities
have out-patient programs, or in-patient medical detoxification pro-
grams in hospitals, there are only six social setting detoxification cen-
ters in the state; 21 this is obviously not sufficient to meet the demands
of this statute's program. The cost of providing the additional beds
necessary to successful implementation of this Act is estimated at over
two billion dollars.129 Obviously, therefore, in many instances there
will not be any facility to which to send the people that are to be as-
sisted under the law. In recognition of this possibility, G.S. 122-65.13
does provide that if a person is found intoxicated in public and is in
need of food or shelter, but not medical care, the officer may take the
person to the city or county jail if there is no place else to take him.130
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-446 (Interim Supp. 1978).
122. In providing the assistance authorized by this statute, the officer is permitted to use rea-
sonable force to protect himself, the intoxicated person, or others; no officer may be held civilly or
criminally liable for actions taken as reasonable measures under the authority of§ 122-65.11. Id.
§ 122-65.11(b). Id. § 122-65.12 authorizes the city or county to hire additional officers to assist
intoxicated persons. Employees hired under this provision are to be trained in first aid and em-
powered with the authority and duty of a law enforcement officer acting under id. § 122-65.11.
123. Id. § 122-65.11(a)(1).
124. Id. § 122-65.11(a)(2).
125. Id. § 122-65.11(a)(4).
126. Id. § 122-65.11(a)(3).
127. See Crowell, supra note 106, at 5.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 5-6.
130. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-65.13 (Interim Supp. 1978). It is likely that jail will be used regu-
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If brought to jail, the person may be detained only until he becomes
sober or a maximum of twenty-four hours, and he may be released at
any time to a relative or any other person willing to accept him.13
Once an intoxicated person has been taken to either a medical or a
detoxification center, he may be detained until he becomes sober, or for
a maximum of twenty-four hours; he can be held longer only if he
chooses to remain in the facility voluntarily or if a court order is ob-
tained to detain him. 132 To obtain a court order, a finding that it is
probable the person is an alcoholic in need of care must be made by a
clerk or magistrate. If this finding is not made, the person must be
released; if probable cause is found, the person may be ordered de-
tained for up to ninety-six hours to arrange an appearance before a
district court judge for a full hearing to determine if the person is an
alcoholic in need of care.1 33 A similar hearing before a district court
judge may also be held if by reason of alcoholism the person is found
not guilty of a charge under G.S. 14-446.134
The hearing provided for under G.S. 14-446 or G.S. 122-65.11(d)
is a full hearing intended to determine if the alcoholic should be com-
mitted for either short-term treatment or long-term residential care. At
such a hearing, the alleged alcoholic must be represented by counsel if
he so desires and is entitled to confront and cross-examine witnesses
against him. 135 If available and if the district judge believes it would be
helpful, an alcoholism counselor may be appointed to make a prehear-
ing review of the alcoholic and his condition that will be considered by
the judge in making his determination.1 36 If the person is found to be
an alcoholic in need of care1 37 and is ordered to participate in a treat-
ment program, 138 he has the right to appeal and the judge is required to
larly in rural areas where it would not be economically feasible to build a detoxification center, in
all other areas, use of a jail is meant only to be a last resort. Crowell, supra note 106, at 6.
131. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-65.13 (Interim Supp. 1978).
132. Id. § 122-65.11(c).
133. Id. § 122-65.11(d).
134. Id. §§ 14-446, 122-58.22(b).
135. Id. § 122-58.22(d). If the alleged alcoholic is an indigent and does not waive counsel,
counsel must be appointed. Id.
136. Id. § 122-58.22(c).
137. In the context of short-term treatment under id. § 122-58.22, a person is an alcoholic if
"he habitually lacks self-control as to the use of intoxicating liquor, or uses intoxicating liquor to
the extent that his health is substantially impaired or endangered or his social or economic func-
tion is substantially disrupted." An alcoholic is in need of care if "his alcoholism is presently
causing him to lose control over his own actions to the extent that he regularly has to depend on
others to provide food, clothing, shelter, medical or other essential care for him." This definition
is applicable to both short-term treatment and long-term residential care. Id. § 122-58.23(a)(1).
138. See id. § 122-58.22(e)(2).
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record facts that support his findings to facilitate the appeal. 139
Once a person is found to be an alcoholic in need of care, the
judge may order short-term commitment under G.S. 122-58.22(e).1 40
Under this provision, the judge has the option to suggest that the alco-
holic participate voluntarily in an alcohol treatment program or to or-
der mandatory participation for up to thirty days. Under G.S. 122-
58.23 the judge may order long-term residential care if certain elements
in addition to those required for short-term commitment have been
demonstrated at the hearing.' 4 1 For long term residential care to be
statutorily permitted, clear and convincing evidence must show that the
alcoholic is a person in need of care as defined by G.S. 122-56.22,142
that he has been given recent opportunities to participate in alcoholism
treatment programs, and that he has wilfully refused to participate or
cooperate in such programs or has failed to show significant progress
toward overcoming his alcoholism. If these factors have been suffi-
ciently demonstrated, the judge may order the alcoholic committed to a
residential facility for up to 180 days.' 43 G.S. 122-58.23(c) allows for
release at any time prior to the end of the court-ordered period of com-
mitment if the director of the facility determines that the person is no
longer in need of the care of that facility.'" If at the end of the period
of commitment the director feels that the alcoholic needs further care,
he may under the procedure of G.S. 122-58.11145 request a hearing for
an additional commitment. 146
The final provision of the Act amends the bail statute' 47 by adding
that a factor to be considered in determining the form of pretrial re-
lease is "whether the defendant is intoxicated to such a degree that he
would be endangered by being released without supervision."' 148 This
provision will empower the magistrate to set a very high bail when the
defendant is too intoxicated to be responsible for himself or to drive
139. Id. § 122-58.22(d). This provision applies only when the judge elects mandatory partici-
pation for the alcoholic as provided by § 122-58.22(e)(2). See Crowell, supra note 106, at 10.
140. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.22(e) (Interim Supp. 1978).
141. Id. § 122-58.23. The requirements for the hearing on long-term commitment are the
same as for short-term commitment under § 122-58.22(c) & (d), except for the added requirement
that at least 48 hours notice of the hearing must be given to the alleged alcoholic and his counsel.
Id. § 122-58.23(b).
142. See note 137 supra.
143. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.23(a) (Interim Supp. 1978).
144. Id. § 122-58.23(c).
145. Id. § 122-58.11 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
146. Id. § 122-58.23(d) (Interim Supp. 1978).
147. Id. §§ 15A-531 to -547 (1978 & Interim Supp. 1978).
148. Id. § 15A-534(c) (Interim Supp. 1978).
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safely, and then lower the bail a few hours later when he becomes
sober. 149
This legislation is clearly intended to be a comprehensive plan for
the rehabilitation of public drunks. The success of the plan is depen-
dent upon the effectiveness of the detoxification centers that are to deal
with the alcoholics assisted under this -Act. At the present time, there
are not enough beds to treat every person arrested or referred under the
new statute. If the statute is to be effective in reducing the problem of
alcoholism, it will be necessary for more facilities to be built. Until
more detoxification facilities can be built, the success of the legislation
depends upon the district judges working closely with local officials to
ensure that no one directed to a facility is turned away.' 50
E. Plea Bargaining
Because of the great importance of plea bargaining in the adminis-
tration of criminal justice in this state,' 5' and the paucity of case law
development on the subject, the North Carolina Court of Appeals' de-
cision in Northeast Motor Co. v. North Carolina State Board of Alco-
holic Control, dealing with the scope of the State's obligation to comply
with plea bargaining agreements, is particularly significant.1 52 Peti-
tioner in Northeast Motor Co. was charged by the Board of Alcoholic
Control with a violation of the state alcoholic beverage control laws.15 3
In connection with the alleged ABC violations, an employee of peti-
tioner was charged with the criminal violation of selling beer to a mi-
nor. Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement between the employee and
the assistant district attorney, the employee entered a plea of nolo con-
tendere and the State agreed "not to take any further action by way of
hearing before any court, board, or agency arising out of this transac-
tion against [the employee or petitioner]."' 54 Subsequently, the Board
of Alcoholic Control suspended petitioner's ABC permit for fifteen
days. Petitioner appealed the decision on the ground the Board of Al-
coholic Control was estopped from instituting the proceeding in which
petitioner's license was revoked by reason of the plea bargain agree-
149. See Crowell, supra note 106, at 11-12.
150. Id. at 12.
151. See State v. Slade, 291 N.C. 275, 229 S.E.2d 921 (1976) ("We are aware that 'plea bar-
gaining' has emerged as a major aspect in the administration of criminal justice.").
152. 35 N.C. App. 536, 241 S.E.2d 727 (1978).
153. Id. at 536, 241 S.E.2d at 728. The charge was knowingly selling malt beverages to a
minor upon licensed premises.
154. Id. at 537, 241 S.E.2d at 728.
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ment in the criminal action.15 5 Relief was denied by the trial court and
the court of appeals affirmed on the ground that neither petitioner nor
the Board of Alcoholic Control was a party to the plea bargain agree-
ment in the criminal proceeding.
56
In 1973 the North Carolina General Assembly passed article 58 of
the Criminal Procedure Act, which endorsed the plea bargaining proc-
ess as a means of expediting the criminal process. 57  The decision in
Northeast Motor Co. recognizes the deficiency of case law development
in this area 58 and attempts to define the scope of liability for breach of
a plea bargain agreement. The court adopted the rule that a defendant
may be granted relief for the breach of agreements induced by both
authorized and unauthorized promises by a prosecutor. 5 9 This scope
of liability is in conformity with that adopted by the federal courts'
60
and complements the intent of the draftsmen of article 58 to bring the
plea bargaining process out of its shroud of secrecy.' 61 Although the
court's definition of the scope of potential liability was unnecessary to
decide the case,162 it informs the criminal defendant of his rights with
respect to plea bargain agreements. 63 Because the result in Northeast
155. Id.
156. Id. at 539, 241 S.E.2d at 729. The court held that on this ground petitioner did not have
standing to enforce the agreement. The court explicitly reserved judgment on the question
whether the Board of Alcoholic Control, a state agency, could bind itself by a plea bargain agree-
ment in a criminal proceeding in which it was not a party. Id.
157. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1021 to -1027 (1978). The purpose of the plea bargaining stat-
ute was to set forth certain procedures to be followed in the plea bargaining process, to allow the
defendant to tell the court the truth about plea bargaining arrangements and to eliminate the
amount of collateral attacks on convictions based on guilty pleas. The procedure was modeled
after the ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURES art. 350 (rent. Draft No. 5,
1972).
158. There have been very few cases in North Carolina in which the court addressed plea
bargaining issues. In State v. Williams, 291 N.C. 442, 230 S.E.2d 515 (1976), the supreme court
ruled that a defendant is entitled to a continuance as a matter of right under N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1024 (1978) when the trial judge at the time for sentencing determines that a different sen-
tence from that provided in the plea agreement must be imposed. See also State v. Lewis, 32 N.C.
App. 298, 231 S.E.2d 693 (1977) (interpreting § 15A-1025).
159. 35 N.C. App. at 538-39, 241 S.E.2d at 729-30.
160. In reaching its decision the court relied on Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262
(1971) ("where a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor,
so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promises must be ful-
filled"); Palermo v. Warden, 545 F.2d 286, 296 (2d Cir. 1976) ("where a defendant pleads guilty
because he reasonably relies on promises by the prosecutor which are in fact unfulfillable, he has a
right to have those promises fulfilled"); United States v. Hammerman, 528 F.2d 326, 331 (4th Cir.
1975) (assurances not within power of prosecutor to make on which defendant relies to plead
guilty constitute grounds for relief). See also Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 994 (1st Cir.
1973); Walter v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1129 (1973).
161. See note 157 supra.
162. See note 156 supra.
163. It also puts the State on notice to monitor carefully the promises it makes.
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Motor Co. was one of nonliability, however, it remains for future
decisions to outline the remedies available for breach of such
agreements. 164
F Narcotics
In State v. Forney,'65 the North Carolina Court of Appeals con-
fronted the issue of the extent of dominion and control 166 sufficient to
support a charge of sale and delivery of heroin and possession of heroin
with the intent to sell and deliver.'67 Two State Bureau of Investigation
(SBI) agents told defendant that they were interested in purchasing her-
oin. Defendant arranged a meeting for this purpose, and brought along
another person, who negotiated the sale and handed the agent the
drugs for the agreed upon price. Defendant contended that there was,
therefore, no evidence tending to show that he had possession of the
heroin.168
The issue whether dominion and control predicated upon a work-
ing relationship of this nature is sufficient to constitute possession had
not yet been decided in the North Carolina courts. 69 There is prece-
dent that "an accused has possession. . . within the meaning of the
law when he has both the power and intent to control its disposition or
use. The requisite power to control may reside in the accused acting
164. In cases in which the prosecutor promised there would be no further criminal prosecu-
tion, something that is in his power to control, specific enforcement of the bargain has been or-
dered. See Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v. Carter, 454
F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933 (1974); United States v. Paina, 294 F. Supp. 742
(D.D.C. 1969). The other alternative, particularly for an unfulfillable promise, would be to allow
withdrawal of a guilty plea. See United States v. Hammerman, 528 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1975).
165. 38 N.C. App. 703, 248 S.E.2d 747 (1978).
166. Dominion and control over a narcotic or dangerous drug is an essential element of the
criminal offense of possession. The control incident to possession may be actual or constructive,
but it has been held that the narcotic or dangerous drug must be in the immediate and exclusive
control of the accused. 28 C.J.S. Drugs and Narcotics Supp. § 157 (1974).
167. 38 N.C. App. 706-07, 248 S.E.2d at 749-50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(a) (1975) provides:
[I]t is unlawful for any person: (1) To manufacture, sell or deliver or possess with intent
to manufacture, sell or deliver, a controlled substance; (2) To create, sell or deliver, or
possess with intent to sell or deliver, a counterfeit controlled substance; (3) To possess a
controlled substance.
168. 38 N.C. App. at 704-06, 248 S.E.2d at 748-49.
169. In jurisdictions that have considered the issue, the criminality of directing to or recom-
mending a source of supply begins to form as one moves along a continuum from a single, casual
naming of another possible source to accompanying another to a meeting with the seller during
which the sale takes place. Whether defendant accompanies the buyer to the meeting seems to
determine whether defendant's actions will likely be found criminal. See Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d
1072 (1972).
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alone or in combination with others."' 70 The court could have applied
this definition of constructive possession and based its decision on ex-
isting interpretations well supported in the case law of a number of
jurisdictions including North Carolina.' 7 1 Instead the court chose to
base its decision upon cases decided under former section 2(c) of the
Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act. 7 2 Possession under this stat-
ute had been defined to include any working relationship or association
with one having physical custody of drugs that enabled delivery to a
customer without difficulty. 173
Applying the reasoning developed in these cases, the Forney court
held defendant to be in possession of the heroin. Defendant produced
the unidentified man on short notice at a place of defendant's choosing;
the man arrived with the amount of heroin desired by the agents, ap-
parently with prior knowledge that the SBI agents were the individuals
who wished to make the purchase; and the man entered into the price
negotiations with people otherwise unknown to him. These facts indi-
cate a close working relationship between defendant and the unidenti-
fied man. Based upon this relationship, defendant was found to be in
possession of the heroin by exercising dominion and control over the
man who physically possessed the drugs. 74
In State v. Bethea,17 1 section 1175 of the federal Drug Abuse Office
and Treatment Act 176 was construed by the North Carolina Court of
Appeals for the first time. This statute was enacted to protect the confi-
dentiality of patient records maintained in connection with any feder-
ally funded drug abuse prevention program. 177 In this case, defendant
170. State v. Allen, 279 N.C. 406, 411, 183 S.E.2d 680, 684 (1971) (quoting State v. Fuqua, 234
N.C. 168, 170, 66 S.E.2d 667, 668 (1951)).
171. See State v. Harvey, 281 N.C. 1, 187 S.E.2d 706 (1972); State v. Spencer, 281 N.C. 121,
187 S.E.2d 779 (1972). See generally 28 C.J.S. Drugs and Narcotics Sup . § 158 (1974).
172. Act of July 18, 1956, ch. 629, § 105, 70 Stat. 567 (formerly codified at 21 U.S.C. § 174)
(repealed 1970). The statute read in pertinent part: "[Whenever ... the defendant is shown to
have or to have had possession of the narcotic drugs, such possession shall be deemed sufficient
evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains the possession to the satisfaction of
the jury."
173. See, e.g., United States v. Baratta, 397 F.2d 215, 224 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 939
(1968) (evidence of "working relationship" between defendant and actual possessors of narcotics
constitutes dominion and control sufficient to constitute possession); Cellino v. United States, 276
F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1960) (negotiation of sale and receipt of purchase price sufficient dominion and
control to constitute possession), cited with approvalin State v. Forney, 38 N.C. App. 703, 706,248
S.E.2d 747, 749-50.
174. 38 N.C. App. at 706, 248 S.E.2d at 749-50.
175. 35 N.C. App. 512, 241 S.E.2d 869 (1978).
176. 21 U.S.C. § 1175 (1976).
177. Section 1175 provides for confidentiality of patient records concerning the identity, diag-
nosis, prognosis, or treatment of any patient maintained in connection with any drug abuse pre-
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was charged with possession with intent to sell and deliver, and sale
and delivery of a controlled substance, methadone.178 Defendant ar-
gued that because the sale was initiated by an SBI agent using a third-
party informant who was an out-patient with defendant at the Durham
Drug Rehabilitation Center, the evidence obtained from observation of
the sale should be excluded because it was acquired in clear violation
of the regulations promulgated under section 1175.179 The relevant
regulation flatly prohibits the enrollment of informants in drug abuse
treatment programs. 80
In rejecting defendant's contention the court relied upon Armenta
v. Superior Court, 8' a California case that also dealt with an informant
under this regulation. After a thorough consideration of the legislative
history of this statute, the California court concluded that only confi-
dential records obtained in violation of section 1175 were intended to
be subject to exclusion.'82 Relying on this interpretation by the Cali-
fornia court, the North Carolina Court of Appeals concluded that de-
fendant's motion to suppress was properly denied even though the
letter of the federal regulation was violated, because the evidence ob-
tained by use of the informant did not include the confidential records
of defendant.'83
In reaching this conclusion, North Carolina is in accord with the
interpretation of section 1175 and the regulations promulgated under it
reached by the few jurisdictions that have considered the issue.' 84 The
vention function conducted, regulated or assisted by the government. Except as authorized by a
court order granted under this section, no patient record may be used to initiate or substantiate
any criminal charges against a patient or to conduct any investigation of a patient. Id.
178. 35 N.C. App. at 513, 241 S.E.2d at 870.
179. Id. at 514, 241 S.E.2d at 870-71. The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, and
the heads of other affected agencies, are given authority, under 21 U.S.C. § 1175(g) (1976), to
prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of § 1175.
180. 42 C.F.R. § 2.19(b)(1) (1977). Section 2.19(a)(2) defines "informant" as a person who, at
the request of a law enforcement agency or officer observes persons enrolled in or employed by a
program for the purpose of reporting the information his observations reveal to the officer or
agency.
181. 61 Cal. App. 3d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1976).
182. Id. at 594-96, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 592-93. The California court noted that this interpretation
is consistent with the history of 42 C.F.R. § 2.19 (1977), which reveals no intention to make the
drug abuse prevention programs criminal sanctuaries.
183. 35 N.C. App. at 516, 241 S.E.2d at 871.
184. Brief for Defendant Appellant at 8-10, State v. Bethea, 35 N.C. App. 512, 241 S.E.2d 869
(1978), reveals only two cases decided nationwide construing this statute and regulation. State v.
Traas, 343 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), does not provide much analysis of the issue;
Armenta v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. App. 3d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1976), was relied upon by the
court. The State relied primarily upon Armenia, but also mentioned State v. White, 169 Conn.
223, 363 A.2d 143 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1978).
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legislative intent in enacting this statute was clearly to protect the iden-
tity of participants in drug abuse prevention programs by statutorily
protecting the confidentiality of program records. 5 In promulgating
regulations to effectuate this purpose, the Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare concluded that a prohibition on the enrollment of
informants in such facilities was necessary to guarantee this
confidentiality.Y8 6 The statute was not intended, however, to make
these programs sanctuaries for criminal activity.8 7 The courts have in-
terpreted the statute in a manner consistent with this legislative in-
tent.'88 Utilizing this approach, the court of appeals found that while
the third-party informant could come within the definition of an in-
formant under the regulations, the information obtained by him was
not of the type the statute was intended to protect. 9 The information
gathered was not a record within the definition set out in section 1175;
it was merely information gathered by the third-party in a parking lot
and was in no way connected with the medical records of the center
itself.'90 Therefore, even if the information was obtained in violation
of the regulation, it was not obtained in violation of the statute, and
should not be suppressed.' 9 '
In adopting this reasoning, the court is effectively condoning the
violation of a federal regulation. If a motion to suppress evidence
wrongfully obtained under the regulations is denied because the evi-
dence so obtained is not a record the statute itself intended to protect,
an important remedy for violations of the regulation is removed. 92 In
so holding, the court of appeals is clearly subordinating the need for
the confidentiality required to operate a successful rehabilitation center
to the need to prevent the illegal sale of narcotic drugs.
G. Double Jeopardy
In State v. Cannon,193 defendant entered a plea of guilty to a
185. See State v. White, 159 Conn. 223, 363 A.2d 143 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025
(1978).
186. See 42 C.F.R. § 2.19-1 (1977).
187. See Armenta v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. App. 3d 584, 593, 132 Cal. Rptr. 586, 596 (1976).
188. See, e.g., id.
189. 35 N.C. App. at 515-16, 241 S.E.2d at 871.
190. Id. For a discussion of what constitutes a record under the statute, see State v. White, 169
Conn. 223, 235-37, 363 A.2d 143, 150-51 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1978).
191. 35 N.C. App. at 515-16, 241 S.E.2d at 871. See also Armenta v. Superior Court, 61 Cal.
App. 3d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1976).
192. See Brief for Defendant Appellant at 9.
193. 38 N.C. App. 322, 248 S.E.2d 65 (1978).
[Vol. 57
CRIMINAL LA W
charge of operating a motor vehicle without being licensed under G.S.
20-7.194 Defendant then moved to dismiss a second case against him
stemming from the same occurrence, operating a motor vehicle when
his operator's license had been permanently revoked under G.S. 20-
28.195 Defendant contended that the plea of guilty to the first charge
precluded the State from proceeding on the second because double
jeopardy had attached. 196 The district court agreed with defendant,
and the State appealed to the superior court, which found in favor of
the State. 197 Defendant then appealed to the court of appeals.
While the prohibition against double jeopardy is not expressly set
out in the North Carolina Constitution, it has been applied in this state
as a fundamental principle of the common law.198 One expression of
the prohibition is the lesser degree rule, which states that "'where the
second indictment is for a crime greater in degree than the first, and
where both indictments arise out of the same act . . . an acquittal or
conviction for the first is a bar to a prosecution for the second.' "199 In
Cannon, the court of appeals found that G.S. 20-7 is not statutorily a
lesser included offense of G.S. 20-28 and hence that conviction under
both statutes is not barred on this ground.2°
. Another rule implementing the double jeopardy prohibition is that
if the two offenses are the same in fact and law, then a defendant may
not be prosecuted for both.2 °1 In making this determination, the "addi-
tional facts test" is applied.20 2 This rule states that "[a] single act may
be an offense against two statutes, and if each statute requires proof of
an additional fact, which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction
194. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-7 (1977).
195. Id. § 20-28.
196. In the appeal to the court of appeals, defendant conceded that the charges had been
properly joined, although objection had been raised on this ground in the district court. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-926(c)(3) (1978) provides that joinder is not applicable when the defendant has
pleaded guilty or no contest to the previous charge. In this case, defendant entered a plea of guilty
to the first charge.
197. The district court found that the ultimate fact to be determined in each of the cases was
whether defendant had in his possession a North Carolina operator's license; operating a motor
vehicle without being licensed would therefore be a lesser included offense of § 20-28, so that
jeopardy had attached after pleading guilty to the first charge.
198. State v. Crocker, 239 N.C. 446, 80 S.E.2d 243 (1954).
199. 38 N.C. App. at 324, 248 S.E.2d at 67 (quoting 15 N.C.L. Rav. 53, 55 (1936)); see State v.
Bell, 205 N.C. 225, 171 S.E. 50 (1933).
200. 38 N.C. App. at 325, 248 S.E.2d at 67. Section 20-7 is intended to apply when the defend-
ant has not been issued a license or has let the license expire, while § 20-28 applies when the
defendant has had his license revoked because of successive violations of the law.
201. See State v. Barefoot, 241 N.C. 650, 86 S.E.2d 424 (1958).
202. See State v. Birckhead, 256 N.C. 494, 124 S.E.2d 838 (1962).
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under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution
and punishment under the other."2 3 The additional facts test is there-
fore bilateral in its application: to prosecute for both offenses, each
offense must have some element not common to the other to make it a
separate and distinct offense.2" The offenses charged in this case can-
not pass this test. Failure to have a license is the only element of the
G.S. 20-7 offense, yet it is also an element necessary in the G.S. 20-8
offense.20' Therefore, the court held that the two offenses are the same
in fact and in law and the plea of double jeopardy should have been
sustained.2 °5
State v. Cox, 20 7 another court of appeals decision, also dealt with
double jeopardy. Cox was charged with armed robbery2 8 and pleaded
not guilty. The evidence against him showed only that he drove the
three other men involved in the robbery away from the scene of the
crime. The trial judge directed a verdict of not guilty at the close of the
State's evidence; defendant was then served with a warrant charging
him with the offense of accessory after the fact.2"9 Defendant moved to
dismiss this charge prior to trial on the ground that a trial on accessory
charges would violate his double jeopardy protection; this motion, as
well as a motion to dismiss on the basis of the joinder statute,21 0 was
denied.211 Defendant appealed from a conviction of guilty of accessory
after the fact.
In support of his argument that a second trial would offend double
jeopardy principles, defendant relied upon Ashe v. Swenson,212 in
which the United States Supreme Court held that the principles of col-
lateral estoppel are embodied in the fifth amendment protection against
double jeopardy.2 13 Collateral estoppel "means simply that when an
issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final
judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties
203. State v. Stevens, 114 N.C. 873, 877, 19 S.E. 861, 862 (1894).
204. State v. Nash, 86 N.C. 650 (1882).
205. 38 N.C. App. at 326, 248 S.E.2d at 68.
206. Id. at 327, 248 S.E.2d at 69.
207. 37 N.C. App. 356, 246 S.E.2d 152, appealdismissed, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 649, 248 S.E.2d
253 (1978).
208. Cox was charged under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-87 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
209. See id. § 14-7 (1969).
210. Id. § 15A-926(c)(2) (1978).
211. 37 N.C. App. at 358-59, 246 S.E.2d at 153.
212. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).




in any future lawsuit." '214 Applying this rationale, the court of appeals
found that the directed verdict on armed robbery foreclosed the State
from subsequent prosecutions for armed robbery or any lesser included
offense; it removed the issue whether the defendant participated as a
principal in the armed robbery or whether he aided or abetted in its
commission.215 Accessory after the fact of armed robbery, however, is
not a lesser included offense of armed robbery; the crime of accessory
after the fact begins after the principal offense has been committed.216
The directed verdict of not guilty of armed robbery therefore did not
decide the question whether defendant had joined the criminal scheme
after the robbery was complete and thus the court of appeals affirmed
defendant's conviction.217
H Doctrine of Recent Possession
In State v. Mussewhite,21 8 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
dealt with the doctrine of recent possession, the well-established doc-
trine that possession of stolen propery soon after a theft permits an
inference that the possessor is the thief, and if there is sufficient evi-
dence that the propery was stolen pursuant to a breaking and entering,
that the possessor is also guilty of the breaking and entering.219 In Mus-
selwhite, the court refused to extend the doctrine to allow possession of
recently stolen goods to be ground for a conviction of aiding and abet-
ting. In this case, defendant and another man were charged with rob-
bery with a firearm; defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting.220
The only evidence before the jury tended to establish unequivocally
that the robbery was committed by the other man. The evidence
214. 397 U.S. at 443.
215. 37 N.C. App. at 360, 246 S.E.2d at 153-54.
216. See State v. McIntosh, 260 N.C. 749, 133 S.E.2d 652 (1963). Mclntosh held that an ac-
quittal of a charge of accessory after the fact of armed robbery will not support a plea of former
jeopardy in a subsequent prosecution of the same defendant for armed robbery, because the two
offenses are different in fact and in law.
217. 37 N.C. App. at 360, 246 S.E.2d at 154.
218. 36 N.C. App. 430, 245 S.E.2d 171 (1978).
219. See State v. Eppley, 282 N.C. 249, 192 S.E.2d 471 (1972); State v. Blackmon, 6 N.C. App.
66, 169 S.E.2d 472 (1969). The weight to be given this presumption depends upon the circum-
stances of the particular case. See State v. Jackson, 274 N.C. 594, 164 S.E.2d 369 (1968); State v.
Williams, 219 N.C. 365, 13 S.E.2d 617 (1941). See generally 2 STRONG's NORTH CAROLINA IN-
DEX 3d Burglary and Other Unlawful Breakings § 5.4 (1978); 8 id. Larceny § 5.
220. One may be convicted of aiding and abetting in the offense of robbery if "he is near
enough to render assistance if need be and to encourage the actual perpetration of the felony" or if
he provides "a means by which the actual perpetrator may get away from the scene upon comple-
tion of the offense." State v. Lyles, 19 N.C. App. 632, 635-36, 199 S.E.2d 699, 701-02, cert. denied,
284 N.C. 426, 200 S.E.2d 662 (1973).
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against defendant proved only that he and the other man were later
found driving in the same van. When the van was stopped, the other
man was found to have the stolen money in his possession; a search of
the van revealed a gun like the one stolen and another gun like the one
used in the robbery so that both men were found to be in possession of
stolen goods. The record was thus devoid of any evidence directly con-
necting defendant to the scene of the crime. The court held that the
charge of aiding and abetting could not be submitted to the jury in
reliance upon the presumption of theft arising from the possession of
recently stolen goods.22'
This refusal to extend the doctrine of recent possession to allow a
finding of guilty of aiding and abetting to be predicated solely upon
possession of the stolen goods is reasonable when considered in light of
the logic behind the presumption. In the usual case, the presumption is
employed when there is no better evidence than possession of the stolen
goods to connect the defendant to the crime. The presumption is justi-
fied nevertheless because of the certainty that someone committed the
theft.22 Hence, when the State's evidence unequivocally establishes
that the larceny was committed by someone else, a critical ingredient of
the presumption is destroyed.223
I Obtaining Property or Services by False Pretenses
In State v. Hines,224 the North Carolina Court of Appeals directly
addressed for the first time the question whether compensation to the
victim precludes conviction of obtaining property or services by false
pretenses.2 25 The court held that obtaining property "without compen-
221. 36 N.C. App. at 436, 245 S.E.2d at 175-76.
222. See State v. Williams, 219 N.C. 365, 13 S.E.2d 617 (1941).
223. See State v. Cannon, 218 N.C. 466, 11 S.E.2d 301 (1940). In Cannon, the evidence tended
to prove that two men stole cigarettes and sold them to a third man who in turn sold them to
defendant. The court held that while the recent possession of stolen property generally raises a
presumption that the possessor is the thief, no such presumption can prevail when the State's
evidence shows the larceny to have been committed by others and fails to connect the defendant in
any way to the felonious taking.
224. 36 N.C. App. 33, 243 S.E.2d 782, appeal dismissed, cer. denied, 295 N.C. 262, 245 S.E.2d
779 (1978).
225. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-100 (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides in pertinent part:
Obtaining property by false pretenses.--(a) If any person shall knowingly and design-
edly by means of any kind of false pretense whatsoever, whether the false pretense is of a
past or subsisting fact or of a future fulfillment or event, obtain or attempt to obtain from
any person within this State any money, goods, property, services, chose in action, or
other thing of value.. ., such person shall be guilty of a felony, and shall be imprisoned
in the State's prison not less than four months nor more than 10 years, and fined, in the
discretion of the court. . ., Provided, further, that it shall be sufficient in any indictment
for obtaining or attempting to obtain any such money, goods, property, services, chose in
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sation" to the victim is not an element of the crime that the State need
allege or prove.226 The court further held that the requisite intent to
defraud might be found even if the victim is adequately compensated
in the economic sense, if that compensation is less than originally
represented.227
Defendant in Hines led the prosecuting witness, largely through
use of falsified documents, to believe that he was a state employee with
authority to contract with her for a state job at a $10,000 salary and
benefits. In fact, defendant was not so employed or authorized, and the
secretarial duties subsequently performed by the prosecuting witness
under the impression she was starting her new state job were actually
for defendant's benefit. Defendant did pay the prosecuting witness
$148 for the time she worked for him until she realized she had been
deceived, and he also reimbursed her expenses incurred on a business
trip.
2 28
After his conviction, defendant contended on appeal that his mo-
tion for nonsuit should have been allowed because the services were
not obtained without compensation.229 While recognizing that lan-
guage in prior decisions suggested that "without compensation" had
been recognized as an element,23 ° the court determined that the use of
action, or other thing of value by false pretenses to allege that the party accused did the
act with intent to defraud, without alleging an intent to defraud any particular person,
and without alleging any ownership of the money, goods, property, services, chose in
action or other thing of value; and upon the trial of any such indictment, it shall not be
necessary to prqve either an intent to defraud any particular person or that the person to
whom the false pretense was made was the person defrauded, but it shall be sufficient to
allege and prove that the party accused made the false pretense charged with an intent to
defraud.
Amended § 14-100 also expanded the violation to include an attempt to obtain property by
false pretenses. See State v. Grier, 35 N.C. App. 119, 239 S.E.2d 870, cert. denied, 294 N.C. 442,
241 S.E.2d 844 (1978).
226. 36 N.C. App. at 40, 243 S.E.2d at 786.
227. Id. at 42, 243 S.E.2d at 788.
228. Id. at 34-35, 243 S.E.2d at 783.
229. Id. at 37, 243 S.E.2d at 785.
230. See, e.g., State v. Agnew, 33 N.C. App. 496,236 S.E.2d 287 (1977), rev'don other grounds,
294 N.C. 382, 241 S.E.2d 684 (1978):
The essential elements which the State must prove to the satisfaction of the jury beyond
a reasonable doubt in order to convict one of the crime of false pretense are as follows:
. .."a false representation of a subsisting fact [or of a future fulfillment or event as
provided in G.S. 14-100 as amended in 1975], calculated to deceive, and which does
deceive, and is intended to deceive, whether the representation be in writing, or in words,
or in acts, by which one man obtains value from another, without compensation .. "
Id. at 500-01,236 S.E.2d at 290 (quoting State v. Davenport, 227 N.C. 475,495,42 S.E.2d 686,700
(1947)). See also State v. Wallace, 25 N.C. App. 360, 364, 213 S.E.2d 420, 423, cert. denied, 287
N.C. 468, 215 S.E.2d 628 (1975).
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these words was merely dictum in those cases.23' The court traced the
"without compensation" phrase to a leading case concerning the of-
fense, State v. Phirer,232 and noted that the issue of the victim's com-
pensation was neither discussed nor before the court in that decision.
Further, the "without compensation" element appeared only in those
cases immediately following Ph/fer that quoted directly from Ph/fer for
a statement of the elements of the offense; 233 cases from that period that
cited but did not quote Phier on the elements of the offense did not
include the "without compensation" element. 234 From this the court
concluded that it had never been intended that failure of the victim to
receive any compensation be an element of the crime. Additionally, no
statutory provision has ever expressly required there be no compensa-
tion,235 and past convictions have been upheld although some compen-
sation was received.236
Defendant in Hines also argued that if the compensation paid the
victim was adequate in the fair market value sense, there could be no
intent to defraud; therefore, the trial court's failure to instruct with re-
gard to the adequacy of compensation was reversible error.237 In re-
jecting this argument, the court interpreted prior decisions upholding
convictions in which either the victim had received some compensa-
tion,238 or the court had found it unnecessary to investigate the ade-
quacy of the compensation,23 9 as aligning North Carolina with the
majority view that no actual pecuniary loss to the victim need be shown
231. 36 N.C. App. at 40, 243 S.E.2d at 786.
232. 65 N.C. 321 (1871).
233. See, e.g., State v. Mikle, 94 N.C. 843 (1886); State v. Hefner, 84 N.C. 751 (1881).
234. See, e.g., State v. Matthews, 91 N.C. 635 (1884); State v. Dickson, 88 N.C. 643 (1883);
State v. Eason, 86 N.C. 674 (1882).
235. 36 N.C. App. at 40, 243 S.E.2d at 786.
236. Id.
237. Id. Also addressing the element of intent in State v. Tesenair, 35 N.C. App. 531, 241
S.E.2d 877 (1978), the court of appeals held that a jury might find the necessary intent to deceive
for conviction under § 14-100 quite apart from any intention to repay. In Tesenair, defendant
purchased paint and supplies on a credit account he established by representing himself as his
brother, who had a good credit rating. In refusing defendant's argument that this evidence could
show no more than a failure to fulfill a promise to pay at a future date, the court followed what is
the generally accepted view that "[w]hen the pretense is false, it is no defense that the defendant
expected or intended to repay. . . the victim, should he be able to do so, or to pay before the
deception is discovered." 2 WHARToN's CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 610 (12th ed. 1957).
238. 36 N.C. App. at 40, 243 S.E.2d at 786; see State v. Wallace, 25 N.C. App. 360, 213 S.E.2d
420, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 468, 215 S.E.2d 628 (1975); State v. Banks, 24 N.C. App. 604, 211
S.E.2d 860 (1975).
239. 36 N.C. App. at 41, 243 S.E.2d at 787; see State v. Howley, 220 N.C. 113, 16 S.E.2d 705
(1941).
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for the jury to find the requisite intent for conviction.240 The court de-
fined the essence of G.S. 14-100241 as the intentional false pretense and
not the resulting economic harm to the victim, noting that the criminal
law will intervene to protect the interests of the victims when services
are obtained by a false representation even though some compensation
is paid.242  Although the victim in Hines had suffered an economic
harm or prejudice in receiving less than represented, the court's holding
that the gravamen of the offense is the intentional misrepresentation
suggests that any "ultimate loss to the victim .. is irrelevant to the
purpose of the. . statute."'243
J Breaking or Entering244 and Larceny
245
In State v. Keeter,246 the court of appeals considered the question
240. 36 N.C. App. at 41, 243 S.E.2d at 737; see, e.g., State v. Meeks, 30 Ariz. 436, 247 P. 1099
(1926); State v. Moss. 194 Ark. 524, 108 SAV.2d 782 (1937); People v. Bartels, 77 Colo. 498, 238 P.
51 (1925); State v. Green, 144 Tex. Crim. 186, 106 S.W.2d 144 (1942); State v. Sargent, 2 Wash. 2d
190, 97 P.2d 692 (1940); State v. Anderson, 27 Wyo. 345, 196 P. 1047 (1921). But see State v.
McGhee, 97 Ga. 199, 22 S.E. 589 (1895).
241. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-100 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
242. 36 N.C. at 42, 243 S.E.2d at 78.
243. Id. While many jurisdictions require that for conviction the victim must have been
prejudiced in some way, it is unnecessary to show damage under statutes making the false repre-
sentation itself the offense. See 2 WIARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 602 (12th ed.
1957).
244. In State v. Sneed, 38 N.C. App. 230, 248 S.E.2d 658 (1978), the court of appeals defined
"entry" as used in the offenses of breaking or entering and burglary. The court adopted the
definition in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 627 (rev. 4th ed. 1968), which defines an entry as "the
least entry with the whole or any part of the body, hand, foot, or with any instrument or weapon,
introduced for the purpose of committing a felony."
245. In State v. Schultz, 294 N.C. 281, 240 S.E.2d 451 (1978), the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that bronze cemetery urns are not real property and the theft of such urns is properly
the subject of common law larceny. This holding rejected the contention of defendant that the
urns should be in the same category of property as tombstones, which are real property and not
subject to common law larceny. See State v. Jackson, 218 N.C. 372, 11 S.E.2d 149 (1940)
(tombstones classified as real property because of their permanence and hence cannot be subject
of common law larceny).
In State v. Carswell, 296 N.C. 101, 249 S.E.2d 427 (1978), the North Carolina Supreme Court
was presented with the issue of the sufficiency of a taking and asportation necessary to sustain a
conviction of larceny. The court recognized that larceny is "a wrongful taking and carrying away
of the personal property of another without his consent,. . . with intent to deprive the owner of
his property and appropriate it to the taker's use fraudulently." State v. Griffin, 239 N.C. 41, 45,
79 S.E.2d 230, 232 (1953). Hence, larceny embraces both a taking and an asportation element.
The asportation element can be satisfied by "a bare removal from the place in which [the thief]
found the goods, though the thief does not quite make off with them." 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES * 231. The taking requirement is met when the goods are severed from the
possession of their owner, State v. Roper, 14 N.C. (3 Dev.) 473, 474 (1832), even if the possession
and control by the thief is only for an instant. State v. Jackson, 65 N.C. 305 (1871). Thus, the act
of picking up an air conditioner and laying it on the floor approximately six inches away is a
sufficient taking and asportation to put the object briefly under the control of the defendant and to
sever it from the owner's possession; defendant can be found guilty of larceny for these actions.
246. 35 N.C. App. 574, 241 S.E.2d 708 (1978).
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whether the acceptance of a verdict of guilty of felonious larceny
should be precluded when the jury is unable to reach a verdict on the
charge of felonious breaking or entering upon which the larceny charge
is predicated. Defendant was tried for felonious breaking or entering
and felonious larceny. No verdict on the breaking or entering charge
was reached; the jury then convicted defendant of felonious larceny.247
Defendant appealed this conviction on the ground that it was in-
consistent with the rule of State v. Jones.248 In Jones, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court held that when a defendant is tried for breaking or
entering and felonious larceny and the jury returns a verdict of not
guilty of felonious breaking or entering and guilty of felonious larceny,
it is improper for the trial judge to accept the verdict of guilty of feloni-
ous larceny unless the jury has been instructed on its duty to fix the
value of the stolen property at more than $200.249 In Keeler, this in-
struction was not given the jury.
The reason for this rule is that without a conviction of breaking or
entering, felonious larceny cannot be found unless the State has proved
in the alternative that the value of the property stolen was in excess of
$200. Felony larceny is committed when the State can prove that the
value of the stolen property is greater than $200; that the larceny is
from the person or perpetrated pursuant to a breaking or entering; or
that an explosive or incendiary device is utilized. 5 0 Hence, if the jury
acquits the defendant on the breaking or entering charge, the charge of
felonious larceny cannot be predicated upon a breaking or entering. It
therefore is "incumbent upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the value of the stolen propery was more than $200; and this
being an essential element of the offense, it is incumbent upon the trial
judge to so instruct the jury."'25'
247. Id. at 574, 241 S.E.2d at 709.
248. 275 N.C. 432, 168 S.E.2d 380 (1969).
249. Although the judgment of felonious larceny must be vacated in such a case, the verdict
will stand and the case will be remanded for entering a sentence consistent with the verdict of
guilty of misdemeanor larceny. Id. at 439, 168 S.E.2d at 385; accord, State v. Teel, 20 N.C. App.
398, 201 S.E.2d 733 (1974).
250. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
251. State v. Cooper, 256 N.C. 372, 380, 124 S.E.2d 91, 97 (1962). In Cooper defendant was
convicted solely upon a charge of felonious larceny. The court held that if the State did not prove
the value of the property stolen exceeded $200, defendant was not guilty of a felony. This man-
date with respect to instructions on value was clearly extended to cover the situation in which
defendant is charged with both breaking or entering and felonious larceny in State v. Holloway,
265 N.C. 518, 144 S.E.2d 634 (1965), which held that if the State cannot prove a breaking or
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The Keeter court extended this rule to the situation in which no
verdict is reached on the breaking or entering charge. This is logically
consistent with Jones since in neither case did the State prove beyond a





A. Searches and Seizures
1. Vehicle Stops Under the Motor Vehicle Act'
In Keziah v. Bostic,2 the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of North Carolina for the first time restricted the power of
law enforcement officers to stop motor vehicles pursuant to G.S. 20-
183(a)3 of the Motor Vehicle Act. G.S. 20-183(a) authorizes the discre-
tionary stop of any vehicle on the state highways for a determination of
whether it is being operated in violation of any provision of the Motor
Vehicle Act.4 The court in Keziah found that prior interpretations of
the statute, which allowed officers unlimited discretion in deciding
which vehicles to stop, were unconstitutional under the fourth
amendment. 5
entering, a felony larceny charge must be based upon the property exceeding $200 in value and
the jury must be so instructed.
252. See Defendant Appellant's Brief at 7, State v. Keeter, 35 N.C. App. 574, 241 S.E.2d 733
(1978).
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 20 (1978).
2. 452 F. Supp. 912 (W.D.N.C. 1978).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-183(a) (1978).
4. Id The statute provides in pertinent part:
It shall be the duty of law-enforcement officers of the state and of each county, city,
or other municipality to see that the provisions of this Article are enforced. . . , and any
such officer shall have the power to arrest on sight or upon warrant any person found
violating the provisions of this Article. Such officers within their respective jurisdictions
shall have the power to stop any motor vehicle upon the highways of the State for the
purpose of determining whether the same is being operated in violation of any of the
provisions of this Article.
5. 452 F. Supp. at 915.
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The arresting highway patrolman in Keziah first observed peti-
tioner Keziah's vehicle turning out of a private drive onto a public
highway. The officer watched Keziah in his rear view mirror, then
turned his patrol car around to follow petitioner's vehicle. Petitioner
drove one hundred and fifty feet down the highway and turned into
another private drive. The officer followed him into the driveway and
approached him. Petitioner, after refusing to display his driver's li-
cense or reveal his name at the officer's request, was told that he was
under arrest for failure to display his license. Keziah resisted arrest,
fought with the officer, and eventually escaped. The patrolman admit-
ted he had no reason to believe petitioner had broken or was about to
break any law, and that petitioner was not driving in any suspicious or
unlawful manner. Keziah was later apprehended, convicted of assault-
ing an officer, and sentenced to a two year prison term.6
Keziah appealed his conviction, basing his appeal on the claim
that he had been unconstitutionally stopped in the first instance, and
thus that the officer had no authority to demand his license or to arrest
him for failure to display it. Petitioner contended that he was therefore
justified in resisting an illegal arrest.7 The North Carolina Court of
Appeals held the initial stop justified as a routine license check under
G.S. 20-183(a) and denied defendant's appeal.'
Keziah then sought habeas corpus relief in the federal district
court, which disagreed with the court of appeals' interpretation of G.S.
20-183(a) and held the initial stop unconstitutional under the fourth
amendment. In the process of reaching its holding the court found
there was no doubt that an officer's stop and demand pursuant to G.S.
20-183(a) was a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment.9
The relevant question was whether the seizure in this case was unrea-
sonable and thus a violation of the fourth amendment.' 0 Relying on
United States v. Montgomery, the court held that the license check
6. Id at 913-14.
7. Id
8. State v. Keziah, 24 N.C. App. 298, 300, 210 S.E.2d 436, 437 (1974).
9. 452 F. Supp. at 915. Petitioner's writ of habeas corpus was, however, denied on other
grounds. Section 20-183(a) had been previously interpreted to authorize complete discretion on
the part of officers; thus the arrest at that time was facially legal. Because the arrest was author-
ized by a statute arguably legal at the time, there was no right to resist arrest. Petitioner's convic-
tion for assaulting a highway patrolman thus survived although the officer's initial stop and
demand was illegal in fact. Id at 916.
10. Id at 914.
11. 561 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Aontgomery police stopped a vehicle they had seen
being driven around the neighborhood in order to check defendant's driver's license. They had no
reason to believe defendant was breaking any traffic laws. When they found defendant did not
Vol. 571008
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seizures authorized by G.S. 20-183(a) are only reasonable when they
are actually routine, systematic stops for the purpose of enforcing the
Motor Vehicle Act, or based on articulable suspicion that the Motor
Vehicle Act is being violated.12 When the stop is nominally for the
purpose of enforcing the Motor Vehicle Act, but in reality is an excuse
for investigating an officer's suspicions that fall short of probable cause
to arrest, then the stop is unreasonable.1 3 The stop in Keziah clearly
fell into the latter category.
The court in Keziah expressly chose to ignore prior interpretations
of G.S. 20-183(a) by the North Carolina Supreme Court " and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 15 Both courts
had declared constitutional the unlimited discretion vested in law en-
forcement officers to stop vehicles for license checks under G.S. 20-
183(a). 16 The North Carolina Supreme Court had previously held that
such stops were not seizures under the fourth amendment and thus not
subject to any constitutional limits of reasonableness.' 7
The Keziah court relied instead on the pioneer decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
United States v. Montgomery.'8 The Montgomery court noted that the
have his license, the officers checked whether he had been issued a license and discovered an
outstanding traffic violation against him. Defendant was arrested and a search incident to his
arrest turned up three weapons. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed defendant's conviction for carrying concealed weapons, holding the initial stop
unconstitutional. Id at 877.
12. 452 F. Supp. at 915. The articulable suspicion justification for stops that intrude less on
privacy rights than do arrests was first articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). It has been
further applied in cases involving vehicle stops for the purpose of enforcing border patrol acts.
See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873
(1975).
13. 452 F. Supp. at 915.
14. State v. Allen, 282 N.C. 503, 194 S.E.2d 9 (1973). In Allen, police observed a parked car
in a nonresidential area. Officers saw two men run from a business area, get into a car, and drive
away. The officers pursued the car and stopped it to check the licenses of the occupants. During
this procedure a bag of stolen money was observed in plain view and seized. The court upheld the
constitutionality of§ 20-183(a) and upheld defendants' conviction for robbery. Id at 505-08, 194
S.E.2d at 12-13.
15. United States v. Kelley, 462 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1972). In Kelley, law enforcement officers
were called to observe a rented truck that had been parked in a public area for some time. They
observed defendants get into the truck and drive away without behaving in any suspicious man-
ner. The officers attempted to stop the truck to check defendants' licenses and, after a chase,
arrested defendants. A search of the truck uncovered stolen goods, and defendants were convicted
of their possession. The original attempt to stop was upheld as constitutional under § 20-183 (a).
16. State v. Allen, 282 N.C. 503, 511, 194 S.E.2d 9, 15 (1973); United States v. Kelley, 462
F.2d 372, 374 (4th Cir. 1972).
17. State v. Allen, 282 N.C. 503, 508, 194 S.E.2d 9, 13 (1973).
18. 561 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Significantly, the court in Montgomery expressly criticized
the Fourth Circuit opinion in United States v. Kelley, 462 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1972). 561 F.2d at
884 n.16.
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United States Supreme Court has been careful not to rule on the consti-
tutionality of vehicle stops pursuant to the enforcement of motor vehi-
cle acts,' 9 but that most lower courts have held that such stops are
seizures within the meaning of the fourth amendment.20 These courts
disagree, however, on the standard of fourth amendment reasonable-
ness that should apply to the stops. 2' The Montgomery court thus
looked for guidance to Supreme Court cases involving vehicle stops for
the purpose of ascertaining if illegal aliens are entering the country in
violation of the border patrol acts.22 The Court in these cases devel-
oped a two-part test for constitutional reasonableness of border patrol
stops. To avoid violating the fourth amendment the stop must be part
of a systematic, routine program of vehicle stops, 23 or based on articul-
able suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle were violating the bor-
der patrol acts.24 Acknowledging the similarity in border patrol and
motor vehicle act stops and their identical potential for abuse, the
Montgomery court applied this two-part test to motor vehicle act
stops,25 despite the Supreme Court's express exclusion of motor vehicle
stops from its holdings in the border patrol cases.
By accepting the Montgomery application of the two-part test, the
Keziah court imposes a stricter standard for the application of G.S. 20-
183(a) than had previously been required. The Keziah ruling will serve
19. 561 F.2d at 881; see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 n.14 (1976);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 n.8 (1975); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S.
891, 897 n.3 (1975).
20. The United States Supreme Court has held in situations other than stops pursuant to
motor vehicle acts that the stop of a moving vehicle, even for a brief period, involves a seizure
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
878-82 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1968).
21. Decisions that disapprove vesting unlimited discretion in officers to single out which ve-
hicles to stop include State v. Ochoa, 112 Ariz. 582, 544 P.2d 1097 (1976); People v. Ingle, 36
N.Y.2d 413, 330 N.E.2d 39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975). Other courts have reserved judgment on
discretionary stops. See United States v. Cupps, 503 F.2d 277, 280 n.7 (6th Cir. 1974); United
States v. De Marco, 488 F.2d 828, 831 n.6 (2d Cir. 1973). Some courts have upheld selective stops
to enforce the motor vehicle laws. See United States v. Croft, 429 F.2d 884, 886 (10th Cir. 1970);
Palmore v. United States, 290 A.2d 573 (D.C.), affd onjurirdictionalgrounds only, 411 U.S. 389
(1972); State v. Holmberg, 194 Neb. 337, 231 N.W.2d 672 (1975); State v. Gray, 59 N.J. 563, 285
A.2d 1 (1971).
22. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (routine systematic stops of
vehicles at border patrol checkpoints held constitutionally reasonable); United States v. Ortiz, 422
U.S. 891 (1975) (discretionary searches of vehicles going through fixed border patrol checkpoint
unconstitutional); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (border patrols may not
stop individual vehicle in border area without reasonable basis for suspecting that vehicle being
occupied by illegal aliens).
23. The systematic, routine program may consist of stops at fixed checkpoints or a planned
system of random stops. United States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d at 883-84.
24. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975).
25. 561 F.2d at 881.
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to curb the abusive use of G.S. 20-183(a) as an investigative tool for law
enforcement officers by subjecting each license check stop to constitu-
tional scrutiny under the fourth amendment. The Keziah opinion fur-
ther represents a major step in the recent trend in North Carolina
toward placing some limits on G.S. 20-183(a) stops.26 Earlier decisions
had limited the scope of permissible actions by officers after making the
stop. Keziah for the first time places the stop under fourth amendment
scrutiny. In so doing, the court strengthened the privacy rights of indi-
viduals when in motor vehicles.2 7
2. Execution of a Search Warrant
The North Carolina Court of Appeals in three cases sought to clar-
ify the requirements for legal execution of a search warrant. The first,
State v. Brown,28 dealt with the requirement that an officer must give
notice of his identity and purpose before entering the premises to exe-
cute a search warrant. State v. Woodard29 delineated the circumstances
in which officers acting pursuant to a general warrant to search the
premises can also search subunits within the premises. Last, in State v.
Long,30 the court examined the authority of officers to search persons
found on the premises described in the warrant, but who are not named
in the warrant. 1
26. See State v. Blackwelder, 34 N.C. App. 352, 238 S.E.2d 190 (1977). The court in
Blackwelder placed limits on permissible searches incident to stops under the Motor Vehicle Act.
The court held that the power to stop did not include the power to search, and evidence seized
under the plain view exception was limited to that evidence in plain view from where the officer
had a legal right to be.
The present reach of the Blackwelder holding is uncertain after a North Carolina Court of
Appeals decision this year. In State v. Thompson, 37 N.C. App. 628, 246 S.E.2d 827 (1978), police
approached a van parked on a public boat dock to check the identity of the occupants. They had
no reason to suspect the occupants were committing or about to commit a crime. In leaning over
the passenger seat to get identification from the driver, the officer observed hashish hidden under
the dash board in a recessed area. The court upheld the seizure of the hashish under the plain
view exception to the search warrant requirement, distinguishing Blackwelder by saying the officer
had a right to be where he was in this case. Judge Erwin dissented, finding that the initial ap-
proach was unlawful and the plain view exception inapplicable. Id at 637-38, 246 S.E.2d at 833-
34 (dissenting opinion).
The officer's approach of the vehicle in Thompson is exactly the sort of activity the Kezah
court declared unconstitutional. Approaching the van was a discretionary move by the officers;
they had no articulable suspicion that the occupants might be engaged in criminal activity.
27. See Note, Automobile License Checks and the Fourth Amendment, 60 VA. L. Rav. 666
(1974).
28. 35 N.C. App. 634, 242 S.E.2d 184 (1978).
29. 35 N.C. App. 605, 242 S.E.2d 201 (1978).
30. 37 N.C. App. 662, 246 S.E.2d 846, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 736, 248 S.E.2d 866 (1978).
31. In another case, State v. Richards, 294 N.C. 474, 242 S.E.2d 844 (1978), the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court reemphasized its position on when items not particularly described in a search
warrant may be seized during a search pursuant to the warrant. The general rule is that items not
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G.S. 15A-24932 requires an officer executing a search warrant to
give notice of his identity and purpose before entering the premises. In
State v. Brown officers were executing a warrant authorizing the search
of defendant's residence for marijuana.33  Knowing that marijuana
could easily be destroyed, the officers devised a plan to gain quick entry
into defendant's house and prevent destruction of the evidence. A
chase was staged in which a sheriffs car, with lights flashing and siren
blowing, pursued an unmarked car and stopped in front of defendant's
house. When defendant opened his door to view the commotion, an
officer dressed in jeans and sandals asked if he could use the phone.
When defendant refused the officer pushed his way inside the house
and discovered several bags of marijuana.34
At trial defendant sought to suppress the evidence obtained in the
search on the ground that it was seized in violation of G.S. 15A-249.
The trial judge denied defendant's motion to suppress, relying on an
exception to the notice of identification and purpose requirement for
searches that seek easily destructible evidence.35 The court of appeals
particularly described in a warrant cannot be seized while executing that warrant without violat-
ing the fourth amendment. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). An exception to this
rule applies when the evidence of criminal activity falls within the plain view of the executing
officer during the search and is discovered inadvertently. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 465-71 (1971). The meaning of "inadvertently" has been the source of considerable contro-
versy. See generally The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 244-46 (1971).
In Richards, officers were searching defendant's residence for a murder weapon described in
the search warrant. In the course of the search police discovered two other weapons that were
admitted into evidence against defendant. The court held that the weapons were inadvertently
found in plain view, and admissible as evidence against defendant. In reaching this holding the
court interpreted the inadvertence doctrine as excluding evidence only when the officers knew the
location of the evidence and intended to seize it. 294 N.C. at 489, 242 S.E.2d at 854-55. The
decision was significant in its interpretation of inadvertence; it was the first time the supreme court
had defined the term directly; prior cases had merely mentioned without defining the term. See
State v. Rigsbee, 285 N.C. 708, 713-14, 208 S.E.2d 656, 660-61 (1974). North Carolina commenta-
tors have likewise avoided interpreting the doctrine. See, e.g., I STANSBURY'S NORTH CAROLINA
EVIDENCE § 121a, at 372 (H. Brandis rev. 1973) [hereinafter cited as STANSBURY]. For a discus-
sion of alternative interpretations, see The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra, at 244-46.
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-249 (1978) provides:
The officer executing a search warrant must, before entering the premises, give appropri-
ate notice of his identity and purpose to the person to be searched, or the person in
apparent control of the premises to be searched. If it is unclear whether anyone is pres-
ent at the premises to be searched, he must give the notice in a manner likely to be heard
by anyone who is present.
33. 35 N.C. App. at 634, 242 S.E.2d at 185.
34. Id at 634-35, 242 S.E.2d at 185.
35. Judge Lupton found that
the defendant was not prejudiced by this deviation from the requirements of North Car-
olina General Statute 15A-249 since the reason for complying with the above statute is to
show that the officers were not trespassers and that the deviation from lawful conduct
was minor, and that the lawfulness of the deviation was somewhat justified by the word
received through the confidential informant that the contraband may be destroyed. ...
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reversed and ordered the evidence suppressed. The court refused to
authorize an exception to G.S. 15A-249 that would be applicable when-
ever there was a possibility that the evidence would be destroyed.
The court based its decision solely on an interpretation of G.S.
15A-249 and G.S. 15A-25 136 of the Criminal Procedure Act,37 admit-
ting that neither federal nor state constitutional standards would re-
quire exclusion of the evidence .3  According to the court, the statutory
scheme reveals a design to permit unannounced forcible entries only
when giving notice would endanger the life or safety of any person.39
This accords with the legislative intent that can reasonably be inferred
from the history of the statutes in question. In drafting the Criminal
Procedure Act, the North Carolina Criminal Code Commission sub-
mitted as part of the proposed Act a provision that would have author-
ized exceptions to the notice and purpose requirement in certain
limited situations.4" One proposed situation was the one in which there
was probable cause to believe that giving notice would cause the de-
struction of evidence and the officers obtained prior judicial authoriza-
tion to proceed without giving notice.41 The General Assembly failed
Id at 636, 242 S.E.2d at 186 (quoting trial court).
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-251 (1978), quotedin note 42 infra.
37. 35 N.C. App. at 637, 242 S.E.2d at 186-87.
38. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (entry held legal when officers acting without a
warrant let themselves into defendant's apartment with pass key, identifying themselves only after
approaching defendant); State v. Watson, 19 N.C. App. 160, 198 S.E.2d 185 (1973) (when officer
had reason to believe evidence was being destroyed, he did not need to give notice of his identity
and purpose).
39. 35 N.C. App. at 636, 242 S.E.2d at 186.
40. H. 296, N.C. Gen. Assembly, 1973 Sess., reprintedin CRIMINAL CODE COMMISSION, LEG-
ISLATIVE PROGRAM AND REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA 19-20
(1973). See also Defendant Appellant's Brief at 5-6, State v. Brown, 35 N.C. App. 634, 242 S.E.2d
184 (1978).
41. Proposed N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-250 provided that:
An officer may execute a search warrant without the prior notice required by G.S.
15A-249 if:
(I) The officer has probable cause to believe that the notice required by G.S. 15A-249
would endanger the life or safety of any person; or
(2) An order authorizing execution without notice has been obtained from any judge.
The application by an officer for such an order must include a statement of facts
establishing probable cause to believe that the notice required by G.S. 15A-249 is
likely to endanger the life or safety of any person or ... is likely to result in the
destruction or disposal of items subject to seizure. If the judge finds that there is
probable cause to believe that either of these conditions is met, he may issue an
order permitting execution of the warrant without notice. The fact that items sub-
ject to seizure are easily destructible or disposable does not in itself constitute an
independently sufficient basis for concluding that there is probable cause to believe
that the giving of notice will result in destruction or disposal ....
H. 296, N.C. Gen. Assembly, 1973 Sess., reprintedin CRIMINAL CODE COMMISSION, supra note 40.
Even this proposed statute would have restricted police activity far more than the federal or state
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to adopt this provision, and instead granted officers the authority to
enter without notice only when there is probable cause to believe that
giving notice would endanger the safety or life of any person.42 The
General Assembly's failure to adopt the proposed statute cast uncer-
tainty on the fate of a prior judicially created exception that notice
would not be required if it would cause the destruction or disposition of
evidence. 43 The court in State v. Brown removed all uncertainty, stat-
ing that the prior judicial exception was overruled by the Criminal Pro-
cedure Act." The court thus established a hard line in North Carolina
against "no-knock" entries, which have caused considerable contro-
versy throughout the country.45
Considering the fact situation in Brown, the court appears to pro-
hibit gaining entry by false notice of identity as well as gaining entry
without giving any notice.46 Courts have, however, declared entries le-
gal in certain situations in which the officers failed to comply fully with
the requirements of G.S. 15A-249 when, for example, the door was
ajar,47 or when officers identified themselves but did not state their pur-
pose before forcing entry.48 The Brown holding does not disturb these
constitutions mandate. Note that the proposed statute would have required a judge to give ap-
proval to the unannounced entry. A warrant need only be approved and issued by a magistrate.
By requiring a judge the Commission sought to subject such requests to individual scrutiny and to
prevent them from becoming a part of standard form warrant applications. Nakell, ProposedRe-
visions of North Carolina'r Search and Seizure Law, 52 N.C.L. REv. 277, 344-48 (1973).
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-251 (1978) deals with entry by force and provides:
An officer may break and enter any premises or vehicle when necessary to the execution
of the warrant if:
(1) The officer has previously announced his identity and purpose as required by
15A-249. . . or
(2) The officer has probable cause to believe that the giving of notice would en-
danger the life or safety of any person.
43. See Dellinger, Subchapter I Law Enforcement and Criminal Investigation, 10 WAKE
FOREST L, REv. 363, 370-73 (1974); Nakell, supra note 41.
44. 35 N.C. App. at 637, 242 S.E.2d at 186-87 (overruling State v. Watson, 19 N.C. App. 160,
198 S.E.2d 185, cert. denied, 284 N.C. 124, 199 S.E.2d 662 (1973) insofar as it is inconsistent with
Brown).
45. See Nakell, supra note 41, at 337-48.
46. Many courts have held that an officer obtaining entry by ruse may not be required to
announce his authority and purpose. See United States v. Beale, 445 F.2d 977, 978 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1026 (1972) (hotel manager knocked on defendant's door and an-
nounced only his presence; officers entered and arrested defendant when he opened the door);
United States v. Syler, 430 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1970) (officer called out "gas man" at defendant's
door and, when defendant came to the door, pushed his way inside); Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d
621, 626 (9th Cir. 1969) (hotel manager announced there was a call for woman sharing room with
defendant, when woman opened door, officers entered and arrested defendant). These cases sug-
gest that in many jurisdictions giving notice of false identity may satisfy the identity requirement.
Any notice, even a false one, is less instrusive than no notice.
47. State v. Brissenden, 23 N.C. App. 730, 209 S.E.2d 539 (1974).
48. State v. Sutton, 34 N.C. App. 371, 238 S.E.2d 305 (1977).
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decisions.
Another problem situation in executing a search warrant may arise
once officers have legally gained entry to the premises described in the
warrant. At this point they occasionally find that the general structure
is divided into several subunits, each under the control of someone
other than the owner. In this situation the general rule is that the war-
rant is valid to search a subunit only if the subunit is particularly de-
scribed in the warrant.49 The court of appeals in State v. Woodard5"
for the first time established the exceptions to the general rule that
should be recognized by North Carolina courts.
In Woodard, officers obtained a general warrant to search for sto-
len clothing in a residence owned by defendant's uncle, and in which
defendant rented a room. Prior to conducting the search, the officers
read the warrant to the owner and gave him a copy. The officers then
proceeded to search the house, including the bedroom in which defend-
ant was asleep on a bed. The police found new clothes in the closet,
seized them, and handed defendant's uncle an inventory of the items
seized. Defendant shared the room with the owner's son, and both de-
fendant and the son used the closet in which the stolen clothes were
found. The police were never notified during the search that defendant
rented the room or that the room was not under the owner's control. 5'
Defendant sought to suppress the evidence of the seized clothes at
trial on the ground that his room was a subunit of the residence and not
particularly described in the search warrant. The trial court denied the
motion to suppress. Affirming, the court of appeals held that two ex-
ceptions to the rule that a warrant must particularly describe a subunit
were applicable in this case.52 The first applies when the premises
searched are not under the exclusive control of the person against
whom the seized evidence is sought to be admitted; the second is appli-
cable when the officers do not know or have reason to know the de-
fendant has exclusive control over the subunit.53
One question left unanswered by the Woodard court is the precise
definition of exclusive control. It is clear that when two people have
equal rights to use or occupy the premises, either may consent to a
49. State v. Mills, 246 N.C. 237, 98 S.E.2d 329 (1957).
50. 35 N.C. App. 605, 242 S.E.2d 201 (1978).
51. Id at 605-07, 242 S.E.2d at 202-03.
52. Id at 610, 242 S.E.2d at 204-05.
53. Id There is a split of authority on the issue. See Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 1330 (1967).
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search of the premises.54 It is unclear to what degree one person must
have a greater right to use or occupy the premises before exclusive con-
trol is said to exist. The Woodard court indicated only that exclusive
control exists when both persons with an interest in the property recog-
nize that one of them has exclusive control.55
The result of the court's holding is that in any situation in which
the officers are ignorant of the character of possession of the premises,
they may undertake the search without fearing that a warrant particu-
larly describing the premises should be obtained. The court did not
delineate the circumstances that would cause it to impose an affirma-
tive duty on the officer to investigate the character of possession of the
premises. Unless such a duty is imposed whenever control over the
premises is uncertain, officers will be encouraged to prevent any oppor-
tunity for learning the character of possession from arising.56 This re-
sult seems inconsistent with the policy in search and seizure cases to
give "priority to the rights of the tenant in possession." 57
Another court of appeals case, State v. Long,58 dealt with the ex-
tent to which an officer executing a valid search warrant may search
persons who are found on the premises but are not described in the
warrant. In Long, officers were issued a warrant authorizing the search
of a residence, the sergeant and his wife who lived there, and any other
military personnel present on the premises.5 9 When officers entered to
conduct the search they discovered defendant, a civilian, on the prem-
ises. Before the search began a limited pat down search was made of
everyone present, including defendant. In searching defendant, the of-
ficer not only patted defendant's clothing, he also reached inside de-
54. State v. Melvin, 32 N.C. App. 772, 233 S.E.2d 636 (1977).
55. 35 N.C. App. at 608, 242 S.E.2d at 204. This is the basis on which the court distinguished
State v. Mills, 246 N.C. 237, 98 S.E.2d 329 (1957). In Mills, defendant leased a room from the
owner of the premises. Defendant shared possession of the room with several others. The court
found that lessor and defendant agreed that defendant controlled the premises, thus exclusive
control was found.
56. See Brief for Appellant, State v. Woodard, 35 N.C. App. 605, 242 S.E.2d 201 (1978).
57. In re Dwelling of Properties, Inc., 24 N.C. App. 17, 22, 210 S.E.2d 73, 76 (1974).
58. 37 N.C. App. 662, 246 S.E.2d 846, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 736, 248 S.E.2d 866 (1978).
59. The warrant in this case was an "Authority to Search and Seize" issued by a command-
ing officer of a military base. Id at 664, 246 S.E.2d at 848. Defendant challenged the validity of
this warrant as not being issued by a neutral magistrate and not being issued upon a written
affirmation as required in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-244 (1978). The court found that commanding
officers qualify as neutral magistrates for the purpose of determining probable cause. See United
States v. Banks, 539 F.2d 14 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976). In addition, when the
search is made of property in the possession or control of a person under the command of the
issuing officer, as the sergeant in this case was, the warrant is valid although based on oral applica-
tion. 37 N.C. App. at 667, 246 S.E.2d at 850. The remainder of the opinion proceeded on the
finding that the warrant was valid.
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fendant's boot to the foot. While reaching in the boot the officer felt a
sharp pointed object which he thought was a knife. He pulled the ob-
ject out and discovered it was a plastic bag containing a needle, packets
of heroin, and other drug related objects. No further search of defend-
ant was made, and he was turned over to county law enforcement of-
ficers and convicted of possession with intent to sell.6"
Defendant contended that the heroin should have been suppressed
due to its seizure in violation of G.S. 15A-255 61 and G.S. 15A-256. 62
G.S. 15A-255 provides that an officer executing a search warrant may
search for weapons by a patting of the clothing of those on the prem-
ises, if he has reason to believe that the safety of any person is in dan-
ger.63 If a search of the premises and persons described in the warrant
fails to produce the evidence sought, G.S. 15A-256 permits an officer to
then search any person who was present at the time of his entry to the
extent necessary to uncover the evidence.6' Neither of these statutes
authorized the search of defendant's boot in Long. G.S. 15A-255 ex-
pressly limits a weapons search to an external pat down of the clothing.
G.S. 15A-256 did not apply because defendant was searched before the
search of the premises. The court found, however, that exclusion of the
evidence was not required because neither of the statutory violations
was "substantial" within the meaning of G.S. 15A-974(2), 65 which pro-
vides that evidence must be excluded if obtained in violation of the
60. 37 N.C. App. at 663-65, 246 S.E.2d at 848-49.
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-255 (1978).
62. Id § 15A-256.
63. Id § 15A-255 provides:
An officer executing a warrant directing a search of premises... may, if the officer
reasonably believes that his safety or the safety of others then present so requires, search
for any dangerous weapons by an external patting of the clothing of those present. If in
the course of such a frisk he feels an object which he reasonably believes to be a danger-
ous weapon, he may take possession of the object.
64. Id § 15A-256 provides:
An officer executing a warrant directing a search of premises ... may detain any
person present for such time as is reasonably necessary to execute the warrant. If the
search of such premises. . . and of any persons designated as objects of the search in the
warrant fails to produce the items named in the warrant, the officer may then search any
person present at the time of the officer's entry to the extent reasonably necessary to find
property particularly described in the warrant which may be concealed upon the person
The North Carolina statute is unusual in its limits on the search of persons on the premises.
The majority view is that if the search is based on probable cause to search the premises for a type
of contraband easily hidden, then complete searches of all individuals on the premises would be
authorized. See, e.g., Samuel v. State, 222 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1969); Willis v. State, 122 Ga. App. 455,
177 S.E.2d 487 (1970); State v. Loudermilk, 208 Kan. 893, 494 P.2d 1174 (1972). See also United
States v. Johnson, 475 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-974(2) (1978).
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United States or North Carolina constitutions or in substantial viola-
tion of the Criminal Procedure Act.66
To determine whether the search violated the United States Con-
stitution, the court turned to the United States Supreme Court decision
in Terry v. Ohio.6 7 In Terry, the Court outlined the "stop and frisk"
doctrine, stating that an officer who stops a person for questioning is
permitted to frisk that person to the extent necessary to discover weap-
ons, provided the officer has reason to believe the person is armed and
dangerous.68 The Terry rule is, therefore, not limited to a patting of
clothing. The court in Long found that the search inside defendant's
boot was necessary to discover weapons hidden there, and was there-
fore reasonable under Terry and the fourth amendment.6 9 Even
though the Terry decision dealt only with stop and frisk procedures
that by their nature create an exigent situation for an officer, the court
in Long saw no difficulty in applying the Terry holding to a search
pursuant to a warrant in which several officers were present. Thus, be-
cause the search was in compliance with the fourth amendment, and
not in substantial violation of the Criminal Procedure Act, the court set
aside the lower court's order suppressing the fruits of the search.70
B. Limits to an Accused's Miranda Rights
In two cases North Carolina courts further defined the limits of an
accused's rights established by the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in Miranda v. Arizona.71 The protections of the Miranda opinion
apply only when an accused is in custody and being interrogated. 72
The brief definition of custodial interrogation found in Miranda left
much room for judicial interpretation.73 One question left unanswered
was the extent to which a law enforcement officer's nonverbal conduct
can be defined as interrogation for purposes of the Miranda doctrine.
66. See Id
67. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (frisk of defendant reasonable under fourth amendment because officer
had reason to suspect defendant was armed and nothing in his initial encounter with defendant
dispelled this suspicion).
68. 37 N.C. App. at 670, 246 S.E.2d at 852. The court appears to be authorizing any search
that would constitute a permissible "frisk" under the holding in Terry, thus indicating that § 15A-
255 will also be expanded in other situations.
69. See 37 N.C. App. at 669, 246 $.E.2d at 851.
70. 37 N.C. App. at 671, 246 S.E.2d at 852.
71. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
72. See id at 445.
73. The Miranda opinion states: "By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way." Id at 444.
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This was the question presented to the North Carolina Supreme Court
in State v. McLean.74
In McLean, officers had obtained a warrant for defendant's arrest
on a charge of rape. They had recovered a checkbook with defendant's
name on it, defendant's driver's license, and a hat from the scene of the
rape. The officers found defendant in jail, under arrest for an unrelated
offense.75 Defendant was ushered into an interrogation room at the jail
with an officer who had the warrant for defendant's arrest in his pocket.
Instead of arresting defendant at that time, the officer placed one of the
checks found at the rape scene in plain view of defendant. The officer
said nothing. Defendant eventually took hold of the check and admit-
ted it belonged to him.76 The officer, still without speaking, placed the
hat found at the rape scene into defendant's view. Defendant began to
act nervous, his hand quivered, and eventually he stated "What's that
man?" and "I liked to have been a free man."77 During the approxi-
mately twenty minute episode the officer observed defendant but said
nothing. Only after defendant's incriminating statements did the of-
ficer read the arrest warrant, arrest defendant, and advise him of his
rights as required by Miranda.78
At trial, defendant sought to bar any testimony relating to his
statements or actions during the silent confrontation with the officer, on
the ground that the confrontation was an in-custody interrogation and
defendant had not been advised of his constitutional rights, in violation
of Miranda. The trial court denied the motion, finding that defendant's
statements were voluntary and not in response to in-custody
interrogation.79
The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, finding that because
the officer's behavior was not inquisitional in nature, defendant's state-
ments were voluntary and not elicited by interrogation. In reaching its
holding the court noted the considerable disagreement among jurisdic-
tions about what constitutes interrogation. 0 In view of this controversy
74. 294 N.C. 623, 242 S.E.2d 814 (1978).
75. The unrelated offense was tampering with an automobile. The prosecutor brought out in
the cross-examination that defendant was trying to get into a car occupied by a female not known
to the defendant. The court upheld the introduction of this evidence for impeachment purposes.
Id at 633-34, 242 S.E.2d at 820-21.
76. Id at 626, 242 S.E.2d at 816. Defendant said "This is my check. I wrote this check when
I did not know how to write checks. However, the check is good." Id
77. Id at 626, 242 S.E.2d at 816-17.
78. Id at 626-27, 242 S.E.2d at 816-17. See also Defendant Appellant's Brief at 6.
79. 294 N.C. at 627, 242 S.E.2d at 817.
80. Cases in other jurisdictions that allow officers wide leeway before an interrogation is
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the court refused to delineate a strict definition of interrogation, but
rather decided to leave the issue to case-by-case analysis.,' The factors
the court indicated it will consider include the degree to which the of-
ficer's conduct is inquisitional in nature, the degree to which the ac-
cused is placed under a compulsion to speak, the degree to which the
accused is deprived of his freedom, and the totality of the circum-
stances.8 2 After consideration of these factors, the court held that the
confrontation in McLean was not an interrogation.
In adopting the case-by-case approach the supreme court appears
to destine law enforcement officers to a position of uncertainty in con-
fronting accused persons. Considering the egregious fact situation in
McLean, however, it is clear that the court will defer to the officer's
judgment in most instances. As pointed out by the dissent, it is difficult
to say under the facts of this case that the officer did not intend the
confrontation to be a tool to elicit information, or that defendant was
not placed under mental compulsion to speak. 3 Further, the court in
McLean assumed without discussion that if the Miranda decision was
inapplicable, defendant's statements were voluntary and thus admissi-
ble.84 Yet the majority of North Carolina courts holding defendants'
statements voluntary, although made before being advised of Miranda
rights, have dealt with situations involving more spontaneity than
found in McLean, such as when the defendant voluntarily confronted
the officer, 5 or was not yet the target of investigation,86 or was con-
fronted with evidence against him before probable cause to arrest was
found include Rosher v. State, 319 So. 2d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (confrontation with
codefendant held not interrogation); Combs v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.2d 82 (Ky. 1969) (officer
may read ballistics report to accused); Howell v. State, 5 Md. App. 337, 247 A.2d 291 (1968)
(reading defendant a statement made by codefendant found acceptable).
Cases that reveal less hesitancy in finding interrogation include Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387 (1977) (officer's declaratory statements to accused, calculated to elicit an emotional response,
held interrogation); Commonwealth v. Mercier, 451 Pa. 211, 302 A.2d 337 (1973) (reading state-
ment by codefendant to defendant held interrogation).
81. 294 N.C. at 629, 242 S.E.2d 818. This is the approach used in United States v. Akin, 435
F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Charles, 371 F. Supp. 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
82. 294 N.C. at 628-30, 242 S.E.2d at 818. These are the factors that appeared to influence
the court's decision.
83. Id at 635-37, 242 S.E.2d at 821-22 (Exum, J., dissenting).
84. Id at 629, 242 S.E.2d at 818.
85. See State v. Bell, 279 N.C. 173, 181 S.E.2d 461 (1971) (defendant voluntarily went to
police headquarters to tell her side of story); State v. Harrelson, 265 N.C. 589, 144 S.E.2d 650
(1965) (defendant telephoned police department to say he was driver in hit-and-run accident).
86. See State v. Pruitt, 286 N.C. 442, 212 S.E.2d 92 (1975) (officer conducting on the scene
investigation of a murder asked defendant some questions; defendant's subsequent answers held
voluntary since defendant was not yet under suspicion); State v. Chappell, 24 N.C. App. 656, 211
S.E.2d 828 (1975) (also dealing with on the scene investigation).
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established.8 7 In no case did the officer have an unexecuted arrest war-
rant in his pocket. 8
The McLean decision is the first in North Carolina to recognize
expressly that conduct, even though nonverbal, may be defined as in-
terrogation although no questions as such were asked.89 This holding
is consistent with recent decisions of the United States Supreme
Court9" and several state courts91 that it is implicit in Miranda that
interrogation consists of more than a question and answer format. The
strength of the McLean court's finding is, however, diminished by the
facts of the case. Clearly the court will be willing to find an interroga-
tion only under the most egregious circumstances. One is left to won-
der how long the officer could have sat in silence before the line into
interrogation would have been crossed. The unfortunate result of the
court's decision is to reward officers for circumventing the Miranda re-
quirements by devising methods to elicit information that fall short of
the definition of interrogation.92
Once a court decides that evidence was obtained in a method pro-
87. See State v. McCloud, 276 N.C. 518, 173 S.E.2d 753 (1970) (confronted defendant with
stolen coins seized from his room; subsequent confession held voluntary); State v. Hines, 266 N.C.
1, 145 S.E.2d 363 (1965) (statement by officer to defendant that others had confessed; defendant's
subsequent confession held voluntary).
88. In a North Carolina Court of Appeals decision this year, State v. Morton, 36 N.C. App.
516, 244 S.E.2d 452 (1978), the court endorsed a liberal view of that degree of voluntariness legally
necessary in a statement made after defendant has been advised of his Miranda rights. During the
investigation of an armed robbery in Morton, officers read defendant his Miranda rights, then
confronted him with three friends who were all crying and begging defendant to confess. Defend-
ant eventually confessed and the court found this confession freely and voluntarily made, without
coercive influence.
89. 294 N.C. at 630, 242 S.E.2d at 818. This finding dispels the notion in a previous court of
appeals decision that an officer's handing defendant a hat, in an attempt to determine ownership,
could not be interrogation because the defendant had not been asked a question. State v. Burton,
22 N.C. App. 559, 207 S.E.2d 344, cert. denied, 286 N.C. 212, 209 S.E.2d 316 (1974). In Burton the
officer handed defendant a cap found at the scene of the crime and defendant accepted it, saying
thank you. Defendant's actions and statements were held admissible.
90. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). In Brewer the officer told defendant to
think about certain statements the officer was going to make. He then made a speech clearly
designed to elicit an emotional response. Although the officer told defendant he should not an-
swer, the Supreme Court held defendant's subsequent statements barred as the result of an inter-
rogation in which defendant had not waived his right to counsel.
91. See State v. Godfrey, 131 N.J. Super. 168, 178, 329 A.2d 75, 80 (1974) (confronting de-
fendant with polygraph test results held interrogation); cases cited note 80 supra.
92. 294 N.C. at 635-37, 242 S.E.2d at 821-22 (Exum, J., dissenting). The trend in North
Carolina courts toward less restriction on law enforcement activity is also evident in cases dealing
with the sufficiency of an accused's waiver of his constitutional rights. An example is State v.
Smith, 294 N.C. 365, 241 S.E.2d 674 (1978), in which the supreme court refused to follow the rule
in other jurisdictions that a defendant in custody who is represented by counsel may not waive his
constitutional rights in counsel's absence. See also State v. Johnson, 35 N.C. App. 729,242 S.E.2d
517, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 263, 245 S.E.2d 779 (1978) (in absence of conflicting evidence, court
may infer waiver of rights from surrounding circumstances).
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hibited by the Miranda decision, the evidence is not necessarily inad-
missible for all purposes, despite dictum in Miranda to the contrary.93
The United States Supreme Court held in Harris v. New York 94 that
Miranda-barred evidence can be introduced for impeachment pur-
poses, provided the evidence satisfies legal standards of trustworthi-
ness.9s The court of appeals in State v. Byrd96 further clarified the
North Carolina position on when the legal standards of trustworthiness
are satisfied.
Defendant in Byrd was told he was suspected of committing incest,
read his Miranda rights, and then subjected to an in-custody interroga-
tion. When officers learned that defendant could not read or write, his
constitutional rights were explained to him and he signed a written
waiver. During the ensuing interrogation defendant made several in-
culpatory statements.97 There was some evidence that an officer
shouted at defendant during the interrogation and made other threat-
ening gestures.98 The trial court found that because defendant had lim-
ited mental capacity he did not fully understand his right to counsel
and had not effectively waived this right. The inculpatory statements
were barred as substantive evidence by the trial court, but admitted for
purposes of impeachment. 99
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the statements did not
meet the legal standards of trustworthiness as mandated by Harris.
The court found that the trustworthiness test is satisfied only when the
93. The Court in Miranda stated:
The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to
incriminate himself in any manner... .[S]tatements merely intended to be exculpatory
by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial. . . .These statements
are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the
full warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement.
384 U.S. at 476-77.
94. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
95. Id at 224. The court stated: "It does not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible
against an accused in the prosecution's case in chief is barred for all purposes, provided of course
that the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards." See generally Howard, State
Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the Day o/the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976); Note, 8
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 276 (1972).
96. 35 N.C. App. 42, 240 S.E.2d 494 (1978).
97. When officers asked defendant if he had committed incest, defendant replied, "I guess
there is no... reason .... I do a lot of things I know is wrong.. :. I reckon I will lose
everything." Id at 44, 240 S.E.2d at 495.
98. Id at 43, 240 S.E.2d at 495.
99. The trial court's finding that defendant's waiver was not effective to waive his rights to
counsel, but did effectively waive his right to remain silent, reflects the lower burden the state must
meet to prove an effective waiver of the right to remain silent. The double standard for proving
waiver was established in State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383, 226 S.E.2d 652 (1976). See Survey of
Developments in North Carolina Law, 1976, 55 N.C.L. Ra-v. 895, 992-98 (1977)..
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statement was voluntarily made with full understanding of the consti-
tutional rights being waived. 00 In Byrd there was conflicting evidence
concerning the voluntariness of defendant's statements, but the trial
court held the statements admissible for impeachment without a spe-
cific determination of their voluntariness. The court of appeals held
that when there is conflicting evidence on voluntariness, a judge is re-
quired to make a specific determination of voluntariness before the evi-
dence may be admitted for impeachment. The court also stated that
even when there is no conflicting evidence on voluntariness, it would
still be the better practice for a judge to make a specific finding on
voluntariness. 10' The case was remanded for such a determination by
the trial judge.
The Byrd decision is significant not only for its definition of trust-
worthiness, but also for its interpretation of prior North Carolina cases.
In State v. Bryant, 2 the North Carolina Supreme Court found a Mi-
randa-barred statement admissible for impeachment purposes without
any discussion of its voluntariness. The court's only mention of the
issue was a reference to defendant's complaint that the trial court had
not specifically found the statements voluntary.0 3 The court's lack of
discussion led to uncertainty about whether any standard of voluntari-
ness need be met before the statement would be admitted. Although
the United States Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari to hear the
Bryant case, two justices dissented from the denial in recognition of the
uncertainty in the Bryant holding." They argued that defendant had
put the question of voluntariness in issue, and by not addressing this
issue the North Carolina court had gone a step beyond the Harris deci-
sion to allow the introduction of illegally obtained statements without
any requirement of voluntariness.0 5
The court in Byrd adopted a restrictive construction of the Bryant
holding, interpreting Bryant as authority for the proposition that when
there is no evidence of involuntariness, then the Miranda-barred state-
ments are deemed voluntary and no specific determination by the trial
100. 35 N.C. App. at 45, 240 S.E.2d at 496.
101. Id at 45-46, 240 S.E.2d at 496. This holding is consistent with implications in Oregon v.
Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
102. 280 N.C. 551, 187 S.E.2d 111, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 995 (1972). The statement in Bryant
was also Miranda-barred due to an ineffective waiver of counsel. Id at 554-55, 187 S.E.2d at 113.
103. Id at 554, 187 S.E.2d at 113.
104. 409 U.S. 995, 996 (1972) (Douglas and Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
105. Id at 996-97.
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judge need be made."0 6 The Byrd court has thus diminished the possi-
ble impact of the Bryant decision and established that the requirement
of voluntariness must be satisfied before a Miranda-barred statement
can be admitted for impeachment purposes.
C. Right to Counsel
In State v. Sanders,17 the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed
a lower court decision 0 s placing on the defendant the burden of raising
again the issue of his indigency when he has been found not to be indi-
gent earlier in the same proceeding. The court held that G.S. 15A-
94219 required the trial judge to inquire newly into the indigency of
defendant when he appeared at arraignment without counsel after try-
ing .twice unsuccessfully to establish his indigency. The court further
held that failure to so inquire entitled defendant to a new trial."10
In Sanders, defendant's first affidavit asserted that he was regu-
larly employed with a weekly salary of $100, owned a car and a house,
and owed $728. His second petition, filed over a month after the first
and over two months before his trial, stated that he had become unem-
ployed, was making payments of $40 per month on his car, and owed
$500 to $600 in monthly payments on his home. After the denial of his
second petition, defendant twice appearedpro se at trials that were de-
clared mistrials for defects in the indictments,"' and then appearedpro
se at the arraignment and trial that resulted in his conviction for re-
ceipt of stolen goods." 2
The result in this case turned on the interpretation given G.S. 15A-
942, which provides: "If the defendant appears at the arraignment
without counsel, the court must inform the defendant of his right to
counsel, must accord the defendant opportunity to exercise that right,
and must take any action necessary to effectuate that right."'' 1 The
106. 35 N.C. App. at 45, 240 S.E.2d at 496.
107. 294 N.C. 337, 240 S.E.2d 788 (1978).
108. 34 N.C. App. 59, 237 S.E.2d 475 (1977), rev'd, 294 N.C. 337, 240 S.E.2d 788 (1978).
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-942 (1978), quotedin text accompanying note 113 infra.
110. 294 N.C. at 343, 240 S.E.2d at 791. The court based its decision on State v. Morris, 275
N.C. 50, 165 S.E.2d 245 (1968). That case involved interpretation of a statute whose requirements
were essentially the same as the statute here in question. 294 N.C. at 345-46, 240 S.E.2d at 792-93.
111. 294 N.C. at 338-39, 240 S.E.2d at 788-89. The first indictment failed to charge defendant
with receipt of stolen goods, the crime for which he was to be tried. The second indictment con-
tained a count of receiving stolen goods, but charged the owner of the goods, and not defendant,
with that crime. Both mistrials were declared on the court's own motion. Id at 339, 240 S.E.2d at
789.
112. Id at 340, 240 S.E.2d at 789.
113. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-942 (1978).
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court of appeals interpreted the statute to mean that, by the time of
arraignment, a defendant must have been informed of his right to ap-
pointed counsel if indigent and must have had an opportunity to exer-
cise that right;1 1 4 the court thus viewed the provision as merely a fail-
safe device to ensure defendant's knowledge of his right. Thus, it deter-
mined that failure to comply with the provision when defendant knew
of and had attempted to exercise his right was not prejudicial error." 5
The supreme court, however, interpreted the statute as placing an
affirmative duty on the trial judge to inquire into the defendant's indi-
gency "irrespective of any request by defendant"11 6 in order to make
defendant aware that he could exercise his rights at that point in the
proceedings. 7 The court noted that the layman defendant has no way
of knowing that the issue of indigency can be redetermined at the time
of his arraignment and that when, as in this case, defendant's applica-
tion for appointed counsel has twice been denied, defendant likely con-
cluded a third application would be useless. 18
The court found that absence of counsel prejudiced defendant in
the presentation of his case because defendant lacked skills and exper-
tise necessary to cross-examine effectively prosecution witnesses, to
make objections, and to use jury argument.1 9 These factors are likely
to appear in every case in which a layman is conducting his own de-
fense, making prejudice almost a foregone conclusion whenever the
trial judge has failed to inform defendant of his right to counsel.
The interpretation given G.S. 15A-942 in Sanders is a sound one
that will serve to ensure compliance with the constitutional require-
ment12 1 that waiver of counsel be knowing and voluntary.12 1 Had the
interpretation of the court of appeals been accepted, the statutory pro-
114. 34 N.C. App. 59, 61-62, 237 S.E.2d 475, 476-77.
115. Id
116. 294 N.C. at 344, 240 S.E.2d at 792.
117. Id
118. Id
119. Id at 346-47, 240 S.E.2d at 793-94. The court rejected the State's contention that failure
to comply with the statute, if error, was harmless because defendant was not indigent at the time
of trial. Id at 344, 240 S.E.2d at 792. The State supported this claim by pointing out that defend-
ant was represented by private counsel on appeal and had been able to post a $300 appeal bond
and a $5,000 appearance bond after his conviction. 34 N.C. App. 59, 62, 237 S.E.2d 475, 476. The
supreme court found these facts to be irrelevant: "That defendant is now represented by counsel
and is out under a premium-paid bond discloses only that a nonindigent has expended money in
defendant's behalf. It is not proof that defendant himself was not indigent [on the date of his
trial]." 294 N.C. at 344, 240 S.E.2d at 792.
120. Arguably, this was the legislative intent in enacting the statute. See State v. Morris, 275
N.C. 50, 56-57, 165 S.E.2d 245, 249 (1968).
121. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-76 (1966).
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vision would have been meaningless and of no protection to indigent
defendants. By its interpretation in Sanders, the court has set out a
clear standard of the extent of the duty of the State to inform defendant
of his right to counsel, which should be simple for trial judges to follow.
D. Effective Assistance of Counsel
In United States v. Evans,22 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit reversed defendant's conviction of bank robbery
and remanded his case for a new trial because of the trial judge's abuse
of discretion in denying a motion for continuance on the ground of late
appointment of counsel. In reviewing the denial of a continuance the
court applied the same criterion it used in United States v. Gaither 2 - --
the actual performance of counsel during trial.' 24 In Evans, defendant
had been found to be ineligible for appointed counsel at arraignment,
but apparently had not been informed of his right to reassert his indi-
gency.' 25 Five days prior to trial, the prosecutor obtained an ex parte
order for increased bail on the ground that defendant was unlikely to
appear because he had not prepared a defense; defendant was then
jailed. The next day, a Friday, defendant executed a second affidavit of
indigency and counsel was immediately appointed. After conferring
with defendant over the weekend, counsel moved for a continuance on
Monday. The motion was denied and the trial began on Tuesday.
Having had insufficient time to prepare the case and interview wit-
nesses, defendant Whitehead's attorney deferred to codefendant's
counsel. Because the position of the defendants was antagonistic, this
deferral proved damaging to Whitehead's defense and resulted in a
failure to provide effective assistance of counsel.' 26 The court of ap-
peals held that because the denial of a continuance resulted in impaired
performance of counsel at trial,127 it constituted an abuse of
discretion.' 28
This standard will not be an easy one for trial judges to apply be-
122. 569 F.2d 209 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 975 (1978).
123. 527 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 952 (1976).
124. Id at 457-58.
125. In addition, defendant was warned by the United States Attorney to retain private coun-
sel or prepare to defend himself. 569 F.2d at 211.
126. Id
127. The court seemed to view the question in terms of whether the result of the denial was to
deprive defendant of effective assistance of counsel. Id.; see United States v. Gaither, 527 F.2d at
457-58.
128. The court recognized that denial of a continuance would not have been an abuse of
discretion had counsel's difficulties at trial been caused by defendant. 569 F.2d at 211.
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cause it will require them to predict or anticipate the effects of a denial
on the performance of defense counsel at trial. Although it is by no
means a clear standard to use in making the decision, it should serve to
impress upon the trial judge the importance and probable effects of his
decision whether to grant a continuance. Should he deny that motion,
the standard of review employed on appeal will be a constitutional one,
that of effective assistance of counsel.129 By adopting this test as the
yardstick for finding an abuse of discretion, the court has reemphasized
that defendants have a right to an adequate time to prepare their
defense.
E. Right to Speedy Trial
In State v. McKoy, 130 the North Carolina Supreme Court, over a
strong dissent, 131 reversed a unanimous court of appeals panel 132 and
held that a wilful delay by the prosecution in bringing a case to trial,
absent any significant prejudice to defendant, was a violation of de-
fendant's right to a speedy trial and required a dismissal of the charges.
Defendant in McKoy was charged with second degree murder in a
shooting death that occurred in October 1974. He was arrested in No-
vember of the same year.133 The grand jury indicted him in February
1975. Trial was initially set for June 2, 1975, but the State was granted
a continuance. Defendant's counsel frequently made oral requests of
the prosecuting attorney between June 1975 and January 1976 for an
early trial date but was told that because defendant was in prison where
he belonged there was no need to try him. On January 22, 1976, de-
fendant moved to dismiss for violation of his right to speedy trial. This
motion was denied, and the trial judge ordered trial calendared by the
May 1976 session.134 The case was delayed for various reasons until
August 9, 1976. At that time, defendant again moved to dismiss, claim-
ing as prejudice the unavailability of a material defense witness. This
129. The test for effectiveness of counsel is whether the performance was within the range of
competence normally expected in criminal trials. MarzuUo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978). The standard was recently applied in a habeas corpus
proceeding brought by a North Carolina prisoner although no constitutional violation was found.
See Fuller v. Luther, 575 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1978).
130. 294 N.C. 134, 240 S.E.2d 383 (1978).
131. Id at 144, 240 S.E.2d at 390 (Moore, J., joined by Sharp, C.J., dissenting).
132. 33 N.C. App. 304, 235 S.E.2d 98 (1977), rev'd, 294 N.C. 134, 240 S.E.2d 383 (1978).
133. Upon his arrest, defendant's parole for a prior conviction of involuntary manslaughter
was revoked and he was returned to Central Prison where he remained until trial. 294 N.C. at
136, 240 S.E.2d at 386.
134. The case was calendared for April 12, 1976, but was not called because of the unavaila-
bility of defense counsel. Id at 137, 240 S.E.2d at 386.
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motion was denied, and defendant was tried and convicted of volun-
tary manslaughter. The court of appeals rejected defendant's claim
that the delay caused the loss of the witness and held that, in the ab-
sence of prejudice, defendant was entitled to no relief.'35
In reaching its decision, the supreme court applied the balancing
test of Barker v. Wingo, 136 which takes into account the following fac-
tors: the length of the delay, the cause of the delay, waiver or demand
of the right by the defendant, and prejudice to the defendant. 3 7 The
court quickly found the twenty-two month delay sufficient to raise a
constitutional issue, 138 and held that the repeated oral requests by de-
fense counsel definitively established lack of waiver. 139
In evaluating the reason for the delay, the court divided the period
into separate parts. It found no unreasonable delay for the periods
prior to June 1975 and after April 1976.1" The ten month intervening
delay was established to be due to the wilfull neglect of the prosecution
in responding to defense counsel's oral demands.'41 The McKoy deci-
sion is surprising because the court reversed the conviction in the face
of its finding that any prejudice to defendant was minimal. The
supreme court agreed with the court of appeals in rejecting defendant's
claim of loss of a witness, stating that had she appeared and testified for
defendant "it is highly improbable that the testimony. . . would have
affected the result." 142 Although the witness loss was the only prejudice
claimed by defendant, it is arguable that other types of prejudice re-
suited. 143 When defendant was arrested for the crime in this case, his
parole from a prior manslaughter conviction was revoked and he was
returned to prison.144 The pending charges resulted in his incarceration
from the time of his arrest to the date of his trial. Furthermore, defend-
ant was prejudiced by the anxiety caused by the unresolved charges.
135. See 33 N.C. App. 304, 235 S.E.2d 98 (1977).
136. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
137. Id at 530.
138. 294 N.C. at 141, 240 S.E.2d at 388.
139. Id at 142, 240 S.E.2d at 389.
140. Id at 141, 240 S.E.2d at 388-89.
141. Id at 141-42, 240 S.E.2d at 389. It is arguable that the court defined wilful neglect as that
which "could have been avoided by reasonable effort." Id
142. 294 N.C. at 143, 240 S.E.2d at 389.
143. The United States Supreme Court has recognized three different types of prejudice, each
to an interest that the speedy trial right protects: (1) pretrial incarceration, (2) anxiety of an ac-
cused over the unresolved charges, and (3) impairment of the defense. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
at 532.
144. Defendant claimed that his parole was revoked because of his arrest but did not offer any
proof to support his contention. See Defendant Appellant's Brief at 2, Brief for the State at 5.
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Even though this prejudice may not be enough, by itself, to require
reversal, its use here to augment the basis of the decision would have
brought McKoy much closer to the long line of North Carolina cases
granting relief only upon a showing of prejudice.1 45
The court did not indicate any belief or possibility that defendant
might have been innocent of the offense charged. On the contrary, the
court doubted that there would have been a different result even had
the absent defense witness appeared. Justice Moore, in dissent, echoed
the sentiments of the court of appeals panel:1 46 "I do not believe suffi-
cient prejudice has been shown to justify the release of this twice-con-
victed killer."' 47 Dismissal of charges in this voluntary manslaughter
case, given defendant's prior manslaughter conviction, is an extreme
remedy.
Because of the court's sole reliance on the wilful neglect of the
prosecution and the extreme nature of the remedy, McKoy is best inter-
preted as a strong reminder to prosecutors of their duty to try defend-
ants within a reasonable time and the possible dire consequences when
that duty is not fulfilled.
148
F. Breathayzer Test Administration
The North Carolina Court of Appeals decided two cases in 1978
that required interpretation of different statutory sections dealing with
administration of the breathalyzer test. Both cases presented problems
of statutory construction and matters of public policy.
In State v. Jordan,149 the court was called upon to give further
definition to the term "arresting officer" contained in G.S. 20-
139.1(b).1 50 The statute prohibits "the arresting officer or officers"'. 51
from administering a breathalyzer test to a person the officer has ar-
rested on suspicion of driving under the influence of intoxicating li-
145. See, e.g., State v. Hill, 287 N.C. 207, 214 S.E.2d 67 (1975); State v. Brown, 282 N.C. 117,
191 S.E.2d 659 (1972).
146. 33 N.C. App. 304, 308-09, 235 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1977). The court of appeals found that the
unavailability of the witness was insufficient prejudice.
147. 294 N.C. at 146, 240 S.E.2d at 391 (dissenting opinion).
148. McKoy could be viewed as an exercise of the court's power of general supervision and
control of proceedings in the lower state courts. The existence of this power was first declared in
State v. Crook, 132 N.C. 1053, 44 S.E. 32 (1903). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has recognized that prosecutorial misconduct may be proper grounds for use of its
general supervisory power. United States v. Neiswender, No. 77-1642 (4th Cir., filed Jan. 9, 1979).
149. 35 N.C. App. 652, 242 S.E.2d 192 (1978).
150. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-139.1(b) (1978).
151. Id
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quor. In Jordan, defendant was arrested for driving under the
influence by Trooper Banks. After taking a breathalyzer test, which
was administered by another officer, defendant secured his release on
bail. Approximately twenty minutes later he was arrested by Officer
Martin on a similar charge. Defendant was taken to the police station
where he took another breathalyzer test. This second test was adminis-
tered by Banks, the officer who had arrested defendant earlier that eve-
ning for driving under the influence.152
Based on the second arrest, defendant was convicted of operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence. Over defendant's objection
that Banks should be considered an "arresting officer" and therefore
prohibited from testifying under G.S. 20-139.1(b), Trooper Banks was
allowed to testify about results of the breathalyzer test he administered.
On appeal defendant argued that, since the purpose of the statute is to
ensure fairness and impartiality in administration of the test, 153 the
strong possibility that Banks had a preconceived notion that the test
would disclose a high alcoholic content was enough to make his admin-
istration of the test illegal and to disqualify him from testifying.'5 4
The court rejected defendant's argument that the policy of the stat-
ute required the exclusion of Banks' testimony. The court stated that
the limitation on the arresting officer's ability to administer the test
grew out of recognition that the judgment of the officer who arrests the
defendant or the judgment of the officer who selects the defendant for
arrest might well be in issue at trial.155 Absent the statutory limitation,
an arresting or selecting officer who also administered the test might
appear to have an interest in the outcome of the test because its out-
come confirms or refutes the soundness of his earlier judgment. Conse-
quently, the court stated that the interest of fairness demands that
arresting or selecting officers be prohibited from administering the test.
Although the court focused on only two possible relationships that an
officer might have to a person who is arrested, it is clear that the court
would disqualify any officer from administering the test who was so
152. 35 N.C. App. at 653, 242 S.E.2d at 193.
153. State v. Stauffer, 266 N.C. 358, 359, 145 S.E.2d 917, 918 (1966) ("The purpose of this
limitation in the statute is to assure that the test will be fairly and impartially made.").
154. 35 N.C. App. at 653, 242 S.E.2d at 193.
155. The peculiar situation of the officer who selected the defendant for arrest arose in State v.
Stauffer, 266 N.C. 358, 145 S.E.2d 917 (1966). In that case the officer who administered the test
was the person who originally observed and stopped the defendant. Another officer, who had
responded to a radio call, made the actual arrest although the first officer remained at the scene of
the arrest to assist. The court held that the first officer's assistance made him an "arresting officer"
within the meaning of the statute.
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causally connected to a particular arrest that his impartiality might be
questioned. 156 In Jordan, however, it was uncontested that Trooper
Banks had absolutely nothing to do with causing defendant's second
arrest. The court held that Banks' earlier arrest and opportunity for
prior observation of the defendant, which may indeed have led to
preconceived notions about what the test would disclose, did not bring
him within the disqualification set out in the language or the policy of
the statute.
In the other case dealing with aspects of North Carolina's
breathalyzer law, Price v. North Carolina Department of Motor Vehi-
cles, 157 the court of appeals considered G.S. 20-16.2(a)(4),' 58 which
states that, upon arrest and a request to submit to a breathalyzer test,
the accused "has the right to call an attorney and select a witness to
view for him the testing procedures; but that the test shall not be
delayed for this purpose for a period in excess of thirty minutes from
the time he is notified of his rights."1 59 The court noted that the statute
is ambiguous because it is not clear to which of the two rights contained
in the first clause the limitation in the second clause applies. 6
In Price, petitioner was arrested for driving under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, taken to the police station and requested to submit
to the breathalyzer test. Petitioner telephoned his attorney twice and
156. The court's conclusion that the statute was enacted to prevent test administration only by
officers who were in some way causally connected with the arrest is supported by prior case law.
In State v. Dail, 25 N.C. App. 552, 214 S.E.2d 219 (1975), the court rejected defendant's claim that
an officer who stopped at the scene after defendant's arrest solely to remove defendant's car from
the highway and who later administered the test was an "arresting officer." In State v. Green, 27
N.C. App. 491, 219 S.E.2d 529 (1975), the court held that an officer who had observed defendant
in an inebriated state 40 minutes prior to the time he administered the test to him was not an
"arresting officer." In State v. Stauffer, 266 N.C. 358, 145 S.E.2d 917 (1966), however, the court's
finding that the officer who administered the test was at the scene of the arrest for the purpose of
assisting in the arrest was crucial to its determination that the officer was an "arresting officer." In
Dail and Green, the officers were not involved in making the arrest, although they had some
contact with defendant prior to test administration; in Stauffer, the officer who administered the
test was the person who actually initiated the arrest procedure.
157. 36 N.C. App. 698, 245 S.E.2d 518, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 551, 248 S.E.2d 728 (1978).
158. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2(a)(4) (1978).
159. Id (emphasis added).
160. 36 N.C. App. at 701, 245 S.E.2d at 520. The court stated that the statute could be inter-
preted any of three ways: 1) that the legislature used the wrong language and really meant to say
"these purposes"; 2) that the singular phrase "this purpose" was intended to apply to the right to
call an attorney; or 3) that the phrase "this purpose" refers to the right to select a witness. Id at
701-02, 245 S.E.2d at 520-21.
This is the first case in which the ambiguity has been at issue. North Carolina courts have
never defined which right the second clause limits. The courts, however, have generally assumed
that the limitation applies either to the right to "select a witness" or to both rights. See State v.
Buckner, 34 N.C. App. 447, 238 S.E.2d 635 (1977).
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refused to take the test until his attorney arrived at the station. After
his attorney arrived, and forty-one minutes after being requested to
submit to the test, petitioner indicated his willingness to take the test.
The test operator, however, refused to administer it because of the de-
lay. The Division of Motor Vehicles subsequently revoked petitioner's
operators license because of his refusal to submit to administration of
the test within thirty minutes after being requested to do so.' 6' Peti-
tioner challenged the finding that he violated the statute and claimed
that his driving privilege was improperly revoked. The court of ap-
peals affirmed the revocation order.
Petitioner advanced two major arguments for the proposition that
he did not violate G.S. 20-16.2.162 Both depended upon a rather
strained interpretation of the statute. 63 He first argued that the limit-
ing phrase "this purpose" in the statute refers to the right to "call an
attorney" and not to the right to "select a witness." Thus, petitioner
asserted that the statute allows a person only thirty minutes to call an
attorney, but that one has an undefined amount of reasonable time (in
this case at least forty-one minutes) to select a witness and secure his
attendance. Petitioner argued that his refusal to take the test before his
attorney arrived was not a violation of the statute because he was sim-
ply exercising his right to a reasonable time to secure a witness.' 64
In his second argument petitioner asserted a right to a reasonable
time to communicate inperson with counsel before being forced to take
the test. Petitioner claimed that, because the statute contains an arbi-
trary thirty minute time limit on the right to call an attorney, the statute
conflicted with and impermissibly restricted his rights under G.S. 15A-
501(5), 165 which provides that a person, upon arrest, has a "reasonable
time" to "communicate with counsel." Petitioner argued that this lan-
161. On the day of his arrest, February 28, 1976, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge of
operating a motor vehicle on the highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The
Division of Motor Vehicles, acting under the authority of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2 (1978), re-
voked his driving privilege on March 21, 1976. The revocation order was affirmed by the superior
court on March 24, 1977.
162. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 20-16.2 (1978).
163. Petitioner also advanced constitutional arguments that were apparently based on the the-
ory that he was entitled to a sixth amendment right to presence of counsel at the administration of
the breathalyzer test. Citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), State v. Syker, 285
N.C. 202, 203 S.E.2d 849 (1974), and decisions from other states, the court summarily rejected
these constitutional arguments. The court stated that "there is no right to the presence of counsel
at the administration of breathalyzer tests or other similar tests." 36 N.C. App. at 703, 245 S.E.2d
at 522.
164. 36 N.C. App. at 701, 245 S.E.2d at 520.
165. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-501(5) (1978).
1032 [Vol. 57
1979] CRIMINA4L PROCED URE 1033
guage in G.S. 15A-501(5) overrode the limitation in G.S. 20-16.2 and
protected his right to refuse to take the test until he had a reasonable
time to communicate in person with counsel. 166
The court acknowledged the ambiguity in G.S. 20-16.2 and the
potential conflict between that statute and G.S. 15A-501(5), 67 but dis-
agreed with petitioner's interpretation of G.S. 20-16.2. The court ex-
amined G.S. 20-16.2 in light of public policy and according to
traditional rules governing statutory construction, and concluded that
the thirty minute limitation referred only to the right to select a witness
and secure his attendance at the test administration and not to the right
to call an attorney. 168 Petitioner, who desired his lawyer to function as
a witness, thus violated the statute when he attempted to delay the ad-
ministration of the test longer than thirty minutes in exercise of his
right to select a witness.
The court's interpretation of G.S. 20-16.2 eliminated any possible
conflict between that statute and G.S. 15A-501(5). Because the thirty
minute time limitation applies only to the right to secure a witness, the
court held that the "reasonable time" time limitation contained in G.S.
15A-501(5) applies to the right to call an attorney in G.S. 20-16.2. Be-
cause petitioner was allowed to contact his lawyer on the telephone, the
court held that he was afforded reasonable time to communicate with
counsel and that his right to call an attorney was satisfied. The court
rejected petitioner's argument that G.S. 15A-501(5) gave him a right to
communicate with counsel in person before the test could be
administered. 69
Because petitioner in Price did communicate with counsel, the
court left open the question of what is a reasonable time for calling an
attorney when the accused is seeking to delay administration of the
166. 36 N.C. App. at 701, 245 S.E.2d at 520.
167. Id
168. The court applied the following rules of statutory construction: 1) a statute imposing a
penalty must be strictly construed; and 2) statutes in pari materia should be construed together.
Strict construction of the statute would apply the singular phrase "this purpose" to the phrase
closest to it, the right to "select a witness." Interpreting the statute so that the limitation would
apply only to the second right would harmonize statutes inpari materia because the time limita-
tion contained in § 15A-501(5), the statute that guarantees the right to communicate with counsel
generally, would then apply to the first right to "call an attorney." Id at 702, 245 S.E.2d at 521.
The court insisted that its interpretation of the statute was supported by "common sense and
sound public policy." Id at 703, 245 S.E.2d at 521. The court stated that exercise of the right to
call an attorney generally requires only a few minutes so that there is no great need for a time
limitation on this right. A time limitation on the right to select a witness and secure his attendance
was necessary, however, because exercise of this right might entail a lengthy delay that could
render the test ineffective.
169. Id at 704, 245 S.E.2d at 522.
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breathalyzer test. Given the need for relatively quick administration of
the test and recognizing that calling an attorney generally takes only a
few minutes, it would seem that very special circumstances would be
required before a period of thirty minutes would be deemed
unreasonable.
In both Jordan and Price the court rejected expansive interpreta-
tions of rights guaranteed by statute to persons to whom the
breathalyzer test is administered. Although neither case presented a
very convincing argument for extending protection, it is clear that the
court's refusal to expand protections was influenced by the public pol-
icy considerations in favor of quick and efficient administration of the
breathalyzer test.
G. Arraignment Rights
In State v. Davis,170 the North Carolina Court of Appeals inter-
preted G.S. 15A-943(b), 17' a provision of the Speedy Trial Act giving
the defendant the right not to be tried within one week of his arraign-
ment. In Davis, defendant's trial on drug charges began on the same
day as his arraignment. Before trial, defendants1 72 moved for a contin-
uance on the ground of inability to locate an essential defense witness.
This motion was denied. Defendant did not enter a general objection,
nor did he specifically assert his right under the statute. The court held
that failure to assert this right resulted in waiver.
The court's decision in Davis was foreshadowed by the North Car-
olina Supreme Court's decision in State v. Shook.173 In that case, the
court held that the provision gave defendant a statutory right not to be
tried in the week of his arraignment and noted that, like other such
rights, it could be waived. Under North Carolina law, a defendant is
deemed to waive the benefit of a statutory right by "express consent,
failure to assert it in apt time, or by conduct inconsistent with a purpose
to insist upon it."'1 74 The court of appeals followed this line of reason-
170. 38 N.C. App. 672, 248 S.E.2d 883 (1978).
171. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-943(b) (1978). The statute provides: "When a defendant pleads
not guilty at an arraignment required by subsection (a), he may not be tried without his consent in
the week in which he is arraigned." Id § 15A-943(a) provides for scheduling of arraignments in
counties where there are 20 or more weeks of trial sessions scheduled for criminal cases in the
superior court.
172. Davis' trial was consolidated with that of a codefendant who had been arraigned over
two months earlier. Thus, only Davis' statutory right was in question.
173. 293 N.C. 315, 237 S.E.2d 843 (1977).
174. State v. Gaiten, 277 N.C. 236, 239, 176 S.E.2d 778, 781 (1970); see State v. Young, 291
N.C. 562, 567, 231 S.E.2d 577, 580 (1977).
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ing, focusing on the statutory nature of the right, and held that failure
to object specifically on the ground of this provision resulted in waiver.
In finding a waiver in Davis, the court ignored the language of
G.S. 15A-943(b). The statute provides that a defendant may not be
denied his right "without his consent."' 75 Thus, the question should
have been what constitutes "consent." The word should have been in-
terpreted in light of the legislative purpose of the statute, which is to
ensure the State and the defendant an adequate time to prepare for
trial. 176 It would therefore be reasonable to conclude that any motion
for continuance relating to time needed to prepare for trial would be
sufficient to manifest nonconsent or nonwaiver. This conclusion is but-
tressed by the supreme court's holding in Shook that the statute is not
merely directory, because it "'promotes justice'" and "'affects the
public interest.' "I" In order for the statute to achieve its purpose, an
interpretation of consent much narrower and more specific than that
given by the court in Davis is required.
H. Amendment of Indictments
G.S. 15A-923(e)"'7 states that "[a] bill of indictment may not be
amended."' 179 In State v. Carrington,18 ° the North Carolina Court of
Appeals, for the first time, defined the word "amendment" as used in
G.S. 15A-923(e) to mean "any change in the indictment which would
substantially alter the charge set forth in the indictment."'' Thus, the
court, in effect, rewrote the statute to permit amendment of indictments
when the amendment does not substantially alter the original charge.
This interpretation appears to be an attempt to harmonize the statute
with prior, more liberal North Carolina case law on this subject.
In Carrington, defendant was indicted on the charges of accessory
after the fact to a murder and armed robbery committed by an alleged
codefendant and "one (other) black male, name unknown."18 2 The co-
175. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-943(b) (1978) (emphasis added).
176. State v. Shook, 293 N.C. at 318, 237 S.E.2d at 846.
177. Id at 319, 237 S.E.2d at 846 (quoting Davis v. Board of Educ., 186 N.C. 227, 231, 119
S.E. 372, 374 (1923)).
178. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-923(e) (1978).
179. Id
180. 35 N.C. App. 53, 240 S.E.2d 475, cert. denied, 294 N.C. 737, 244 S.E.2d 155 (1978).
181. Id at 57, 240 S.E.2d at 478.
182. Id Two indictments were returned: one charging accessory to murder and the other
charging accessory to armed robbery. Part of the indictment charging defendant with accessory
after the fact of murder read:
The jurors for the State upon their oath present that on or about the 19th day of Febru-
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defendant was acquitted on all charges prior to defendant's trial. At
defendant's trial his motion to dismiss the indictments on the ground
that they charged him with being an accessory to crimes committed by
a person who had been acquitted was denied. Instead, the court
amended the indictments to excise mention of the alleged codefendant
and proceeded to trial on the balance of the indictments, which charged
defendant with accessory after the fact to crimes committed by an un-
known male. Defendant was found guilty at trial and argued on appeal
that the court's action in amending the indictments was error under
G.S. 15A-923(e). t8 3 The court of appeals rejected defendant's argu-
ment because it found, under its new definition, that the amendments
did not substantially alter the charges set forth in the indictment. 184
The strictest common law rule prohibited the making of any
amendment to an indictment. Some courts held, however, that amend-
ment of an indictment was permissible with the consent of the grand
jury that presented it.'" 5 In North Carolina, the approach that permit-
ted amendment only with grand jury consent seems to have been fol-
lowed in only one early case. 18 6 Despite references to this rule in some
early twentieth century cases, 187 the modem rule that emerged in North
Carolina held that courts had the power to amend indictments as to
ary, 1976, in Durham County Obie Carrington, Jr. unlawfully and wilfully did feloni-
ously give aid and assistance to (Arthur Junior Parrish and) one (other) black male,
name unknown, who had unlawfully, wilfully, and feloniously killed and murdered Otis
Jackson Rigsbee, Jr . . . At the time of the giving of aid and assistance, the defendant
knew that (Arthur Junior Parrish and) the aforesaid (other) black male, name unknown,
had committed the felony of Murder ....
Id
183. Defendant argued that the amendments violated his due process rights on three separate
but related grounds: 1) that any amendment was error under § 15A-923(e); 2) that the amend-
ments that were made improperly expanded the charges against him; and 3) that the indictments,
as amended, were not specific enough to allow him to plead any conviction in bar of future prose-
cutions. Id at 57-58, 240 S.E.2d at 478. The court rejected defendant's third argument because it
found, upon examination of the indictments, that the offenses charged were clear and that a con-
viction would bar future prosecutions. Defendant's second argument was rejected because the
court held that the amendments did not expand the charge and, in fact, made the State's case
harder to prove. The court's treatment of the first argument is discussed in the text. The court did
not consider whether the solution it adopted raised any due process objections.
184. The amendments did not alter in any way the offenses that were charged; as the court
pointed out, the State was still required to prove all the elements of the offenses originally
charged.
185. See 41 AM. JUR. 2d Indictments and Informations §§ 172, 174 (1968); 42 C.J.S. Indict-
ments and Informations § 230 (1944).
186. State v. Sexton, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 184 (1824).
187. See State v. Dowd, 201 N.C. 714, 161 S.E. 205 (1931); State v. Corpening, 191 N.C. 751,
133 S.E. 14 (1926). In these cases no amendment was made at trial so the court did not have to
pass on the point; the references were made in dictum.
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matters of form but not as to matters of substance.18 8 While North
Carolina courts have not given precise definitions of what constitutes
form or substance,18 9 the courts have indicated that amendments that
change the nature or degree' 90 or supply a material element of the of-
fense charged,' 91 or amendments that prejudice the defendant's ability
to conduct his defense, 192 would be considered inappropriate amend-
ments of substance. Amendments to form have generally involved
changes in matters such as the date of an offense that do not have any
substantive effect.193 Despite this definitional problem, the form-sub-
stance approach has clearly prevailed in North Carolina courts since at
least 1896.194
The prohibitory language of G.S. 15A-923(e), which became effec-
tive in July 1975, appeared to bring the state of the law in this area to a
strict rule that would have prohibited all amendments even with grand
jury consent.' 95 The Carrington court's refusal to enforce the literal
meaning of the statute sprang, presumably, from an abhorrence of such
a rule and from a desire to maintain the more flexible modem
approach.
In construing the mandatory language of the statute in a fashion
that would permit amendment of indictments, the Carrington court in-
troduced a novel definition of what kind of amendment is permissi-
ble.' 96 The court did not explicitly refer to the traditional form-
188. See State v. Jackson, 280 N.C. 563, 187 S.E.2d 27 (1972); State v. Cody, 119 N.C. 908, 26
S.E. 252 (1896); State v. Teel, 24 N.C. App. 385, 210 S.E.2d 517 (1975); State v. Peele, 16 N.C.
App. 227, 192 S.E.2d 67, cert. denied, 282 N.C. 429, 192 S.E.2d 838 (1972); State v. Haigler, 14
N.C. App. 501, 188 S.E.2d 586, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 625, 190 S.E.2d 468 (1972).
189. For a discussion of the problems caused by this distinction, see 41 AM. JUR. 2d Indict-
ments and Informations § 181 (1968).
190. State v. Teel, 24 N.C. App. 385, 210 S.E.2d 517 (1975) (amendment to indictment disal-
lowed when it changed charge from misdemeanor to felony).
191. State v. Tarlton, 208 N.C. 734, 182 S.E. 481 (1935) (indictment amended to add necessary
element of wilfully failing to support an illegitimate child held impermissible).
192. See State v. Haigler, 14 N.C. App. 501, 188 S.E.2d 586, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 625, 190
S.E.2d 468 (1972), in which the.court mentioned this factor in finding that the amendment was one
of form.
193. See State v. Helms, 26 N.C. App. 601, 216 S.E.2d 494, appeal dismissed, 288 N.C. 354,
218 S.E.2d 407 (1975) (indictment amended to change date of offense); State v. Haigler, 14 N.C.
App. 501, 188 S.E.2d 586, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 625, 190 S.E.2d 468 (1972) (indictment amended
to change description of stolen property from "copper" to "bronze").
194. State v. Cody, 119 N.C. 908, 26 S.E. 252 (1896).
195. This was the strictest common law rule. See text accompanying note 186 supra. Prior to
the enactment of § 15A-923(e), North Carolina had no statute relating to amendment of
indictments.
196. The Carrington court's definition of a permissible amendment, one which does not "sub-
stantially alter the charge," is couched in different language than the prior North Carolina rule,
which permitted amendments only in matters of form rather than substance.
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substance approach. The opinion, therefore, raises the question
whether its use of different language signals a break from the tradi-
tional form-substance approach or whether the new definition is meant
merely to be a restatement of established law. The more logical view is
that the definition presented in Carrington is simply this court's way of
expressing the form-substance approach. 97 Thus, the Carrington deci-
sion appears to establish that North Carolina's traditional approach to
allowing amendment of indictments survives the prohibitory language
of G.S. 15A-923(e).
Z Presentments
In State v. Cole,19 8 the North Carolina Supreme Court was faced
with the problem of defining when a misdemeanor charge is initiated
by presentment for the purpose of deciding whether the superior court
has jurisdiction under G.S. 7A-271(a)(2).' 99 This question was one of
first impression2°° and the court's decision fills a void in the law of
superior court jurisdiction. G.S. 7A-271(a) provides limited exceptions
to North Carolina's general rule that the district court has exclusive
197. The manner in which the court presented the new definition does not indicate that the
court thought that it was departing from established case law. The definition is offered at the
bottom of a paragraph without citations, argument or fanfare. 35 N.C. App. at 58, 240 S.E.2d at
478.
Furthermore, the differences in language do not create a meaningful distinction. Amend-
ments found "substantive," and therefore impermissible under the form-substance approach uni-
versally affected or "substantially altered" the charge. See cases cited notes 190 & 191 supra.
Amendments considered merely matters of form invariably did not affect or "substantially alter"
the charge. See cases cited note 193 supra. Although it is possible to conceive of an amendment
that is one of "substance" but that does not "substantially alter" the charge, it is extremely doubt-
ful that the Carrington court intended to draw such a distinction. If a case should arise in which
such a distinction might prove crucial, it would seem preferable to utilize the traditional form-
substance approach and its established body of case law.
198. 294 N.C. 304, 240 S.E.2d 355 (1978).
199. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-271(a)(2) (1969) provides in pertinent part: "The superior court
has exclusive, original jurisdiction over all criminal actions not assigned to the district court divi-
sion by this article, except that the superior court has jurisdiction to try a misdemeanor. .. (2)
When the charge is initiated by presentment... "'
North Carolina's statutory definition of a presentment is as follows:
A presentment is a written accusation by a grand jury, made on its own motion and filed
with a superior court, charging a person, or two or more persons jointly, with the com-
mission of one or more criminal offenses. A presentment does not institute criminal
proceedings against any person, but the district attorney is obligated to investigate the
factual background of every presentment returned in his district and to submit bills of
indictment to the grand jury dealing with the subject matter of any presentment when it
is appropriate to do so.
Id. § 15A-641(c) (1978).
200. The question had been considered only once before in State v. Wall, 271 N.C. 675, 157
S.E.2d 363 (1967). The facts of that case, however, did not present as difficult a problem as did the
facts in Cole. See note 206 infra.
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original jurisdiction of misdemeanor-grade criminal actions.201 The
statute states that the superior court has original jurisdiction to try a
misdemeanor "[w]hen the charge is initiated by presentment." 20 2
In Cole, the grand jury charged by presentments that defendants
"violated the game laws of the State of North Carolina by taking and
possessing a bear in Tyrrell County during closed season. '2 3 On the
same day, the indictments upon which defendants were tried were re-
turned. They charged that defendants did unlawfully and wilfully
"possess a dead game animal, a bear, which was taken during closed
season in Tyrrell County."' Defendants were tried in superior court
and convicted of the misdemeanor. On appeal defendants argued that
the charges against them were not initiated by presentment and that
their cases did not fall within any of the other statutory exceptions to
the general rule that the district court has exclusive original jurisdiction
over misdemeanors. Defendants maintained that the judgment of the
superior court was therefore void for lack of original jurisdiction.
In the first appeal of the case, the court of appeals held that the
charges were not initiated by presentment and voided the judgments
because the superior court lacked original jurisdiction. 20  The court of
appeals, without guidance from prior case law concerning when a
201. The general rule is found at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-272(a) (1969), which provides: "Ex-
cept as provided in this article, the district court has exclusive, original jurisdiction for the trial of
criminal actions, including municipal ordinance violations, below the grade of felony, and the
same are hereby declared to be petty misdemeanors."
202. Id. § 7A-271(a)(2).
203. 294 N.C. at 305, 240 S.E.2d at 357. The presentments were handed down on April 20,
1976. Defendants had originally been arrested on warrants dated November 16, 1974, which
charged offenses similar to those contained in the presentments. At trial in the district court,
defendants were found guilty of one count and appealed to the superior court on the ground that
the warrant did not charge a crime. The conviction was reversed on this ground on September 15,
1975. On the same day, differently worded warrants that charged the same basic offense were
issued. On December 5, 1975, the new warrants were dismissed in the district court for failure to
state an offense. Although the State was successful in prosecuting an appeal of this order so that
the warrants were resuscitated, the presentment and indictments were returned during the time
period of the appeal and legal action on the indictments apparently took precedence. Id. at 305-
06, 240 S.E.2d at 356-57.
204. Id. at 305-06, 240 S.E.2d at 357.
The indictments upon which defendants were tried charged a violation of N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 113-103 (1978). That statute provides in part that "[t]he possession, transportation, purchase, or
sale of any dead game animals ...during the closed season in North Carolina ... shall be
unlawful." .d. Violation of the statute is a misdemeanor. Id. § 113-109.
Although trial was scheduled in district court, the cases were transferred to superior court on
motion of the State with the consent of the six defendants.
205. 33 N.C. App. 48, 234 S.E.2d 191 (1977), rev'd, 294 N.C. 304, 240 S.E.2d 355 (1978). The
court noted that defendants agreed to the State's motion to transfer the case to superior court but
held that the agreement could not confer jurisdiction on a court that never properly had it. Id. at
51, 234 S.E.2d at 193.
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charge is initiated by presentment, °6 adopted a narrow, formal defini-
tion of the term. First the court examined both instruments and con-
cluded that the offense charged in the presentment was different from
the offense charged in the indictments. 20 7 The court of appeals then
held that, because the actual offenses charged in the instruments were
different, the charges upon which the defendants were tried-those in
the indictments-were not initiated by presentment. ° s
The North Carolina Supreme Court overruled the court of appeals
and held that the superior court did have original jurisdiction because
the charges were initiated by presentment. °9 In so doing, the court
adopted a less formal definition of when a charge is initiated by pre-
sentment. Its approach to the problem proceeded from an analysis of
the role that the presentment has played in the criminal justice system.
The court stated that the presentment is a device by which the grand
jury brings "subject matter"210 to the attention of the district attorney
and is not a formal document that initiates criminal proceedings.
211
206. Although the supreme court had considered this problem in State v. Wall, 271 N.C. 675,
157 S.E.2d 363 (1967), the facts of that case did not fairly raise the real issue discussed in Cole. In
Wall, defendant was arrested on two warrants. Later two indictments, both charging misdemean-
ors, were returned against him. The grand jury never returned a presentment against defendant.
Defendant was originally tried and convicted in superior court and appealed on the ground that
the district court had exclusive original jurisdiction. The court stated that the "initiated by pre-
sentment" exception to the general rule that the district court has exclusive original jurisdiction
over misdemeanors did not apply in Wall because no presentment was ever returned and the cases
were in fact initiated by the warrants.
207. The court of appeals noted that, while the presentment alleged that defendants violated
the law by "taking and possessing a bear. . . during closed season," the indictment charged that
defendants violated the law by "possessing a dead game animal. . . in violation ofG.S. 113-103."
The court stated that the charge in the presentment of "taking and possessing" was not the same as
the charge in the indictment of "possessing a dead game animal," upon which defendants were
tried. 33 N.C. App. 48, 51, 234 S.E.2d 191, 193 (1977).
208. Id.
209. Although the court reversed on this issue, the ultimate holding of the court was in de-
fendant's favor. After disposing of the jurisdiction issue, the court vacated the judgments and
quashed the indictments on the ground that the bills of indictment did not charge a crime. 294
N.C. at 310, 240 S.E.2d at 559. The indictment had alleged a violation of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-
103 (1978), which makes it a misdemeanor to "possess ... any dead game animals ... during
the closed season." Defendants were arrested possessing a bear on a date that is inside North
Carolina's state-wide "open season" on bear. Id. § 113-100. Although chapter 103 of the 1973
Session Laws made it unlawful to "take or hunt bear in the County of Tyrrell" during the time of
the alleged offense, that law did not make mere possession of a dead bear a crime. Law of March
26, 1973, ch. 103, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 83. The court refused to construe the two statutes in
conjunction and held that no actual offense had been charged in the indictments.
210. 294 N.C. at 308, 240 S.E.2d at 358.
211. The court cited both statutory and case law to support its position on the function of the
presentment and stated that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-641(c) (1978), quotedin note 199 supra, sup-
ported its less formal view of the presentment's function. 294 N.C. at 308, 240 S.E.2d at 358.
The court further stated that the statute only codified and clarified the holding of the
landmark case of State v. Thomas, 236 N.C. 454, 73 S.E.2d 283 (1952). That case reviewed the
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The court concluded that because it is not the function of the present-
ment to charge a specific crime or initiate criminal proceedings, a
charge in an indictment could be initiated by presentment even though
the instruments might charge different offenses.2 12 Approaching the
word "initiated" in a common-sense manner, the court stated that the
charges in the indictment were initiated by presentment because the
indictment "dealt with the same factual subject matter"21 3 as the pre-
sentment. It seems then, that the rule adopted by the court in Cole is
that a charge in an indictment is initiated by presentment if the present-
ment addresses the subject matter out of which the charge in the indict-
ment grows.
The supreme court's historical and functional analysis rendered
the court of appeals' approach irrelevant. Because the presentment is
only intended to be a communication from the grand jury to the prose-
cutor, it would be too much to expect the presentment and the eventual
indictment to contain identical charges. The court of appeals' ap-
proach would have rendered the statutory provision granting the supe-
rior court jurisdiction when the charge is initiated by presentment
meaningless for practical purposes. The supreme court's approach bet-
ter accords with the true function of the grand jury presentment.
J Joinder of Offenses
In State v. Greene,214 the North Carolina Supreme Court was
faced with the problem of interpreting G.S. 15A-926(a),215 the section
of the 1973 Criminal Procedure Act that deals with joinder of offenses.
In contrast to its predecessor statute, which permitted joinder of of-
fenses when the offenses charged were "of the same class of crimes or
modes of prosecution and concluded that the presentment is "nothing more than an instruction by
the grand jury to the public prosecuting attorney for framing a bill of indictment for submission to
them." Id. at 458, 73 S.E.2d at 286.
212. The court stated that the presentment in Cole successfully fulfilled the very role it is
assigned to play in our criminal justice system; the grand jury alerted the prosecutor to a problem
via a presentment and the prosecutor later returned to the grand jury an indictment that dealt with
the same factual subject matter. 274 N.C. at 308-09, 240 $.E.2d at 358.
213. Id. at 309, 240 S.E.2d at 358.
214. 294 N.C. 418, 241 S.E.2d 662 (1978).
215. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-926(a) (1978). The statute, which became effective on July 1,
1975, reads:
Two or more offenses may be joined in one pleading or for trial when the offenses,
whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are based on the same act or transaction or
on a series of acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a single
scheme or plan. Each offense must be stated in a separate count as required by G.S.
15A-924.
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offenses, 216 the new statute provides that offenses can be joined only if
they are "based on the same act or transaction or on a series of acts or
transactions connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme
or plan. '217
In Greene, defendant was charged in three separate bills of indict-
ment with assault with intent to commit rape against one victim, and
rape and kidnapping of a second victim. 218 All three charges were con-
solidated for trial over defendant's objection that joinder of the charge
relating to one victim with the charges relating to the other victim vio-
lated G.S. 15A-926(a) and was prejudicial to his defense because it al-
lowed the jury to hear the testimony of both victims.2 19 The jury found
defendant not guilty of the kidnapping charge but returned verdicts of
guilty of assault with intent to commit rape on the other two charges.
On appeal, the supreme court held that the joinder of offenses in
Greene was proper under the statute and nonprejudicial to defendant.
Justice Exum concurred, stating that the offenses were not joinable
under the statute but that the erroneous consolidation was harmless
error.
The majority held that the joinder of offenses in Greene was
proper under G.S. 15A-926(a) because the sexual assaults were "parts
of a single scheme or plan."22 That scheme was defendant's effort
"within a time span of three hours. . . to satisfy his sexual desires on
the afternoon of 3 May 1976.''221 Although the Greene court did not
state a standard by which one can determine whether the G.S. 15A-
926(a) requirement is met, two factors seemed to have been especially
216. Law of March 6, 1917, ch. 168, 1917 N.C. Pub. Laws 319 (formerly codified as amended
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-152) (repealed 1974).
217. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-926(a) (1978).
This is a welcome change. Joinder of unrelated offenses simply because they are of the same
class has been heavily criticized. See ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO JOINDER AND SEVERANCE § 2.2(a), at 29 (1968). Because the
offenses are distinct, the public gain from joinder for trial of unrelated offenses in terms of trial
efficiency is minimal compared to the great possibility of prejudice to defendants in such trials.
218. The State alleged that the first offense occurred around 2:00 p.m. when defendant, posing
as a painter, gained admission to the first victim's apartment and unsuccessfully attempted to rape
her. The second and third offenses occurred later that afternoon when defendant picked up the
second victim, who was hitchhiking on the highway, and drove her to a wooded area and raped
her.
219. 294 N.C. at 420, 241 S.E.2d at 663.
Defendant did not contend that it was error to consolidate the two charges growing out of the
second incident. Defendant apparently argued that joinder of the first charge with the later two
charges was improper because the offenses were not parts of a "single scheme" as required by the
statute, Id. at 421-22, 241 S.E.2d at 664-65.




important to the court in reaching its determination that a single
scheme was present. First, the court stated that, although the new stat-
ute does not allow joinder on the basis that the offenses are of the same
class, "the nature of the offenses is one of the factors which may prop-
erly be considered in determining whether certain acts or transactions
constitute 'parts of a single scheme or plan' as those words are used in
present G.S. 15A-926(a). ' 222 The offenses charged in Greene were ob-
viously of the same class.
Second, case law under the old joinder statute recognized that an
important factor in determining the propriety of joinder was whether
evidence on one charge would be admissible at a separate trial on the
other charge.223 The court stated that in Greene, evidence of the of-
fenses committed against one victim was admissible in the case charg-
ing offenses against the other victim for the purpose of establishing
defendant's identity as the assailant. 2 4 The court also determined that
evidence from one case was admissible in the other for the alternative
purpose of establishing "defendant's intent and plan and design to
commit the crimes, or, in the language of the statute, to show a 'single
scheme or plan.' "225 The court thus intimated that offenses can be
properly joined under G.S. 15A-926(a) if evidence from one case can
properly be used in another case under any of the other crimes excep-
tions to the general rule that prohibits admission of evidence of sepa-
rate and unrelated offenses at trial.2 26 At any rate, it is clear that the
court would find the statutorily required single scheme and thus permit
joinder whenever similar evidence would be admissible in separate
cases under the particular other crimes exceptions that permit introduc-
tion of other offenses to prove intent, plan, or design.227
222. Id. (quoting State v. Greene, 34 N.C. App. 149, 152, 237 S.E.2d 325, 327 (1977), aftd, 294
N.C. 418, 241 S.E.2d 662 (1978)).
223. It was generally held that joinder of offenses was appropriate when "the offenses charged
are of the same class and are so connected in time and place that evidence at trial upon one
indictment would be competent and admissible on the other." State v. Taylor, 289 N.C. 223, 230,
221 S.E.2d 359, 364 (1976). Although it is difficult to determine how much weight the evidence
factor alone has played in favor ofjoinder, it is clear that it has been important.
224. 294 N.C. at 423, 241 S.E.2d at 665.
225. Id.
226. The general rule is that evidence of separate and unrelated offenses, "other crimes," is not
admissible for the purpose of proving the accused's guilt of a crime. Evidence of "other crimes" is
admissible, however, if introduced for other, proper purposes. Some of these proper purposes are
to show knowledge, intent, motive, plan or design, or identity. STANSBURY, supra note 31, §§ 91-
99.
227. The purpose of proving intent and the purpose of proving plan and design are different
and are treated separately by the commentators. See id. § 92; 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 304 (3d
ed. 1940). Evidence that tends to prove plan or design, however, may in some cases show intent.
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Justice Exum stated in his concurrence that the offenses were im-
properly joined in violation of G.S. 15A-926(a) because the two inci-
dents were not part of a single scheme. In his view, a single scheme
permitting joinder of offenses does not exist unless similar evidence
could be admitted in separate cases under the particular other crimes
rule exception that permits introduction of another offense to prove the
defendant'splan or design to commit the crime charged. This standard
is to be distinguished from the standard the majority intimated is ap-
propriate. At the very least, the majority approved joinder when evi-
dence that proves intent, plan, or design could be used in different
cases. The concurrence would approve joinder only when evidence
from one case could be used to prove plan or design in a separate
case-a more rigorous standard than that of the majority. Justice
Exum stated that in order for joinder to be appropriate, defendant's
pattern of conduct must contain more than "'mere similarity [of act],
which suffices for evidencing intent,"' but "'such a concurrence of
common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as
caused by a general plan of which they are the individual manifesta-
tions.' "228 In Greene the differences in the modus operandi employed
by the defendant proved that defendant did not have a single scheme as
that phrase is understood in the other crimes exception. Therefore,
Exum contended, the statutory criteria forjoinder of offenses, the exist-
ence of a single scheme, was not present. Justice Exum declared that
the majority was in effect disregarding and nullifying the new statutory
joinder rule.2 9
On the question of prejudice, the majority first stated the general
rule that joinder of offenses should not be permitted, even if allowed by
statute, if the defendant would suffer unfairly.230 In determining
whether an accused has been prejudiced byjoinder the court stated that
the question to be asked is " 'whether the offenses are so separate in time
andplace and so distinct in circumstances as to render a consolidation
228. 294 N.C. at 424, 241 S.E.2d at 666 (concurring opinion) (quoting 2 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 227).
229. Id. at 425, 241 S.E.2d at 666.
230. Id. at 421, 241 S.E.2d at 664. Because a motion for severance of offenses is addressed to
the discretion of the court, rulings on this matter are not overturned absent abuse of discretion.
State v. Davis, 289 N.C. 500, 508, 223 S.E.2d 296, 301 (1976). North Carolina courts are not prone
to reverse trial court decisions in favor ofjoinder on the ground of unfair prejudice to the defend-
ant. The situation in North Carolina seems to be similar to the national situation in which "appel-
late reversal of a trial court's decision not to grant a severance is extremely rare." ABA PROJECT
ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 217, § 2.2(a), at 30.
1044 [Vol. 57
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
unjust and prejudicial to defendant.' "231 The court determined that
the record did not disclose such prejudice. Its earlier determination
that evidence of one crime would be admissible in a separate trial of
the other offense was undoubtedly an important factor in its conclusion
that defendant suffered no prejudice.
Justice Exum accepted the majority's standard for measuring
prejudice and agreed that defendant in Greene was not unfairly
prejudiced by the joinder. He therefore concluded that the erroneous
consolidation was harmless error because, although evidence of the
other offenses would not have been admissible in separate trials for the
purpose of proving the existence of a plan under the other crimes ex-
ception, evidence of the other offenses would have been admissible in
separate trials for the purposes of proving questions of intent and con-
sent.232 Because the evidence would have been heard in separate trials,
the consolidation did not prejudice defendant.
Greene is the first case in which the courts have closely examined
the problem ofjoinder of offenses under G.S. 15A-926(a).233 The statu-
tory requirement of a "single scheme or plan" seems to imply that join-
der is appropriate only when the series of alleged criminal acts are
connected in some systematic, planned way. Yet offenses may be intro-
duced to prove intent under the other crimes exception that are related
231. 294 N.C. at 423, 241 S.E.2d at 665 (quoting State v. Johnson, 280 N.C. 700, 704, 187
S.E.2d 98, 101 (1972)). This standard was enunciated in State v. white, 256 N.C. 244, 247, 123
S.E.2d 483, 486 (1961).
By statute, the court is required to grant severance of offenses whenever it is necessary for "a
fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
927(b) (1978).
232. 294 N.C. at 425, 241 S.E.2d at 666 (concurring opinion).
233. This question has been focused on in only three cases, none of which set any interpreta-
tive standards. The facts in Greene certainly were the most difficult yet presented for determining
whether joinder of offenses was appropriate.
In State v. Creech, 37 N.C. App. 261, 245 S.E.2d 817, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 554, 248 S.E.2d
731 (1978), charges of rape, kidnapping and crime against nature were consolidated. Evidence
showed that defendant picked up the victim on the highway in his car, took her to a remote area,
and performed oral sex. The court held that joinder was proper under the statute because the
offenses were" 'a series of acts or transactions. . . connected together.'" Id. at 263, 245 S.E.2d at
819 (quoting § 15A-926(a)).
In State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 231 S.E.2d 833 (1977), two burglary charges and two charges
of assault on a law officer with a firearm were consolidated over defendant's objection that joinder
was improper under the statute. Evidence showed that the burglaries occurred within one neigh-
borhood in a two hour time span and that the confrontation with the police took place as defend-
ant was leaving the area. The court stated that the evidence showed a "common plan." Id. at 487-
88, 231 S.E.2d at 839.
In State v. Karbas, 28 N.C. App. 372, 221 S.E.2d 98, cert. denied, 289 N.C. 618, 223 S.E.2d
394 (1976), the court held that consolidation of a manslaughter charge and a driving under the
influence charge, both of which grew out of one automobile accident, was proper under the statute
because the offenses were based on the "same transaction." Id. at 374, 221 S.E.2d at 100.
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to the alleged offense only because of the general similarity of act, and
that are clearly not part of a common purpose or systematic scheme.234
Therefore, a standard that permits joinder of offenses when an offense
could be introduced to prove intent will not ensure that the joined of-
fenses constituted a "single scheme or plan" within the apparent mean-
ing of the statute. The other crimes exception that permits introduction
of other offenses to prove plan and design requires that the offenses
have features so common that they indicate the existence of a specific
pattern or scheme.235 This standard would better ensure that the joined
offenses truly constitute a "single scheme or plan." Justice Exum's ap-
proach thus seems more in keeping with the language of the statute
than the majority's approach.
Adoption of Justice Exum's interpretation of the statutory require-
ment would not, however, as the Greene case vividly illustrates, require
reversals of convictions when joinder was improperly allowed under
that strict standard. Justice Exum concluded that the erroneous consol-
idation in Greene was harmless error because evidence on the issues of
intent and consent would have been admissible in separate trials. It
thus appears that, even under Justice Exum's view, operation of the
harmless error rule may protect consolidations made in violation of the
statute whenever evidence of the joined offenses could have been prop-
erly introduced to prove an issue in a separate trial. If this view
prevails it will render the statutory single scheme requirement mean-
ingless in cases such as Greene, and make it very difficult for criminal
defendants to complain about improper joinder of offenses.
One solution to this problem would be for North Carolina to
adopt Rule 472 of the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure. 36 This
rule generally leaves to the criminal defendant the option to sever the
charges against him if he so desires, notwithstanding that the charged
offenses are related. 37 Another solution would be for the courts to
234. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 227, § 302, at 200. Wigmore states that "the prior doing of
other similar acts . . . the mere repetition of instances, and not their system or scheme" is the
crucial factor in the admissibility of evidence to prove intent. Id.
235. Id. § 304. Although the difference between the requirements for introduction of evidence
to prove intent and plan or design is one of degree rather than kind, the distinction is a real one.
In order to illustrate the distinction Wigmore cites an example in which, in order to prove that A
committed a fraud on B, proof that .4 committed a fraud on C is irrelevant. It would be relevant
only for the purpose of showing intent once the fraud was admitted by .4. If it could be shown,
however, that the fraud on B was one of a class having common features with prior frauds com-
mitted by A, the prior frauds are relevant for the purpose of proving guilt because they illustrate
common scheme or design.
236. See UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 472(a).
237. The only limitation on the defendant's right to sever offenses is the court's power to deter-
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make more frequent use of their inherent power to refuse to join of-
fenses when consolidation would prejudice the defendant.238 When the
Greene court considered this problem, it ignored the statutory standard
for measuring prejudice in this area and utilized a measure for
prejudice that put far too heavy a burden on the defendant. 39 Many
serious problems are created for criminal defendants when offenses are
joined,2' and North Carolina courts should be more responsive to po-
tential joinder problems. The statutory standard for joinder of offenses
that Justice Exum proposed in Greene should be adopted and the in-
herent judicial power to refuse potentially prejudicial joinders should
be readily used when necessary.
K Discovery
The North Carolina Supreme Court decided two appeals based on
the prosecution's failure to comply with discovery motions. In State v.
Jones, 4' the court held that defendant was entitled to a new trial when
the prosecutor had withheld material and exculpatory information in
response to a voluntary discovery request with which he had otherwise
complied. In State v. Stevens,242 the court refused to grant relief, hold-
ing that failure of the prosecution pursuant to defendant's discovery
motion to disclose oral statements made by defendant to police did not
require their exclusion at trial.
In Jones, an arson case, the prosecution, in response to a request
for voluntary discovery, failed to disclose a laboratory report2 43 con-
mine that severance would defeat the ends of justice because of risk of loss of material evidence.
See id.
238. See text accompanying notes 232 & 233 supra.
239. See text accompanying note 233 supra.
240. See generally ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra
note 217; Maguire, Proposed New Federal Rules of CriminalProcedure, 23 ORE. L. REv. 56 (1943);
Note, Joint and Single Trials Under Rules 8 and 14 offhe Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 74
YALE L.J. 553 (1965). It has been observed:
[Ihf you can pile up a number of charges against a man, it is quite often the case that the
jury will convict, where, if they were listening to the evidence on one charge only, they
would find it wholly insufficient as to the degree of proof required.
Maguire, supra, at 58-59.
Joinder of offenses creates a dilemma for the defendant who wishes to testify in his own
behalf regarding some of the joined offenses. In Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir.
1964), the court encountered such a situation and found sufficient prejudice to require a new trial.
In a recent case, State v. Creech, 37 N.C. App. 261, 245 S.E.2d 817, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 554, 248
S.E.2d 731 (1978), the court rejected defendant's argument that he had been prejudiced in this
manner.
241. 296 N.C. 75, 248 S.E.2d 858 (1978).
242. 295 N.C. 21, 243 S.E.2d 771 (1978).
243. The laboratory report indicated that no inflammable accelerants were found in defend-
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taining potentially exculpatory information. 2' The prosecutor had
agreed to comply and had furnished some material in response, but,
apparently through oversight, never informed defendant of the exist-
ence of or information contained in the laboratory report. Defendant
learned of the report only after his conviction and moved for relief on
the ground that material evidence that had been unavailable to him
and that could not with due diligence have been discovered by him at
trial245 was now available. The State contended that defendant had not
exercised due diligence in discovering the evidence because he had not
moved for court-ordered discovery. The court's reasoning in rejecting
this contention was sound. A motion to compel discovery may be
made only after there has been some indication that the party from
whom discovery is sought will not fully comply. 246 In this case, be-
cause the prosecutor had agreed to comply and had partially complied,
defendant had no reason to know the prosecutor had not fully com-
plied and thus had no grounds for seeking court-ordered discovery.
By emphasizing the reasonableness of defendant's actions in light
of the surrounding circumstances, the court's interpretation should pro-
duce equitable and reasonable results and will promote use of volun-
tary discovery. Had the court adopted the State's interpretation,
voluntary discovery in criminal prosecutions would become merely a
token gesture prior to court-compelled discovery, in order that defend-
ants could protect their statutory rights.
In Stevens, the second discovery case decided by the supreme
court, the district attorney replied in answer to a request for discovery
that he had no oral statement of defendant that he intended to offer in
evidence at trial.247 He actually did possess summaries of defendant's
oral statements, but, because they were largely exculpatory, did not in-
ant's outer clothing. 296 N.C at 78-79, 248 S.E.2d at 860. The investigating officer testified that he
had smelled kerosene on defendant when he arrived at the scene. Id. at 76, 248 S.E.2d at 859.
244. The request, in part, was for material discoverable by court order under N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-903(e) (1978). 296 N.C. at 79, 248 S.E.2d at 860. This provision provides for discovery of
"results or reports of physical or mental examinations or of tests, measurements or experiments
made in connection with the case,. . . within the possession, custody, or control of the State, the
existence of which is known or by the exercise of due diligence may become known to the prosecu-
tor," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(e) (1978).
245. This ground is contained in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1415(b)(6) (1978).
246. There must be no response, or a negative or unsatisfactory one. 296 N.C. at 80, 248
S.E.2d at 861; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-902(a) (1978).
247. 295 N.C. at 37, 243 S.E.2d at 781. It appeared that this response was purely voluntary on
the part of the prosecutor since defendant had not requested this information under N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-903(a)(2) (1978). The court found it unnecessary to decide whether the prosecutor's
response obviated the need for such a request. 295 N.C. at 37, 243 S.E.2d at 781.
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tend to use them in his case. At trial, defendant took the stand and
gave testimony that was inconsistent with those prior oral statements.
In rebuttal, the district attorney sought to introduce the oral statements
and defendant objected. The court overruled the objection, but granted
a continuance to allow defense counsel time to examine the
statements.24 8
On appeal, defense counsel argued that his client was prejudiced
because, had counsel known the substance of the oral statements, he
would not have allowed defendant to take the stand.249 The court sum-
marily rejected this contention, saying that the discovery procedures
could not be used to protect perury.2 _0 The remedy employed here, a
continuance, was sufficient to protect against the introduction of sur-
prise evidence.2 5' Of greater importance was the court's discussion of
the meaning of G.S. 15A-903(a)(2), the statute providing for discovery
of defendant's oral statements "which the State intends to offer in evi-
dence at the trial. ' 2 2 Although the court did not seek to define the
limits of intent, it did indicate that subjective intent, or intent to use in
the case in chief was not the proper interpretation, since this would
circumvent the purpose of the statute.2 53 The court, instead, preferred
to advise the prosecution to comply fully with the legislative intent to
permit broad discovery and disclose all material that might be used at
trial. 4 While this case gives no definitive ruling on the meaning of
G.S. 15A-903(a)(2), 255 it does indicate judicial approval of liberal dis-
covery and gives a practical framework within which both defense and
prosecution would be well-advised to work.
L. Identification of Defendant
The North Carolina Court of Appeals in State v. Connall2 56 inter-
preted and applied the test of admissibility for unnecessarily suggestive
pretrial identification procedures recently enunciated by the United
248. 295 N.C. at 36, 243 S.E.2d at 780.
249. Id. at 37, 243 S.E.2d at 781.
250. Id.
25 1. The court stated that the remedy utilized here would have been proper had there been a
motion under N.C. GEM. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(2) (1978). Therefore, it was unnecessary to reach
defendant's contention that the district attorney's reply excused the necessity of making the mo-
tion. 295 N.C. at 37, 243 S.E.2d at 781.
252. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(2) (1978).
253. 295 N.C. at 36-37, 243 S.E.2d at 780-81.
254. Id. at 37, 243 S.E.2d at 781.
255. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(2) (1978).
256. 36 N.C. App. 43, 243 S.E.2d 788 (1978).
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States Supreme Court in Manson v. Brathwaite. I" The Manson test
evaluates reliability of the suggestive pretrial identification according to
the following factors: "'the opportunity of the witness to view the crim-
inal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accu-
racy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty
demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and
the confrontation.' "258 These factors are to be weighed against the
"corrupting effect"' '259 of the suggestive identification.
In Connally, defendant was charged with uttering a forged instru-
ment.26 0 He presented an alibi defense, the essence of which was that
he had not been in Reidsville, the city where the check was uttered, on
the day of the crime.2 6 ' In rebuttal, the State presented Moody, a sales-
clerk, to testify that defendant had been in his store in Reidsville on
that day.262 Defendant made a prior objection to Moody's identifica-
tion testimony and moved for a voir dire hearing to determine its ad-
missibility. 63 The court denied the motion, refusing to hold voir dire,
and Moody identified defendant as having been present in his store on
that day.211 On cross-examination, defendant elicited the details of
Moody's observations of defendant, both in the store and at the pretrial
show-up where he first identified defendant.2 65 The court of appeals
held that failure to hold voir dire was prejudicial error under these cir-
cumstances and remanded for a new trial. 66
In deciding whether the judge's error was prejudicial, the court
appeared to use a two-step analysis, incorporating the Manson test for
admissibility of identification evidence derived from an unnecessarily
suggestive pretrial procedure. The court first sought to determine
whether the pretrial procedure met the Manson standards of reliability.
257. 432 U.S. 98 (1977). In Manson, the suggestiveness of pretrial procedures was already
established; the question was what standard should be applied to determine the resulting identifi-
cation's admissibility.
258. Id. at 114 (quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972)).
259. Id.
260. He was also charged with breaking and entering, larceny, and forgery of the uttered
check. 36 N.C. App. at 44, 243 S.E.2d at 789. The identification issue arose with respect to the
uttering charge only.
261. Id. at 45, 243 S.E.2d at 790.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 48, 243 S.E.2d at 792. A voir dire hearing upon the competency of a witness to
identify the defendant is required any time a defendant makes a timely objection to the testimony
and requests that a voir dire be held. See State v. Waddell, 289 N.C. 19, 220 S.E.2d 293 (1975),
modFed on other grounds, 428 U.S. 904 (1976).
264. 36 N.C. App. at 48, 243 S.E.2d at 792.
265. Id. at 49-50, 243 S.E.2d at 793.
266. Id. at 50-51, 243 S.E.2d at 793.
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Although it is not clear from the opinion,2 6 7 the court apparently made
this inquiry because under the first step of the test, if it finds that the
pretrial procedure was reliable, it then will hold that the failure to con-
duct voir dire was harmless error. By definition, reliable pretrial identi-
fication evidence is not "so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a
very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."268 If the
pretrial procedure is found to be unreliable, then the court will proceed
to decide whether the in-court identification was likely to have been
tainted by the pretrial procedure,269 the test formulated in Simmons v.
United States.270
Under the Connaly facts, the court found that the show-up con-
frontation did not meet the Manson standards of reliability2 71 because
Moody observed defendant for only a few minutes in a crowded store,
had no reason to pay particular attention to defendant, gave no accu-
rate description of him and the show-up occurred two months after the
in-store observation.272 The court did not rule on the admissibility of
Moody's in-court identification,273 but hinted that its admissibility was
doubtful 274 since the standards for determining the admissibility of in-
court identification are similar to those for pretrial confrontations. 275
The decision in Connaly is unlikely to have a significant impact
on the conduct of the trial,276 and may have only a limited effect in the
appellate courts. Without the Connaly test, the identification issue
would be decided under the Simmons test by determining whether
267. The court applied the Manson test without articulating a reason, id. at 49, 243 S.E.2d at
792, but since the pretrial identification evidence was presented by defendant and not the prosecu-
tion, its admissibility was not in issue. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the reliability of
the pretrial identification was used as an indicium of the prejudice, or lack thereof, resulting from
failure to hold voir dire on the admissibility of the in-court identification.
268. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). This is the test for determining
whether the in-court identification is impermissibly tainted by the suggestive pretrial procedure.
269. Id. If the in-court identification is tainted, then failure to hold voir dire is prejudicial
error; if it is not tainted, the error is harmless.
270. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
271. The court stated that the initial observation of defendant did not meet the reliability
standards of Manson, 36 N.C. App. at 50, 243 S.E.2d at 793, but probably intended to refer to the
pretrial procedure since that was the concern of Manson.
272. Id.
273. The court remanded the case for a new trial rather than a voir dire because failure to hold
the hearing had forced defendant to bring before the jury the pretrial identification and the details
of the initial observation. Thus, remand for voir dire would not cure the trial error. Id.
274. Id.
275. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967).
276. The Connally test does not alter the requirements of when a voir dire hearing must be
held, see note 263 supra; it merely formulates a new means to test the effects of the error in failing
to hold voir dire.
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there exists a substantial likelihood that the in-court identification was
tainted by the pretrial procedure. Because the two tests involve weigh-
ing many of the same factors, cases in which the Connaly test is dispos-
itive and the older is not will be rare. Thus, the cases in which the
Connally test will prove to be useful are likely to be few.
M. Jury Argument
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in State v. Walters,27 7 held
that the right to inform the jury of the statutory punishment for the
crimes charged applies to offenses for which there is no mandatory sen-
tence. In Walters, defendant was tried for second degree murder. At
trial, defense counsel requested and was denied permission to read to
the jury the statutory provisions prescribing the punishments for first
and second degree murder2 78 and for voluntary and involuntary man-
slaughter.2 79 Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and
given a fifteen year sentence. The court held that refusal to allow de-
fense counsel to read the provisions relating to second degree murder
and manslaughter was error and that prejudice resulted from the denial
with respect to the manslaughter provisions, entitling defendant to a
new trial.28°
North Carolina courts have recognized the right to read punish-
ment provisions28  in the cases of murder and first degree burglary, 282
both of which offenses carry mandatory punishment provisions. Wal-
ters is the first case to apply the right to an offense without a
mandatory sentence. The manslaughter statute that defendant re-
quested to read provides for a sentence of not less than four months nor
more than twenty years for voluntary manslaughter, and for a fine or
imprisonment in the discretion of the court for involuntary manslaugh-
ter.283 The judge's refusal to allow this statute to be read resulted in
277. 294 N.C. 311, 240 S.E.2d 628 (1978).
278. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
279. Id. § 14-18 (1969).
280. 294 N.C. at 314, 240 S.E.2d at 630.
281. The right is based on N.C. GEM. STAT. § 84-14 (1975), which allows the whole case-law
as well as fact--to be argued to the jury.
282. See, e.g., State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 231 S.E.2d 833 (1977); State v. McMorris, 290 N.C.
286, 225 S.E.2d 553 (1976).
283. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-18 (1969). The manslaughter statute has been modified by case
law to limit sentences for involuntary manslaughter to a maximum of 10 years. State v. Adams,
266 N.C. 406, 146 S.E.2d 505 (1966) (punishment for involuntary manslaughter as provided by
statute held not to be specific); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-2 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The court as-
sumed that the jury may be informed of this case law modification but did not expressly so hold.
294 N.C. at 315, 240 S.E.2d at 631. Because the appeal dealt with the reading of statutory provi-
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prejudice to defendant. 84
The purpose of the right to read sentencing provisions is to impress
upon the jury the seriousness of its duty and to encourage it to give the
decision its full and careful consideration.2 85 The purpose is not to al-
low the jury to reach its verdict on the basis of the punishment for each
possible offense; this consideration should be irrelevant to the jury's
decision.286 In light of the right's intended purpose, it would seem that
the refusal to inform the jury of the punishment for second degree mur-
der would be just as prejudicial as the refusal of the reading of the
manslaughter provision. 87 In Walters, the court stated that the judge's
error had hampered the defense "in shaping his argument to persuade
the jury. . . that defendant should be acquitted on the ground of self-
defense or, at most, convicted of involuntary manslaughter only."288
The court's language does not reflect the presently recognized purpose
of the statute, to impress upon the jury the gravity of its duty. Because
the court recognized that refusal to allow the jury to be informed of the
punishment provisions impairs defendant's jury argument, Walters tac-
itly broadens the purpose of the right and, to some extent, allows de-
fense counsel to use the punishment information to argue the propriety
of certain sentences for the conduct charged.
N. Prisoners' Rights
In Bolding v. Holshouser,28 9 a divided panel290 of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed an earlier dismissal of
a section 1983291 civil rights suit brought by twenty-nine North Caro-
lina prisoners in the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
sions only, the inclusion of case law in the punishment information should not be assumed to have
been definitively established.
284. 294 N.C. at 314, 240 S.E.2d at 630.
285. Id. at 314, 240 S.E.2d at 630; State v. McMorris, 290 N.C. 286, 288, 225 S.E.2d 553, 554
(1976).
286. E.g., State v. Watkins, 283 N.C. 504, 508, 196 S.E.2d 750, 753 (1973); State v. Rhodes, 275
N.C. 584, 588, 169 S.E.2d 846, 848 (1969).
287. The question of prejudice arises only when there is a substantial likelihood that, absent
the error, a different result would have been obtained. The test employed by the court was
whether the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Under the Walters facts, the court found the
evidence of guilt not to be overwhelming. 294 N.C. at 315, 240 S.E.2d at 631.
288. Id.
289. 575 F.2d 461 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 121 (1978).
290. A subsequent poll of the full court failed to get the necessary votes to rehear the case. In
an addendum to the opinion three judges recorded their dissent from the failure to rehear the case
en bane. Id. at 467 (dissenting opinion). Senior Circuit Judge Field also filed an addendum to the
opinion in which he expressed complete accord with the panel dissent. Id. at 471.
291. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
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trict of North Carolina.292 The prisoner petitioners, as individuals and
as representatives of a class composed of all North Carolina prisoners,
sought a declaratory judgment that certain prison conditions violated
their federal and state constitutional rights.293 The suit also prayed for
comprehensive injunctive relief 294 that, if granted, would involve the
federal judiciary in the operation of the entire North Carolina prison
system. The district court granted defendants' motion under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the ground that the complaint set
forth legal conclusions unsupported by adequate factual allegations.
The district court also stated that it would not grant class relief in this
or any similar case because it was unwilling "to take under its control
and management the prison system [of North Carolina]. 295
After a short discussion of the concept of notice pleading embod-
ied in the federal rules,296 the court of appeals held that the majority of
the complaint was improperly dismissed because it did contain "factual
allegations sufficient to state a cognizable claim. 2 9 7 While the court
292. The opinion of the district court is not reported. The 29 plaintiffs were incarcerated in 13
penal institutions in various locations in North Carolina. Defendants were the Governor of North
Carolina and various officials of the North Carolina Department of Corrections.
Because only eight of the plaintiffs were confined in prisons located in the Western District of
North Carolina, defendants moved in the district court under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) to dismiss
on the ground of improper venue. Although the district court did not find it necessary to rule on
the motion, the court of appeals stated that the motion should not be granted because of the
special venue provision contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1392(a) (1976). 575 F.2d at 467. That provision
states that a civil action "not of a local nature, against defendants residing in different districts in
the same state, may be brought in any of such districts." 28 U.S.C. § 1392(a) (1976).
293. The complaint charged that defendants' acts and practices amounted to: I) cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution and
article I, § 27 of the North Carolina Constitution; 2) denial of access to the courts and access to
counsel in violation of the sixth amendment; and 3) denial of due process of law in violation of the
fourteenth amendment.
294. Part of the relief sought included requests for the court to: enjoin defendants from ac-
cepting new prisoners until minimum constitutional prison standards relating to food, medicine
and other matters were met; declare that each prison inmate is entitled to 80 square feet of living
space; require defendants to afford prisoners procedural due process with regard to their parole
and classification status; appoint a citizens committee to monitor compliance with any order
granting relief. 575 F.2d at 463-64.
Suits seeking similar relief have been successful. See Battle v. Anderson; 376 F. Supp. 402
(E.D. Okla. 1974), afj'd, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1978); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark.
1970), a9'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). See also Comment, Confronting the Conditions of Con-
ftnement:,n ExfpandedRolefor Courts in Prison Reform, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 367, 369 n.12
(1977).
295. 575 F.2d at 463.
296. The court restated the pleading requirements of FED. R. Civ. P. 8 and stated that in
testing the sufficiency of a complaint in face of a 12(b)(6) motion "'we follow, of course, the
accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief.'" 575 F.2d at 464 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
297. 575 F.2d at 465. The court appended to the opinion parts of the substantive portions of
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noted that the complaint at issue was overbroad298 and that "delinea-
tion and definition of the issues" 299 would be necessary before the trial
could commence, it correctly maintained that summary disposition
upon the pleadings was inappropriate under the scheme of the federal
rules.30 0 The case was remanded for further proceedings.
In Bolding, the court of appeals joined an increasing number of
courts that have rejected the judicially developed hands-off doctrine,30'
a policy under which courts decline to entertain suits brought by pris-
oners seeking relief that could entail federal court involvement in the
operation of state correctional systems.30 2 A number of these courts,
finding that prison conditions violate prisoners' constitutional rights,
have indeed become deeply involved in the operation of state penal
systems.3 °3 This controversial intervention, which has paralleled simi-
the complaint. The complaint contained five substantive allegations, which charged: 1) over-
crowding; 2) interference with prisoners' mail; 3) poor conditions in isolation; 4) denial of proce-
dural due process at administrative hearings; and 5) poor general conditions. .d. at 467-68. The
court made a detailed examination of the complaint and concluded that all of plaintiffs' allega-
tions except the due process charge were sufficiently factual to state cognizable claims. In the
opinion, the court detailed the allegations that did satisfy the rule 12(b)(6) requirement; for in-
stance, in support of the isolation charge plaintiffs alleged that they are "not provided with three
wholesome. . . meals a day;. . . are not provided with toilet articles necessary to keep up their
own personal hygiene; . . . are not provided with adequate shower opportunities; . . . are not
provided with clean and sanitary linen; and . . . are not provided with adequate exercise and
recreation time." Id. at 465.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. The court noted that before a trial could begin, it would be necessary to determine
whether a class should be certified, whether to sever claims and try them separately, and whether
to transfer claims to other North Carolina districts. The court also mentioned that issues could be
narrowed or perhaps eliminated through use of other techniques contained in the federal rules-
discovery, requests to admit, motions for more definite statements, and pretrial conference. 1d. at
465-66.
301. Under this doctrine courts refused to exercise jurisdiction or even to consider the allega-
tions of a complaint when confronted with a petition from a prisoner. This reluctance stemmed
from the view that the courts did not have the power or responsibility to supervise the manage-
ment of prison systems. See generally Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 859 (1954); Garcia v. Steele, 193 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1951); Note, Beyond the Ken of the
Courts: 4 Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506
(1963).
302. For a history of the recent decline of this doctrine see Comment, Cruel But Not So Unu-
sual Punishment: The Role of the Federal Judiciary in State Prison Reform, 7 CuM. L. REv. 31
(1976); Note, Decency and Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REv.
841 (1971).
The principle vehicle for prisoner suits is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
303. See, e.g., Pugh v. Loche, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), a1fdsub nom. Newman v.
Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3144 (1978) (detailed and extensive
I 1-point plan ordered into effect and human rights committee created to oversee implementation
after finding prison conditions violated eighth amendment); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.
Ark. 1970), aj-'d, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971), a'd on other grounds sub. nom. Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678 (1978) (order for extensive changes in trusty system and barrack and isolation condi-
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lar judicial intervention in school desegregation 3" and other areas,
has raised questions of federalism and separation of powers.30 6 Two
recent Supreme Court decisions, Rizzo v. Goode317 and Meachum v.
Fanno,3 °8 can be read to give some support to advocates of the hands-
off doctrine, who contend that federal courts overstep their proper role
when they interfere in the administration of state institutions. The
specter of substantial involvement of the federal courts in the adminis-
tration of the North Carolina prison system prompted the district court
in Bolding to refuse even to consider the possibility of class relief and
sparked a vehement dissent in the court of appeals.
The dissenting opinion began by indicating that it was in funda-
mental philosophical disagreement with the majority's "basic hold-
ing."30 9  Citing Rizzo and the principles of federalism and state
sovereignty, the dissent stated that the very theory of the complaint at
issue and the "compass of its allegations and prayers"3 ' made it
unentertainable and illegal.31 ' The dissent argued that extensive relief
of the type prayed for by plaintiffs was simply beyond the legitimate
and proper power of a federal court to grant and therefore that a rule
12(b)(6) dismissal was appropriate.312
In contrast, the majority's discussion of this issue began with a re-
tions upon finding violation of eighth and fourteenth amendments). See also Comment, supra
note 294.
304. Some federal district courts have become deeply involved in the operation of local school
boards when they have perceived the need to vindicate constitutional guarantees. See, e.g., Swam
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (affirming district court's extensive de-
segregation order); United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951
(1975) (affirming district court's order to consolidate school systems).
305. Legislative reapportionment cases also evidence the proclivity of the courts, in remedying
constitutional violations, to become involved in matters traditionally thought to be the responsibil-
ity of state legislative and executive bodies. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)
(affirming district court's reapportionment order).
306. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fanno, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475
(1973).
307. 423 U.S. 362 (1976). In Rizzo, the Court reversed a district court's order that mandated
substantial changes in the complaint procedures of the Philadelphia Police Department. The
Court warned that the principles of federalism militated against broad injunctive orders aimed at
executive branches of government "except in the most extraordinary circumstances." Id. at 379.
308. 427 U.S. 215 (1976). In Meachum, the Court reversed a district court order that voided
the transfer, for disciplinary reasons, of inmates from one prison to another because of due process
violations in the disciplinary hearings. In the course of finding that the inmates had no constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest, the Court stated that it was not the business of the federal courts
to review the "wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of
prison administrators." Id. at 225.
309. 575 F.2d at 468 (Bryan, J., dissenting).
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 469.
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minder to the district court "of the scope of a proper exercise of its
jurisdiction in an appropriate case."313 The court stated that "class re-
lief requiring sweeping changes in a state prison system may still be
mandated when the proof requires such relief. '31 4 The court specifi-
cally concluded that Rizzo could not be read to preclude use of broad
injunctions to remedy a clear pattern of unconstitutional conduct. This
is the correct interpretation of Rizzo. The Rizzo Court, in reliance
upon the district court's own finding that none of the petitioners' con-
stitutional rights had been violated,31 5 voided the injunction at issue
because the case "presented no occasion for the District Court to grant
equitable relief against petitioners. 316 Although Rizzo and other cases
do caution that a court must find a clear violation of a constitutional
right before it may become involved in the operation of a state institu-
tion,31 7 the Bolding court correctly insisted that Rizzo and other cases
do not cast doubt upon the ability of federal courts to exercise the full
range of equitable power when necessary to remedy a constitutional
violation.318
In examining the allegations contained in the complaint and re-
versing and remanding the case for further proceedings, the court was
careful to refrain from expressing a view on whether plaintiffs could
prove any of the facts alleged and, if so, what type of relief, if any, they
would be entitled to. The court frankly recognized that there were
many troublesome issues to be confronted before the trial could be-
3191 hgin. Yet the court vigorously maintained that, because plaintiffs'
complaint did contain allegations sufficiently factual to make it im-
mune to dismissal under rule 12(b)(6), plaintiffs should have been
313. Id. at 466.
314. Id. This proposition was also maintained by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 1977).
315. 423 U.S. at 377.
316. Id. This makes clear that the holding in Rizzo turned on the lack of a constitutional
violation.
317. In Rizzo, the Court stated that injunctive relief should be granted only in "a clear and
plain case," id. at 378 (citing Irwin v. Dixion, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 10, 33 (1850)) or only in "ex-
traordinary circumstances," id. at 379.
318. See Hite v. Leeke, 564 F.2d 670, 672 (4th Cir. 1977); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283,
288 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3144 (1978). See also Comment, supra note 294, at 382-
83.
The court specifically stated that it did not consider Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396
(1974), overruled. In that case the Court stated that "a policy ofjudicial restraint cannot encom-
pass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or
state institution. When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guar-
antee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights." Id. at 405-06.
319. See note 300 supra.
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given a chance to present their claims and that it was the court's duty to
grant any relief ultimately found appropriate on the proof. To the ex-
tent that the district court's dismissal was based on its reluctance to
undertake this type of case or its unwillingness to grant class relief that
might be mandated upon proof of the facts, the dismissal was, it seems,
an abdication of judicial responsibility. Bolding correctly held that the
twenty-nine prisoner plaintiffs are entitled to their day in court.
0. Prosecutor's Duly to Disclose
In Reddy v. Jones,320 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that a state pros-
ecutor who uses witnesses discovered, kept and provided by federal au-
thorities has no duty to inquire about or disclose inducements made to
these witnesses for their favorable testimony if that information is re-
quested by defense counsel. Appellants in Reddy were three black civil
rights activists, popularly known as the Charlotte 3, convicted in North
Carolina state court for the unlawful burning of a stable in 1968.321
The only testimony placing appellants at the barn came from two wit-
nesses who also testified against one of the appellants in a federal
trial322 shortly before the state trial commenced. The witnesses' state-
ments implicating appellants were first made to federal authorities only
after the witnesses themselves were arrested in 1970 for violations of
the 1968 Gun Control Act. Two years after appellants' convictions in
the state trial, independent investigations by news reporters revealed
that the witnesses had agreed to testify only after being promised "relo-
cation" money by federal authorities. The amount was not settled
upon until after the state trial, when each witness was paid $4,000,
$1,000 of which was designated as a reward.323 Although defense attor-
neys were aware that the witnesses were being held in protective cus-
tody by federal authorities and that immunity from prosecution had
been arranged, the financial promises were never made known at the
trial, despite appellants' formal requests for information about any
promises to witnesses and despite cross-examination of the two wit-
nesses concerning inducements for their testimony. 24
320. 572 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1977), cer. denied, 99 S. Ct. 126 (1978).
321. Id. at 981.
322. United States v. Grant, No. 63-71 (E.D.N.C. 1972), a'd, 471 F.2d 648 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 868 (1973).




After appellants had exhausted their state remedies, they applied
to federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus, based on a denial of
due process in the state prosecutor's failure to disclose these "relocation
payments." A panel of the court of appeals affirmed the denial of the
writ, rejecting appellants' reliance on a line of decisions finding nondis-
closures by prosecutors to be constitutional error.325 In Brady v. Mary-
land,326 the United States Supreme Court held the suppression by the
prosecutor of material evidence upon request-the confession of de-
fendant's companion in the same case-violated due process "irrespec-
tive of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 327 This
principle, based primarily on the need to protect the accused's opportu-
nity for a fair trial, was held to require reversal in Giglio v. United
States,328 in which a key witness denied that his testimony had been
induced, when in fact the Assistant United States Attorney, unknown
to the trial prosecutor, had promised the witness an "understanding of
leniency" in exchange for his testimony. Viewing the prosecutor's of-
fice as an entity including the assistant district attorney, the Supreme
Court reversed the defendant's conviction, finding the prosecutor held
to knowledge of the assistant district attorney's promises, regardless of
the latter's failure to inform his superiors or associates. In Boone v.
Paderick,329 a police department detective promised to use his influ-
ence to help a witness avoid prosecution if he cooperated. The defend-
ant's attorney was unable to uncover any bargains in his cross-
examination of the witness, and the prosecutor, unaware of the detec-
tive's promise, credited the witness with altruistic motives for giving
testimony, as in Giglio. The district court distinguished Giglio on the
ground that the promise had come from a police officer who did not
have authority, rather than from the prosecutor's office. Judge Craven,
writing for the Fourth Circuit panel, reversed, finding no merit in this
distinction since "'the police are also part of the prosecution, and the
taint on the trial is no less if they, rather than the State's attorney, were
guilty of the nondisclosure.' "330
The Reddy court concluded that these decisions "stand for the
principle that facts bearing upon the credibility of a witness, which if
325. Id. at 982; see Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963); Boone v. Paderick, 541 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977).
326. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
327. Id. at 87.
328. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
329. .541 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1976).
330. 541 F.2d at 451 (quoting Barbee v. Walden, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1964)).
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not revealed might falsely mislead a jury, must be revealed, whether
the knowledge of such facts resides with the police or the prosecu-
tor.' '33t This principle did not apply in Reddy, according to the court,
because despite the timing of the payments and the cooperation be-
tween state and federal officials, the payments to the witnesses by fed-
eral authorities were for the witnesses' testimony at the federal trial
only and the state prosecution had known nothing of them. The court
concluded that although the state may be "proper insurers of the verac-
ity of their own investigations, they cannot be called upon to foretell
the knowledge of others resting in some foreign sphere. '332 The court
alternatively held that if a duty to disclose did exist, failure to do so
constituted harmless error.333
The Reddy opinion, however, offered no justification for treating
the state prosecutor and the federal authorities who discovered and
provided the State's witnesses as separate entities. By refusing to find
an implied agency relationship in Reddy similar to the agency principle
applied in Giglio, an unfortunate "double entities" doctrine was cre-
ated.334 For example, federal authorities investigating a violation of
331. 572 F.2d at 982.
332. Id. at 983.
333. Id. Also undisclosed at trial were exculpatory statements by one of the witnesses in a
pretrial interview with federal authorities and promises by the state prosecutor to terminate the
same witness' 25 year probationary sentence on unrelated charges in exchange for his testimony.
The court found no duty to disclose the exculpatory statement, or alternatively that failure to do
so was harmless error. Id. at 984. The state prosecutor's failure to disclose his promise to termi-
nate the witness' probation was similarly held harmless. Id. at 984-85.
The court's alternative holding of harmless error was based on the premise that each piece of
undisclosed evidence would have been only cumulative to the evidence already before the jury
that tended to impeach the witnesses' credibility. Id. at 983. As Judge Butzner's dissent noted,
Under the circumstances, this alternative ruling [of harmless error] is difficult to sustain,
and quite properly the panel did not rely solely on it. . . .Instead, the panel affirmed
on the district judge's "comprehensive opinion," which. . . is primarily based on the
theory that non-disclosure did not violate the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of due
process.
Id. at 986 (dissenting opinion).
The degree of prejudice necessary to create error requiring reversal or a new trial has been a
difficult issue underlying all nondisclosure cases. Seegeneral, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97
(1976); Comment, Prosecutor'r Duly to Dirclose Reconsidered, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 480.
334. In his dissent to the court's refusal to rehear the case en banc, Judge Butzner noted that
the court's decision is basically an extension of the silver platter doctrine. 572 F.2d at 987 (dissent-
ing opinion). The silver platter doctrine would allow federal agents to use evidence obtained as a
result of an unconstitutional search or seizure by state officers. The United States Supreme Court
in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), outlawed this practice on the ground that a per-
son's constitutional rights cannot be stripped from him because state and federal agents cooperate
in an investigation and later decide to prosecute in one jurisdiction or another. As the Court
stated, "To the victim it mattered not whether his constitutional right has been invaded by a
federal agent or by a state officer." Id. at 215.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
the Hobbs Act335 could build a case by promising to reward an accom-
plice. The accomplice could then be turned over to state authorities,
who could commence a robbery prosecution on the basis of the in-
former's testimony. The state trial could proceed without disclosure of
the promises so long as the state prosecution did not learn of the federal
promises. Absent such disclosure, the state prosecution would natu-
rally be stronger than the federal, in which disclosure of the promises
would clearly be required by Giglio.
The proposition endorsed by the court that undisclosed promises
by a state police officer or associate district attorney may deprive a trial
of the fairness required by due process, but that similar promises by
federal law enforcement agents do not, seems illogical because the po-
tential for false testimony is just as great and a finding of guilt just as
unreliable in the latter as in the former cases. Additionally, fair proce-
dures that protect a defendant constitute an end in themselves, for a
fair trial is as important to society as the correct result in a particular






A. Hearsay. Declarations Against Penal Interest
Since 1833, North Carolina courts have excluded as hearsay decla-
rations against penal interest, including third-party extrajudicial con-
fessions to the crime for which a defendant is charged.' In the past,
North Carolina and the majority of jurisdictions have restricted their
declarations against interest exceptions to the hearsay rule to declara-
335. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976).
336. See generally Comment, supra note 333.
1. State v. Madden, 292 N.C. 114,232 S.E.2d 656 (1977); State v. English, 201 N.C. 295, 159
S.E. 318 (1931); State v. May, 15 N.C. 280, 4 Dev. 328 (1833).
1979] 1061
1062 NORTH CAROLINA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 57
tions against pecuniary or proprietary interests.2 In State v. Haywood,3
however, Chief Justice Sharp reevaluated case law excluding declara-
tions against penal interest in view of the emerging trend toward
admission of such evidence4 and concluded that declarations against
penal interest are admissible, subject to certain conditions designed to
preclude false confessions.
In Haywood, three defendants indicted for assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill and inflicting serious injury,6 and for robbery
2. MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 277 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as MCCORMICK]; 1 D. STANSBURY'S NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 147 (H. Brandis rev.
1973) [hereinafter cited as STANSBURY].
3. 295 N.C. 709, 249 S.E.2d 429 (1978).
4. See generally Note, Declarations Against Penal Interest: Standards of Admissibility Under
an Emerging Majority Rule, 56 BOSTON U.L. REV. 148 (1976). The Note writer observed that
seven states (California, Kansas, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Utah and Wisconsin) and
two possessions (Canal Zone and Virgin Islands) have enacted statutes recognizing the admissibil-
ity of declarations against penal interest. Fourteen states (Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Mary-
land, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas
and Virginia) have judicially adopted the hearsay rule exception for declarations against penal
interest. Id. at 149 n.5. In addition, Arkansas and Maine have enacted statutes recognizing this
exception, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Rule 804(b)(3) (Supp. 1976); ME. R. Ev. 804(b)(3) (1975),
and Tennessee has judicially extended the hearsay exception, Breeden v. Independent Fire Ins.
Co., 237 Tenn. 769, 530 S.W.2d 769 (1975).
Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 277-78 (1913),
succinctly stated the criticism against restricting the declaration against interest exception to decla-
rations against economic interest:
The rules of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic and common sense, less
hampered by history than some parts of the substantive law .... [N]o other statement is
so much against interest as a confession of murder, it is far more calculated to convince
than dying declarations, which would be let in to hang a man ....
Other criticism of the traditional restriction to economic interests asserts that statements against
penal interests generally are no less trustworthy than those exposing the declarant to potential
financial losses. See, e.g., People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 389 P.2d 377, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964);
People v. Edwards, 396 Mich. 551, 242 N.W.2d 739 (1976); Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728,
117 S.E. 843 (1923); Powers, The North Carolina Hearsay Rule and the Uniform Rules of Evidence,
34 N.C.L. REV. 171, 197-98 (1956).
Perhaps the most common argument in support of admitting declarations against penal inter-
est is that such statements are no less reliable than those against economic interests. "The desire to
avoid criminal liability is as strong as the desire to protect economic interests. It is the determina-
tion that the declaration exposes the declarant to a penalty that gives such statements sufficient
reliability, not the particular interest that is jeopardized." Note, supra, at 152. Moreover, criminal
liability often includes pecuniary liability, id. at 156 n.46, as in the case of a driver who admits
carelessness, exposing himself to both manslaughter charges and a wrongful death claim. Wig-
more has advocated extending the hearsay exception to include declarations against penal interest
because the traditional rule is an "arbitrary" and "barbarous doctrine." 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1477 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974).
5. 295 N.C. at 730, 249 S.E.2d at 442. The Haywood decision applies only to third-party
confessions offered by the defense to exculpate a criminal defendant. The court was silent about
whether such declarations could be used in civil cases or in criminal trials when offered by the
prosecution.
6. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
with firearms,7 contended that a confession by a fourth defendant
(declarant), even though inadmissible against declarant because of a
Miranda warning violation, should be admitted to exculpate the other
defendants because it was a declaration against declarant's penal inter-
est.8 Declarant's confession was that he and the other defendants came
to North Carolina together and that they stopped at the store where "I
[declarant] went in to rob the store but tthe prosecuting witness] put up
such a fight that I shot him. . ... - The supreme court held that al-
though it would adopt a hearsay exception for declarations against pe-
nal interest, the trial court's exclusion of this evidence was not
prejudicial to defendants and was in accord with traditional eviden-
tiary rules excluding declarations against penal interest when certain
conditions precedent to their admissibility are not present. The court
observed that the statement was entirely consistent with the prosecu-
tion's theory that "all the defendants were engaged in a joint enterprise,
aiding and abetting each other," and affirmed the convictions.'
While the North Carolina Supreme Court chose to recognize a
hearsay exception for declarations against penal interest in Haywood,
the declaration offered in Haywood could not exonerate the proponents
because it failed to meet the court's threshold criteria for admitting
such declarations. The admissibility of declarations against penal in-
terest depends on the trial judge's preliminary finding that such state-
ments reach a certain threshold of trustworthiness.12 The threshold
criteria enumerated in Haywood, which expand the traditional require-
ments for admitting declarations against pecuniary and proprietary in-
terests,1 3 are as follows: The declarant must be unavailable as a witness,
7. See id. § 14-87.
8. 295 N.C. at 721, 249 S.E.2d at 436.
9. Id. at 716, 249 S.E.2d at 434. Defendant's confession stated:
I came to Clinton from D.C. with James and Linda Watkins, John Brown and Ronald
Covington. We stopped at Jackson's Red & White in Clinton. I went in to rob the store
but Mr. Jackson put up such a fight that I shot him and ran out of the store. Paul
Haywood, 5936 East Capitol Street, Northeast, Washington, D.C. Witness, Lieutenant
J.H. Goodwin.
Id.
10. Id. at 721, 249 S.E.2d at 436-37.
11. Id. at 730, 249 S.E.2d at 442.
12. Id.
13. The traditional requirements for admission of a declaration against pecuniary or proprie-
tary interest are stated in 1 STANSBURY, supra note 2, at 493-95, as follows:
(1) The declarant must be dead, or for some other reason, unavailable as a witness. (2)
The fact stated must have been against the declarant's interest when made, and he must
have been conscious that it was so. (3) The declarant must have had competent knowl-
edge of the fact declared. (4) There must have been no probable motive for the declarant
to falsify. (5) The interest must be a pecuniary or proprietary (as distinguished from a
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have appreciated at the time his confession was made that it had the
potential of actually endangering his personal liberty, have had the op-
portunity to have committed the crime, have had no probable motive to
fabricate a confession; the declaration must be a voluntary confession
to the crime for which the defendant is on trial and must be inconsis-
tent with the defendant's guilt; and the circumstances surrounding the
crime and the declaration must corroborate the confession and must
indicate its probable reliability.' 4
The formulation of the declarations against interest exception to
the hearsay rule approved by the Haywood court is essentially a cau-
tious version of the rule laid down by the United States Supreme Court
in Chambers v. Mississippi.'5  In approving the admission of declara-
penal) one, and it is on this ground that the defendant in a criminal case is not permitted
to show the confession of another person.
14. 295 N.C. at 730, 249 S.E.2d at 442. The exact requirements for the admission of declara-
tions against penal interests stated by the court are:
(I) The declarant must be dead; beyond the jurisdiction of the court and the reach
of its process; suffering from infirmities of body or mind which preclude his appearance
as a witness either by personal presence or by deposition; or exempt by ruling of the
court from testifying on the ground of self-incrimination. As a further condition of ad-
missibility, in an appropriate case, the party offering the declaration must show that he
has made a good-faith effort to secure the attendance of the declarant.
(2) The declaration must be an admission that the declarant committed the crime
for which defendant is on trial, and the admission must be inconsistent with the guilt of
the defendant.
(3) The declaration must have had the potential of actually jeopardizing the per-
sonal liberty of the declarant at the time it was made and he must have understood the
damaging potential of his statement.
(4) The declarant must have been in a position to have committed the crime to
which he purportedly confessed.
(5) The declaration must have been voluntary.
(6) There must have been no probable motive for the declarant to falsify at the
time he made the incriminating statement.
(7) The facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime and the
making of the declaration must corroborate the declaration and indicate the probability
of trustworthiness.
Id.
15. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). In Chambers, defendant was charged with murder and sought to
exculpate himself by offering testimony of witnesses to an extrajudicial confession. Declarant was
called as a witness, but renounced his earlier confessions. The Mississippi voucher rule precluded
impeachment of one's own witness and the other witnesses were prevented from testifying because
the hearsay exception did not extend to penal interests. Id. at 285-94. In finding that defendant's
fourteenth amendment due process right to present evidence necessary to ensure a fair trial was
denied by the exclusion of the confessions, the Court relied heavily on the spontaneity of the
confessions and the strong corroborative evidence as indicia of trustworthiness. .d. at 300-03.
Although Chambers did not establish minimum standards for the admissibility of confessions to
crime, see general)y MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 278 (Supp. 1978), North Carolina's evidentiary
requirements enumerated in Haywood track the criteria relied upon in Chambers. In deciding
Iaywood, the court noted that no constitutional issue was raised, as in Chambers, and observed
that the holding in Chambers was limited because under the facts presented due process de-
manded admission of the confessions. It seems clear, however, that North Carolina's formulation
tions against penal interest, the Chambers Court attributed much of the
reliability of proffered extrajudicial confessions to the circumstantial
evidence surrounding the making of the statements. Evidence of the
surrounding circumstances can enhance the probability that the confes-
sions were actually made and that their contents were not falsified to
exculpate the defendant in the trial. Although the Chambers rule's cor-
roboration requirement has been criticized' and rejected by a small
minority of jurisdictions, 17 it is imposed by the majority of jurisdictions
admitting extrajudicial confessions' 8 and by the federal courts' 9 to di-
minish the risk of fraudulent confessions exculpating the criminal
defendant."
Conditioning the admission of declarations against penal interest
on a preliminary determination by the trial court of corroborating facts
and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime and the
making of the declaration raises a question regarding the appropriate
provinces of the judge and the jury. Arguably, the threshold level of
reliability has been met if the declaration has the potential of actually
jeopardizing the declarant's penal interest at the time it was made, and
the declarant understood this potential and voluntarily made the state-
ment without a probable motive to lie. No greater indicia of trustwor-
thiness is demanded for statements against economic interest.2 The
traditional suspicions about procured confessions appear insufficiently
substantiated to justify such disparate requirements for the admission
of statements against penal and economic interests.22  Additionally,
that declarant was in a position to have committed the crime to which
she or he confessed could be presumed, subject to the introduction of
contrary evidence by the State. Corroborating circumstances arguably
affect the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility and
of the declaration against penal interest exception was designed to protect defendants' rights to
due process.
16. See Note, supra note 4, at 173-78 (contending that corroborating evidence should be
weighed by jury in considering credibility).
17. See, e.g., People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 389 P.2d 377, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964); People
v. Edwards, 396 Mich. 551, 242 N.W.2d 739 (1976).
18. See, e.g., State v. Larsen, 91 Idaho 42,415 P.2d 685 (1966); Hines v. Commonwealth, 136
Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843 (1923).
19. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). Prior to the effective date of Federal Rule 804(b)(3), a corrobo-
ration requirement was approved in United States v. Goodlow, 500 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1974).
20. Aside from the fraudulent procurement of confessions problem, it is not uncommon for a
number of persons to "confess" to highly publicized or spectacular crimes.
21. Compare note 13 supra (requirements for declarations against economic interest) with
note 14 supra (requirements for declarations against penal interest).
22. See 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4 (discounting fear of procured confessions as "the ancient
rusty weapon" preventing justified use of exculpations as well as fraudulent use of confessions).
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should be considered by the jury.23
B. Hearsay. Dying Declarations
In State v. Stevens,24 the North Carolina Supreme Court ended
any speculation that the admissibility requirements for the dying decla-
ration exception to the hearsay rule were made more restrictive by the
1973 codification in G.S. 8-51.125 of the common law rule.26 Before
enactment of section 8-51.1, dying declarations were admissible in
homicide and wrongful death actions27 provided the declarant was "in
actual danger of death" at the time of the statement, had "full appre-
hension of his danger," did actually die,28 and would have been compe-
23. Compare the stringent admission requirements for a declaration against penal interest
outlined in Haywood with the relatively lenient requirements for an admission implied by silence
in State v. Fewell, 38 N.C. App. 592, 248 S.E.2d 351 (1978). Generally, if a statement that would
naturally be denied if untrue is made in the presence of a person able to hear, understand and
respond, his silence or failure to deny it justifies receiving the statement as an admission implied
by silence. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 270. In Fewell, a statement accusing defendant of mur-
der was admitted although the witness testified defendant acted "like he was going crazy or some-
thing, in some kind of a daze." 38 N.C. App. at 593, 248 S.E.2d at 352 (emphasis added). The
court of appeals concluded the statement was properly admitted without mentioning the question-
able ability of defendant to hear, understand or respond, and without citing any evidence in sup-
port of his mental competence at the time of the accusation. Id. at 595-96, 248 S.E.2d at 353.
Indeed, there is no evidence in Fewell conflicting with the witness' observation that the ac-
cused was in "a daze." See also J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1072 ("[I]f on the circumstances it
appears that the party was in fact physiciall, disabled from answering, his silence of course signi-
fies nothing, and the statement is inadmissible.") The opinion does not indicate whether the trial
judge initially determined the competence of defendant and left the question of his ability to
understand to the jury. Such an allocation of judge and jury functions is prescribed in State v.
Guffey, 261 N.C. 322, 325, 134 S.E.2d 619, 622 (1964).
24. 295 N.C. 21, 243 S.E.2d 771 (1978); accord, State v. Penn, 36 N.C. App. 482, 244 S.E.2d
702 (1978) (follows Stevens).
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-51.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides:
The dying declarations of a deceased person regarding the cause or circumstances of his
death shall be admissible in evidence in all civil and criminal trials and other proceed-
ings before courts, administrative agencies and other tribunals to the same extent and for
the same purposes that they might have been admissible had the deceased survived and
been sworn as a witness in the proceedings, subject to proof that:
(1) it the time ofthe making of such declaration the deceased was conscious ofapproach-
ing death and believed there was no hope of recover,
(2) Such declaration was voluntarily made.
Id. (emphasis added).
26. 1 STANSBURY, supra note 2, § 146, at 488 n.17 (Supp. 1976).
27. Id. § 146.
28. In State v. Robinson, 35 N.C. App. 617,242 S.E.2d 197 (1978), the court of appeals would
have been faced with an interesting question under the dying declaration exception had the ac-
cused not opened the door to testimony concerning statements made by his assault victim and
then failed to object promptly to the hearsay accusations. The court noted that at the time the
declarant identified defendant as her assailant, the victim was in actual danger of death and had
full apprehension of her danger. This hearsay exception, however, requires that death actually
ensue, 1 STANSBURY, supra note 2, § 146; the victim in Robinson suffered irreversible brain dam-
age and will probably remain in a coma for the rest of her life.
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tent to testify if living.29 Section 8-51.1 varies the "full apprehension"
formulation of the common law rule to require preliminary proof that
the declarant "was conscious of approaching death and believed there
was no hope of recovery. 3°
In two 1976 cases, 31 the North Carolina Supreme Court observed
that the "no hope of recovery" language in section 8-51-1 might be
more limiting than existing case law, but declined to reach a conclusion
on the matter. During the 1977 fall term, before Stevens was decided,
the court expressly stated that the statute restricted the former common
law exception "since the court must find, in addition to an apprehen-
sion of death with death in fact ensuing, that the deceased believed
there was no hope of recovery. "32
After reviewing the explanatory statements in the cases prior to
enactment of the statute,33 the Stevens court reaffirmed the case law
and concluded the statutory terminology did not change those require-
ments.34 Whether the test is stated as "no hope of recovery" or "full
apprehension" of the "actual danger of death," it is the declarant's be-
lief in the imminence of death that is thought to assure the trustworthi-
ness of a dying declaration.
C. Privileged Communications: Waiver
An inflexible application of the concept of waiver of the attorney-
It seems that requiring actual death rather than legitimate unavailability adds nothing to the
trustworthiness of the statement or the need for its admission. Since the statute is not limited to
homicide prosecutions, an absolute requirement of death is arbitrary. In extending the exception's
application to all civil and criminal actions, the legislature must have acted out of belief in the
reliability of such statements rather than belief in the necessity of ending secret murders. See 1
STANSBtJRY, supra. Obviously, the subsequent fate of the victim cannot be determinative of the
trustworthiness of a statement made in the face of imminent death.
29. State v. Jordan, 216 N.C. 356, 362, 5 S.E.2d 156, 159 (1939).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-51.1 (CuM. Supp. 1977), quoted in note 25 supra.
31. State v. Cousin, 291 N.C. 413, 419-20, 230 S.E.2d 518, 522 (1976); State v. Bowden, 290
N.C. 702, 712, 228 S.E.2d 414, 421 (1976).
32. State v. Lester, 294 N.C. 220, 226, 240 S.E.2d 391, 397 (1978).
33. State v. Jordan, 216 N.C. 356, 363, 5 S.E.2d 156, 160 (1939) (declarant must have had
"full apprehension of his danger" of death); State v. Dalton, 206 N.C. 507, 513, 174 S.E. 422, 426
(1934) ("It is not necessary that the declarant should be in the very act of dying; it is enough if he
be under the apprehension of impending dissolution."); State v. Tate, 161 N.C. 280, 282, 76 S.E.
713, 714 (1912) (it is enough if declarant "believed he was going to die").
34. 295 N.C. at 29, 243 S.E.2d at 776; accord, State v. Penn, 36 N.C. App. 482, 244 S.E.2d 702
(1978).
35. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1440 ("The essential idea is that the belief should be a
positive and absolute one, not limited by doubts or reserves; so that no room is left for the opera-
tion of worldly motives .. ).
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client privilege led to harsh results for defendant in State v. Tate,36 a
recent murder and felonious assault prosecution. According to the
assault victims' testimony, defendant said he was going to kill them
because his lawyer wrote to him and told him that he would receive a
ten year sentence for an earlier shooting into the victims' apartment.37
The State called defendant's former attorney as a witness and elicited
testimony merely that the attorney had written a letter to defendant
three days before the crimes alleged in Tate.38 To rebut his former
attorney's testimony, defendant sought to establish on cross-examina-
tion that although the attorney wrote a letter to him, it contained no
statement that defendant would receive ten years for the earlier of-
fense.39 The trial judge, however, ruled out of the jury's presence that
such testimony would constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privi-
lege with regard to the to the contents of the entire letter.40 Defendant
decided not to cross-examine his former attorney after receiving this
ruling.
On appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court approved the trial
judge's ruling, rejecting defendant's argument that he should be al-
lowed to show that the letter did not contain the alleged statement
without waiving his privilege in respect of the entire contents of the
letter.4 As the Tate court noted, it is established law that the sub-
stance, but not the existence, of attorney-client communications is priv-
ileged from disclosure.42 Thus, it was proper to allow the attorney to
testify that he had written the letter to defendant three days before the
assault and murder. It is also settled law that a client who offers an
attorney's testimony regarding the substance of a communication
waives the privilege with regard to the entire communication on the
matter.43 The concept of waiver stems from the reasoning that when a
36. 294 N.C. 189, 239 S.E.2d 821 (1978). For a discussion of waiver of attorney-client privi-
lege, see generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 93; 1 STANSBURY, supra note 2, § 62; 8 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2327.
37. 294 N.C. at 192, 239 S.E.2d at 824.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 193, 239 S.E.2d at 824. Tate's former lawyer testified in the absence of the jury that
the letter did not contain the statement in question.
40. Id. at 193, 239 S.E.2d at 824-25.
41. Id. at 194, 239 S.E.2d at 825. Justice Exum dissented, stating that he believed it was error
to permit the attorney's acknowledgement of the letter without also allowing defendant to estab-
lish what the letter did not contain. Id. at 200, 239 S.E.2d at 828-29 (dissenting opinion).
42. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, §§ 87-93; 1 STANSBURY, supra note 2, § 621;
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2309.
43. Hayes v. Ricard, 244 N.C. 313, 93 S.E.2d 540 (1956); State v. Artis, 227 N.C. 371, 42
S.E.2d 409 (1947); Jones v. Marble Co., 137 N.C. 237, 49 S.E. 94 (1904); McCoRMICK, supra note
2, § 93; 1 STANSBuRY, supra note 2, § 62; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2327, at 636.
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client's action "touches a certain point of disclosure, fairness requires
that his privilege shall cease whether he intended that result or not." 4
Further examination of the policy underlying the attorney-client privi-
lege suggests, in addition, that waiver is designed to prevent a client
from using the privilege as a sword as well as a shield.45 Thus, a client
may not use partial disclosure when it is advantageous to her or his
case to do so, while withholding the damaging information that
remains.
The North Carolina cases cited as authority for the waiver concept
by the supreme court may be distinguished from Tate on their facts.
The client in each of the cited cases initiated the testimony regarding
the privileged information by testifying himself or by calling the attor-
ney as a witness.46 Arguably, the clients in the earlier cases engaged in
the deliberate, offensive use of testimony contemplated by the waiver
rule, whereas Tate reacted defensively in proferring testimony about
what the letter did not contain. The policy of the waiver rule would not
be undermined if defendant Tate had been allowed to dispel the in-
criminating inference arising from the State's direct examination of his
attorney. Defendant sought not to wield the privilege offensively but
sought only to preserve the utility of his attorney-client privilege.
Under these unusual facts, Tate's silence and reliance on the privilege
of nondisclosure might have appeared to the jury to be his acknow-
ledgement and acquiescence in the damaging implications of the attor-
ney's testimony' concerning the letter.
D. Character: Impeachment by Prior Acts of Misconduct
On cross-examination, counsel may question any witness concern-
ing specific acts of prior misconduct that tend to discredit the witness.4 7
While most jurisdictions limit such cross-examination to acts of mis-
conduct that are related to the credibility of the witness,4" North Caro-
lina courts allow the cross-examiner to bring forth any disparaging
facts tending to discredit the testimony of the witness even though those
44. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2327.
45. Id.
46. See cases cited note 43 supra.
47. 1 STANSBUR , supra note 2, §§ 42, 111, at 120-21, 340-42. See also McCoRMICK, supra
note 2, § 42; 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, §§ 981-987.
48. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at § 42. Under FED. R. EvID. 608(b) specific instances of
conduct of a witness may be inquired into on cross-examination only if probative of truthfulness.
For further discussion of this rule, see Annot., 36 A.L.R. FED. 564 (1978).
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facts are only tangentially related to the witness' credibility.a9 There
are, however, several limitations on the state's liberal rule regarding
character impeachment: (1) The trial judge has discretionary authority
to limit the cross-examiner's scope of inquiry;5" (2) the witness may not
be asked whether he has been accused, arrested or indicted for an unre-
lated criminal offense;' (3) the cross-examiner is bound by the answer
of the witness and may not offer extrinsic evidence in contradiction;5 2
and (4) the questions must be asked in good faith.53
In State v. Ross,5 4 defendant was tried and convicted of possession
with intent to sell, and of sale and delivery of a controlled substance,
methylenedioxy amphetamine (MDA). The State's case rested entirely
on the testimony of an undercover police officer who testified that he
purchased MDA from Ross at Ross' home on February 2, 1975. De-
49. 1 STANSBURY, supra note 2, at § I11; see State v. Parrish, 25 N.C. App. 466, 213 S.E.2d
354 (1975) (proper to ask defendant, on trial for driving without license and registration and re-
sisting arrest, whether he had shot a man several years earlier); State v. McGuinn, 6 N.C. App.
554, 170 S.E.2d 616 (1969) (in prosecution for murder district attorney allowed to bring out on
cross-examination that defendant and his wife had several children before their marriage); State v.
Caldwell, 25 N.C. App. 269, 212 S.E.2d 669 (1975) (defendant, charged with breaking and enter-
ing and larceny, properly questioned about presence of his fiancee in his house at 2:50 a.m. when
officers conducted search of premises).
50. 1 STANSBURY, supra note 2, § 111, at 341-42; see, e.g., State v. Williams, 279 N.C. 663,
675, 185 S.E.2d 174, 181 (1971).
51. State v. Williams, 279 N.C. 663, 672, 185 S.E.2d 174, 180 (1971). In a comprehensive
opinion by Chief Justice Bobbit the Williams court overruled State v. Maslin 195 N.C. 537, 143
S.E. 3 (1928), and announced the following rule:
We now hold that, forpurposes of impeachment, a witness, including the defendant
in a criminal case, may not be cross-examined as to whether he has been indicted or is
under indictment for a criminal offense other than that for which he is then on trial ....
In respect of this point, we overrule State v. Maslin ... and decisions in accord with
Aaslin, on the basic ground that an indictment cannot rightly be considered more than
an unproved accusation.
,4arlior, we hold that, forpurposes of impeachment, a witness, including the de-
fendant in a criminal case, may not be cross-examined as to whether he has been ac-
cused, either informally or by affidavit on which a warrant is issued, of a criminal offense
unrelated to the case on trial, nor cross-examined as to whether he has been arrestedfor
such unrelated criminal offense.
279 N.C. at 672, 185 S.E.2d at 180 (emphasis by court). See generally Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1421
(1951).
52. 1 STANSBURY, supra note 2, §§ 48, 111, at 138-39, 342; see, e.g., State v. Cross, 284 N.C.
174, 200 S.E.2d 27 (1973).
53. 1 STANSBURY, supra note 2, at 341. Compare State v. Hampton, 294 N.C. 242, 239 S.E.2d
835 (1978) (first degree murder, prosecutor's questions concerning defendant's prior act of break-
ing and entering and robbery were asked in good faith) with State v. Phillips, 240 N.C. 516, 82
S.E.2d 762 (1954) (solicitor's insinuating questioning concerning collateral acts of misconduct was
based on supposed fact for which there was no evidence and therefore denied defendant a fair
trial).
54. 295 N.C. 488, 246 S.E.2d 780 (1978). The North Carolina Supreme Court granted de-
fendant's petition for discretionary review of the court of appeals holding that there was no error
in defendant's trial. 35 N.C. App. 98, 239 S.E.2d 843 (1978).
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fendant's evidence tended to show that he was away from his home the
night of the alleged purchase.5 At trial, the district attorney was per-
mitted to conduct an extensive cross-examination of Ross regarding il-
legal drugs found in defendant's home during an earlier, unrelated
search that had been declared unlawful by the district court.5 6 On ap-
peal the North Carolina Supreme Court focused on defendant's claim
that cross-examination concerning articles seized during the prior un-
lawful search violated the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. The
majority opinion concluded that the exclusionary rule did not apply
because Ross failed to show that the prior search was declared unlaw-
ful for constitutional reasons. 7 In a strong dissent, however, three
members of the court questioned the propriety of the cross-examination
permitted by the trial court. 8
Justice Exum, writing for the dissenters, identified three possible
grounds for holding the cross-examination objectionable. First, he ar-
gued that defendant was guilty of "misconduct" only if he knowingly
possessed the drugs found in his house during the prior unlawful
search.59 The evidence showed that Ross shared a large house with
several other people and was not present when the illegal search was
55. 295 N.C. at 489, 246 S.E.2d at 782. The State's evidence showed that undercover agent
R.T. Guerette went to defendant's home in Charlotte on the night of February 27, 1975 and made
a previously arranged purchase from Ross of two plastic bags of MDA for $65. Id.
56. Id. at 489-90, 246 S.E.2d at 782.
57. Id. at 490-92, 246 S.E.2d at 782-84. Defendant cited Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S.
20 (1925), and Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), in support of his constitutional argu-
ment. In Agnello, the United States Supreme Court held questions concerning evidence unconsti-
tutionally seized improper when defendant did not testify concerning the evidence on direct
examination and denied knowledge of its existence on cross-examination. 269 U.S. at 35. The
Agnello rule was refined in Wader. The Walder Court held that facts pertaining to illegally
seized narcotics may be brought out on cross-examination to attack the credibility of a defendant
who asserted on direct examination that he had never possessed narcotics. 347 U.S. at 64-65.
Defendant in Ross argued that the Agnello-Walder exclusionary rule was made applicable to the
states by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and should have been applied on the ground that
defendant made no reference to the possession of drugs on direct examination. The Ross court,
citing several articles and subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions, questioned the con-
tinued efficacy of the exclusionary rule and then refused to decide the issue because the record of
the trial did not show that the search was declared unlawful for constitutional reasons. 295 N.C.
at 491-92, 246 S.E.2d at 783-84. The supreme court hinted, however, that the exclusionary rule
would apply when there was a "substantial violation" of the statutory search and seizure proce-
dures set forth in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-974 (Cum. Supp. 1978). 295 N.C. at 492, 246 S.E.2d at
784.
The Ross court also addressed defendant's claim that cross-examination of a criminal defend-
ant for impeachment purposes based on prior unrelated convictions and acts of misconduct should
be declared unconstitutional. Citing numerous decisions rejecting this argument by both the
North Carolina and United States Supreme Courts, the Ross majority also rejected this argument.
295 N.C. at 492-93, 246 S.E.2d at 784-85.
58. 295 N.C. at 494-99, 246 S.E.2d at 785-88 (Exum, Lake, J.J., and Sharp, C.J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 497-98, 246 S.E.2d at 787 (dissenting opinion).
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conducted.6" There was no proof that the drugs confiscated during the
search were actually the property of defendant Ross.
Second, Justice Exum pointed out that the drug charges used to
impeach defendant's testimony were dismissed by the district court.6 '
He questioned whether the supreme court "has carried this impeach-
ment rule so far as to permit cross-examination about past criminal
conduct for which a defendant has been tried and acquitted," 62 citing
State v. Sharratt63 for the proposition that this may not be done in
controlled substance cases. 64 Examination of the Sharratt record
shows, however, that the witness was asked whether she had been ar-
rested and indicted, not whether she actually possessed the drugs that
were the basis of the indictment.65 Moreover, several North Carolina
appellate decisions do indeed permit a witness to be impeached by a
prior act of misconduct even though the witness was acquitted or the
charges against the witness were dismissed.66 For instance, in State v.
Parrish,67 no error was found when defendant was asked on cross-ex-
amination whether he had killed a man several years earlier even
though the prosecutor apparently was aware that defendant had been
acquitted of the charge.68
60. Id. at 494, 246 S.E.2d at 785. Defendant Ross testified that he owned a four bedroom,
single family dwelling in which he rented several rooms to help make mortgage payments. Ross'
testimony also showed that his job required him to be away from home much of the time. Justice
Exum pointed out in a footnote that the presence of the drugs in defendant's house would be
evidence of knowing possession, but that defendant was not on trial for the earlier possessions
even though the district attorney's cross-examination apparently turned the proceeding "into a
mini-trial on the question of defendant's guilt of the collateral misconduct." Id. at 498 n.l, 246
S.E.2d at 787 n.1.
61. Id. at 494, 246 S.E.2d at 785.
62. Id. at 499, 246 S.E.2d at 787.
63. 29 N.C. App. 199, 223 S.E.2d 906, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 554, 226 S.E.2d 512 (1976).
64. 295 N.C. at 499, 246 S.E.2d at 787 (dissenting opinion).
65. See Record at 47-49, State v. Sharratt, 29 N.C. App. 199, 223 S.E.2d 906 (1976). From
reading the court of appeals' opinion in Sharrall, the exact form of the question asked the witness
on cross-examination is not clear. The Sharratt decision noted that the drug charges against the
witness had been dismissed at the time of the trial, but stated the general rule that a witness may
not be cross-examined "regarding an indictment or other accusation of crime, as distinguished
from a conviction." 29 N.C. App. at 203, 223 S.E 2d at 908. This ambiguity in the exact form of
the cross-examination may account for the Ross dissenters' misinterpretation of Sharram.
66. See State v. Calloway, 268 N.C. 359, 150 S.E.2d 517 (1966); State v. Parrish, 25 N.C.
App. 466, 213 S.E.2d 354 (1975).
67. 25 N.C. App. 466, 213 S.E.2d 354 (1975), discussed in note 74 infra.
68. See Brief for State at 4. Compare State v. Parrish, 25 N.C. App. 466, 213 S.E.2d 354
(1975) with State v. Calloway, 268 N.C. 359, 150 S.E.2d 517 (1966) (defendant in Calloway, on
trial for purse snatching, admitted on cross-examination that he had been tried and convicted in
nine prior cases of purse snatching; trial court was in error in sustaining solicitor's objection to
defendant's attempt to explain that he had obtained a new trial in each case and had on retrial
either been acquitted or prosecution had been abandoned).
For an example of a different approach taken by other jurisdictions, see People v. Sanza, 37
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The third and by far the most forceful argument made by the dis-
sent in Ross was that the cross-examination was not conducted in good
faith.69 The district attorney engaged in detailed questioning concern-
ing specific drugs seized during the prior search that were allegedly the
property of defendant Ross. To each inquiry defendant answered that
he was not at home on the occasion in question and therefore was
unable to admit or deny what might have been found in the house.70 In
State v. Williams,71 the North Carolina Supreme Court made it clear
that questions concerning a witness' prior misconduct must "relate to
matters within the knowlege of the witness . ,,72 The prosecutor in
Ross obviously was aware that Ross lacked the knowledge necessary to
answer the very detailed questions put to him on cross-examination.
A.D.2d 632, 323 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1971) (cross-examination concerning prior acts of misconduct for
which witness had been acquitted is afortiori in bad faith).
69. 295 N.C. at 498, 246 S.E.2d at 787 (Exum, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 496-97, 286 S.E.2d at 786-87. The following is a sample of the district attorney's
cross-examination in Ros.
Q. I'll ask you, sir, if on the third day of January, 1975, if found in your room,
pursuant to a search warrant, was 15.67 grams of a green vegetable material, that mate-
rial being marijuana?
MR. WHITFIELD: OBJECTION as to that question.
COURT: OVERRULED.
DEFENDANT'S EXCEPTION #26.




A. I don't know. To my knowledge, it couldn't have been.Q. I'll ask you, sir, if on the third day of January, 1975, if found in your room was
a zipped-locked bag containing a mottled orange tablet, that tablet analyzed as contain-





Q. Is what you're telling this jury, sir, that you deny it being found there because




Q. So you really have no basis for the denial on what you have stated in this
courtroom. Is that right?
OBJECTION: OVERRULED.
DEFENDANT'S EXCEPTION #30.
A. Just the same thing I have said. I wasn't there so I don't know whether it was
found in my room or not.
Id. (quoting Record at 114-15).
71. 279 N.C. 663, 185 S.E.2d 174 (1974).
72. Id. at 675, 185 S.E.2d at 181 (emphasis by court). For a complete statement of the VI-
lams holding, see note 6 supra.
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The only basis for the cross-examiner's insinuating interrogation was
that the illegal drugs were found in a house occupied by defendant and
several other people. Because the State's entire case rested on the un-
dercover police officer's testimony that he had made a drug purchase
from Ross, the dissenting justices in Ross were able to argue persua-
sively that the State convicted defendant "by trying him, in effect, for
certain alleged past offenses of which he had been accused and
acquitted."73
Although no new guideline for determining permissible cross-ex-
amination referring to prior acts of misconduct was suggested by the
Ross dissent, it would seem to accord with fundamental fairness to de-
fine "good faith" in a manner that would assure the exclusion of ques-
tions concerning past acts of misconduct when the cross-examiner has
little or no evidence that the witness, in fact, committed wrongful or
criminal acts.74 In Watkins v. Foster75 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit, affirming the district court's grant of
73. 295 N.C. at 494, 246 S.E.2d at 785 (Exum, J., dissenting); see note 60 supra. In State v.
Phillips, 240 N.C. 516, 82 S.E.2d 762 (1954), defendant was on trial for obtaining and conspiring
to obtain money by false pretenses. The solicitor engaged in a lengthy and highly suggestive
cross-examination of defendant, referring to seventeen separate instances of misconduct that had
allegedly taken place over a period of several years. The court held that the questions were based
on supposed facts of which there was no evidence and granted defendant a new trial. Justice
Exum argued that the questions in Ross were even more vicious than the ones in Phillps. 295
N.C. at 499, 246 S.E.2d at 788 (dissenting opinion). Compare State v. Phillips, 240 N.C. 516, 82
S.E.2d 762 (1954), with State v. Black, 283 N.C. 344, 196 S.E.2d 225 (1973) (Phillps distinguished).
74. Even though the witness was acquitted of a prior charge, however, a good faith inquiry
into the act of misconduct should not necessarily be barred. For example, in State v. Parrish, 25
N.C. App. 466, 213 S.E.2d 354 (1975), defendant was asked on cross-examination if he had previ-
ously killed a man, even though he had been acquitted of the crime. Defendant readily admitted
the prior act and on redirect was able to explain the circumstances surrounding the event. The
cross-examiner's objective, good faith belief that the witness committed the act should be determi-
native. A mechanical definition of "good faith" is impractical and should be left to a case by case
determination. For example, in State v. Alford, 289 N.C. 372, 222 S.E.2d 222 (1976), defendant,
on trial for first degree murder, was not prejudiced when the district attorney asked on cross-
examination if he had stolen two guns found in his apartment. There was evidence that the guns
had been stolen from a hardware store close to defendant's apartment. In a situation such as the
one presented by Ross, however, in which the cross-examiner has only minimal proof that the act
of misconduct was committed by the witness, allowing the questioner to suggest the witness' guilt
through detailed cross-examination is not justifiable.
75. 570 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1978), affirming 423 F. Supp. 53 (W.D.N.C. 1976). After a prior
conviction was overturned and the case was remanded, State v. Foster, 282 N.C. 189, 192 S.E.2d
320 (1972), defendant Foster was retried and convicted in February of 1973. The conviction was
appealed on several grounds, including improper cross-examination, and the supreme court af-
firmed. Two justices dissented, arguing that defendant was improperly cross-examined concern-
ing alleged prior acts of misconduct. 284 N.C. 259, 278-84, 200 S.E.2d 782, 796-99 (1973) (Sharpe,
J., and Bobbitt, C.J. dissenting). In August 1975 Foster had filed apro se petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina.
Counsel was appointed for defendant and a new petition filed. The district court concluded that
reference to six prior acts of misconduct on cross-examination should not have been allowed.
Therefore, the writ of habeas corpus was granted and Foster's conviction overturned. Foster v.
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habeas corpus relief from a North Carolina conviction, seems to have
reached just such a result. Defendant Foster was arrested and subse-
quently indicted for eight separate incidents of burglary and house-
breaking.76 The State elected to proceed on only one charge, and relied
solely on a photographic enlargement of a fingerprint matching Fos-
ter's found on a flower pot in one of the burglarized homes.77 "Foster's
entire defense rested on his credibility.' 78 The defense offered no ex-
planation for the fingerprint but pointed out that defendant was a long-
time resident of the area with no prior criminal record and offered the
testimony of Foster's wife who stated that the defendant was home in
bed when the burglary took place.79  During cross-examination, the
district attorney, without referring to the pending indictments, asked
defendant detailed questions concerning six of the prior burglaries."0
Shortly after defendant's conviction all other indictments were dis-
missed for lack of sufficient evidence.81
Watkins, 423 F. Supp. 53 (W.D.N.C. 1976). The state appealed the ruling, leading to the Wakins
opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
76. 570 F.2d at 503.
77. Id. at 502. The burglary victims were unable to identify Foster and the stolen items were
not recovered. Id. at 506.
78. Id. at 506.
79. Id. at 504.
80. Id. The following excerpt from the transcript of Foster's cross-examination illustrates the
suggestive nature of the questioning:
Q. I will ask you if you didn't break in the residence of James Sinclair at 312
Center Street on October 11, 1971, by going into the front door and reaching up and
unscrewing with your fingers a light-bulb in the ceiling?
MR. HICKS: Objection.
COURT: Overruled.
DEFENDANT'S EXCEPTION NO. 24.
Q. Did you or did you not?
A. What you mean "did I"? No, I didn't.
Q. I will ask you if you didn't break into the residence of Lonnie Bell Wallace at
217 South Turner Street? How far is South Turner Street from there on Center Street?
MR. HICKS: Objection.
A. I couldn't tell you.
Q. I will ask you if you didn't break into Lonnie Bell Wallace's house on February






Id. (quoting Record at 74-77).
81. At the time of Foster's cross-examination one of the six indictments had already been
dismissed. Id. at 505. Apparently the North Carolina Supreme Court was not aware of this when
they affirmed Foster's conviction. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Bobbitt stated that "the
record shows that defendant is under indictment for each of the six criminal offenses to which the
cross-examiner's questions relate... .. State v. Foster, 284 N.C. 259, 283, 200 S.E.2d 782, 799
1076 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57
The Watkins court, pointing out that the State only had minimal
evidence that Foster committed the prior burglaries, held that the
cross-examination was not conducted in good faith.82 Even though
defendant had answered each of the questions in the negative, the in-
sinuating nature of the inquiry undoubtedly left an indelible mark on
the minds of the jurors. 3 The court of appeals used language similar to
that of the dissent in Ross when it concluded that defendant Foster
"was tried not only on the evidence, but also on the detailed 'facts'
recounted in the prosecutor's questions . ... "84 The Watkins court
did note, however, that had the State presented overwhelming in-
dependent evidence of defendant's guilt the error would have been
harmless. 85 The only factor distinguishing Watkins from Ross is that
the defendant in Watkins was under indictment for the prior acts of
misconduct, whereas the defendant in Ross had been acquitted of the
(1973) (dissenting opinion). It is doubtful that knowledge of the dismissed indictment would have
changed the view of the majority, which ruled summarily that the cross-examination was proper.
Id. at 275, 200 S.E.2d at 794.
82. 570 F.2d at 505-06. Although not referring specifically to the good faith issue, the dis-
sentingjustices in State v. Foster, reached an identical conclusion after reviewing the same record.
Chief Justice Bobbitt focused on the problem created by allowing this type of cross-examination:
Under the circumstances, the asking of these six questions by the State's counsel was
highly prejudicial to defendant in that it tended to destroy by inference and suspicion the
otherwise unimpeached evidence as to his alibi and as to his good character. The asking
of these questions gave the impression that the State's counsel had knowledge of eviden-
tial facts sufficient to support these insinuations. The record tends to negate rather than
to support the view that he had such knowledge.
284 N.C. 259, 283-84, 200 S.E.2d 782, 799 (dissenting opinion).
83. "Foster's denial of the prosecutor's insinuations should have left his credibility intact but
in actuality could not erase the blemish on his character which had been left in each juror's mind."
570 F.2d at 506.
84. Id. at 507.
85. Id. at 506 n.6.
In State v. Thompson, 37 N.C. App. 651, 247 S.E.2d 235 (1978), defendant was tried and
convicted of armed robbery. Several persons observed the robbery and were able positively to
identify defendant. On appeal Thompson, citing Watkins, argued that the trial court erred in
permitting the State to impeach him by asking about other robberies for which he was under
indictment. The North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected this argument, pointing out that "the
State's case against Foster consisted solely of fingerprint evidence; the evidence against defendant
Thompson is not nearly so sparse." Id. at 660, 247 S.E.2d at 240.
Judge Widener, dissenting in Watkins, pointed out that the majority seemed to reach its de-
termination of bad faith because the indictments on which the cross-examination was premised
were dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. He concluded that, henceforth, impeachment by
prior acts of misconduct will only be permissible in the Fourth Circuit when the cross-examiner
possesses evidence sufficient to prove the prior acts beyond a reasonable doubt. 570 F.2d at 507-
08 (dissenting opinion). While this argument may be technically correct, it should not, as Widener
suggests, unduly limit the ability of the cross-examiner to impeach the witness. For example, in
Watkins the State based its entire case on one fingerprint of defendant found in the home of a
burglary victim. If the State had possessed a similar quantum of proof in connection with any of
the indictments that were later dismissed, the majority view would apparently have found such
evidence sufficient to permit good faith cross-examination.
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misconduct. In both cases the cross-examination presumably had a
detrimental effect on the defendant's credibility. The Watkins court
took the sounder course in prohibiting impeachment by prior acts of
misconduct for which there was only a minimal factual basis.
E Refreshing Recollection
As a general rule, a witness who is unable to recall a fact about
which he or she is questioned may refer to a writing to refresh his recol-
lection, provided that the writing is made available to opposing counsel
for inspection. 6 A witness who refreshes his memory before trial need
not produce in court the writing used for that purpose."7 In State v.
McQueen,ss the supreme court held that a witness' testimony concern-
ing her present recollection of past events was not rendered incompe-
tent when her memory was refreshed prior to trial by hypnosis.8 9
Although McQueen is a case of first impression in North Carolina, the
court's decision is in accord with decisions from other jurisdictions. 9°
86. See I STANSBURY, supra note 2, § 32. A writing is not the only instrument that may be
used to refresh memory. In State v. Peacock, 236 N.C. 137, 139, 72 S.E.2d 612, 615, the supreme
court, discussing the witness' use of memoranda to refresh memory while testifying, quoted with
approval the following passage from Jewett v. United States, 15 F.2d 955, 956 (9th Cir. 1926):
[1]t is quite immaterial by what means the memory is quickened; it may be a song, or a
face, or a newspaper item, or a writing of some character. It is sufficient that by some
mental operation, however mysterious, the memory is stimulated to recall the event, for
when so set in motion it functions quite independently of the actuating cause.
The evidence, of course, consists of the witness' testimony, not the document used to refresh
recollection. State v. Greenlee, 22 N.C. App. 489, 206 S.E.2d 753, appeal dismissed, 285 N.C. 761,
209 S.E.2d 285, cert. denied, 286 N.C. 339, 210 S.E.2d 59 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 969 (1975).
The document may, however, be introduced into evidence by the adverse party or may be used as
an aid in cross-examining the refreshed witness. See 1 STANSBURY, supra note 2, § 32. See gener-
ally MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 9.
87. See, e.g., Star Mfg. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 222 N.C. 330, 23 S.E.2d 32 (1942).
88. 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978).
89. Id. at 119, 244 S.E.2d at 427. The opinion, however, expressly limited hypnosis to use as
an aid in refreshing recollection prior to trial. The court noted that the witness was not under
hypnosis during trial, that no question was raised about the admissibility of pretrial statements
made under hypnosis, and that the State did not attempt to introduce testimony of the hypnotist
concerning statements made by the witness while in a hypnotic trance. Accordingly, the court
expressed no opinion on these issues. Id. at 119, 122, 244 S.E.2d at 427, 429. In dictum, the
McQueen court also approved of the use of psychiatric or other medical treatment as a device for
refreshing memory. Id. at 120, 244 S.E.2d at 428.
Courts in other jurisdictions have refused to admit pretrial statements made under hypnosis,
see, e.g., State v. Harris, 241 Or. 224,405 P.2d 492 (1965), and have held that a hypnotist may not
testify concerning what his subject said while under hypnosis, see, eg., State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23,
207 S.E.2d 414 (1974).
90. The McQueen court cited with approval the four leading cases in this area. 295 N.C. at
120-21, 244 S.E.2d at 428-29 (citing Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975);
Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974); Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230,
246 A.2d 302 (1968); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971)).
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In McQueen, witness Kiser and defendant McQueen were in-
volved in a double murder in June 1972.91 In August 1972 Kiser
voluntarily surrendered and, in exchange for a grant of prosecutorial
immunity, gave a statement to police implicating McQueen. 92 In Sep-
tember 1977, several weeks before defendant was brought to trial in
North Carolina, Kiser asked to be hypnotized to aid her memory of the
events surrounding the murders.93 Kiser's testimony at trial, based on
her memory as revived by the hypnosis, was inconsistent with the state-
ment she gave to police two months after the crime was committed, and
was more prejudicial to defendant. 94 McQueen's counsel argued that
Kiser's testimony was based on post-hypnotic suggestion rather than on
her present memory of past events, and that Kiser's testimony should
have been entirely excluded.95 The McQueen court rejected this argu-
ment, citing several cases that have held that a witness whose memory
has been refreshed by hypnosis is able to testify from present recollec-
tion of past events.96
In legal effect, the use of hypnosis to revive memory is no different
from the use of more conventional means, such as by reading a docu-
ment.97 As the McQueen court correctly noted, that a person was hyp-
notized prior to trial should bear upon that person's credibility, which
is a factual determination for the jury to make in most cases, but should
not bear upon the witness' competence to testify, which is a legal deter-
mination for the judge to make.98 McCormick refers to the hypnotized
person as "ultrasuggestible," 99 and warns that the use of any item to
91. 295 N.C. at 99, 244 S.E.2d at 416.
92. Id. at 101, 244 S.E.2d at 417.
93. Id.
94. In her statement to the police in August 1972, Kiser stated that McQueen committed the
murders inside the victim's home while Kiser was outside the house. After Kiser's memory was
refreshed with the aid of hypnosis, she testified at trial that she was actually present and that she
saw McQueen commit the murders. See Record at 65-67; Brief for Defendant at 24-25.
95. Brief for Defendant at 28.
96. 295 N.C. at 120-21, 244 S.E.2d at 428-29 (citing Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067
(9th Cir. 1975); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974); Harding v. State, 5
Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971)). In
Harding v. State, a detailed opinion explaining the theory behind hypnotic suggestion, the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland pointed out that modem medical science has recognized that
hypnosis can be helpful in restoring memory of past events. 5 Md. App. at--, 246 A.2d at 311-12.
97. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Kline v. Ford Motor Co.,
523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975), noted that "[allthough the device by which recollection was re-
freshed is unusual, in legal effect [the] situation is not different from that of a witness who claims
that his recollection of an event that he could not earlier remember was revived when he thereafter
read a particular document." Id. at 1069-70.
98. 295 N.C. at 119, 244 S.E.2d at 427.
99. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 208, at 510.
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refresh memory creates a very real danger that the witness "will 're-
member' something that never happened.' The basic safeguards
against abuse in this area, which include the trial judge's power to ex-
clude testimony when he determines that memory was not actually
refreshed,"° ' and the adverse party's right to cross-examine the wit-
ness, 10 2 should provide adequate protection when hypnosis is used to
refresh recollection.
F Jury Arguments
An attorney, in presenting his case to the jury, has the right to
argue every aspect of the case supported by evidence in the record, in-
cluding the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evi-
dence.' 0 3 He may also argue the applicable legal principles involved in
the case." Counsel may not, however, " 'travel outside the record'
and inject into [the] argument" his personal views and beliefs.'0 5 In
Currituck Grain Inc. v. Powell,06 the North Carolina Court of Appeals,
making a logical extension of this rule, held that it was error for the
trial court to allow an attorney to personally vouch for the credibility of
100. Id. § 9, at 16-19.
101. See State v. Collins, 22 N.C. App. 590, 207 S.E.2d 278, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 760, 209
S.E.2d 284 (1974) (witness may testify from refreshed memory "fijf, after reading the document,
he is able to remember the events. ... Id. at 595, 207 S.E.2d at 281 (emphasis added)). Even
where the witness' memory is not revived, the document itself may be read to the jury and intro-
duced as evidence if the requirements of "past recollection recorded" are met. See MCCORMICK,
supra note 2, § 9, at 299-303; 1 STANSBURY, supra note 2, § 33.
102. STANSBURY, supra note 2, § 32, at 87. A question left unanswered by the McQueen opin-
ion is whether the availability of the hypnotist for cross-examination is a prerequisite to the ad-
mission of testimony by a witness whose memory has been refreshed by hypnosis. The court
pointed out that defendant had access to a tape recording of the entire hypnosis procedure and
that the hypnotist was available to testify, though he was not called by either party. 295 N.C. at
120, 244 S.E.2d at 428. In each of the cases cited by the McQueen court in support of its decision,
see note 52 supra, the hypnotist testified concerning the procedure. In Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller
Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974), the court stated that the adverse part was entitled to challenge
the reliability of the hypnosis procedure through cross-examination of the hypnotist. Id. at 509-
10.
103. See, e.g., Crutcher v. Noel, 284 N.C. 568, 201 S.E.2d 855 (1974); Lamborn & Co. v.
Hollingsworth & Hatch, 195 N.C. 350, 142 S.E. 19 (1928). In State v. McKenna, 289 N.C. 668, 224
S.E.2d 537 (1976), the supreme court pointed out that the scope of argument to the jury is within
the sound discretion of the trial judge. His ruling will only be disturbed when there is prejudicial
error. Id. at 687, 224 S.E.2d at 550. Also, in State v. Alford, 289 N.C. 372, 222 S.E.2d 222 (1976),
the court noted that wide latitude should be given counsel in arguing his case to the jury. Id. at
384, 222 S.E.2d at 230.
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-14 (1975); see, e.g., State v. McMorris, 290 N.C. 286, 225 S.E.2d
553 (1976) (court emphasized that law argued must be applicable to facts of case).
105. Cuthrell v. Greene, 229 N.C. 475, 50 S.E.2d 525 (1948).
106. 38 N.C. App. 7, 246 S.E.2d 853 (1978).
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his witness during closing argument.10 7
In a case of first impression,0 8 the Currituck Grain court held that
counsel's reference to his acquaintance with plaintiffs witness was, in
effect, testimony by the attorney about the witness' credibility.10 9 Re-
ferring to attacks made on the memory and truthfulness of the witness
during the trial, I" plaintiff's counsel, over defendant's objection,
stated: "[Plaintiff's witness] is a man of honesty and integrity and he is
not going to. . . commit perjury from the witness stand under oath. I
have known him for a long time and I know he is not a person who is
able to do that.""'
As courts in numerous other jurisdictions have pointed out, to per-
mit such conduct allows the attorney to bolster the credibility of the
witness through unsworn testimony that is not subject to cross-exami-
nation." l2 Additionally, when the trial judge overrules an objection
and permits counsel to argue facts outside the evidence presented in the
case, the judge, in effect, highlights the error by putting his stamp of
approval on the argument.t13 The Currituck Grain court properly re-
cognized the great potential for prejudice when an attorney is allowed
to vouch for the credibility of his witness in his closing argument.
107. Plaintiffs counsel's improper closing statement regarding his client's veracity coupled
with plaintiffs witness' expression of an opinion on the ultimate issue in the case, see text accom-
panying notes 114-131 infra, resulted in the Curriluck Grain court ordering a new trial for defend-
ant. Id. at 12, 246 S.E.2d at 856.
108. In State v. Monk, 291 N.C. 37, 229 S.E.2d 163 (1976), the North Carolina Supreme Court
faced a somewhat similar problem but did not directly rule on the issue. The district attorney in
Monk stated that he had known the State's witness for 15 years and further implied that he per-
sonally felt the witness was telling the truth. The Monk court noted its disapproval of the argu-
ment but found no prejudicial error and did not elaborate on the issue.
109. 38 N.C. App. at 12, 246 S.E.2d at 856. In light of the general rule that counsel may refer
to any evidence contained in the record during his closing argument, he should also be able to
comment on the credibility of a witness if his remarks are based on evidence introduced in the
case. See State v. Gauger, 200 Kan. 515, 438 P.2d 455 (1968).
110. The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that counsel, by making improper remarks
to the jury, may invite retaliatory argument by opposing counsel. State v. McCall, 289 N.C. 512,
223 S.E.2d 303 (1976). In McCall, defense counsel vehemently attacked the credibility of several
of the State's witnesses, referring to one of them as a liar. The district attorney responded with an
abrasive attack on defendant's counsel and also made several general comments concerning the
good character of the State's witnesses. The supreme court found no error, holding that the re-
marks of the defense counsel opened the door for the district attorney's argument. The attack on
plaintiff's witness in Curriluck Grain took place during cross-examination rather than defense
counsel's closing argument. 38 N.C. App. at 12, 246 S.E.2d at 856.
111. 38 N.C. App. at I1, 246 S.E.2d at 856. The attorney also stated that the witness was
known throughout the county for his honesty and integrity and referred to his election to the
Currituck County School Board. Id.
112. See Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 1240 (1962); 75 AM. JUR. 2d Trial §§ 305, 306 (1974).
113. See Crutcher v. Noel, 284 N.C. 568, 201 S.E.2d 855 (1974).
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G. Opinion
In Currituck Grain Inc. v. Powell,"4 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals also restated the rule that a witness should not be allowed to
express an opinion on the ultimate issue in the case." 5 This eviden-
tiary principle has been severely criticized over the past thirty-five
years"t6 and has been abandoned by many state courts.' 7 As Professor
Brandis suggests, the rule "has produced only confusion and unpredict-
ability, and [should] be completely revised or definitely repudiated by
the Court.""'
The traditional justification for the rule is that the witness would
be invading the province of the jury if allowed to express an opinion on
the exact question at issue.' 19 Courts adhering to the rule are con-
cerned that the members of the jury will substitute the opinion of the
witness for their own. It is often difficult to determine, however,
whether the opinion expressed actually goes to the ultimate issue in the
case.' 20 Also, the many recognized exceptions to the rule have tended
to make its application even more confusing.' 2 1 Moreover, abolition of
114. 38 N.C. App. 7, 246 S.E.2d 853 (1978).
115. Id. at 11, 246 S.E.2d at 856. This rule is generally assumed to apply to expert as well as
lay opinions. Application of the rule may be relaxed, however, when expert testimony is involved.
See 1 STANSBURY, supra note 2, § 126, at 393 n.33.
116. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 12, at 27. McCormick points out that the trend began
with the Iowa Supreme Court's decision in Grismore v. Consolidated Prods. Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5
N.W.2d 646 (1942). The Grismore court held that, as long as the matter at issue is one in which
opinion testimony is proper, the witness' opinion should be admitted "even though it passes upon
a controlling fact, or the ultimate fact which the jury must determine." Id. at 344, 5 N.W.2d at
655-56.
117. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 12, at 27. McCormick indicates that a majority of state
courts have discarded the rule in the area of expert testimony and that at least a few courts have
allowed ultimate issue opinion by lay witnesses. Id. Under FED. R. EVID. 704, an opinion, other-
wise admissible, "is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the
trier of fact."
118. 1 STANSBURY, supra note 2, § 126, at 393. For a discussion of early North Carolina cases
illustrating the problems created by the rule, see Note, 16 N.C.L. REv. 180 (1938). See also 7
WIGMORE, supra note 4, §§ 1920, 1921 (referring to rule as empty rhetoric).
119. See, e.g., Starkey Paint Co. v. Springfield Life Ins. Co., 24 N.C. App. 507, 211 S.E.2d 498
(1975) (in action on insurance policy in which defendant insurer denied coverage, contending that
death was by suicide, trial court erred in admitting testimony by witness who testified that, upon
seeing insured's body, he stated "he has committed suicide").
120. E.g.., State v. Atkinson, 278 N.C. 168, 179 S.E.2d 410 (1971) (ultimate issue was whether
victim had been raped; State's pathologist allowed to express his opinion that victim had been
penetrated and that injuries could have been caused by a male organ); Triad Constructors, Inc. v.
Morris, 25 N.C. App. 647, 214 S.E.2d 209 (1975) (in counterclaim action for breach of contract in
which defendant alleged that plaintiff failed to properly elevate floor of building, defendant's
expert witness was allowed to testify that elevation of floor by 5 3/4 inches would have prevented
drainage problems).
121. 1 STANSBURY, supra note 2, §§ 126-129, at 134, 198-99. Stansbury points out that excep-
tions to the rule are recognized when the following questions are at issue: (1) mental capacity or
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the rule would not, as some decisions suggest, open the door to opin-
ions that merely tell the jury how to decide the case. 122 The guidelines
applicable to the admission of opinion evidence in general would pro-
vide adequate safeguards. First, opinion testimony on any issue is
inadmissible when the witness can relate the facts in a manner that the
jury can understand or the jury is as well-qualified as the witness to
draw a conclusion from the facts. 23 A witness' opinion in either situa-
tion is clearly of no help to the jury in deciding the case. 124 Second,
opinions-on questions of law are always excluded. 25 Even courts per-
mitting opinion on the ultimate issue prohibit questions that call for the
witness to give a legal opinion.'2 6 Finally, the basis for a witness' opin-
ion is always subject to attack during cross-examination. 27
In Currituck Grain, the ultimate issue was whether defendant came
within the Uniform Commercial Code's (UCC) definition of
"merchant."' 128 A merchant is defined in the UCC as one who has
knowledge or skill peculiar to the transaction in question. 29 On direct
examination plaintiff's chief witness was allowed to testify over objec-
tion that, in his opinion, defendant had the special knowledge and skill
condition; (2) habits of temperance or intemperance; (3) solvency or insolvency; (4) identity; (5)
handwriting; and (6) value. Id. § 126, at 395. Also, numerous cases have avoided the issue by
treating the witness' testimony as a shorthand statement of fact rather than an opinion. See, e.g.,
Tarkington v. Rock Hill Printing & Finishing Co., 230 N.C. 354, 53 S.E.2d 269 (1949) (testimony
of witness characterized as shorthand statement of fact rather than opinion and therefore did not
invade province of jury); Morris v. Lambeth, 203 N.C. 695, 166 S.E. 790 (1932) (plaintiff alleged
property damage caused by negligent construction of dam; defendant's witness allowed to state
that, in his opinion, dam broke due to some "manner of explosion").
122. See, e.g., Ponder v. Cobb, 257 N.C. 281, 126 S.E.2d 67 (1962).
123. If either condition is absent, the opinion should be admitted. The reference in the second
condition to a witness with knowledge superior to the jury refers to testimony by an expert. 1
STANSBURY, supra note 2, § 124, at 388-89; see, e.g., Davis v. Cahoon, I1 N.C. App. 395, 181
S.E.2d 229 (1971).
124. See I STANSBURY, supra note 2, § 123, at 386. The advisory committee note to FED. R.
EvID. 704, discussedin note 117 supra, points out that opinions that merely tell the jury what result
to reach should be excluded under FED. R. EVID. 403 as evidence that wastes time.
125. See, e.g., State v. Sawyer, 26 N.C. App. 728, 217 S.E.2d 116, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 395,
218 S.E.2d 469 (1975) (court properly excluded question put to policeman on cross-examination
concerning his duty under law at issue); Brooks & Brooks, Ltd. v. Easton's Culligan Water Condi-
tioning, 28 N.C. App. 143, 220 S.E.2d 147 (1975) (question concerning whether offer was
"amended" held not to require expression of legal opinion).
126. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 12, at 28-29. McCormick points out that when the
issue is one's capacity to make a will "a court taking the view that there may be opinion upon an
ultimate issue would approve a question, 'Did X have mental capacity sufficient to understand the
nature and effect of his will?' but would frown on the question, 'Did X have sufficient mental
capacity to make a will?' " Id. § 12, at 29.
127. See 1 STANSBURY, supra note 2, § 35, at 103-08.
128. 38 N.C. App. at 8-9, 246 S.E.2d at 855.
129. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-104(1) (1965).
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necessary to sell corn and soybean "futures."' 13° At no time was the
witness asked if he believed defendant was a "merchant" when the
transaction in question took place. 131 Nevertheless, the court held that
the form of the questions1 32 called for the witness to answer the very
legal question at issue in the case. This seems to be a very questionable
result, especially in light of defendant's opportunity to expose any
weakness in the basis for plaintiff's witness' opinion on cross-examina-
tion. The North Carolina courts should examine the experience of ju-
risdictions that have abandoned the rule prohibiting "ultimate issue"
opinion. Application of the basic principles regarding opinion evi-
dence would appear to provide adequate assurance that the province of
the jury is not infringed by such evidence.
VIRGINIA ANNE BUSH
JAMES W. Hovis
130. Id at 10-11, 246 S.E.2d at 855.
131. Defendant objected to the following questions:
Q. And did he hold himself out as having knowledge by his occupation as a




WITNESS: I certainly felt like he knew what he was talking about.
BY MR. BRUMSEY:




Id. at 10-11, 246 S.E.2d at 855 (quoting Record at 24).
132. Id. at 11, 246 S.E.2d at 855-56.
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VIII. FAMILY LAW1
A1. Child Custody and Support
1. Termination of Parental Rights
The court of appeals in In re Dinsmore2 denied the Guilford
County Department of Social Services' request to terminate respon-
dent's parental rights over her child, even though respondent never ini-
tiated plans for the return of the child during the three years the child
was in custody of the department,3 or responded affirmatively to at-
tempts by the department to effect the child's return during that time.4
In reaching its decision, the court ignored the best interests of the child5
and narrowly construed former G.S. 7A-288(1) and (3),6 the statutory
1. Two 1978 cases that are treated elsewhere involved significant family law issues.
Important conflict of laws issues were resolved by the court of appeals in Vincent v. Vincent, 38
N.C. App. 50, 248 S.E.2d 410 (1978). The Vincent court held that a sister state that has personal
jurisdiction over both spouses in a divorce action may terminate a prior North Carolina alimony
decree, and that a sister state may, regardless of whether it has personal jurisdiction over both
parties, modify a prior North Carolina alimony decree to the same extent that a North Carolina
court may do so. The court further established that the obligation to make alimony payments
decreed by a North Carolina court, but properly terminated by a sister state, is extinguished at the
time the foreign decree terminating the payments is entered. For a discussion of Vincent, see this
Survey, Constitutional Law: Full Faith and Credit.
The supreme court in Gardner v. Gardner, 294 N.C. 172, 240 S.E.2d 399 (1978), considered
the important procedural question of the applicability of the compulsory counterclaim provisions
of N.C.R. Civ. P. 13(a) to divorce actions. The court held that rule 13(a) applies in divorce actions
as it does in other civil actions, but that a claim arising out of a marital dispute that forms the
basis of an action filed by one spouse can be prosecuted after final judgment has been entered in
that spouse's prior action and is not barred by rule 13(a) so long as proceedings in the second
spouse's claim were not instituted during the pendency of the other spouse's action. For an
extensive discussion of Gardner, see Note, New Rulesfor an Old Game, North Carolina Compulsory
Counterclaim Provision Applies in Divorce Actions, 57 N.C.L. REv. 439 (1979).
2. 36 N.C. App. 720, 245 S.E.2d 386 (1978).
3. The child had been in custody of the Department of Social Services since December 27,
1973. The action by the department to terminate the parents' rights to the child was instituted
November 19, 1976. Id. at 721, 245 S.E.2d at 386.
4. Since respondent's child has been in custody of the department, the department has tried
unsuccessfully to help respondent overcome her chronic alcoholism and has counseled respondent
on the actions she must take to regain custody of the child. Against the advice of the department,
respondent continues to live with a man who prevents her child from visiting her. Id. at 721-23,
245 S.E.2d at 386-88.
5. The court never discussed whether termination of respondent's parental rights would be
in the best interest of the child, even though the "best interest" standard guides courts in custody
disputes and adoption proceedings. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (Supp. 1977); id. § 48-1(3)
(1976).
6. These provisions provided:
Termination of parental rights.-In cases where the court has adjudicated a child to be
neglected or dependent, the court shall have authority to enter an order which terminates
the parental rights with respect to such child if the court finds any one of the following:
(1) That the parent has abandoned the child for six consecutive months prior to
the special hearing in which termination of parental rights is considered or that
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provisions governing termination of parental rights under which the
case arose. The court equated abandonment under former G.S. 7A-
288(1), which was a condition for termination of parental rights, to
wilfull abandonment under G.S. 48-2,7 which governs adoption of
abandoned children, and applied the same criminal wilfulness stan-
dard8 used in interpreting G.S. 48-2 to both G.S. 7A-288(l) and (3).
Applying these circumscribed definitions of abandon and wilful, the
court found that respondent had neither abandoned her child under
G.S. 7A-288(l) nor wilfully failed to contribute adequate financial sup-
port to her child under G.S. 7A-288(3). 9
Although discussion of the merits of the Dinsmore decision has
been mooted by the replacement of former G.S. 7A-288 with G.S.
chapter 7A, article 24B-Termination of Parental Rights,' 0 this deci-
sion is instructive in that it reveals an unwillingness by the court of
a child is an abandoned child as defined by Chapter 48 of the General Statutes
entitled "Adoption of Minors."
(3) That the parent has willfully failed to contribute adequate financial support to
a child placed in the custody of an agency. . . for a period of six months ....
Law of June 19, 1969, ch. 911, § 2, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 1047 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-288 (1969)). This section was repealed in 1977 and replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 7A-289.22 to .34 (Cum. Supp 1977), effective October 1, 1977. Because the action in Dinsmore
was instituted prior to October 1, 1977, the case was decided under former § 7A-288.
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-2. Section 48-2(3a) provides that "an abandoned child shall be
any child who has been willfully abandoned at least six consecutive months immediately preced-
ing institution of an action or proceeding to declare the child to be an abandoned child." Id. § 48-
2(3a).
Section 48-2(3b), which is similar to former § 7A-288(3), quotedin note 6 supra, provides that
an abandoned child is "a child who has been placed in the care of a child-caring institution or
foster home, and whose parent. . . has failed substantially and continuously for a period of more
than six months to maintain contact with such child, and has willfully failed for such period to
contribute adequate support to such child." The court must also find that diligent but unsuccess-
ful efforts have been made on the part of the institution or a child placing agency to encourage the
parent to strengthen the parental or custodial relationship to the child. Id. § 48-2(3b).
8. The criminal wilfulness test is taken from State v. Whitener, 93 N.C. 590, 592 (1885), in
which the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that:
The word willful, used in a statute creating a criminal offense, means something more
than an intention to do a thing. It implies the doing the act purposely and deliberately,
indicating a purpose to do it, without authority-careless whether he has the right or
not-in violation of law, and it is this which makes the criminal intent, without which
one can not be brought within the meaning of a criminal statute.
In re Hoose, 243 N.C. 589, 91 S.E.2d 555 (1956), read this definition of wilfulness into § 48-2. In
re Maynor, 38 N.C. App. 724, 248 S.E.2d 875 (1978), is a good example of the application of this
criminal wilfulness standard to § 48-2. The court in Maynor held that petitioner's son, who had
been placed in the custody of the social services department by petitioner's wife, had not been
abandoned according to the requirements of§ 48-2(3a) or (3b), because petitioner was unaware of
his wife's actions and did not intentionally refrain from supporting his son but was prevented
from doing so by his incarceration.
9. 36 N.C. App. at 725-27, 245 S.E.2d at 388-89.
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 7A, art. 24B (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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appeals to terminate parental rights despite indications that the best
interest of the child would be served by termination. The case further
suggests possible unintended interpretations of the current statutes
dealing with termination of parental rights. Because this decision was
the first to interpret former G.S. 7A-288(l) and (3), the court, rather
than relying upon the definitions in the adoption statute," could have
adopted more flexible definitions of "abandonment" and "willful re-
fusal to provide adequate support" to achieve a desirable result from
the standpoint of the child's welfare. The court's refusal to terminate
respondent's parental rights leaves the child in an uncertain state, inca-
pable of being permanently placed in a new home through adoption 12
and unable to return to respondent's custody because of respondent's
behavior.' 3
The new provision, G.S. 7A-289.32, would, on its face, dictate a
different result in Dinsmore.14 The current provisions give the court the
ability to decide disputes involving parental rights on the basis of the
best interest of the child and vest the court with broad discretionary
power in reaching its decision whether to terminate parental rights.' 5
11. See notes 7 & 8 supra.
12. Consent of the parent is required for adoption unless the parent's rights to the child have
been judicially terminated or the court finds that the child has been abandoned as defined in § 48-
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-5 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
13. See note 4 supra.
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32 (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides six grounds for terminating
parental rights:
(I) The parent has without cause failed to establish or maintain concern or responsibil-
ity as to the child's welfare.
(2) The parent has physicially abused or neglected the child ....
(3) The parent has willfully left the child in foster care for more than two consecutive
years without showing to the satisfaction of court that substantial progress has been
made within two years in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the
child for neglect, or without showing positive response within two years to the diligent
efforts of a county department of social services . . . to encourage the parent to
strengthen the parental relationship to the child or to make and follow through with
constructive planning for the future of the child.
(4) The child has been placed in the custody of a county department of social services
. .and the parent, for a continuous period of six months next preceding the filing of the
petition, has failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the child.
(5) One parent has been awarded custody.., and the other parent whose parental
rights are sought to be terminated has for a period of one year or more... willfully
failed without justification to pay for the care, support, and education of the child, as
required by said decree or custody agreement.
(6) (deals with the father of children born out of wedlock)
If Dinsmore had been decided under these provisions, respondent's parental rights could arguably
have been terminated on the basis of § 7A-289.32(l), (3) or (4).
15. Section 7A-289.22(3) specifically states that the interest of the child is paramount in de-
ciding disputes involving termination of parental rights. Id. § 7A-289.22(3).
No provision of G.S. 7A-289.32, 16 which lists six grounds for terminat-
ing parental rights, requires that the child be abandoned before paren-
tal rights can be terminated, and the term "willful" is deleted from the
new counterpart to former G.S. 7A-288(3), which provided for termi-
nation upon wilfull failure to support.1 7 Nevertheless, it is possible that
the terms "without cause" in G.S. 7A-289.32(l), which provides for ter-
mination when the parent has without cause failed to act responsibly
for the child's welfare, and "willfully left" in G.S. 7A-289.32(3),' s
which provides for termination when the parent has wilfully left the
child under foster care for over two consecutive years, could be inter-
preted in the same manner as former G.S. 7A-288(l) and (3) were in-
terpreted in Dinsmore. This interpretation would frustrate the
legislative intent of the current provisions;' 9 but, considering the court's
approach in Dinsmore, such an interpretation is not unlikely.
2. Child Custody
Potential conflict between the statutory mandate to award custody
to the person or agency that will best promote the interest and welfare
of the child,20 and the strong presumption that the natural parent may
not be deprived of custody except upon "convincing proof" of some
"extraordinary fact or circumstance," 2' was definitively resolved by the
court of appeals in In re Kowalzek 2 The child in the Kowatzek case,
whose natural mother was alive, had been in the custody of another
couple for three years. 3 Although the natural parent was not deprived
of custody because of insufficient findings of fact by the lower court
16. Id. § 7A-289.32, quoted in note 14 supra.
17. Id. § 7A-289.32(4); see notes 6 & 14 supra.
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32(l), (3) (Cum. Supp. 1977), quoted in note 14 supra.
19. Article 24B is to be liberally construed to promote the best interests of the child. Id.
§ 7A-289.22(3).
20. Id. § 50-13.2(a).
21. Thomas v. Pickard, 18 N.C. App. 1, 4, 195 S.E.2d 339, 342 (1973). This language describ-
ing the conditions under which a parent may be deprived of custody is typical. The supreme court
similarly stated in Spitzer v. Lewark, 259 N.C. 50, 53-54, 129 S.E.2d 620, 623 (1963), that the
parent's natural and legal right to custody may not "lightly be denied or interfered with" except
for the "most substantial and sufficient reasons."
22. 37 N.C. App. 364, 246 S.E.2d 45, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 734, 248 S.E.2d 863 (1978).
23. Petitioner (the mother) left her husband and infant son, Jeffrey, on December 1, 1974,
and returned to her former home in Minnesota. Jeffrey lived with his father until February 28,
1975, when his father was killed in an automobile accident. Petitioner was aware of her husband's
death but did not attempt to locate her son. Legal custody of Jeffrey was awarded to the Lee
County Department of Social Services, and physical custody of Jeffrey was awarded to Mrs.
Liendo and her sister in March 1975. Jeffrey had been living with the Liendos since that time. Id.
at 365-66, 246 S.E.2d at 45-46.
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concerning her fitness as guardian,24 the Kowalzek court explicitly held
that the natural parent does not have to be found unfit to be deprived
of custody.25 The statutory directive, therefore, outweighs the pre-
sumption favoring the natural parent. Although fitness of the parent is
of greatest importance in determining what course of action will best
promote the interests of the child, it is not conclusive.26 This decision
was implicit in prior case law27 and is consistent with the court's re-
peated emphasis on the best interests of the child as the "polar star"28
in custody disputes.
In keeping with the North Carolina court's treatment of visitation
rights as a form of custody,2 9 the supreme court in Clark v. Clark3"
expressly stated that "[v]isitation privileges are but a lesser degree of
custody" 3' and held that the term "custody" as used in G.S. 50-13.732
includes visitation rights.33 Consequently, modification of an award of
24. Id. at 369-70, 246 S.E.2d at 48.
25. Id. at 368, 246 S.E.2d at 47.
26. The question whether the court must award custody to a third person if the natural parent
is found unfit remains open. It is possible that the best interest of the child would require that the
child remain in the custody of an unfit parent. Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-289.31(a), (b) (Cum.
Supp. 1977) (finding one or more grounds for terminating parental rights does not require termi-
nation of parent's rights unless in best interests of the child to do so).
27. North Carolina courts have consistently held that a parent's natural right to custody is
not absolute, and that while a parent is ordinarily entitled to custody as against all other persons,
custody may be judicially denied for substantial reasons. E.g., In re Stancil, 10 N.C App. 545, 179
S.E.2d 844 (1971). See also In re Bowen, 7 N.C. App. 236, 172 S.E.2d 62 (1970). In discussing
who between the mother and father should be awarded custody of their child, the court in Bowen
stated, "We do not understand the law in this jurisdiction to be... that a change in custody may
not be ordered absent a finding that the person having custody under a prior order has become
unfit or is no longer able or suited to retain custody." Id. at 241-42, 172 S.E.2d at 65.
While a specific finding that the natural parent was unfit has been made in almost every
North Carolina case in which the natural parent was deprived of custody, e.g., In re Hughes, 254
N.C. 434, 119 S.E.2d 189 (1961), the court of appeals in In re Morrison, 6 N.C. App. 47, 169
S.E.2d 228 (1969), awarded custody to the paternal grandparents without an express finding that
the mother was unfit.
28. E.g., Ridenhour v. Ridenhour, 225 N.C. 508, 514, 35 S.E.2d 617, 620 (1945).
29. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Montgomery, 32 N.C. App. 154,231 S.E.2d 26 (1977) (award of
visitation rights, analogous to award of custody, should contain findings of fact that support con-
clusion that party is fit person to visit child and that such visitation rights are in best interests of
child); In re Stancd, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971) (award of visitation rights, like
award of custody, is exercise of judicial function).
30. 294 N.C. 554, 243 S.E.2d 129 (1978).
31. Id. at 575-76, 243 S.E.2d at 142.
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.7 (1976) provides:
(a) An order of a court of this State for custody or support, or both, of a minor
child may be modified at any time, upon. . . a showing of changed circumstances ....
(b) When an order for custody or support, or both, of a minor child has been
entered by a court of another state, a court of this State may,. . . upon a showing of
changed circumstances, enter a new order.., which modifies or supersedes such order
for custody or support.
33. 294 N.C. at 576, 243 S.E.2d at 142.
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visitation rights, as in modification of custody awards, requires a show-
ing of changed circumstances.3 4 The court in Clark made it clear that
this requirement of a showing of changed circumstances before a visita-
tion award can be modified is absolute. Reversing the court of appeals,
the court held that a court must "determine whether changed circum-
stances affecting the welfare of the child" justify modification of a visi-
tation award even when the parties have agreed that the court may
change their visitation privileges without such a showing.35
3. Child Support
The supreme court in Elmwood v. Elmwood 36 clarified the types of
military payments that are subject to garnishment under G.S. 110-13631
to enforce child support obligations.38  Defendant-garnishee in Elm-
wood was a retired regular officer of the Marine Corps39 and received
military retirement and disability payments."n The court held that de-
fendant's retirement pay was subject to garnishment under G.S. 110-
136 but that his disability pay was not.41 Controlling federal law re-
quires that this distinction be drawn between the two types of payments
defendant received. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 659, only monies received
from the United States as "remuneration for employment" are subject
to garnishment in accordance with applicable state law.42 While the
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.7(a) (1976), quoted in note 32 su ra.
35. 294 N.C. at 575, 243 S.E.2d at 141.
36. 295 N.C. 168, 244 S.E.2d 668 (1978).
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-136 (1978 & Interim Supp. 1978). Section 110-136(a) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, in any case in which a responsible par-
ent is under a court order or has entered into a written agreement... to provide child
support, a judge... may enter an order of garnishment whereby no more than 25 per-
cent (25%) of the responsible parent's monthly disposable earnings shall be garnished for
the support of his minor child.
Id. § 110-136(a) (Interim Supp. 1978).
38. For a similar analysis of the types of military payments that are subject to garnishment
for alimony, see Watson v. Watson, 424 F. Supp. 866 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
39. There is a significant difference between retired regular officers and retired reserve of-
ficers. A retired regular officer of the military services is subject to recall to active duty under
certain circumstances and remains subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, neither of
which is true of retired reserve officers. Hostinsky v. United States, 292 F.2d 508, 510 (Ct. Cl.
1961). This distinction is determinative of whether military retirement pay is garnishable. See
text accompanying notes 41-43 infra.
40. 295 N.C. at 170, 244 S.E.2d at 669-70.
41. Id. at 180-81, 244 S.E.2d at 676. The court, however, made no finding on whether de-
fendant was actually disabled in support of designation of part of his retirement pay as disability
pay.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1976) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law.., moneys (the entitlement to which
is based upon the remuneration for employment) due from, or payable by, the United
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retirement pay of retired reserve officers is considered akin to a pension
for past services, retirement pay of retired regular officers is considered
current compensation for present services.43 True military disability
payments obviously have no relationship to performance of services
and, therefore, cannot be garnished. Although federal law determines
the type of payments received from the United States that can be gar-
nished, state law determines the extent to which the appropriate pay-
ments can be garnished. G.S. 110-136 restricts the extent to which
defendant's retirement pay may be garnished for child support to
twenty-five percent of his monthly disposable retirement income.44
A novel question concerning the ability of one party to pay the
attorneys' fees of the other party in a child support action was
presented to the court of appeals in Wyatt v. Wyatt.45 Plaintiff father in
Wyatt claimed the trial court erred in considering his present wife's
income in determining his ability to pay the attorneys' fees of his for-
mer wife incurred in an action brought by the former wife for support
of a child by the former marriage.46 Apparently relying on the broad
discretion bestowed upon North Carolina courts by G.S. 50-13.641 to
determine an award of reasonable attorneys' fees in a child custody or
support action,48 the court of appeals held that the income of plaintiffs
present wife was a proper factor to consider in assessing his financial
circumstances and ability to pay the former wife's counsel fees.49 The
court reasoned that consideration of plaintilfs present wife's income
was justified because plaintiffs present wife was a member of his
household, shared in the, responsibility for supporting the household,
and was the mother of all three children living in the household.50
Nevertheless, the Wyatt decision should not be read to imply that con-
sideration of a second spouse's income is generally appropriate in
States... to any individual including members of the armed services, shall be subject,
in like manner and to the same extent as if the United States were a private person, to
legal process brought for the enforcement, against such individual of his legal obligations
to provide child support or make alimony payments.
43. 23 Comp. Gen. 284, 286 (1943).
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-136(a) (Interim Supp. 1978), quotedin note 37 supra.
45. 35 N.C. App. 650, 242 S.E.2d 180 (1978).
46. Id. at 651, 242 S.E.2d at 181.
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.6 (1976) specifically authorizes an award of reasonable attor-
neys' fees in an action for child support or custody or a modification of an existing order for child
support or custody.
48. See Kearns v. Kearns, 6 N.C. App. 319, 170 S.E.2d 132 (1969). The court in Wyatt cites
no authority to support its holding.




determining financial ability under G.S. 50-13.6. In Wyatt, plaintiff
himself introduced evidence of his present wife's income;-" under simi-
lar circumstances in Wyche v. Wyche,5 2 plaintiff father did not intro-
duce evidence of his second wife's income and the court made no
inquiries about her income. 3
B. Divorce and Alimony
1. Relation with Separation Agreement
Several recent decisions5 4 have dispelled much of the lingering
confusion over the nature and incidents of the relationship between a
separation agreement and a divorce decree. A divorce decree may
merely approve the separation agreement of the parties or the separa-
tion agreement may be incorporated and adopted into the divorce de-
cree.55 The power of the court to modify support payments set forth in
the separation agreement and the types of remedies available to enforce
the provisions of the agreement depend upon whether the separation
agreement is adopted or only approved by the court.56 The supreme
court in Levitch v. Levitch 7 further described how to make the critical
distinction between court adoption and court approval of a separation
agreement.
The separation agreement in Levitch had been incorporated by
reference into a divorce decree, but not specifically adopted by the
court as its own order. Plaintiff wife sought to enforce the support pro-
visions of the agreement through the court's contempt power.5 8 Be-
51. Id. at 652, 242 S.E.2d at 182.
52. 29 N.C. App. 685, 225 S.E.2d 626, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 668, 228 S.E.2d 459 (1976).
53. Plaintiff's "new family" was mentioned in Wyche, id. at 687, 225 S.E.2d at 628, but no
specific reference was made to his present wife. Plaintiff's affidavit of financial standing, which
listed his income and expenses, did not include any income from his present wife. Record at 28-
31.
54. Levitch v. Levitch, 294 N.C. 437, 241 S.E.2d 506 (1978); Britt v. Britt, 36 N.C. App. 705,
245 S.E.2d 381 (1978); White v. White, 37 N.C. App. 471, 246 S.E.2d 591 (1978). For a discussion
of Britt and *hte, see text accompanying notes 106-19 infra.
55. In the former case, "the court merely approves or sanctions the payments which the hus-
band has agreed to make for the wife's support and sets them out in a judgment against him. Such
a judgment constitutes nothing more than a contract between the parties made with the approval
of the court." In the latter case, however, "the court adopts the agreement of the parties as its own
determination of their respective rights and obligations and orders the husband to pay the speci-
fied amounts as alimony." Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C 67, 69, 136 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1964).
56. Unlike separation agreements that have been adopted by a court, separation agreements
that have merely been approved by a court may not be modified by the court upon a showing of
changed circumstances and are not enforceable by contempt. Id.
57. 294 N.C. 437, 241 S.E.2d 506 (1978).
58. Id. at 438, 241 S.E.2d at 507. '
1979] 1091
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW V
cause only those agreements that have been adopted by the court can
be enforced through the court's contempt power,59 determination of
whether these provisions were enforceable by contempt necessarily in-
volved a finding of whether the trial court adopted the agreement as its
own adjudication of the rights of the parties or merely approved the
agreement. The trial court specifically ordered that the agreement be
incorporated by reference into the divorce decree but did not order de-
fendant husband to make the support payments specified therein.60
The court in Lepitch was thus presented with the question whether a
specific court order that the supporting spouse make the support pay-
ments set out in a separation agreement is necessary for court adoption
of the agreement. Reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court
held that an order to incorporate a separation agreement into a divorce
decree does not require a specific order to comply with the support pro-
visions of the agreement to give the agreement the force of a judicial
decree and, thereby, render it enforceable through the contempt power
of the court.61
Prior case law was silent on the precise issue addressed by the
Levitch court, but suggested that a court order to make the payments
agreed upon in a separation agreement was required for court adoption
of the agreement. 2 In Bunn v. Bunn,63 the landmark case defining the
differences between court approval and court adoption of a separation
agreement, the supreme court stated that in consent judgments that en-
dow the separation agreement with the force of a judicial decree "the
court adopts the agreement of the parties as its own determination of
their respective rights and obligations and orders the husband to pay
the specified amounts as alimony."' Subsequent cases reinforced the
idea that a court order to make support payments was a prerequisite to
court adoption of the agreement. In explaining the two types of con-
sent judgments described in Bunn, the supreme court in Mitchell v.
Mitchell65 stated, "When. . . a court. . . orders the husband to make
specified payments to his wife for her support, his wilful failure to com-
ply with the court's judgment will subject him to attachment for con-
59. See note 56 supra.
60. 294 N.C. at 439, 241 S.E.2d at 507.
61. Id. at 440, 241 S.E.2d at 508.
62. E.g., Mitchell v. Mitchell, 270 N.C. 253, 154 S.E.2d 71 (1967); Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C.
67, 136 S.E.2d 240 (1964).
63. 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E.2d 240 (1964).
64. Id. at 69, 136 S.E.2d at 242 (emphasis added).
65. 270 N.C. 253, 154 S.E.2d 71 (1967).
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tempt .... This is true . . . 'because the judgment requires the
payment.' "66 The Levitch decision makes it clear, however, that a di-
vorce decree can require compliance with support payments set forth in
a separation agreement through court adoption of the agreement with-
out specifically ordering that the support payments be made.
Because the Levitch court looked to the trial court's intent in or-
dering incorporation of the agreement to determine whether the agree-
ment had the effect of a judicial decree,67 this decision should be read
with a measure of caution and should not be interpreted to mean that
an order of incorporation without a specific order to comply with the
support provisions of the agreement automatically converts the separa-
tion 'agreement into a judicial decree. A court may not always intend
that the separation agreement be adopted by the court when the provi-
sions of the agreement are incorporated into a divorce decree but are
not expressly made the subject of the court's own order.68 In addition,
the divorce judgment may be a consent judgment,69 in which case the
intent of the parties, not that of the court, controls in determining the
effect of the judgment.7 ° Thus, had the Levitch judgment been a con-
sent judgment,7' language contained in the agreement stating that the
agreement was not to be merged in a divorce decree,72 could properly
have been given more weight in interpreting the effect of the decree
than was given it in Levitch.
2. Divorce from Bed and Board
In Trplett v. Trliett,73 a case of first impression, the court of ap-
peals considered whether one spouse may pursue an action for divorce
from bed and board74 and alimony while both spouses are staying to-
gether in the same house. Defendant husband in Trplett had moved
66. Id. at 256, 154 S.E.2d at 73 (quoting Sessions v. Sessions, 178 Minn. 79, 80, 226 N.W. 701,
701 (1929) (per curiam)) (emphasis added).
67. 294 N.C. at 439, 241 S.E.2d at 507-08.
68. See Williford v. Williford, 10 N.C. App. 451, 179 S.E.2d 113, cert. denied, 278 N.C. 301,
180 S.E.2d 177 (1971). The court in Willfordheld that incorporation of the support provisions of
a separation agreement into a divorce decree without a specific order to either party to comply
with the incorporated provisions was not sufficient to establish court adoption of the agreement.
69. Divorce decrees based on separation for the statutory period are typically consent judg-
ments. See, e.g., Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E.2d 240 (1964).
70. Yount v. Lowe, 288 N.C. 90, 215 S.E.2d 563 (1975); 46 AM. JUR. Judgments § 73 (1969).
71. 294 N.C. at 439, 241 S.E.2d at 507-08.
72. The separation agreement in Levitch contained a proviso that it should survive a divorce
decree but not be merged therein. Id. at 439, 241 S.E.2d at 507.
73. 38 N.C. App. 364, 248 S.E.2d 69 (1978).
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-7 (1976) provides:
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out of the marital abode prior to plaintiff's initiation of the divorce and
alimony action, but he occasionally stayed with plaintiff for several
days at a time and was staying with plaintiff during the hearing in the
action.75 Plaintiff sought a divorce from bed and board and alimony
on the basis of defendant's wilful failure to provide her with support76
and his excessive use of alcohol.77 With little discussion of the issue
presented, the court held that spouses do not have to be living apart to
prosecute an action for divorce from bed and board."8
The Tr#7lel holding is stated too briefly because living apart is
obviously a condition for divorce from bed and board on the statutory
grounds of abandonment or maliciously turning the other spouse out of
doors. Nevertheless, the decision promotes a desirable policy of refus-
ing to find condonation, through continued cohabitation by the parties,
of continuing marital offenses such as cruelty and habitual drunken-
ness.79 This decision should be read with caution, however. Facts of
the case reveal that plaintiff and defendant had indeed separated; they
were not living together when the action was initiated, and defendant
was only staying at plaintifis residence temporarily during the hearing.
3. Changed Circumstances
The court of appeals in Stallings v. Stallings"° considered whether
post-divorce sexual misconduct of a dependent ex-spouse can consti-
tute changed circumstances, thereby justifying modification of a per-
The court may grant divorces from bed and board on application of the party in-
jured. . . in the following cases:
(1) If either party abandons his or her family.
(2) Maliciously turns the other out of doors.
(3) By cruel or barbarous treatment endangers the life of the other.
(4) Offers such indignities to the person of the other as to render his or her condi-
tion intolerable and life burdensome.
(5) Becomes an excessive user of alcohol or drugs so as to render the condition of
the other spouse intolerable and the life of that spouse burdensome.
75. 38 N.C. App. at 365-66, 248 S.E.2d at 71.
76. This claim is presumably an allegation of constructive abandonment. Several decisions
involving plaintiffs seeking alimony without divorce on the basis of abandonment have held plain-
tiffs allegations that defendant wilfully refused to provide plaintiff with adequate support suffi-
cient to state a claim for alimony without divorce on the ground of constructive abandonment.
See, e.g., Brady v. Brady, 273 N.C. 299, 160 S.E.2d 13 (1968). No decision, however, has granted
a divorce from bed and board on the ground of constructive abandonment.
77. Abandonment and habitual drunkenness are grounds for divorce from bed and board
under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-7(1), (5) (1976) as well as for alimony without divorce under id § 50-
16.2(4), (9).
78. 38 N.C. App. at 366, 248 S.E.2d at 71.
79. See generally I R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 83 (1963 & Supp. 1976).
80. 36 N.C. App. 643, 244 S.E.2d 494, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 648, 248 S.E.2d 249 (1978).
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manent alimony award.8 Defendant payor in Stallings claimed that
his former wife's occasional post-divorce fornication was a changed cir-
cumstance requiring termination or reduction in his alimony payments
to her.82 Taking a strict statutory approach, the court concluded that
post-divorce sexual misconduct does not provide a basis for modifica-
tion or termination of an alimony award because the term "changed
circumstance" as used in G.S. 50-16.9(a) 83 refers only to financial needs
and abilities of the former spouses. The court further noted that post-
divorce sexual misconduct is not included as a ground for termination
of alimony under G.S. 50-16.9(b),84 which provides that alimony shall
terminate upon the payee's remarriage. 85
C. Separation Agreements
In Murphy v. Murphy,8 6 the North Carolina Supreme Court, for
the first time, squarely addressed the question "whether a husband and
wife who, after having executed a separation agreement and estab-
lished separate abodes, continue to engage in sexual intercourse from
time to time thereby rescind the [separation] agreement.""7 Reversing
the court of appeals,88 the supreme court in Murphy held that sexual
81. An alimony award may be modified upon a showing of changed circumstances pursuant
to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(a) (1976).
82. 36 N.C. App. at 643-44, 244 S.E.2d at 495.
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(a) (1976).
84. Id. § 50-16.9(b).
85. 36 N.C. App. at 644-45, 244 S.E.2d at 495.
86. 295 N.C. 390, 245 S.E.2d 693 (1978).
87. Id. at 394, 245 S.E.2d at 696.
The North Carolina Supreme Court had previously held that a resumption of the conjugal
relationship between husband and wife, after a separation agreement has been duly executed,
rescinds the agreement. State v. Gossett, 203 N.C 641, 166 S.E. 754 (1932); Smith v. King, 107
N.C. 273, 12 S.E. 57 (1890) (per curiam). Similarly, the supreme court has consistently held that a
separation agreement between husband and wife is terminated, insofar as it remains executory,
upon their reconciliation and resumption of marital cohabitation. E.g., In re Estate of Adamee,
291 N.C. 386, 230 S.E.2d 541 (1976). The supreme court, however, has never defined the terms
"resumption of the conjugal relationship," "reconciliation" or "resumption of marital cohabita-
tion," and their meaning is not clear from the context of the cases. Gosset equated "conjugal
relationship" with sexual intercourse; the case held that a deed of separation is invalid if after its
execution the husband continues to visit his wife from time to time and upon each visit they
engage in sexual intercourse. 203 N.C. at 642-44, 166 S.E. at 754-55. In Smith, the phrase "re-
sumption of the conjugal relationship" described the wife's actions in moving back into the mari-
tal abode and residing there with her husband as man and wife for 12 months. 107 N C. at 6, 12
S.E. at 57. "Resumption of marital cohabitation" in Adamee also described the situation in which
the husband and wife move back into the marital abode and live as they did before the separation
and execution of a separation agreement. 291 N.C. at 393, 230 S.E.2d at 546. No supreme court
case, prior to Murphy, had discussed what is the minimally sufficient conduct by a husband and
wife that constitutes a reconciliation, and, therefore, an abrogation of the separation agreement.
88. 34 N.C. App. 677, 239 S.E.2d 597 (1977), rev'd, 295 N.C. 390, 245 S.E.2d 693 (1978).
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intercourse between husband and wife after the execution of a separa-
tion agreement rescinds the agreement regardless of whether their sex-
ual encounters are "'casual,' 'isolated,' or otherwise"89 and irrespective
of any intent, or lack thereof, by the parties to renew their marital rela-
tionship.9" The court in Murphy held the separation agreement exe-
cuted by plaintiff and defendant invalid solely because of the parties'
intermittent 9' post-separation sexual intercourse.
This decision is supported neither by reason nor by precedent. It
directly conflicts with a desirable policy of preserving marriages by en-
couraging reconciliation attempts between separated spouses who have
made a separation agreement, it is a much narrower holding than the
facts of the case demanded,92 and it inexplicably rejects case law devel-
oped by the court of appeals.93
The decision in Murphy is based almost exclusively94 on State v.
89. 295 N.C. at 397, 245 S.E.2d at 698.
90. Id. at 395, 245 S.E.2d at 697.
91. Plaintiff's and defendant's testimony on the exact number of times they engaged in sexual
intercourse after executing a separation agreement conflicted, but both admitted to having done so
at least six times. Defendant wife estimated the number at more than two dozen. d. at 393-94,
245 S.E.2d at 695-96.
92. The facts in Murphy indicated frequent visits between plaintiff and defendant, occasion-
ally coupled with sexual activity. There was conflicting evidence about whether the parties in-
tended to reconcile their differences and begin living together again as husband and wife. 295
N.C. at 392-93, 245 S.E.2d at 695-96.
93. Murphy impliedly overruled Cooke v. Cooke, 34 N.C. App. 124, 237 S.E.2d 323, cert.
denied, 293 N.C. 740, 241 S.E.2d 513 (1977), and Newton v. Williams, 25 N.C. App. 527, 214
S.E.2d 285 (1975), both of which held that a reconciliation between husband and wife sufficient to
rescind a separation agreement requires a mutual intent to resume cohabitation in a normal rela-
tionship of husband and wife and that sexual intercourse alone does not abrogate the agreement.
These cases are in accord with the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that have considered
the question. 1 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 8 (1964
& Supp. 1978). "The usual judicial approach is to be circumspect in finding that reconciliation
[necessitating rescission of the agreement] has occurred." Wadlington, SexualRelations After Sep-
aration or Divorce: The New Morality and the Old and New Divorce Laws, 63 VA. L. REv. 249,
261-62 (1977).
94. The court also cited the Lindey treatise and several cases from other jurisdictions in sup-
port of its conclusion. 295 N.C. at 397, 245 S.E.2d at 698 (citing I A. LINDEY, supra note 93, § 8,
at 13; Weeks v. Weeks, 143 Fla. 686, 197 So. 393 (1940); Wolff v. Wolff, 134 N.J. Eq. 8, 34 A.2d
150 (1943); Ahrens v. Ahrens, 67 Okla. 147, 169 P. 486 (1917)). These cites, however, do not
support the Murphy decision; the statement taken from Lindey is quoted out of context and the
cases are either not on point or have been limited by later decisions in their respective
jurisdictions.
The court in Murphy cited Lindey in support of its statement that severance of marital rela-
tions by a separation agreement and continued sexual intercourse are "essentially antagonistic and
irreconcilable notions." 295 N.C. at 397, 245 S.E.2d at 698 (quoting I A. LINDEY, supra note 93,
§ 8 at 13). Lindey, however, unequivocally states that "[a]brogation [of a separation agreement]
...is a matter of intention; it does not arise automatically as a matter of law." I A. LINDEY,
supra note 93, § 8, at 14.
Weeks v. Weeks, 143 Fla. 686, 197 So. 393 (1940), was a case cited by the court that was later
limited. Weeks held that plaintiff's and defendant's resumption of the marital relationship in
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Gossett. 95 This reliance is misplaced, however, because Gossett is eas-
ily distinguished from Murphy on its facts. Gossett, a prosecution for
criminal abandonment and nonsupport, was decided at a time when
separation agreements were not favored by North Carolina courts9
6
and presented a compelling factual situation for rescission of the sepa-
ration agreement. As a defense to prosecution, defendant pleaded a
separation agreement in which his wife relinquished any interest she
might have in his property. Evidence in the case clearly indicated that
defendant's wife had no independent counsel when she signed the
agreement, that she did not understand the provisions of the separation
agreement and that she was rendered destitute by the terms of the
agreement.97 The court in Gossett upheld defendant's conviction, find-
ing the separation agreement had been invalidated due to defendant's
post-separation sexual intercourse with his wife every time he visited
her.9
8
In Murphy, on the other hand, the separation agreement was
drawn up entirely by defendant wife's attorney, defendant was fully
aware of the extent of plaintiff's assets, and defendant was adequately
provided for by the terms of the agreement.99 Furthermore, there was
travelling together as man and wife on several occasions after separation abrogated their separa-
tion agreement. Subsequently, in Busot v. Busot, 338 So. 2d 1332, 1334 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
(dictum), the Florida Court of Appeals stated that the facts in Weeks showed a true reconciliation
between spouses while the facts in Busot (sexual intercourse between the parties an undisclosed
number of times coupled with unsuccessful attempts at reconciliation) did not. The court in Busot
explained the distinction, stating, "[o]bviously, reconciliation requires an intention of the parties
to reconcile and this requires more than some occasional post-separation sexual experiences." Id.
at 1334-35.
Wolffv. Wolff, 134 N.J. Eq. 8, 34 A.2d 150 (1943), held a separation agreement raised by the
husband as a defense to his wife's separate maintenance suit invalid for a number of reasons: the
agreement was grossly unfair to plaintiff wife who had no independent counsel when the separa-
tion agreement was executed, and the agreement was void as against public policy because it
facilitated divorce. In enumerating the laws of the separation agreement, the court stated without
discussion that the parties' continued normal cohabitation following execution of the separation
agreement, as though the agreement had never been made, effectively put an end to it. Id. at 141,
34 A.2d at 156 (dictum). Nothing in the opinion indicates what the court meant by "normal"
cohabitation.
In Ahrens v. Ahrens, 67 Okla. 147, 169 P. 486 (1917), plaintiff and defendant resumed living
together for a period of 10 days after execution of a separation agreement. Id. at 148, 169 P. at
487. Therefore, the issue in the case was not whether there was sufficient contact between husband
and wife short of actually living together to rescind a separation agreement.
95. 203 N.C. 641, 166 S.E. 754 (1932).
96. The court's hostility to separation agreements was openly acknowledged. Id. at 643, 166
S.E. at 754.
97. Id. at 642, 166 S.E. at 754.
98. Id. at 643-44, 166 S.E. at 755.
99. Record at 50-51, 72-79, 85-86, 94, Murphy v. Murphy, 34 N.C. App. 677, 239 S.E.2d 597
(1977). By the terms of the agreement defendant wife was to receive a lump-sum alimony award
of $12,000, all the household and kitchen furniture, a 1968 Oldsmobile, and a house trailer and lot
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no pervading fear in Murphy, as in Gossett, of separation agreements
being used by husbands as a means to escape the financial responsibili-
ties of marriage while remaining free to enjoy the benefits of marriage
by continuing to engage in sexual intercourse with their estranged
wives.' 00
The holding in Murphy becomes even more surprising when con-
sidered in light of prior North Carolina Supreme Court decisions that
imply that post-separation sexual activity between spouses who have no
intention of resuming a marital relationship does not interrupt the stat-
utory separation period and, thereby, bar a divorce based on separation
under G.S. 50-5(4)101 or 50-6.102 In both Young v. Young'03 and In re
Estate qfAdamee' ° the supreme court held that separation under G.S.
§ 50-5(4) or G.S. § 50-6 "means cessation of cohabitation, and cohabi-
tation means living together as man and wife, though not necessarily
implying sexual relations. Cohabitation includes other marital respon-
sibilities and duties [aside from sex]."'0 5
The Murphy decision is unsound for the reasons discussed above
and, accordingly, should be strictly limited to its facts. In light of the
circumstances of the case, the words "isolated" and "casual," held in
Murphy to describe sexual relations sufficient to rescind a separation
agreement, can perhaps be construed to mean "from time to time" or
"intermittent."
The court of appeals, in two recent cases, clarified the relationship
between provisions in a separation agreement pertaining to support
at Topsail Beach, North Carolina. Evidence indicated that plaintiff owned a substantial interest in
Murphy Mills, Incorporated and Murphy Farm Company; each company's assets were valued at
greater than $100,000. The provisions of the separation agreement, however, must be considered
in light of the strong evidence indicating that defendant committed adultery. Adultery is a com-
plete bar to alimony in North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.6(a) (1976).
100. 203 N.C. at 644, 166 S.E. at 755.
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-5(4) (1976) provides that a marriage may be dissolved by divorce
on application of the injured party if the husband and wife have lived separate and apart for one
year.
102. Id, § 50-6 (Interim Supp. 1978) provides that a marriage may be dissolved by divorce on
application of either party if the husband and wife have lived separate and apart for one year.
103. 225 N.C. 340, 34 S.E.2d 154 (1945).
104. 291 N.C. 386, 230 S.E.2d 541 (1976).
105. 225 N.C. at 344, 34 S.E.2d at 157 (citations omitted); 291 N.C. at 391-92, 230 S.E.2d at
546. Consistent with this definition of separation is Tuttle v. Tuttle, 36 N.C. App. 635, 244 S.E.2d
446 (1978), in which the court of appeals held that the statutory separation period was not inter-
rupted by mere social contact between the parties without any cohabitation in the sense of living
together as man and wife or intent to resume the marital relationship. Defendant in Tuttle stayed
in plaintiffs home one night over the Christmas holidays for the purpose of visiting her children
and did not have sexual relations with plaintiff.
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and those pertaining to a property settlement. In Brilt v. Britt,"°6 the
aourt of appeals erased any doubt about the separability of support and
property settlement provisions in a separation agreement that has been
adopted by the court. In White v. White, ' 7 the court indicated factors
relevant to the determination of whether these provisions are separable.
Although it had previously been held by implication'0 8 and stated
in dictum0 9 that provisions in a separation agreement for the division
of property rights and for support payments may be included as separa-
ble provisions that remain separable upon adoption of the agreement
by the court, Brit was the first decision to hold expressly that such
property settlement and support provisions are separable. The separa-
tion agreement in Britt expressly stated that the support provisions
were independent from any agreement for division of property and
should not for any purpose be considered "to be a part of or merged in
106. 36 N.C. App. 705, 245 S.E.2d 381 (1978).
107. 37 N:C. App. 471, 246 $.E.2d 591 (1978).
108. In Seaborn v. Seaborn, 32 N.C. App. 556, 233 S.E.2d 67 (1977), the issue before the court
was whether a consent judgment could be modified to permit greater support payments upon a
showing of changed circumstances. By provision one of the consent judgment, plaintiff husband
agreed to pay $150 per month to defendant wife until she died or remarried. By provisions two
and three of the consent judgment, plaintiff deeded his interest in one piece of real property owned
jointly by them to defendant, and defendant deeded her interest in another piece of real property
owned jointly by them to plaintiff. Id. at 556-57, 233 S.E.2d at 68. The agreement, therefore,
contained both provisions for support and property division. In holding that the support provi-
sion was modifiable the court necessarily held that the support provision and the property settle-
ment in the consent judgment were separable. The court cited Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 136
S.E.2d 240 (1964), in support of its conclusion that the support provision and property settlement
provision of the consent judgment were separable. Id. at 558, 233 S.E.2d at 69.
109. Both Holsomback v. Holsomback, 273 N.C. 728, 732, 161 S.E.2d 99, 102-03 (1968), and
Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 70, 136 S.E.2d 240,243 (1964), contain dictum stating that provisions
for support and property division may be included in a consent judgment as separable provisions.
The Bunn court stated:
[A]n agreement for the division of property rights and an order for the payment of ali-
mony may be included as separable provisions in a consent judgment. In such event the
division of property would be beyond the power of the court to change, but the order for
future installments of alimony would be subject to modification in a proper case. How-
ever, if the support provision and the division of property constitute a reciprocal consid-
eration so that the entire agreement would be destroyed by a modification of the support
provision, they are not separable and may not be changed without the consent of both
parties.
Id. at 70, 136 S.E.2d 243 (citations omitted).
Similarly, the court in Holsomback stated:
In the consent judgment which Judge May purported to set aside, the parties agreed
upon a division of their property and upon the amount of alimony which defendant
should pay plaintiff until her death or remarriage. This judgment was ... a decree of
the court. The order with reference to the payment of future installments of alimony
was, therefore, subject to modification by the court in the event of changed conditions.
The agreed division of property, a separable provision, however, was beyond the power
of the judge to modify without the consent of both parties.
273 N.C. at 732, 161 S.E.2d at 102-03 (citations omitted).
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or integrated with a property settlement of the parties."" 0 The courl
did not discuss the relevance of any other aspects of the agreement tc
its finding that the provisions were separable, but considered this lan-
guage in the separation agreement determinative of whether the provi-
sions were separable."'
In contrast, the court of appeals in While enumerated several fac-
tors considered by courts in other jurisdictions" 2 to be relevant to a
determination of the severability of support and property settlement
provisions in a separation agreement. Factors relevant to a finding that
the provisions are severable include the wife's claim for alimony in the
divorce action,' 3 a provision in the agreement that the support pay-
ments would terminate in the event of the wife's remarriage,' 1 4 lack of
evidence that the amount of the support payments was based on the
value of any property given as consideration for the payments," 5 and
language in the agreement itself indicating that the agreement was not
a final settlement of rights and duties of the parties with respect to both
property and support." 6 Finding that the support payments in White
had every indicia of alimony and no evidence that the support pay-
ments and the provisions for a property settlement were interrelated, 117
the White court concluded that the payments denominated as "perma-
nent alimony" in the divorce action consent judgment were precisely
that, and, therefore, severable.'1
None of the factors enumerated by the court in White is determi-
native, however. The court expressly stated that each case involving
the issue of separability of support and property settlement provisions
must be decided upon its own facts." 9
Other 1978 cases involving disputes over separation agreements
110. 36 N.C. App. at 711, 245 S.E.2d at 385.
111. Id.
112. The court examined cases from New Mexico, Montana and California. 37 N.C. App. at
476-77, 246 S.E.2d at 594-95.
113. Movius v. Movius, 163 Mont. 463, 517 P.2d 884 (1976).
114. Id.
115. Scanlon v. Scanlon, 60 N.M. 43, 287 P.2d 238 (1955). But see Washington v. Washing-
ton, 512 P.2d 1300 (Mont. 1973) (provisions for support and property division held nonseparable
because one party assumed preexisting liabilities against part of the property as partial considera-
tion for support payments).
116. California courts in particular emphasize the wording of the agreement. See, e.g.,
DiMarco v. DiMarco, 60 Cal. 2d 387, 385 P.2d 2, 33 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1963).
117. By the terms of the agreement, defendant was to pay plaintiff $100 per week until she
remarried or died and $1,000 in a lump sum as well as convey his half interest in their home to
plaintiff. 37 N.C. App. at 472-73, 246 S.E.2d at 593.
118. Id. at 477-78, 246 S.E.2d at 595.
119. Id. at 477, 246 S.E.2d at 595.
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were resolved by the court of appeals by applying principles of contract
law.120 Stressing contract rules of interpretation, the term "single" used
in separation agreements 121 was determined as a matter of law to mean
"unmarried" in Hall v. Hall.122  Defendant's argument that "single"
was ambiguous and was intended to mean "alone"1 23 was rejected in
favor of a common sense interpretation of the word.
In Stanback v. Stanback,24 the court of appeals held that the
measure of damages for breach of a separation agreement was the same
as for any other contract. Plaintiff and defendant in Stanback agreed
that defendant husband would pay plaintiffs attorneys' fees. In a sub-
sequent amendment to this agreement, plaintiff agreed to pay her own
attorneys' fees in exchange for increased support payments and defend-
ant's promise to pay any federal or state income tax plaintiff incurred
by not being able to deduct the attorneys' fees in determining her tax
liability. Plaintiff was unable to deduct $28,500 of the attorneys' fees,
and defendant did not pay this deficiency as he had promised. 25
Plaintiff's claims for both consequential and punitive damages for de-
fendant's breach were dismissed for insufficiency. 126  The claim for
consequential damages for mental anguish was dismissed because the
tax arrangement was commercial as opposed to personal in nature. 27
The claim for punitive damages was not allowed because the tax provi-
120. Separation agreements between husband and wife are generally construed in accordance
with rules and provisions applicable to contracts in general. Bowles v. Bowles, 237 N.C. 462, 75
S.E.2d 413 (1953).
121. The term "single" as used in separation agreements had never been interpreted by the
court of appeals before. A similar issue was raised in Riddle v. Riddle, 32 N.C. App. 83, 230
S.E.2d 809 (1977), however. The separation agreement in Riddle provided that the husband was
to pay his wife $600 per month until she either died or remarried. Plaintiff began living with
another man, and defendant ceased making the agreed upon payments. The court held that plain-
tiff's cohabitation with another man to whom she was not married did not furnish a defense to
plaintiff's duty to support defendant pursuant to the agreement.
122. 35 N.C. App. 664, 242 S.E.2d 170, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 260, 245 S.E.2d 777 (1978).
123. By the terms of the agreement, defendant was obligated to pay plaintiff $300 per month
as long as she remained single. Defendant argued that plaintiff was no longer "single" because
she was living with another man. Id. at 664, 242 S.E.2d at 171-72.
124. 37 N.C. App. 324, 246 S.E.2d 74, cert. granted, 295 N C. 649, 248 S.E.2d 253 (1978) (No.
44 PC).
125. Id. at 325, 246 S.E.2d at 76.
126. Id. at 327-31, 246 S.E.2d at 77-80.
127. A personal contract is one in which "the contractual duty or obligation is so coupled with
matters of mental concern or solicitude, or with the sensibilities of the party to whom the duty is
owed, that a breach of that duty will necessarily or reasonably result in mental anguish or suffer-
ing" such as a contract of marriage or a contract to inter a body in specified manner. Lamm v.
Shingleton, 231 N.C. 10, 14, 55 S.E.2d 810, 813 (1949). Compensatory damages for mental
anguish may be recoverable for breach of personal, but not commercial, contracts. Id.
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sion was commercial and because plaintiff failed to allege any separate
identifiable tortious conduct sufficient to justify such an award.
Consistent with the North Carolina courts' refusal to enforce ex-
tra-judicial separation agreements through the contempt power of the
court, 128 the court of appeals, in Sainz v. Sainz129 and Moore v.
Moore,130 held that a separation agreement that has not been adopted
in a court order may not be enforced by specific performance. This
prohibition against enforcement of extra-judicial separation agree-
ments by a decree of specific performance is absolute; it applies when
arrearages in support payments provided for in the separation agree-
ment have been reduced to judgment13 ' as well as when plaintiff has
obtained a foreign decree of specific performance to enforce such an
agreement.' 32 Reasoning that plaintiffs in Sainz and Moore sought
specific performance decrees to compel defendants to comply with ex-
tra-judicial separation agreements under threat of being jailed for con-
tempt, 33 the court refused to order specific performance of the
agreements. 134
Even though plaintiff in Sainz had a New York judgment ordering
specific performance of the agreement, this judgment was not given ef-
fect by the North Carolina court because of the policy and law of
North Carolina that contractual rights may not be enforced by civil
contempt proceedings. 13  This holding does not violate the full faith
and credit clause of the United States Constitution. That clause re-
128. See, e.g., Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C 129, 37 S.E.2d 118 (1946).
129. 36 N.C. App. 744, 245 S.E.2d 372 (1978).
130. 38 N.C. App. 700, 248 S.E.2d 761 (1978), re'd 297 N.C. 14, - S.E.2d - (1979).
131. Plaintiff in Moore sought specific performance of an extra-judicial separation agreement
after a judgment obtained against defendant for arrearages in payments set forth in the agreement
proved worthless. Id. at 700, 248 S.E.2d at 761. The dissent in Moore would grant plaintiff the
remedy of specific performance of the agreement under those circumstances in which plaintiff's
remedy at law-judgment for the accrued payments-has proven inadequate. Id. at 702-03, 248
S.E.2d at 762-63 (Webb, J., dissenting).
132. Plaintiff in Sainz asked the North Carolina court to give effect to a New York judgment
ordering defendant to specifically perform the separation agreement. 36 N.C. App. at 745, 245
S.E.2d at 373.
133. 36 N.C. App. at 746-47, 245 S.E.2d at 374; 38 N.C. App. at 701, 248 S.E.2d at 761.
134. A similar situation confronted the court of appeals in Riddle v. Riddle, 32 N.C. App. 83,
230 S.E.2d 809 (1977). Injunctive relief sought by plaintiff to compel her ex-husband to make the
support payments agreed upon in their extra-judicial separation agreement was denied because
the effect of an injunction would be to compel defendant to make the support payments under
threat of enforcement by contempt proceedings.
135. N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 28 prohibits imprisonment for debts. Separation agreements that
have not been incorporated into a court decree and ordered by the court are nothing more than
civil contracts and cannot be enforced by contempt proceedings, the gist of which is wilful disobe-
dience to a court order. See Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C. 129, 37 S.E.2d 118 (1946).
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quires that foreign judgments be recognized by courts of sister states,
but does not require recognition of the specified method of
enforcement.1
36
The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, reversed the deci-
sion of the court of appeals in Moore and held that, for the first time in
North Carolina, a seperation agreement that has not been incorporated
in a divorce decree may be enforced by an order of specific perform-
ance.137 Although the court distinguished earlier North Carolina deci-
sions holding that contempt orders may not be invoked to enforce a
seperation agreement not made a part of a divorce decree, 138 it did not
address the question whether a civil contempt proceeding would be
available to force compliance with a decree of specific performance
used to enforce an extra-judicial seperation agreement. Without the
threat of a court's contempt power, however, an order of specific per-




A. Mortgages, Deeds of Trust and Statutory Liens
The North Carolina Court of Appeals in In re Deed of Trust of
136. The methods by which a judgment of another state is enforced are determined by the
local law of the forum. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 26 (1909). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 99 (1971).
137. 297 N.C. 14, 252 S.E.2d 735 (1979).
138. Id. at 16, 252 S.E.2d at 737 (distinguishing Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C. 129, 37 S.E.2d
118 (1946); Brown v. Brown, 224 N.C. 556, 31 S.E.2d 529 (1944)).
I. The court of appeals decided cases of interest in the areas of vendor-purchaser and
cemeteries in 1978. In an action for specific performance of a contract to convey a house with
abatement of the purchase price, the court in Nugent v. Beckham, 37 N.C. App. 557, 246 S.E.2d
541 (1978), held that there was not an absolute right to interest on the purchase price for vendors
in such an action. The court refused to award interest because defendant vendors would have
received an amount in excess of that awarded to plaintiff purchasers for rents and profits and thus
would have realized a net gain from their refusal to convey the land. In another vendor-purchaser
case, Passmore v. Woodard, 37 N.C. App. 535, 246 S.E.2d 795 (1978), the court determined that
plaintiff was entitled to receive sums paid pursuant to an option agreement to purchase land from
defendants when defendants were unable to deliver clear title to the property. The court further
held that plaintiff could recover the $5000 he spent for improvements on the land but only to the
extent that plaintiff could show that the improvements enhanced the value of the land.
In Singletary v. McCormick, 36 N.C. App. 597, 244 S.E.2d 731 (1978), the court of appeals
1104 NORTH CAROLINA L4W REVIEW [Vol. 57
Watts2 limited the jurisdiction of a superior court judge in a hearing de
novo under G.S. 45-21.16(d) 3 to determine a creditor's right to foreclo-
sure under a power of sale. The superior court in Watts, citing equita-
ble reasons, had reversed the finding of the clerk that a creditor was
entitled to foreclosure.4 The court of appeals held that in the hearing
on the right to foreclosure required by G.S. 45-21.16(d) the clerk of
superior court is limited to the four findings specified in the statute and
that in a hearing de novo on appeal the superior court is similarly lim-
ited and may not invoke its equitable jurisdiction.5
The court of appeals found first that G.S. 45-21.16 was the legisla-
tive response to the due process requirements laid down in Turner v.
Blackburn.6 It then concluded that those requirements were met by
interpreted for the first time the statute authorizing removal and relocation of graves, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 65-13(a)(2) (1975). Under the statute a church may remove graves "in order to erect a
new church... [or] in order to expand or enlarge an existing church facility .... " The court
read "in order to" to signify "as the means to" and held that a church could remove graves for the
purpose of relocating a street on the grave-site so that the area of the existing street could be used
for the construction of a new church building.
2. 38 N.C. App. 90, 247 S.E.2d 427 (1978).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.16(d) (Supp. 1977), discussed in note 5 infra.
4. 38 N.C. App. at 91-92, 247 S.E.2d at 427-28. North Carolina recognizes two types of
foreclosure: foreclosure by action or judicial sale in which the court may order a sale; and the
power of sale foreclosure in which the authority to foreclose arises from a power of sale granted in
the mortgage or deed of trust. The power of sale foreclosure is preferred by most creditors be-
cause it is quicker, simpler and less expensive. See generally J. WEBSTER, REAL ESTATE LAW IN
NORTH CAROLINA §§ 248-254 (1971 & Supp. 1977).
5. 38 N.C. App. at 94, 247 S.E.2d at 429. In addition to complying with the provisions of
the mortgage or deed of trust, a creditor foreclosing under a power of sale must comply with the
minimum statutory requirements, designed to protect the debtor, specified in N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 45-4 to -21.45 (1976 & Supp. 1977). See J. WEBSTER, supra note 4, § 252, at 307. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 45-21.16 (Supp. 1977) requires that, in a power of sale foreclosure, notice of hearing be
sent to the debtor and any record owner of the real estate on which the lien is held and that a
hearing be conducted to determine the creditor's right to foreclosure. Subsection (d) of that stat-
ute provides in part:
The hearing. . shall be held before the clerk of court in the county where the land
.. . is situated. Upon such hearing, the clerk shall consider the evidence of the par-
ties. . . . If the clerk finds the existence of (i) valid debt. . . , (ii) default, (iii) right to
foreclose under the instrument, and (iv) notice to those entitled to such under subsection
(b), then the clerk shall authorize the mortgagee or trustee to proceed under the instru-
ment, and the mortgagee or trustee can give notice of and conduct a sale pursuant to the
provisions of this Article. The act of the clerk in so finding or refusing to so find is a
judicial act and may be appealed to the judge of the district or superior court having
jurisdiction at any time within 10 days after said act. Appeals from said act of the clerk
shall be heard de novo.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.16(d) (Supp. 1977). Whether or not the debtor appears at this hearing
the creditor must present affirmative evidence sufficient for the clerk to make the findings re-
quired. See Note, Real Property--Changes in North Carolina's Foreclosure Law, 54 N.C.L. REv.
903, 917 (1976).
6. 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975). Turner held the former North Carolina procedure
for foreclosure under power of sale, Law of Apr. 1, 1948, ch. 720, 1949 N.C. Sess. Laws 788,
unconstitutional as applied. 389 F. Supp. at 1261. Finding state action in the extensive participa-
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less than a full hearing and found instead that the "notice and hearing
required by G.S. 45-21.16 were designed to enable the mortgagor to
utilize the injunctive relief already available in G.S. 45-21.34." 7 While
recognizing that a superior court judge has general equitable jurisdic-
tion,8 the court stated that it may be invoked only in a "proper proceed-
ing," which was, in this context, an action to enjoin a foreclosure sale
under G.S. 45-21.34.9
Although the court correctly found that the legislative purpose was
to meet the standards enunciated in Turner, it misinterpreted the con-
stitutional requirements that must be met in achieving that purpose.
The court's analysis is faulty because of a failure to perceive that the
Turner decision was only a part of the application of due process re-
quirements to debtor-creditor procedures that began with the United
States Supreme Court decisions in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.10
and Fuentes v. Shevin," and because of a misreading of Turner itself.
The implication of Watts is that due process may be satisfied in power
of sale foreclosures by providing the debtor with notice and a partial
tion of the clerk in the procedure, the Turner court found that the procedure did not comport with
due process because it made no provision for personal notice to the debtor or for a prior hearing.
389 F. Supp. at 1254-58. The court further found that the power of sale contained in a deed of
trust did not effectively waive the debtor's rights. Id. at 1260-61. It therefore ruled that future
foreclosures would be unlawful unless there was either a "knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
waiver" or both "adequate and timely notice" and "opportunity for a hearing." Id. at 1261. See
generally Note, supra note 5. The Turner decision led to the passage of substantial amendments
to the foreclosure statutes a few months later. Id at 916; Law of June 6, 1975, ch. 492, 1975 N.C.
Sess. Laws 509 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-21.9, .16, .16A, .17, .21, .29, .30,
.33, .45 (1976 & Supp. 1977)). For a discussion of the changes that these amendments made in the
North Carolina procedure, see J. WEBSTER, supra note 4, § 252 (Supp. 1977).
7. 38 N.C. App. at 94, 247 S.E.2d at 429. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.34 (1976) provides in
part:
Any owner of real estate. . . may apply to a judge of the superior court, prior to the
confirmation of any sale of such real estate by a mortgagee. . . , to enjoin such sale or
the confirmation thereof, upon the ground that the amount bid or price offered therefor
is inadequate and inequitable and will result in irreparable damage to the owner.... or
upon any other legal or equitable ground which the court may deem sufficient.
For a discussion of the interpretation and application of this statute, see note 13 and accompany-
ing text infra.
8. This jurisdiction is derived from the general grant of judicial power to the General Court
of Justice found in N.C. CONsT. art. IV, § I.
9. 38 N.C. App. at 94, 247 S.E.2d at 429.
10. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
II. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). In Fuentes the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Penn-
sylvania and Florida replevin statutes that permitted a secured creditor to seize the goods of a
defaulting debtor pending a full hearing on the merits. Id. at 96. Fuentes and Sniadach estab-
lished the proposition that before a debtor may be deprived of his property by a creditor he must
be given notice and a prior opportunity to be heard. See id.; 395 U.S. at 343 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). While the "nature and form of such prior hearings" might be "open to many potential
variations," Fuentes required that the hearing "provide a real test." 407 U.S. at 96-97.
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hearing because he may then avail himself of injunctive relief to block
the foreclosure.' 2 Fuentes, however, permitted a partial hearing at an
early stage only on the condition that a full hearing on the merits be
provided later. 3 The injunctive relief available under G.S. 45-21.34,
on the other hand, does not afford the debtor such a hearing because, as
interpreted by the courts, it only permits an action after the foreclosure
sale and it provides relief only on a showing that the sale price was
inadequate coupled with some other inequity. 14 Thus, as a result of
Walls, although a debtor may have a valid equitable defense sufficient
to bar foreclosure, he cannot utilize it until the foreclosure sale has be-
come afait accompli and then only if the price bid can be proven inade-
quate. This can only be regarded as the unconstitutional denial of a
forum to the debtor.
The Turner court recognized these shortcomings in requiring that
the mortgagor "'be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is
deprived of any significant property interest' ,,s and in specifying that
at this hearing "the mortgagor must of course be afforded the opportu-
nity to rebut and defend the charges."' 6 Clearly, the restricted hearing
12. See note 7 and accompanying text supra. It has even been argued that notice alone may
meet the requirements of due process in a foreclosure under power of sale. See Comment, Power
of Sale Foreclosure After Fuentes, 40 U. CHi. L. REv. 206, 220-22 (1972).
13. See 407 U.S. at 82.
14. The conclusion that an injunction may be granted only after the sale has occurred may be
inferred from the nature of the proof required to entitle a party to relief. In Woltz v. Asheville
Safe Deposit Co., 206 N.C. 239, 173 S.E. 587 (1934), the court held that Law of Apr. 18, 1933, ch.
275, § 1, 1933 N.C. Pub. Laws 401 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.34 (1976))
gave a superior court judge the power to enjoin aprevious sale or confirmation thereof only when
the price bid was shown to be inadequate. The court noted that "[t]he statute is remedial only."
206 N.C. at 242, 173 S.E.2d at 589. Later decisions added the requirement that the party seeking
an injunction show some other "irregularity," as well as inadequacy of price. Certain-Teed Prods.
Corp. v. Sanders, 264 N.C. 234, 246, 141 S.E.2d 329, 337 (1965); Foust v. Gate City Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 233 N.C. 35, 37, 62 S.E.2d 521, 523 (1950). Obviously, a party seeking an injunction cannot
show that the price bid at the sale was inadequate until that sale has been conducted. Further, in
Sanders the court held that when the statute required that the action be commenced "prior to
confirmation" it referred to the confirmation required by the clerk in the event of an upset bid and
not to the consummation of a sale generally. 264 N.C. at 244, 141 S.E.2d at 336. Because N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 45-21.27 (1976) requires that an upset bid be filed within 10 days after the sale and
because no confirmation would be required after that time, the implication to be drawn from
Sanders is that a party seeking injunction of the foreclosure must wait until the sale is held, and
then has only 10 days to commence his action if no upset bid is made.
15. 389 F. Supp. at 1259 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)). The
Turner court further stated:
The extraordinary injunctive relief available under § 45-21.34 does not suffice [as a hear-
ing] because (I) the burden of proof is clearly on the mortgagor, (2) he most likely must
show irreparable damage, as by inadequacy of the bid; and (3) a condition precedent to




required by the court of appeals is not the one contemplated by Turner.
Therefore, while the Watts court's restriction of defenses in a hearing
pursuant to G.S. 45-21.16 might be considered a victory for quick, effi-
cient foreclosure, 7 it will probably not withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
In In re Deed of Trust of Simon, 8 the court of appeals was again
called upon to construe the scope and application of G.S. 45-21.16, this
time in relation to the statute's appellate bond requirement.' 9 The
debtor in Simon appealed an adverse judgment of the clerk in a fore-
closure proceeding, first to the superior court and then to the court of
appeals. Upon each appeal the debtor was required to post a bond" 'to
protect the petitioner from any probable loss by reason of delay in the
foreclosure.' "20 At the conclusion of all appeals in favor of the creditor
a hearing was held in the superior court on the creditor's motion for
determination of damages and costs resulting from the delay in foreclo-
sure.21 The trial court determined that the creditor was entitled to
damages far in excess of the total amount of the bonds, as measured
primarily by interest on the indebtedness, and the debtor appealed.22
Employing an analogy to cases involving injunction bonds, the
court of appeals held that when a party elects to proceed on the appel-
late bond his damages are limited to the amount of the bond.23 Turn-
17. The court of appeals further grounded its construction of the statute on the conclusion
that to permit a full hearing under § 45-21.16(d) would make the power of sale foreclosure as
costly and time-consuming as the foreclosure by action it was designed to avoid. 38 N.C. App. at
94, 247 S.E.2d at 429. As the late Professor Webster emphatically observed, however, with the
decision in Turner and the General Assembly's consequent amendment of the foreclosure statutes,
"everyforeclosure even underpower of sale, is in eject a Judicialforeclosure. "' J. WEnsTER, supra
note 4, § 252, at 63 (Supp. 1977) (footnote omitted). The Turner court considered even the former
North Carolina procedure to involve so much "detailed statutory authority" that it became noth-
ing more than "a streamlined version of a judicial sale.' 389 F. Supp. at 1258. Manifestly, the
conclusion to be drawn from cases such as Fuentes and Turner is that when the state becomes
involved in streamlined procedures for creditors to reclaim secured property the streamlining can-
not come at the expense of debtors' due process rights.
18. 36 N.C. App. 51, 243 S.E.2d 163 (1978).
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.16(d) (Supp. 1977), provides in part:,
If an appeal is taken from the clerk's findings, the appealing party shall post a bond with
sufficient surety as the clerk deems adequate to protect the opposing party from any
probable loss by reason of appeal; and upon posting of the bond the clerk shall stay the
foreclosure pending appeal.
20. 36 N.C. App. at 52-53, 243 S.E.2d at 164 (quoting order of superior court).
21. Id. at 53-55, 243 S.E.2d at 164-65.
22. Id. at 55, 243 S.E.2d at 165-66.
23. Id. at 56, 243 S.E.2d at 166 (citing Local 755, IBEW v. Country Club East, Inc., 283 N.C.
1, 194 S.E.2d 848 (1973); Shute v. Shute, 180 N.C. 386, 104 S.E. 764 (1920)). The court noted that
in such cases
a person wrongfully restrained could elect either (1) to recover only the amount of the
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ing to the question of interest as a measure of damages, the court first
determined that the bond specified in G.S. 45-21.16(d) applied only to
an appeal from the clerk to the district or superior court and that in any
further appeal the general appeal bond provision for real property ac-
tions, G.S. 1-292, would continue to apply. 4 The court then concluded
that because of the broad language used in describing the bond re-
•quired by G.S. 45-21.16(d) interest on the indebtedness would be an
appropriate measure of damages.2 5
The Simon decision is commendable for several reasons. First, the
extension to appellate bonds of the rule limiting recovery of damages to
the amount of the bond clarifies the law in this area and is long over-
due.26 Second, confining application of the bond provided for in G.S.
45-21.16(d) to appeals from the clerk is also a much needed clarifica-
tion. Finally, the court's expansive interpretation of the interests pro-
tected by that bond should permit a more accurate reflection of a
creditor's actual damages than previously provided by other bonds in
this area.27
The court of appeals erred, however, in its conclusion that interest
on the indebtedness would be an appropriate measure of damages in
all cases in which the bond required by G.S. 45-21.16(d) is sued upon.
Previously, in cases involving suits upon the bond required for the en-
joining of a foreclosure under G.S. 45-21.34, interest had been permit-
ted as a measure of damages only on a showing that the value of the
bond for the damages he has suffered simply by petitioning the trial court in that action
for recovery or (2) to forego his action on the bond and bring an independent tort.suit for
malicious prosecution.
Id. at 56, 243 S.E.2d at 166. North Carolina permits a tort action for malicious civil action only
on a showing of "special damages beyond those normally incident to a civil proceeding." Byrd,
Malicious Prosecution in North Carolina, 47 N.C.L. Rev. 285, 308 (1969). Presumably a similar
tort action would be permitted for abuse of appellate process with similar requirements of proof.
24. 36 N.C. App. at 56-57, 243 S.E.2d at 166-67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-292 (1969) provides
that in appeals from the trial courts involving real property a bond is required to cover "waste"
and "the value of the use and occupation of the property.'
The Simon court reasoned that because the legislature in enacting § 45-21.16 was only con-
cerned with making the North Carolina foreclosure procedure comport with due process, see note
6 and accompanying text supra, it could not have been interested in "the more traditional and
constitutionally permissible procedures for appeal from the district court or the superior court to
the Court of Appeals." 36 N.C. App. at 57, 243 S.E.2d at 166-67.
25. 36 N.C. App. at 57-58, 243 S.E.2d at 167.
26. Although it is in keeping with the general law on the subject, see 5B C.J.S. Appeal &
Error § 2064 (1958), this is apparently the first North Carolina decision applying the rule to appel-
late bonds.
27. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.16(d) (Supp. 1977) ("any probable loss by reason of
delay in the foreclosure"), with id. § 1-292 (1969) ("waste" and "the value of the use and occupa-




land, prior to the date of an injunction, was insufficient to pay the in-
debtedness and accrued interest.28 The obvious reason for this distinc-
tion was that, unless the value of the land was insufficient to meet the
debt prior to the injunction, the creditor would presumably be compen-
sated for the delay, either by the sale price at foreclosure, or by dam-
ages measured by depreciation during the period of injunction.29
Because of the similarity of damages arising from a delay in foreclosure
caused by an injunction and those arising from a delay caused by an
appeal, the effect of the decision in Simon will be to give the creditor, in
some cases, double compensation, first in damages awarded on the
bond and again in the price bid at the foreclosure sale.
In Ross Realty Co. v. First Citizen's Bank & Trust Co. 30 the North
Carolina Supreme Court tightened the restrictions under G.S. 45-21.38
on a vendor's recovery on a purchase money mortgage or deed of
trust.31 A vendee in default of a purchase money deed of trust offered
to return the deed to the vendor.32 The vendor refused the deed and
proceeded to sue on the promissory note.33 The court of appeals, ap-
plying a literal construction of the statute, held that although G.S. 45-
21.38 prohibits a deficiency judgment after foreclosure, it does not bar
a suit on the note prior to foreclosure. 34
28. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Hicks, 207 N.C. 157, 176 S.E. 249 (1934) (permitting interest
on the value of the land); Gruber v. Ewbanks, 199 N.C. 335, 154 S.E. 318 (1930) (permitting
interest on the indebtedness).
29. See Gruber v. Ewbanks, 199 N.C. 335, 339, 154 S.E. 318, 321 (1930).
30. 296 N.C. 366, 250 S.E.2d 271 (1979), rev'g, 37 N.C. App. 33, 245 S.E.2d 404 (1978).
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
In all sales of real property by mortgagees and/or trustees under powers of sale
contained in any mortgage or deed of trust. . . to secure to the seller the payment of the
balance of the purchase price of real property, the mortgagee or trustee or holder of the
notes secured by such mortgage or deed of trust shall not be entitled to a deficiency
judgment on account of such mortgage, deed of trust or obligation secured by the same:
Provided, said evidence of indebtedness shows upon the face that it is for balance of
purchase money for real estate ....
In further action relating to § 45-21.38, the court of appeals held in Armel Management
Corp. v. Stanhagen, 35 N.C. App. 571, 241 S.E.2d 713 (1978), that the statute was not applicable
when the vendee purchased a leasehold interest from the vendor and executed a note for the
purchase price secured by a deed of trust conveying other property previously purchased from the
vendor. The court found that a deed of trust is a purchase money deed of trust only ifit embraces
the property purchased in the same transaction. Id. at 573, 241 S.E.2d at 714-15; see Dobias v.
White, 239 N.C. 409, 412, 80 S.E.2d 23, 26 (1954).
32. 37 N.C. App. at 33, 245 S.E.2d at 405.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 35, 245 S.E.2d at 406. Finding no North Carolina decisions on point, the court
based its decision on the construction given a similar statute by an Oregon court. Id. (citing Page
v. Ford, 65 Or. 450, 131 P. 1013 (1913) (construing Law of Feb. 24, 1903, 1903 Or. Laws 252
(current version at OR. REv. STAT. § 88.070 (1977))).
The issue whether § 45-21.38 applies to a suit on the promissory note prior to foreclosure was
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The supreme court reversed and held that the statute has the effect
of limiting the vendor solely to his remedy in foreclosure.35 The court
rejected a literal construction of the statute and looked instead to the
intent of the legislature for guidance in its interpretation of the stat-
ute.36 The court found that the "manifest intention of the legislature
was to limit the creditor to the property conveyed when the note and
mortgage or deed of trust are executed to the seller of real estate."' 37 As
a further reason for adopting a broad construction of the statute, the
court pointed to the "anomalous situation" the court of appeals ac-
knowledged to be the result of its interpretation of the statute, and con-
cluded that the legislature could not have intended such
circumvention.38
The supreme court's decision is open to attack on a number of
grounds. First, while the court purported to follow the legislative in-
tent, its perception of that intention was drawn almost solely from a
law review article written nearly thirty years after enactment of the
statute.39 The analysis in that article, in turn, was primarily conjecture
based on the historical context in which the statute was enacted.40 Sec-
previously presented to the court of appeals in Gambill v. Barr, 32 N.C. App. 597, 232 S.E.2d 870
(1977), but was avoided when the court held that the statute did not apply because the deed of
trust did not show on its face that it was for the purchase price. Further, it has been held that the
statute does not apply when the purchase money deed of trust is a junior lien and the first deed of
trust is foreclosed. Brown v. Kirkpatrick, 217 N.C. 486, 8 S.E.2d 601 (1940). An Oregon court in
construing an analogous statute, however, held that when the vendor, as the holder of a junior
lien, participated in the foreclosure proceeding on the first mortgage and received a share of the
overplus in discharge of its indebtedness, the statute did apply. Ward v. Beem Corp., 249 Or. 204,
437 P.2d 483 (1968) (construing OR. REV. STAT. § 88.070 (1977)).
35. 296 N.C. at 370, 250 S.E.2d at 273.
36. Id; accord, State v. Hart, 287 N.C. 76, 213 S.E.2d 291 (1975); Underwood v. Howland,
274 N.C. 473, 164 S.E.2d 2 (1968).
The court of appeals, on the other hand, had found its construction of the statute limited by
the "literal terms of the statute." 37 N.C. App. at 34, 245 S.E.2d at 406; accord, State v. Camp, 286
N.C. 148, 209 S.E.2d 754 (1974).
37. 296 N.C. at 370, 250 S.E.2d at 273; see note 39 and accompanying text infra.
38. Id. at 373, 250 S.E.2d at 275. The court of appeals recognized that, as a result of its
decision, a vendor might evade the statute by suing on the note and then having this judgment
executed upon the subject property or by simply proceeding to foreclose after suit on the note. 37
N.C. App. at 35, 245 S.E.2d at 406. The Oregon courts seek to avoid such circumvention of their
statute, at least in part, by imputing a waiver of the vendor's right to foreclosure when he has
previously sued on the note. See Ward v. Beem Corp., 249 Or. 204,437 P.2d 483 (1968); Wright v.
Wimberly, 79 Or. 626, 156 P. 257 (1916). Although the adoption of this waiver by the North
Carolina courts has been suggested, Note, 35 N.C.L. REv. 492, 495-96 (1957), the court of appeals
in Ross Realty Co. chose not to do so. 37 N.C. App. at 35-36, 245 S.E.2d at 406.
39. See 296 N.C. at 370-71, 250 S.E.2d at 273-74 (quoting Currie & Lieberman, Purchase-
Money Mortgage and State Lines A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 1960 DuKE LJ. 1, 11-12,
23-24).
40. See Currie & Lieberman, supra note 39, at 11-16. The authors acknowledged that there
was no conventional legislative history concerning the statute. Id. at 11. They viewed Law of
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ond, while the supreme court criticized the "anomalous situation" cre-
ated by the decision below, it failed to recognize a far greater anomaly
arising from its own decision. Under a contract of purchase and sale
the parties are mutually bound to a bilateral contract,41 but, as a result
of the court's decision, when the contract is merged into the deed and
deed of trust, the transaction is converted into a unilateral contract with
the vendee having the option to withdraw at any time. Finally, while
G.S. 45-21.38 may have been justified by the oppressed condition of the
vendee resulting from the speculative nature of the Depression land
market, there seems little reason for its existence, much less for an ex-
pansion of its scope, today.42 While the supreme court's decision in
Ross Realy Co. has only served to make a bad rule worse, perhaps it
will prompt repeal of this dated statute.
In Frank H. Connor Co. v. Spanish Inns Charlotte, Ltd.,4 3 the
supreme court updated the statutory definition of the "labor" necessary
to establish a mechanics' hen under G.S. 44A-8,4 and interpreted the
accrual statute, G.S. 44A-10,45 that applies to such hens. A contractor
perfected his claim of hen on a construction site and brought an action
to enforce it.4 6 The trial court held that because the contractor's clear-
Feb. 6, 1933, ch. 36, 1933 N.C. Pub. Laws 28 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38
(1976)), which was passed at the height of the Depression in 1933, as being motivated primarily by
a desire to protect the overburdened mortgagor of that time from the inequities produced by a
forced sale at depressed prices. Currie & Lieberman, supra note 39, at 13-14. They further ar-
gued, however, that the statute was intended to be a "permanent change in the law" inasmuch as it
is, unlike much of the other legislation passed at the time, prospective and preventive, rather than
retroactive and therapeutic. Id. at 15-16. Currie and Lieberman believed the legislature did not
expressly extend the coverage of the statute'to suits on the personal obligation or to land contracts
because legislatures "are not always astute to close all loopholes." Id. at 23-24. Yet it seems that
after 45 years, some session of the General Assembly would have been astute enough to close the
loopholes if they were, in fact, regarded as such. A comparison of those states having statutes
preventing a deficiency judgment on a purchase money mortgage or deed of trust reveals that the
California statute was amended in 1935 to also cover contracts of sale, Law of July 16, 1935, ch.
680, 1935 Cal. Stats. 1868 (current version at CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580b (West 1976)); the
Montana, North Carolina, and Oregon statutes make no mention of land contracts, see MONT.
REv. CODES ANN. § 93-6008 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38 (1976); OR. REv. STAT. § 88.070
(1977); and the South Dakota statutes expressly provide that they do not cover land contracts, see
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 44-8-20, -23 (1967).
41. See J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 144 (2d ed. 1975).
42. While it may be argued that the vendor gets an unfair advantage through retaining the
down payment, foreclosing on the property, and seeking a deficiency judgment, it must be
remembered that the vendee also benefits by the lower interest rates that are usually obtainable on
a purchase money mortgage or deed of trust. Moreover, the purchase money mortgage or deed of
trust often provides an alternative means of financing at a time when conventional loans are
unavailable.
43. 294 N.C. 661, 242 S.E.2d 785 (1978).
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-8 (1976).
45. Id. § 44A-10.
46. 294 N.C. at 664, 242 S.E.2d at 787. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-8 (1976) provides that "[a]ny
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ing, surveying and staking of building lines on the site antedated the
recording of a construction loan deed of trust on the same property, the
mechanics' lien should be given priority.4 7 The lender appealed, con-
tending that the work done by the contractor prior to the recordation of
its deed of trust did not constitute the "labor" required to establish a
lien under former G.S. 44A-8 and that the lien did not accrue until the
"commencement of building. ' 48
The supreme court, in rejecting a definition of "labor" as "manual,
unskilled work of an inferior and toilsome nature, ' 49 noted that the
word had not been construed in over sixty years and concluded that
"labor" should, therefore, be broadened to include modem skilled
workers5 0 Such a definition, it held, brought clearing and staking of
building lines within the meaning of "labor" as used in G.S. 44A-8.5'
The court further found that G.S. 44A-10 was unique among the fifty
person who performs or furnishes labor or professional design or surveying services or furnishes
materials pursuant to a contract. . . with the owner of real property" may establish a lien on that
property for the payment of his debts. His lien may be perfected by filing a claim of lien with the
clerk of court in the county in which the land is situated within "120 days after the last furnishing
of labor or materials at the site," id. §§ 44A-1 1, -12 (1976 & Supp. 1977), and may be enforced by
instituting suit within "180 days after the last furnishing of labor or materials at the site," id.
§§ 44A- 11, -13 (1976 & Supp. 1977). The lien then relates back to and takes effect "from the time
of the first furnishing of labor or materials at the site," id. § 44A-10 (1976), and takes priority over
all liens taking effect after that date, id. § 44A-14 (1976). See generally Humphrey, Position, Pri-
orities and Protection of Parties and Statutory Liens, in NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION
FOUNDATION INSTITUTE ON TROUBLED REAL ESTATE VENTURES AND NEW USE AND OWNER-
SHIP CONCEPTS, at IV-l (1975); Urban & Miles, Mechanics' Liensfor the Development ofReal
Property" Recent Developments in Perfection, Enforcement, and Priority, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
283 (1976).
47. 294 N.C. at 665, 242 S.E.2d at 788.
48. Id. at 668, 671, 242 S.E.2d at 789, 791.
49. Id. at 668, 242 S.E.2d at 790. The definition proposed by the lender is apparently a
distillation of the court's comments about the word in Stephens v. Hicks, 156 N.C. 239,72 S.E. 313
(1911).
50. 294 N.C. at 670, 242 S.E.2d at 90-91.
In further action in 1978 relating to the construction of § 44A-8, the court of appeals in Ra-
leigh Paint & Wallpaper Co. v. Peacock & Assocs., Inc., 38 N.C. App. 144, 247 S.E.2d 728 (1978),
cert. denied, 296 N.C. 415 (1979), held that a materialiman was not required to show that he
actually delivered the materials to the site to establish a lien within the meaning of § 44A-8.
While recognizing that the contrary interpretation had been suggested by the authors of two recent
articles on the subject, see Humphrey, supra note 46, at IV-1 1; Urban & Miles, supra note 46, at
287, and that such an interpretation was consistent with the statutory language, the court found
that it would not advance the intent of the statutory scheme, which is to provide notice of potential
liens to third parties, to impose such a requirement. 38 N.C. App. at 147-48, 247 S.E.2d at 731.
51. 294 N.C. at 671, 242 S.E.2d at 791. This decision was made under § 44A-8 as it read
prior to the 1975 amendment, which added the words "professional design or surveying service."
See Law of June 23, 1975, ch. 715, § 2, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 940 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 44A-8 (1976)). The court, however, rejected the lender's argument that this amendment indi-
cated that the activities under consideration were not included within the meaning of "labor"
under the former law. The court found instead that the amendment was intended as a clarifica-
tion of, rather than an addition to, the former statute. 294 N.C. at 669, 242 S.E.2d at 790.
19791 PROPERTY 1113
states in dating the accrual of a mechanics' lien not from the "com-
mencement of building," but rather from the" 'first furnishing of labor
or materials at the site.' "52 Nevertheless, it held that the statute implic-
itly requires a "visible commencement of the improvement" and that
"partial clearing of the site and the staking of the outlines of the build-
ing" were sufficient to meet this requirement.5 3
The court's broadening of the definition of "labor" is a significant
and belated reform in light of the numerous changes that have oc-
curred in the construction industry since the word was last defined. 4
Although it is not even implicitly required by the statutory language,
the court's addition of the "visible commencement" requirement under
G.S. 44A-10 is in keeping with the "intent of the draftsmen that per-
sons interested in the subject lot. . . should be able to examine the
property and ascertain the extent to which it [is] possibly encum-
bered."55 The decision preserves this opportunity to discover the exist-
ence of potential liens on property, while increasing the protection
available to a contractor through the use of a mechanics' lien.
52. 294 N.C. at 671, 242 S.E.2d at 791 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-10 (1976)); see cases
cited in Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 822 (1965).
53. 294 N.C. at 671-72, 242 S.E.2d at 791-92; see Urban & Miles, supra note 46, at 321.
54. The subject was apparently last discussed in Stephens v. Hicks, 156 N.C. 239, 72 S.E. 313
(1911).
55. Urban & Miles, supra note 46, at 321. In 1978 the court of appeals in Miller v. Lemon
Tree Inn, Inc., 39 N.C. App. 133, 249 S.E.2d 836 (1978), held that acceptance of a note maturing
beyond the period for perfecting a mechanics' lien and secured by a deed of trust on the same
property subject to the lien constitutes a waiver of that lien. Id. at 140, 249 S.E.2d at 840-41.
Although an earlier North Carolina decision had implied that acceptance of a note maturing
beyond the period for perfecting the lien constituted a waiver of that lien, see Raeford Lumber
Co. v. Rockfish Trading Co., 163 N.C. 314, 318, 79 S.E. 627, 629 (1913), the court noted a split
among the jurisdictions on the effect of taking a note secured by a deed of trust on the identical
property subject to the lien, 39 N.C. App. at 138, 249 S.E.2d at 839-40 (citing 57 C.J.S. Mechanics'
Liens § 227(b) (1948)). It chose to adopt the prevailing view that the intent of the parties is the
determinative factor, and held that the taking of a deed of trust upon the same property necessar-
ily shows the parties' intent to waive the lien. Id. at 138-39, 249 S.E.2d at 840; accord, Barrows v.
Baughman, 9 Mich. 213 (1861); Gorman v. Sagner, 22 Mo. 137 (1855); Charles K. Spaulding
Logging Co. v. Ryckman, 139 Or. 230, 6 P.2d 25 (1932). The court did not decide the question
whether there is a waiver when the contractor takes security in addition to that provided by the
mechanics' lien. 39 N.C. App. at 140, 249 S.E.2d at 840. This decision permits
[olne who finds a deed of trust in the obligor's chain of title covering the identical prop-
erty as would be subject to a materialmen's lien.., to rely on that as settlement of the
obligation when it is recorded prior to perfection of the lien and the maturity date of the
note extends beyond the period of perfection.
Id. at 141, 249 S.E.2d at 840.
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B. Covenants5 6
In Beech Mountain Property Owners' Association v. Current,17 the
North Carolina Court of Appeals confronted the issue whether a prop-
erty owners' association may enforce a covenant to pay assessments to
that body when no covenant provides for enforcement by the associa-
tion. Plaintiff property owners' association (POA) instituted actions
against defendant owners within the subdivision to collect dues and
assessments owed it for the maintenance of subdivision facilities and
roads. 8 The POA contended, in reliance on Neponsit Property Owners'
Association v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank,59 that covenants in all
deeds conveying lots within the subdivision that provided for the for-
mation of a property owners' association, the payment of assessments
to that body, and enforcement by the property owners "jointly or sev-
erally'" implicitly gave the POA the right to enforce the covenants as
an agent of the owners.6
The court of appeals distinguished Neponsit on the ground that in
that case the covenant "expressly conferred a right of action on the
grantor's 'assigns,' which expressly included the property owners' asso-
ciation."'6 ' The court further held that because the POA owned no
property within the subdivision it could not claim the benefit of the
covenant giving "the owners of lots" a right of enforcement. 2 The
56. In 1978 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held in Board ofTransp. v. Turner, 37 N.C.
App. 14, 245 S.E.2d 223 (1978), that a reservation by the grantor of the right to negotiate with the
Board of Transportation concerning a right of way, and of the right to the proceeds resulting from
any such condemnation for a period of 10 years, did not constitute a restraint on alienation.
Finding this reservation distinguishable from one involving the proceeds of a voluntary sale, the
court ruled that it did not restrict the full and free transfer of the property. Id. at 17, 245 S.E.2d at
225; accord, In re Mazzone, 281 N.Y. 139,22 N.E.2d 315 (1939). See generally J. WEBSTER, supra
note 4, § 346, at 445-46; Note, RealPropert-Direct Restraints on Alienation, 48 N.C.L. REV. 173
(1969).
57. 35 N.C. App. 135, 240 S.E.2d 503 (1978).
58. Id. at 135-36, 240 S.E.2d at 505.
59. 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938).
60. 35 N.C. App. at 138, 240 S.E.2d at 506.
61. Id. at 139, 240, S.E.2d at 507. The fallacy of this distinction is discussed in note 64 and
accompanying text infra.
62. Id., 240 S.E.2d at 507. The North Carolina courts have long held that when a developer
sells lots and imposes common restrictions on use " 'pursuant to a general plan of development or
improvement, such restrictions may be enforced by any grantee against any other grantee, either
on the theory that there is a mutuality of covenant and consideration, or on the ground that
mutual negative equitable easements are created.'" Sedberry v. Parsons, 232 N.C. 707, 710-11, 62
S.E.2d 88, 90 (1950) (quoting 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 167 (1956)). See Tull v. Doctors Bldg., Inc., 255
N.C. 23, 120 S.E.2d 817 (1961); Higdon v. Jaffa, 231 N.C. 242, 56 S.E.2d 661 (1949); Myers Park
Homes Co. v. Falls, 184 N.C. 426, 115 S.E. 184 (1922); Shipton v. Barfield, 23 N.C. App. 58, 208
S.E.2d 210, cert. denied, 286 N.C. 212, 209 S.E.2d 316 (1974). Even in the absence of a uniform
plan of development, a covenant may be enforced by other property owners as third-party benefi-
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court concluded with the assumption that "if the grantor had intended
to authorize the plaintiff to enforce the provisions as an agent of the
property owners, it would have expressed such intent."63
The apparent holding of the court in Current, that a property own-
ers' association may enforce a covenant to pay assessments only if the
developer expressly so provides, threatens the effectiveness of many
land development schemes in North Carolina,'M and disregards the de-
velopment of the law concerning the enforcement of covenants. Nepon-
sit, the seminal case in this area, concluded that a property owners'
association has the right to enforce a covenant to pay assessments, not
as an assignee of the grantor, but as an agent of the property owners.
This conclusion was based on the implicit character of a property own-
ers' association as an organization created to advance the common in-
terests of the property owners and not on an express provision by the
grantor.65 As the court in Neponsit noted,
ciaries if "the grantor intended to create a negative easement benefiting all the property" and if
this intent is reflected in an express provision conferring on other property owners the right to
enforce the restrictions. Lamica v. Gerdes, 270 N.C. 85, 88, 153 S.E.2d 814, 816 (1967). The
courts have, however, required that for a covenant to be enforceable it must benefit a "dominant
tenement;" when the party seeking to enforce the covenant owns no land that might be benefited
by the covenant, the courts have refused to impose the restriction. Steagall v. Housing Auth., 278
N.C. 95, 178 S.E.2d 824 (1971). See also Sleepy Creek Club, Inc. v. Lawrence, 29 N.C. App. 547,
225 S.E.2d 167, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 659, 228 S.E.2d 455 (1976).
63. 35 N.C. App. at 139, 240 S.E.2d at 507. It would seem, however, that, if the grantor had
intended that the covenants be enforceable by the lot owners, the principles of agency, and not the
express intent of the grantor, would determine whether those covenants might also be enforced by
an agent of the lot owners. See note 64 and accompanying text infra.
64. Dean Cribbet notes: "The contemporary subdivision with its detailed set of covenants, to
be enforced by a Property Owners'Association rather than by individual owners, has become a part
of every community." J. CRIBBET, supra note 41, at 360 (emphasis added). Further, it has been
argued that policing of covenants by a property owners' association is preferable to enforcement
by individual owners because enforcement costs may then be equitably and uniformly shared by
those benefiting from the covenants. See Ellickson, Alternative to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance
Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 717 (1973).
65. Although the Neponsit court did find the assignment of enforcement rights to the prop-
erty owners' association of some significance, it noted that the property owners' association had
"not succeeded to the ownership of any property of the grantor," but instead was "created solely
to act as the assignee of the benefit of the covenant," and had "no interest of its own in the
enforcement of the covenant." 278 N.Y. at 260, 15 N.E.2d at 797. Therefore, the court did not
base the property owners' association's right of enforcement upon the express assignment of those
rights by the grantor, rather, the requisite privity of estate existed because the property owners'
association had been formed to act and was acting as the "agent or representative of the Neponsit
property owners." Id. at 261-62, 15 N.E.2d at 797-98. The court in Current found that the POA
could not draw upon the property interests of the lot owners in establishing privity of estate be-
cause the POA "is a corporation and, as such, must be viewed as an entity distinct from its indi-
vidual members." 35 N.C. App. at 139, 240 S.E.2d at 507. See also Troy Lumber Co. v. Hunt, 251
N.C. 624, 112 S.E.2d 132 (1960). The court in Neponsit, on the other hand, while not ignoring the
corporate form of the property owners' association, looked behind that form to recognize the
association as an agent of the owners. 278 N.Y. at 262, 15 N.E.2d at 798. While the court of
appeals in Current found that the express provision for enforcement by the property owners' asso-
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[o]nly blind adherence to an ancient formula devised to meet entirely
different conditions could constrain the court to hold that a corpora-
tion formed as a medium for the enjoyment of common rights of
property owners. . . has no cause of action in equity to enforce the
covenant upon which such common rights depend. 6
With its decision in Raintree Corp. v. Rowe,67 the court of appeals
cast doubt on its earlier decision in Current and further confused the
North Carolina law on enforcement of covenants. An assignee of the
original subdivision developer brought suit to collect unpaid mainte-
nance assessments and country club dues from defendant property
owners.68 The trial court dismissed the action, holding that the prop-
erty owners' association (POA) and the country club, as the real parties
in interest, were the only ones entitled to enforce these claims. 9
The court of appeals held that because the covenant establishing
the maintenance assessment, as well as the bylaws of the POA, required
that the assessment be paid to the POA, the covenant was intended to
benefit the POA. Plaintiff, therefore, was not the proper party to en-
force a claim for the assessment. 70 Turning to the claim for country
club dues, the court stated that the real party in interest was the party
who had a substantive legal right to enforce the claim.7' The court first
found that the covenant created an "affarmative duty" to pay a collat-
eral sum of money that did not "touch and concern" the land. The
covenant did not, therefore, run with the land so as to be enforceable
by anyone other than the original parties to the promise.72 Having held
ciation made the Neponsit deeds "a model of clarity in comparison with the provisions in the
Beech Mountain deeds," 35 N.C. App. at 139, 240 S.E.2d at 507, it would seem that the intention
that the POA enforce the covenant to pay assessments as an agent of and for the benefit of the
owners is no less implicit in the covenants viewed as a whole.
66. 278 N.Y. at 262, 15 N.E.2d at 798.
67. 38 N.C. App. 664, 248 S.E.2d 904 (1978).
68. Id. at 665, 248 S.E.2d at 906. All lots in the subdivision were conveyed subject to restric-
tive covenants, which in pertinent part provided:
(I) property owners have rights of enjoyment in common areas, (2) each owner and each
subsequent owner covenants to pay assessments for maintenance of common areas and
other purposes by accepting a deed, (3) every owner is a mandatory member of Raintree
Country Club and must pay club dues, (4) unpaid maintenance assessments and unpaid
club dues subject the owner's lot to a lien.
Id. at 665-66, 248 S.E.2d at 906.
69. Id. at 666, 248 S.E.2d at 906. See N.C.R. Civ.,P. 17.
70. 38 N.C. App. at 668, 248 S.E.2d at 907.
71. Id.; see Reliance Ins. Co. v. Walker, 33 N.C. App. 15, 19, 234 S.E.2d at 206, 209 (1977).
72. 38 N.C. App. at 669-71, 248 S.E.2d at 907-09. The traditional requirements that must be
met for a covenant to run with the land, and thus be enforceable by those other than the original
parties to the promise, are: (1) form, (2) intention of the parties, (3) a promise that "touches and
concerns" the land, and (4) privity of estate. See C. CLARY, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER IN-
TERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND" 94 (2d ed. 1947). The requirement of intent can most easily
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the covenant to be a personal one, the court of appeals concluded that
such covenants are not assignable and plaintiff, as an assignee of the
original grantor, could not enforce the covenant to pay country club
dues.73
The court's decision can be criticized for several reasons. First,
while it is unquestioned that a property owners' association may en-
force a covenant to pay assessments,74 it does not follow that an as-
signee of the original developer may not also enforce the promise.
Having succeeded to the estate of the original grantor, an assignee is
generally held to be entitled to enforce the covenants that the grantor
be met by a statement to the effect that "these covenants shall run with the land." J. CRIBBET,
supra note 41, at 354; see Lamica v. Gerdes, 270 N.C. 85, 88, 153 S.E.2d 814, 816 (1967). In the
absence of an express provision, the requisite intent may be inferred in North Carolina from a
"general plan of development." J. WEBSTER, supra note 4, § 346, at 438. The developer in Rain-
tree Corp. took the former course. See 38 N.C. App. at 669, 248 S.E.2d at 908. Even if intent is
established, however, the covenant will not run with the land unless the two remaining require-
ments are met. See J. CRIBBEr, supra note 41, at 354.
The court in Raintree Corp. adopted a restrictive test of the "touch and concern" requirement;
the covenant "'must respect the thing granted or devised, and ... the act covenanted to be done
or omitted, must concern the lands or estate conveyed.'" 38 N.C. App. at 670, 247 S.E.2d at 438
(quoting Nesbit v. Nesbit, 1 N.C. 490, 495 (1801)). This test, adopted from a decision rendered
about the turn of the nineteenth century, says little and should be rejected. A more workable test,
proposed by Professor Bigelow, measures the effect of the covenant upon the legal relations of the
parties in their status as owners of the land in question, and not merely as members of the commu-
nity generally. Under this test if the value of the parties' respective legal interests in the property
affected by the covenants is increased or decreased by the promise, the covenant "touches and
concerns" the land. See Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases, 12 MIcH. L. REV. 639, 645-
46 (1914). This test "has the merit of realism" and "is based on the effect of the covenant rather
than on technical distinctions." Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank,
278 N.Y. at 257, 15 N.E.2d at 796. Contra, Berger, A Policy Analysis ofPromises Respecting the
Use of Land, 55 MINN. L. REv. 167, 211 (1970). While the court in Raintree Corp. seems to
require that under the Nesbit test a physical nexus exist between the benefit to be derived from the
promise to pay country club dues and the promisor's land, see 38 N.C. App. at 670, 247 S.E.2d at
438, it could easily have found under the modern "legal relations" test that the promise touched
and concerned the land.
Although the court in Raintree Corp. did not reach the question, it is clear that the assignee of
the original grantor could have established privity of estate. Although this test has been defined in
several ways, Clark has pointed out that it is valid only in the "sense of succession to the state of a
party to the covenant." C. CLARK, supra at 131-37. Further, it is the rule in North Carolina that
"[a]s between the original parties to the covenants and those owning title by mesne conveyances
from them, restrictive covenants are enforceable irrespective of any general scheme of develop-
ment." J Webster, supra note 4, § 346, at 438; see Starmount Co. v. Greensboro Memorial Park,
Inc., 233 N.C. 613, 65 S.E.2d 134 (1951).
73. 38 N.C. at 671, 248 S.E.2d at 909; see McCotter v. Barnes, 247 N.C. 480, 486, 101 S.E.2d
330, 335 (1958); Maples v. Horton, 239 N.C. 394, 399, 80 S.E.2d 38, 42 (1954).
74. See Merrionette Manor Homes Improvement Ass'n v. Heda, 11 Ill. App. 2d 186, 136
N.E.2d 556 (1956); Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248,
15 N.E.2d 793 (1938). But see Beech Mountain Property Owners' Ass'n v. Current, 35 N.C. App.
135, 241 S.E.2d 182 (1978). It is not clear whether this case remains a valid precedent after the
holding in Raintree Corp.
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received from his grantees." Further, the assignee of the original de-
veloper, as the owner of lots still to be sold, should be entitled to en-
force common covenants against other lot owners.76 Finally, under a
more liberal reading of the "touch and concern" requirement,7 7 cove-
nants to pay assessments and dues have been enforced as covenants
running with the land. 8
Although Current and Raintree Corp. reflect the North Carolina
courts' traditional view that "'[c]ovenants and agreements restricting
the free use of property are strictly construed against limitations upon
such use' -71 in light of society's acceptance of the restrictive covenant
as "an essential tool in private land use control,"80 the time has come to
revise this conservative attitude.81 At their best the two decisions repre-
sent a muddying of the waters concerning enforcement of restrictive
covenants. At their worst they appear to be a concerted effort to pre-
serve eighteenth century property concepts that can only serve to in-
hibit private development in North Carolina.
75. See J. WEBSTER, supra note 4, § 346, at 437-38; accord, Snowmass American Corp. v.
Schoenheit, 524 P.2d 645 (Colo. App. 1974).
76. See Sheets v. Dillon, 221 N.C. 426, 431, 20 S.E.2d 344, 347-48 (1942).
77. For a discussion of the "legal relations" test, see note 72 supra.
78. See Merrionette Manor Homes Improvement Ass'n v. Heda, 11 I11. App. 186, 136 N.E.2d
556 (1956); Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 15
N.E.2d 793 (1938).
The inference to be drawn from the court of appeals' divergent treatment in Raintree Corp. of
a covenant to pay a maintenance assessment and one to pay country club dues is that the former is
sufficiently related to the ownership of land in a subdivision to permit enforcement by a stranger
to the covenant, while the latter lacks the physical nexus and thus should only be enforceable as a
personal covenant. A covenant to pay country club dues, however, does undoubtedly enhance the
value of lots in a subdivision by assuring prospective buyers and other lot owners that funds for
the maintenance of country club facilities will be forthcoming. Moreover, while such a charge
reduces the value of the homeowner's interest in his lot, this reduction should be offset by the
benefit that inures to the homeowner from the common promise of other grantees within the
subdivision that they will pay their country club dues. Thus, it is apparent that the covenant to
pay country club dues does meet the "legal relations" test of a promise that "touches and con-
cerns" the land and should be enforceable by those who receive some benefit from the promise,
Ze., the developer, the country club and other lot owners. Although the Raintree Corp. court
believed that it would be unfair to impose a charge for country club facilities upon a homeowner
who might never use them, 38 N.C. App. at 670,248 S.E.2d at 908, it would seem that a homeown-
er, in purchasing a lot with record notice of the covenant, impliedly consents to payment of the
dues notwithstanding his nonuse of the facilities.
79. Long v. Branham, 271 N.C. 264, 268, 156 S.E.2d 235, 239 (1967) (quoting 20 AM. JUR. 2d
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions § 187 (1965)); accord, Starmount Co. v. Greensboro Me-
morial Park, Inc., 233 N.C. 613, 65 S.E.2d 134 (1951); Edney v. Powers, 224 N.C. 441, 31 S.E.2d
372 (1944). Even this view, however, is tempered by the statement that "'[t]he strict rule of con-
struction as to restrictions should not be applied in such a way as to defeat the plain and obvious
purposes of a restriction.'" Long v. Branham, 271 N.C. 264, 268, 156 S.E.2d 235, 239 (1967)
(quoting 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions § 187 (1965)).
80. J. CRIBBET, supra note 41, at 360.
81. See Dunham, Promises Respecting the Use ofLand, 8 J.L. EcON. 133, 162-65 (1965).
In Mills v. HTL Enterprises, Inc.,82 the court of appeals stiffened
the requirements for terminating a restrictive covenant. Plaintiff lot
owners brought suit to enforce a covenant restricting all lots in a subdi-
vision to residential use against defendant lot owner who intended to
use its lot as a parking area for an adjacent retail fried chicken outlet.8 3
The lot in question was located at the corner of a major commercial
thoroughfare and a residential street running through the subdivision,
and marked the southern boundary of the covenanted area. It had pre-
viously served for a number of years as a parking lot for a plumbing
company and a candle shop, this use being acquiesced in by the adjoin-
ing lot owners.8 4 The trial court found that, because of the fundamen-
tal, radical and substantial changes that the neighborhood had
undergone since the imposition of the covenant, the covenant no longer
served its purpose in relation to the lot in question, but rather rendered
the lot virtually useless and worthless. The court concluded, therefore,
that the covenant should be removed.85
The court of appeals reversed and held that" 'the encroachment of
business and changes due thereto, in order to undo the force and vital-
ity of the restrictions, must take place within the covenanted area.' "86
The court further held that the parking previously allowed on the lot
was not "significant enough to undo the force and validity of the re-
strictions. . . or to constitute a waiver or an estoppel of plaintiffs' right
to enforce the covenants. 87
The decision in Mills represents a stiffening of conditions neces-
sary to terminate an outmoded restriction. Although the North Caro-
lina courts have generally refused to find that changes occurring
outside the restricted area are sufficient to warrant a removal of the
restriction,88 when there have been "'changed conditions within the
covenanted area, acquiesced in by the owners to such an extent as to
82. 36 N.C. App. 410, 244 S.E.2d 469, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 551, 248 S.E.2d 727 (1978).
83. Id. at 410-11, 244 S.E.2d at 470.
84. 36 N.C. App. at 411-15, 244 S.E.2d at 470-72.
85. Id. at 415-16, 244 S.E.2d at 472-73. At the time the restrictions were imposed, 37 years
earlier, the area was a residential one lying just inside the Charlotte city limits, but at the time of
suit the surrounding neighborhood had become largely commercial. Id. at 413-15, 244 S.E.2d at
471-72.
86. Id. at 419-20, 244 S.E.2d at 475 (quoting Brenizer v. Stephens, 220 N.C. 395, 399, 17
S.E.2d 471, 473 (1941)).
87. 36 N.C. App. at 417-18, 244 S.E.2d at 473-74.
88. See, e.g., Tull v. Doctor's Bldg., Inc., 255 N.C. 23, 120 S.E.2d 817 (1961); Brenizer v.
Stephens, 220 N.C. 395, 17 S.E.2d 471 (1941). Contra, Muilenberg v. Blevins, 242 N.C. 271, 87
S.E.2d 493 (1955); Elrod v. Phillips, 214 N.C. 472, 199 S.E. 722 (1938).
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constitute a waiver or abandonment' "9 the courts have usually re-
moved the restriction.9" The change in Mills occurred not only in the
surrounding area but extended to the lot in question as well. Further,
in previous cases finding an absence of waiver, the use acquiesced in by
the adjoining owners was far more in keeping with the residential char-
acter of their neighborhoods.9' While lot owners may understandably
wish to preserve a buffer zone between their homes and commercial
development, they should not be allowed to do so at the expense of one
who purchases in reasonable reliance on their apparent acquiescence in
such development. In view of the decision in Mills, those who
purchase a lot or tract for commercial use should carefully check the
chain of title for possible restrictions and disregard any former use of
the property.92
C. Disputed Ownersh0 93
The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Garrison v. Blake-
89. Tull v. Doctor's Bldg., Inc., 255 N.C. 23, 40, 120 S.E.2d 817, 829 (1961) (quoting Vernon
v. R.J. Reynolds Realty Co., 226 N.C. 55, 61, 36 S.E.2d 710, 712 (1946)).
90. Shuford v. Asheville Oil Co., 243 N.C. 636, 91 S.E.2d 903 (1956); Bengel v. Barnes, 231
N.C. 667, 58 S.E.2d 371 (1950).
91. See Tull v. Doctor's Bldg., Inc., 255 N.C. 23, 120 S.E.2d 817 (1961) (parking lot for
doctor's office); Van Poole v. Messer, 25 N.C. App. 203, 212 S.E.2d 548 (1975) (single house
trailer); Sterling Cotton Mills, Inc., v. Vaughan, 24 N.C. App. 696, 212 S.E.2d 199 (1975) (conces-
sion stand in home).
The Mills court feared that the removal of restrictions on border lots would subject the lots
next inside to the same process until "'the restrictions throughout the tract'" became "'nugatory
through a gradual infiltration of the spreading change."' 36 N.C. App. at 419, 244 S.E.2d at 474
(quoting Tull v. Doctor's Bldg., Inc., 255 N.C. at 40, 120 S.E.2d at 829). Even under a more
liberal rule, however, such a process could easily be avoided if the lot owners would refuse to
permit any further nonresidential use of the lots within the subdivision.
92. A further development in the law as it relates to residential restrictions was Harris &
Gurganus, Inc. v. Williams, 37 N.C. App. 585, 246 S.E.2d 791 (1978), a case of first impression in
which the court of appeals held that a covenant to build a house within a specified time or recon-
vey was valid if enforced within a reasonable time after the failure to build. Although the court
found scant authority for its position, id. at 587, 246 S.E.2d at 793-94, a promise to reconvey has
been held valid, Felton v. Grier, 109 Ga. 320, 35 S.E. 175 (1900), and a number of cases have
found a covenant to build enforceable, see, e.g., Sayles v. Hall, 210 Mass. 281, 96 N.E. 712 (1911);
Baumert v. Malkin, 235 N.Y. 115, 139 N.E. 210 (1923). While such covenants are generally con-
sidered a form of residential restriction, Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 1209 (1953), in light of the fact that
they are only enforceable by the grantor, a direct restriction to residential use would appear to be
more effective.
93. In 1978 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held in Wadsworth v. Georgia-Pacific
Corp., 38 N.C. App. 1, 247 S.E.2d 25 (1978), that parol evidence is competent to prove the location
of a disputed boundary line, even though neither party attempted to first locate the boundary line
from calls in the deeds. This is apparently the first North Carolina decision permitting use of
parol evidence absent a showing that the deeds are insufficient to locate the boundary. For cases
not permitting parol evidence in this situation, see Taylor v. Meadows, 175 N.C. 373, 95 S.E. 662
(1918); Wiggins v. Rogers, 175 N.C. 67, 94 S.E. 685 (1917); Kirkpgatrick v. McCracken, 161 N.C.
198, 76 S.E. 821 (1912). The court apparently based its holding on the distinction that neither
party offered a deed in evidence. 38 N.C. App. at 5, 247 S.E.2d at 27.
Further, the court of appeals in North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Evans, 35 N.C. App. 322, 241
ney94 examined the requirement of proving a seal to validate a deed.
Petitioners appealed a trial court determination in favor of respon-
dents' claim to ownership of a parcel of land involved in a partition
proceeding, alleging that a deed in respondents' chain was void for lack
of a seal.95
Although the court of appeals recognized that "the reason for the
use of a seal-the authentication of the grantor-has long since been
completely eliminated in this State," it concluded that, in the absence
of a legislative abrogation of this requirement, a seal remains essential
to the validity of a deed in North Carolina.96 The deed in Garrison
ended with this handwritten statement: "In token where of I do hereto
this thirteenth day of February 1917 fix my sign and seal."'97 The gran-
tor's signature appeared immediately below this statement and opposite
the word "Sign."98 The court noted that the word "Sign" could include
the words "Sign and Seal" appearing above it because "any mark or
scrawl may be a seal if proved to be a seal." 99 It held, nevertheless, that
while the trial court might conclude as a matter of law that the word
"Sign" constituted a seal, there remained a question of fact about
whether the grantor placed it there, or adopted it as his seal if placed
there by someone else."°°
Because most seals are now printed rather than handwritten, the
decision in Garrison raises the specter of numerous challenges to the
S.E.2d 379 (1978), held that a conveyance was not "voluntary" so as to constitute a fraudulent
conveyance when there was any legal consideration, and that adequacy of consideration was
irrelevant when there was no allegation of fraud on the part of the grantor. The dissent argued
persuasively that although consideration may be "adequate" to support the deed as between the
parties, it may still be fraudulent in respect of creditors. Id. at 327, 241 S.E.2d at 382 (dissenting
opinion). The decision is apparently contrary to prior North Carolina holdings. See, e.g., L & M
Gas Co. v. Leggett, 273 N.C. 547, 161 S.E.2d 23 (1968).
An additional development in 1978 was the holding of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit in King v. United States, 585 F.2d 1213 (4th Cir. 1978), that, in resolving an
issue of untimeliness in an action to quiet title under 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1976), the same rules that
govern the establishment of title by adverse possession under North Carolina law shall apply in
determining whether a party knew or should have known of the defendant's claim.
94. 37 N.C. App. 73, 246 S.E.2d 144, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 646, 248 S.E.2d 251 (1978).
95. Id. at 78, 246 S.E.2d at 147.
96. Id. at 79, 246 S.E.2d at 148; see Williams v. Board of Educ., 284 N.C. 588, 201 S.E.2d
889 (1974); Williams v. Turner, 208 N.C. 202, 179 S.E. 806 (1935); Patterson v. Galliher, 122 N.C.
511, 29 S.E. 773 (1898).
97. 37 N.C. App. at 80, 246 S.E.2d at 148.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 81, 246 S.E.2d at 149. Professor Webster criticized the efficacy of the rule requiring
a seal for this very reason. See J. WEBSTER, supra note 4, § 170, at 198-99 n.184.
100. 37 N.C. App. at 81,246 S.E.2d at 149; see Williams v. Turner, 208 N.C. 202, 179 S.E. 806
(1935); Pickens v. Rymer, 90 N.C. 282 (1884); Yarborough v. Monday, 14 N.C. 420 (1832).
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validity of deeds with the consequent difficulty of proving that the
grantor adopted the seal."0 ' This apprehension should be allayed, how-
ever, by the Garrison court's further reaffirmation of the rule that when
the deed is a form deed and the printed word "seal" appears in paren-
theses opposite the grantor's signature, there is a presumption that the
grantor intended to adopt the seal. '0 2 Because most conveyances today
are made by form deed, the decision will probably affect few cases. It is
significant, however, as a reflection of the problems created by adher-
ence to the rule requiring a seal for a valid deed. Many states have
abolished the rule,' 3 and the General Assembly should heed the coun-
sel of the bar and the courts and lay the rule to rest in North Carolina.
In Faucette v. Grion' 4 plaintiff brought an action to quiet title,
claiming superior title from a common source. 10 5 Defendant con-
tended that one of the conveyances in plaintiff's chain of title had been
made by a married woman during coverture without the assent of her
husband, and, therefore, was invalid under the constitutional provi-
sions then in effect.' 0 6 Plaintiff countered that the deed was validated
by G.S. 39-7.1,1° 7 which purports to validate all conveyances made
prior to 1965 by a married woman of her separate property without the
joinder of her husband.0 8
The court of appeals reversed the judgment in favor of plaintiff
because she had failed to fit her chain of title to the description in the
deed from the common source. 0 9 The court indicated, however, that,
were the question presented to it in a proper case, it would invalidate
G.S. 39-7.1 because '[a] void contract cannot be validated by a subse-
quent act, and the Legislature has no power to pass acts affecting vested
rights.' "'110
The decision in Faucette demonstrates a trend on the part of the
101. See UNITED TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY BULLETIN, OCT. 16, 1978 (copy available from
United Title Insurance Co., P.O. Box 1920, Raleigh, N.C. 27602).
102. 37 N.C. App. at 84, 246 S.E.2d at 150; see McGowan v. Beach, 242 N.C. 73, 86 S.E.2d 763
(1955).
103. See J. WEBSTER, supra note 4, § 170, at 198-99 n.184.
104. 35 N.C. App. 7, 239 S.E.2d 712, ceri. denied, 294 N.C. 736, 244 S.E.2d 154 (1978).
105. Id. at 7-9, 239 S.E.2d at 712-13; see Mobley v. Griffin, 104 N.C. 112, 10 S.E. 142 (1889).
106. 35 N.C. App. at 11, 239 S.E.2d at 714; see Buford v. Mochy, 224 N.C. 235, 29 S.E.2d 729
(1944).
107. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-7.1 (1976).
108. 35 N.C. App. at 11-12, 239 S.E.2d at 714-15.
109. 35 N.C. App. at 10-11, 239 S.E.2d at 714; see Allen v. Conservative Hunting Club, 14
N.C. App. 697, 700, 189 $.E.2d 532, 534 (1972).
110. 35 N.C. App. at 12, 239 S.E.2d at 715 (quoting Mansour v. Rabil, 277 N.C. 364, 376, 177
S.E.2d 849, 857 (1970)).
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North Carolina courts to invalidate curative acts that affect vested
rights."' Although curative acts are a laudable attempt on the part of
the legislature to remove the technicalities that often create problems of
merchantability of title," 2 the decision in Faucefte casts doubt on the
constitutionality of such measures and reliance on them should be
avoided." 13
In Meachem v. Boyce,'"4 the court of appeals required the joinder
in a partition proceeding of those parties who might claim an interest in
the land by virtue of an unasserted right of estoppel by deed. The sub-
ject property in Meachem had formerly been held by the parties as te-
nants by the entirety, but that estate was converted to a tenancy in
common upon the divorce of the parties." 5 During the marriage, the
petitioning former wife had, without the joinder of her husband, exe-
cuted a deed of trust on the property and attempted to convey it to a
third party." 6 The trial court, nevertheless, ordered a sale of the prop-
erty and partition of the proceeds between the former spouses. 117 Re-
spondent former husband appealed, contending that the parties to the
wife's two purported conveyances during the marriage should have
been joined in the action." 8 The court of appeals held that these par-
ties were necessary parties to a partition proceeding" 9 because while
their unasserted rights to an interest in the property by virtue of estop-
pel by deed would be terminated by a sale to a purchaser for value,12 0
111. Mansour v. Rabil, 277 N.C. 364, 177 S.E.2d 849 (1970) invalidated N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 39-13. 1(b) (1976), purporting to validate all deeds executed prior to February 7, 1945 by married
women who had not been privately examined. See also Booth v. Hairston, 193 N.C. 278, 136 S.E.
879 (1927).
112. See e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47-47 to -108.17 (1976 & Supp. 1977).
113. A notable exception to this statement is the Real Property Marketable Title Act, N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 47B-1 to -9 (1976). The constitutionality of this Act is apparently assured by
§ 47B-4, which permits those having extinguishable claims to re-record them. See Note, Property
Law- North Carolina's Marketable Title Act-Will the Excepilons Swallow the Rule? 52 N.C.L.
REv. 211, 220 (1973).
114. 35 N.C. App. 506, 241 S.E.2d 880 (1978).
115. See J. WEBSTER, supra note 4, § 116.
116. 35 N.C. App. at 507, 241 S.E.2d at 881. In North Carolina an attempted conveyance by
either spouse, acting alone, of entirety property is invalid. It is converted, however, under the case
law, into a contract to convey and upon the termination of the marriage relation by divorce or the
death of the other spouse, the third party may assert principles of estoppel by deed against the
spouse who attempted to convey and attempt to enforce the contract. See Harrell v. Powell, 251
N.C. 636, 112 S.E.2d 81 (1960). See also Cruthis v. Steele, 259 N.C. 701, 131 S.E.2d 344 (1963).
117. 35 N.C. App. at 508, 241 S.E.2d at 881.
118. Id., 241 S.E.2d at 882.
119. Id. at 511, 241 S.E.2d at 883. "Necessary parties are those persons who have rights which
must be ascertained and settled before the rights of the parties to the suit can be determined."
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Basnight, 234 N.C. 347, 352, 67 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1951).
120. See Builders' Sash & Door Co. v. Joyner, 182 N.C. 518, 109 S.E. 259 (1921).
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the mere presence of such rights might have an adverse effect on the
sale price. 21
The court in Meachem looked beyond legal distinctions to achieve
an equitable result. Although it realized that an unasserted right to
estoppel by deed would be extinguished by the partition sale, it also
recognized that such an interest might, in the eyes of a purchaser, con-
stitute a potential cloud on title and, therefore, lower the price bid. The
Meachem decision should serve to avoid the prejudice to an innocent
spouse that might result from the illegal acts of the other spouse in
attempting to convey their joint interest in entirety property.
D. Eminent Domain12
2
In Berta v. Highway Commission, 123 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals for the first time addressed the question when title vests in the
Board of Transportation under G.S. 136-111,194 the inverse condemna-
tion12 5 provision, for the purpose of allocating the condemnation award
between the original owner of the land and his grantee. Plaintiff Berta
brought an inverse condemnation action under G.S. 136-111 in which
he alleged that defendant's construction of Interstate Highway 26 had
caused severe water, silt, and gravel run-off onto his land. 126 Three
years later plaintiff conveyed a portion of this land to appellant grant-
ees who subsequently sought to intervene to claim damages for injury
to their parcel.'27 The lower court denied the motion to intervene, and
the court of appeals affirmed, finding that appellants had not lost a
compensable interest in the property. 2 8
121. 35 N.C. App. at 511-12, 241 S.E.2d at 883-84.
122. In Board of Transp. v. Jones, 38 N.C. App. 337, 248 S.E.2d 108 (1978), the court of
appeals found that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that they were to consider
both general and special benefits to the portion of the tract not taken when determining the
amount of damages for a partial taking under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-112(1) (1974).
123. 36 N.C. App. 749, 245 S.E.2d 409 (1978).
124. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-111 (1974). The statute provides in part: "Any person whose land
or compensable interest therein has been taken by an intentional or unintentional act or omission
of the Board of Transportation and no complaint and declaration of taking has been filed by said
Board of Transportation [may make a claim for compensation]."
125. The legal doctrine indicated by the term, "inverse condemnation," is well established
in this jurisdiction. Where private property is taken for a public purpose by a municipal-
ity or other agency having the power of eminent domain under circumstances such that
no procedure provided by statute affords an applicable or adequate remedy, the owner,
in the exercise of his constitutional rights, may maintain an action to obtain just compen-
sation therefor.
City of Charlotte v. Spratt, 263 N.C. 656, 663, 140 S.E.2d 341, 346 (1965) (emphasis in original).
126. 36 N.C. App. at 750-51, 245 S.E.2d at 410.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 751, 754, 245 S.E.2d at 410, 412.
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Appellants' argument turned on the difference in the language of
G.S. 136-1l11129 and G.S. 136-104131 the condemnation provision.
When the Board of Transportation institutes a condemnation action
under G.S. 136-104, title vests in the Board upon satisfaction of the
statutory requirements."' G.S. 136-111, however, does not contain a
similar provision on vesting of title. Therefore, appellants claimed that
under G.S. 136-111 title could not vest in the Board until final judg-
ment and payment of compensation and that because they had inter-
vened befor. final judgment, they were deprived of a compensable
interest. 132
The court of appeals, however, adopted the interpretation of the
statute advanced by defendant: when an owner brings an action under
G.S. 136-111 for inverse condemnation, the taking has already oc-
curred.'33 The court found this view to be consistent with the language
of the statute that speaks of land or an interest that "has been taken"
although no complaint and declaration of taking "has been filed" by
the Board of Transportation. 34  Therefore, because the land was
"taken" before plaintiff transferred the tract to appellants, injury was
inflicted upon plaintiff alone; appellants took the land subject to the
already present damage.' 35 This interpretation of the statute accords
with the accepted rule that the right to a condemnation award belongs
to the vendor and does not inure to the benefit of the vendee when the
land is sold after the taking.136
129. Quoted in note 124 supra.
130. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-104 (1974); see 36 N.C. App. at 752-53, 245 S.E.2d at 411.
131. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-104 (1974) pertinent provides in part:
Upon the filing of the complaint and the declaration of taking and deposit in court,.
of the amount of the estimated compensation stated in the declaration, title to said land
or such other interest therein specified. . . together with the right to immediate posses-
sion hereof shall vest in the Board of Transportation ....
132. 36 N.C. App. at 752-53, 245 S.E.2d at 411.
133. Id. at 753, 245 S.E.2d at 411.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 754, 245 S.E.2d at 411-12.
136. The rationale for the rule is that any "condemnee owner is only entitled to be indemni-
fied to the extent that he has lost by the taking." J. WEBSTER, supra note 4, § 360, at 485 (empha-
sis in original). Here appellants had not "lost" anything because the taking occurred before the
land was conveyed to them.
The rule is stated in 2 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.21, at 48-52 (rev. 3d
ed. 1978):
If a parcel of land is sold after a portion of it has been taken (or after it has been injuri-
ously affected by the construction of some authorized public work), the right to compen-
sation, constitutional or statutory, does not run with the land but remains a personal
claim in the hands of the vendor, unless it has been assigned by special assignment or by
a provision in the deed. It is immaterial that the question of compensation is deferred.
Conversely, if the land is sold after condemnation proceedings have been instituted, but
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The result is well founded both in terms of statutory construction
and in terms of'fairness to the parties. Indeed, as defendant argued,
there would be no basis for an inverse condemnation action under G.S.
136-111 unless a prior taking had occurred. Any damages arising from
that taking properly should go to the owner at the time, and not to any
subsequent grantee. Failure to follow the rule articulated by the court
would cause an undeserved loss to the original owner and an unde-
served gain to the vendee.'37
In Board of Transportation v. Martin,138 the North Carolina
Supreme Court in a case of first impression confronted the question
whether there is unity of ownership for the purpose of considering two
parcels of land as a unit in the determination of a condemnation award
when one parcel is owned jointly by two individuals and the other is
owned by a corporation whose sole shareholder is one of the individu-
als. A portion of a parcel jointly owned by defendant and his wife was
condemned; the other parcel at issue was contiguous to this and was
owned by a shopping center corporation of which the defendant hus-
band was the sole shareholder. 39 Prior to the taking by plaintiff, de-
fendants had decided to expand the shopping center onto the parcel
owned by them as individuals."14 Initial preparations for the expansion
were made. 14 1 The trial court held that the two parcels comprised a
unity for damages purposes, but the supreme court found no unity of
ownership, vacated the judgment and remanded. 42
The supreme court invoked the three requirements for unity of
lands in eminent domain proceedings stated in Barnes v. North Carolina
State Highway Commission:143 "unity of ownership, physical unity and
before the punctum lemporis of the taking, the purchaser, and not the vendor, is entitled
to the compensation unless the right to recieve [sic], the compensation is expressly re-
served by the vendor, or the vendee has waived his rights in favor of the vendor.
The court also held that appellants did not make a timely motion to intervene in the action be-
cause they did not intervene at the initial hearing but waited instead to intervene at the damages
hearing. 36 N.C. App. at 754-55, 245 S.E.2d at 412. See generally N.C.R. Civ. P. 24.
137. See Brooks Inv. Co. v. City of Bloomington, 305 Minn. 305, 315, 232 N.W.2d 911, 918
(1975).
138. 296 N.C. 20, 249 S.E.2d 390 (1978).
139. Id. at 21-22, 249 S.E.2d at 392. Defendants incorporated the shopping center in order to
facilitate financing of the venture. At the time of the taking, the shopping center corporation was
involved in Chapter X bankruptcy proceedings. Id. at 22, 24, 249 S.E.2d at 392-93.
140. Id. at 23, 249 S.E.2d at 393.
141. Defendants had introduced water and utility services and had had a large area graded.
Id.
142. Id. at 24, 30, 249 S.E.2d at 394, 397.
143. 250 N.C. 378, 109 S.E.2d 219 (1959).
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unity of use."'" The Barnes court defined unity of ownership as own-
ership "by the same party or parties."'45 The problem thus faced by
the court was whether an individual and a corporation could constitute
the "same party" to satisfy the Barnes test. Defendants argued that this
unity did exist because the land owned by the corporation was in sub-
stance the same as the land owned by them as individuals, despite the
different legal form of ownership.' 4 6 The court, however, rejected the
views of the New York' 47 and New Jersey 48 authorities cited by de-
fendants and accepted instead those advanced by plaintiff based on
Sams v. Redevelopment Authority 49 and Jonas v. State. 50 In those two
cases Pennsylvania and Wisconsin courts refused to disregard the cor-
porate entity in order to benefit the individuals who were shareholders
who wanted to establish unity of ownership to increase condemnation
damages. 15  Because the corporate entity has a separate legal existence
144. Id. at 384, 109 S.E.2d at 224-25. An owner attempts to establish that one or more parcels
of land should be treated as a single tract in order to receive greater condemnation damages. See
generally 4A P. NICHOLS, supra note 136, § 14.3111]-12] (rev. 3d ed. 1978); Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d
887 (1964). See also UNIFORM EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § 1007 which states:
For the purpose of determining compensation under this Article, all parcels of real prop-
erty, whether contiguous or noncontiguous, that are in substantially identical ownership
and are being used, or are reasonably suitable and available for use in the reasonably
foreseeable future, for their highest and best use as an integrated economic unit, shall be
treated as if the entire property constitutes a single parcel.
Id. at 97 (emphasis added).
145. 250 N.C. at 384, 109 S.E.2d at 225; e 4A P. NICHOLS, supra note 136, § 14.31[2], at 416
("It is, of course, essential to constitute a single parcel that it be owned in its entirety by one owner
or one set of owners.").
146. 296 N.C. at 28, 249 S.E.2d at 396.
147. See Erly Realty Dev., Inc. v. State, 43 App. Div. 2d 301, 351 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1974), appeal
denied, 34 N.Y.2d 515, 357 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1974).
[Tihe award of such [severance] damages has been sustained where, given contiguity and
unity of use, close control of one ownership entity by the other is tantamount to actual
ownership. . . .There was proof that the respective stock holdings of the individual
claimants in the corporation were in exactly the same proportion as the undivided inter-
est of each in the real estate of the individuals. Together, the individual claimants
owned all the shares of the corporation.
Id. at 305, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 461-62 (citations omitted).
148. See Housing Auth. v. Norfolk Realty Co., 71 N.J. 314, 364 A.2d 1052 (1976). The New
Jersey court looked to "the unity of beneficial ownership of the whole." Id. at 325, 364 A.2d at
1058.
149. 431 Pa. 240, 244 A.2d 779 (1968).
150. 19 Wis. 2d 638, 121 N.W.2d 235 (1963).
151. "It is difficult to conceive that a unity of use can exist when there are two separate
and distinct legal entities operating each parcel of land .... Where there are two sepa-
rate users (completely different entities) of the parcels involved, the use of both cannot be
said to be so inseparable as to make them a unit for purposes of damages in a condemna-
tion proceeding."
Sams v. Redevelopment Auth., 431 Pa. at 243-44, 244 A.2d at 781 (holding that two parcels could
not be considered a unit when one was owned by individuals as partnership and the other owned
by corporation of which partners were sole shareholders).
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from that of its shareholder owners,' the court determined that the
choice of a corporate legal form was binding on defendants and pre-
cluded a finding of unity of ownership when the only reason to pierce
the corporate veil would be to allow defendants an economic benefit.153
The Martin situation forced the court to choose between two con-
flicting policies. The first is that the corporation's status as a legal en-
tity will not be disregarded absent a showing of good cause to pierce
the corporate veil.'54 The second is that businessmen should be able to
take advantage of various methods of asset ownership for economic
and tax reasons without the risk of losing full damages in a condemna-
tion taking.155 By adopting a formalistic test that "a parcel of land
owned by an individual and an adjacent parcel of land owned by a
corporation of which that individual is the sole or principal shareholder
cannot be treated as a unified tract for the purpose of assessing con-
demnation damages, 5 6 the court asserted its belief in the preeminence
of the first policy.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Board of Transportation v.
Charlotte Park & Recreation Commission 15 dealt for the first time with
a question of apportionment of a condemnation award between the
holder of a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent and the holder
of the right of re-entry or power of termination. The court affirmed the
lower court decision that the owner of the possessory fee was entitled to
the full award because there was no showing that the owner of the fee
intended to renounce the limited use required by the deed.' 51
The property at issue was conveyed by the Diocese of.North Caro-
"In the present case, those who created the corporation in order to enjoy advantages flowing
from its existence as a separate entity are asking that such existence be disregarded where it works
a disadvantage to them. We do not consider it good policy to do so." Jonas v. State, 19 Wis. 2d at
644, 121 N.W.2d at 239 (holding that two parcels could not be considered a unit when one was
owned by individuals and the other owned by a corporation of which one of individuals was
principal shareholder).
152. See Troy Lumber Co. v. Hunt, 251 N.C. 624, 627, 112 S.E.2d 132, 134 (1960); 18 AM.
JUR. 2d Corporations § 13 (1965).
153. 296 N.C. at 28, 249 S.E.2d at 395-96.
154. 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41, at 166 (rev.
perm. ed. 1974).
155. Housing Auth. v. Norfolk Realty Co., 71 N.J. 314, 324, 364 A.2d 1052, 1057 (1976).
156. 296 N.C. at 28, 249 S.E.2d at 396. See W. FLETCHER, supra note 154, § 41.2, at 180.
The court noted two additional problems with finding a unity of lands in Martin: title to the
corporation's property was vested in the trustee in bankruptcy and there was no unity of use since
one parcel was undeveloped and the other was used for a shopping center. 296 N.C. at 29-30, 249
S,E.2d at 396-97.
157. 38 N.C. App. 708, 248 S.E.2d 909 (1978), cert. denied, appeal dismissed, 296 N.C. 583
(1979).
158. Id. at 712, 248 S.E.2d at 912.
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lina of the Protestant Episcopal Church (Diocese) to the Commission
on the condition that it be used "for playground purposes" and that if
the park were ever discontinued, the Commission had to offer to resell
it to the Diocese for the original consideration.' 59 The City of Char-
lotte initiated plans to condemn part of the property for street reloca-
tion; until that time the Commission had always maintained a park on
the land. 6 ' The court first established that the Commission and the
City were separate entities so that the City's decision to condemn did
not trigger the condition of the deed and require the Commission to
offer the property to the Diocese. 6 The Diocese then claimed that it
was entitled to a portion of the award nevertheless and contended that
the court should follow the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court
in State v. Independent School District No. 31.162 In that case the court
held that the owner of a possibility of reverter is always entitled to at
least nominal damages when condemnation of the fee occurs and that
substantial damages will accrue to the grantor in cases in which the fair
market value of the restricted use in the deed is less than the fair mar-
ket value of the highest practicable use. 163 The court of appeals, how-
ever, refused to adopt the Minnesota rule, and instead accepted the
159. Id. at 709, 248 S.E.2d at 910. The court did not analyze this conveyance but merely
stated that it was a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. This characterization would
appear correct because the termination of the estate was not to occur automatically but rather the
grantee was to tender an offer to purchase to the grantor. See J. WEBSTER, supra note 4, § 37, at
51-52.
160. 38 N.C. App. at 709, 248 S.E.2d at 910.
161. Id. at 710, 248 S.E.2d at 911. The Diocese contended that the City and Commission were
substantively identical entities so that the City's decision to condemn the park for a street could be
attributed to the Commission; thus, the Commission would violate the restrictive use of the deed
and would entitle the Diocese to re-enter. Id.
A taking by eminent domain of a fee simple defeasible "does not. . . cause a reversion of the
title to the grantor." City of Charlotte v. Charlotte Park & Rec. Comm'n, 278 N.C. 26, 32, 178
S.E.2d 601, 605 (1971). See 2 P. NICHOLS, supra note 136, § 5.221[1], at 73.
162. 266 Minn. 85, 123 N.W.2d 121 (1963), cited in 38 N.C. App. at 711, 248 S.E.2d at 912.
163. Id. at 95-97, 123 N.W.2d at 129. The court stated the measure of damages as follows:
If this value [value when used as provided in the conveyance of the fee simple determi-
nable] is equal to or greater than the market value of the realty if used for other practica-
ble purposes, the owner of the fee simple determinable is entitled to the full amount of
the award less some nominal amount-I percent of the sum awarded, for example---to
be allocated to the owner of the possibility of reverter. If the value so fixed, in cases
where abandonment of the use is imminent or where the realty would have a greater
market value if devoted to some other practicable purpose, is less than the totality of the
value, the owner of the possibility of reverter shall be entitled to a proportion of the
condemnation award expressed by a fraction the denominator of which is the market
value of the realty when devoted to its best practicable use and the numerator of which is
the difference between such value and the value of the realty applied to the use to which
it is restricted by the terms of the deed for such period of time as such use is reasonably
to be anticipated.
Id. at 97, 123 N.W.2d at 130 (emphasis in original).
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majority view that if the occurrence of the condition upon which the
defeasible fee will terminate or which will trigger the re-entry rights of
the grantor is not probable or imminent at the time of the institution of
the eminent domain action, the entire award will go to the owner of the
possessory fee simple defeasible.' 64
The court failed to delineate its reasons for adopting the majority
rule. Its focus on the grantee's lack of intention to abandon the re-
stricted use would suggest that the basis for its conclusion was a belief
that the possibility of reverter or right of re-entry was too remote to be
of consequence for damages purposes.'65 Although the Minnesota rule
allowing nominal damages to all owners of a possibility of reverter or
right of re-entry on condemnation affords those interests a possibly de-
sirable recognition, the portion of the rule providing for substantial
damages in appropriate cases would create additional confusion and
difficulty in eminent domain proceedings that the court of appeals has
avoided by selecting the majority view.
E. Zoning 66
The North Carolina Supreme Court in George v. Town of
164. 38 N.C. App. at 711-12, 248 S.E.2d at 912. The rule is stated in RESTATEMENT OF PROP-
ERTY § 53, Comment b (1936):
If, viewed from the time of the commencement of an eminent domain proceeding, and
not taking into account any changes in the use of the land sought to be condemned
which may result as a consequence of such proceeding, the event upon which a posses-
sory estate in fee simple defeasible is to end is an event the occurrence of which, within a
reasonably short period of time, is not probable, then the damages for a taking thereof by
an eminent domain proceeding are ascertained as though the estate were a possessory
estate in fee simple absolute and the entire amount thereof is awarded to the owner of
the estate in fee simple defeasible. Under these circumstances the future interest has no
ascertainable value.
See 2 P. NICHOLS, supra note 136, § 5.221[1] at 71-72; 27 AM. JUR. 2d Eminent Domain § 251
(1966).
In dictum the supreme court stated the general rule with approval in City of Charlotte v.
Charlotte Park & Ree. Comm'n. The claimants of the possibility of reverter in City of Charlotte
either did not answer or else transferred their interests to the possessor of the fee interest so that
there was no dispute about title to the damages. 278 N.C. at 33, 178 S.E.2d at 606.
165. 38 N.C. App. at 710, 712, 248 S.E.2d at 911-12. See also Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 568, 571
(1962).
166. In Capps v. City of Raleigh, 35 N.C. App. 290, 241 S.E.2d 527 (1978), the court of
appeals held that in an action by residents to challenge a zoning ordinance brought five years and
nine months after adoption of the ordinance and after defendants had spent large sums for
development of the area, defendants could assert a laches defense although plaintiffs had only
constructive and not actual notice of the public hearing on the zoning change.
The court of appeals in City of Winston-Salem v. Hoots Concrete Co., 37 N.C. App. 186, 245
S.E.2d 536, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 645, 248 S.E.2d 249 (1978), held that if, in a suit by the city to
enjoin defendant's operation of a concrete mixing business in a certain zone, a city zoning officer,
pursuant to the authority of the city code, had approved defendant's business as a permitted use in
that zone, the city could not raise the established defense that a municipality cannot be estopped
Edenton167 decided a zoning issue of first impression concerning a pro-
vision in a city zoning ordinance prohibiting reconsideration within a
six-month period of an application for rezoning of a tract. The court
held that the action of the Town Council of Edenton in permitting a
zoning change that it had previously refused during the preceding six
months was in violation of the town zoning ordinance and therefore
void. 168
The controlling provision of the Edenton zoning ordinance, sec-
tion 14-8, stated:
When the Town Board shall have .denied any application for the
change of any zoning district, it shall not thereafter accept any other
application for the same change of zoning amendment affecting the
same property, or any portion thereof, until the expiration of six (6)
months from the date of such previous denial. 16 9
Plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action to challenge a rezon-
ing decision made by the Edenton Town Council allegedly in violation
of this provision."' The owners of the property applied for rezoning of
the tract from residential-agricultural ("R-20") to highway-commercial
("CH") on March 14, 1975.171 The Town Council denied the request
on May 13.172 On July 8, 1975, the Council resolved to hold a public
hearing on August 12 to reconsider rezoning the tract as the owners had
requested in March. 173 On its own motion the Council decided at the
August 12, 1975 meeting to rezone the tract to "CH" in accordance
with the owners' original application.17 At the same meeting, the
Town Council adopted the "New Ordinance," a revised zoning ordi-
nance for the town. 175 The New Ordinance contained the same section
14-8 governing successive applications for rezoning that had appeared
in the "Old Ordinance." 176  Defendants argued that the rezoning
change was made "as part of the adoption of" the New Ordinance so
to enforce its own zoning laws because the officer was acting with proper authority and not in
violation of the ordinance.
167. 294 N.C. 679, 242 S.E.2d 877 (1978).
168. Id. at 687, 242 S.E.2d at 882.
169. Id. at 683, 242 S.E.2d at 880.
170. Id. at 680, 242 S.E.2d at 878. Plaintiffs were residents of Chowan County and were
within the town's zoning jurisdiction. Id.
171. Id. at 681, 242 S.E.2d at 878.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 682, 242 S.E.2d at 879. The owners applied to have the property rezoned to "CS"
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that section 14-8 would not be applicable.177 Plaintiffs claimed, how-
ever, that the change was made after the New Ordinance was adopted
and that section 14-8 therefore prohibited it. 178 Concluding that the
timing of the Council's decision to rezone as related to the adoption of
the New Ordinance was irrelevant, the supreme court found that the
Council had violated the time restriction of section 14-8.179
The court determined that the Council's July 8 action was in effect
"its own petition or application for an amendment""' and that section
14-8 extended to amendments proposed by the Town Council as well as
to those proposed by property owners. 18 ' Looking at similar cases from
various jurisdictions, the court perceived a determination to enforce
such time limitations in order to prevent "circumventions of zoning
provisions" such as occurred in this case.' 82 The policy reason for lit-
eral compliance with limitations on reapplication clauses is to protect
residents who live in the area subject to rezoning from "'the burden of
having to protest and defend against a series of repetitious applica-
tions.' "1'83 Finding that section 14-8 was intended to serve this protec-
tive role, the court ruled that the Council's action did not comply with
the ordinance's purpose or procedure and therefore could not stand.18 4
The court's application of section 14-8's procedural requirements
to strike down the conduct of the Edenton Town Council ensured the
efficacy of the protective function of the ordinance. If the court had
held that the council's decision to rezone was not subject to section 14-
8, it would have rendered the ordinance open to easy circumvention.
The court's strict reading of the provision, therefore, affirmed the sig-
nificance of such restrictions in zoning ordinances in safeguarding the
interests of property owners.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 683, 242 S.E.2d at 879.
180. Id. at 684, 242 S.E.2d at 880. Section 14-1 of the ordinance provided that "the Town
Council, the Planning Board, any department or agency of the Town, or the owner or renter of
any property within the zoning jurisdiction of the Town of Edenton" could petition for a zoning
amendment. Id. at 683, 242 S.E.2d at 880.
181. Id. at 685, 242 S.E.2d at 881.
182. Id. See Newman v. Smith, 217 Ga. 465, 123 S.E.2d 305 (1961) (finding that board's
action in granting requested rezoning was void when second application by owner was made
within 12 months of denial of first); Tyrie v. Baltimore County, 215 Md. 135, 137 A.2d 156 (1957)
(finding that grant of special exception was void when reclassification of same property had been
denied within the 18-month period established by ordinance); Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 494, 509
(1973).
183. Stephens v. Montgomery County Council, 248 Md. 256, 258, 235 A.2d 701, 702 (1967),
quoted with approval in George v. Town of Edenton, 294 N.C. at 686, 242 S.E.2d at 882 (1978).
184. 294 N.C. at 686-87, 242 S.E.2d at 882.
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F Landlord-Tenant
In Dixon v. Rivers, 8 ' the North Carolina Court of Appeals for the
first time confronted the question of the validity of covenants for per-
petual renewal in leases. In upholding the covenant at issue, the court
adopted the general rule that such covenants "will be enforced where
the language of the lease unmistakably indicates that the parties in-
tended to provide for such renewal."'186
Plaintiffs bought a tract of land that included a portion leased to
defendants by plaintiffs' predecessor in title.'87 The lease provided for
an initial ten year period and stated that
if said property has been kept in a good state of repair, and if said
parties of the second part so desire, this lease shall be renewed for an
additional period of 10 years, and thereafter shall be renewable every
10 years for so long as the parties of the second part so desire. 188
The lease was to be binding on the parties, "their heirs, executors, ad-
ministrators, and assigns."'18 9 The court rejected plaintiffs' contention
that because of the language "if said parties of the second part so de-
sire," the instrument created only a tenancy at will with an indefinite
term. 190 Instead, the court found that a true lease was intended because
of the definite ten year term with successive renewal terms of ten
years. 19' In support of its conclusion concerning the validity of the cov-
enant of perpetual renewal, the court determined that the intention of
the lessor to grant the right was clearly stated under the general rule;1 92
however, the question of the lessor's intent is but one factor, as the
court recognized. Another significant factor is the Rule against Perpe-
tuities. The law considers the covenant to renew a vested interest, and
therefore it is not in violation of the Rule; the court accepted this stan-
dard interpretation. 93
The court's decision to test the validity of covenants of perpetual
185. 37 N.C. App. 168, 245 S.E.2d 572, cert. granted, 295 N.C. 733, 248 S.E.2d 867 (1978) (No.
92 PC).
186. Id. at 171, 245 S.E.2d at 574. See also Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 607, 623 (1953).
187. 37 N.C. App. at 169, 245 S.E.2d at 573.
188. Id. at 170, 245 S.E.2d at 573-74.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 170-71, 245 S.E.2d at 574. The principal differentiating characteristic between a
lease and a tenancy at will is the existence in a lease of a designated, fixed term. See Barbee v.
Lamb, 225 N.C. 211, 34 S.E.2d 65 (1945); J. CRIBBEr, supra note 41, at 53, 55; C. MOYNIHAN,
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 65, 83 (1962); 8 STRONG'S NORTH CAROLINA
INDEX 3D Landlord and Tenant § 15 (1977); J. WEBSTER, SUpra note 4, §§ 89, 208.
191. 37 N.C. App. at 171, 245 S.E.2d at 574.
192. Id.
193. Id.; cf. J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 230, at 231 (4th ed. 1942) (covenant
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renewal according to the intent of the parties is a reasonable one. Be-
cause there is no technical perpetuities objection to such covenants,
they should be afforded legal recognition when this recognition accords
with the express wishes of the lessor and lessee. In addition, covenants
of perpetual renewal serve as a significant tool in the commercial realm
"to aid alienability."19
4
The court of appeals in Jones v. Andy Griffith Products, Inc.95 for
the first time considered possible standards for determining whether a
lessor has reasonably or unreasonably withheld consent to a proposed
sublease by the lessee. Plaintiffs leased premises in front of a shopping
center (owned by plaintiff Jones) to defendant Andy Griffith Products,
Inc.; Griffith in turn assigned the leasehold to defendant Silver's Enter-
prises, Inc.' 96 Both Griffith and Silver's operated restaurants on the
premises.197 Plaintiffs sued to recover unpaid rent and taxes on the
property, and defendant Silver's claimed that plaintiffs had unreasona-
bly refused to approve a sublease to the operator of an electronics
store. 98 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's holding that
plaintiffs' refusal to consent was reasonable and that defendants there-
fore were liable for the rent and taxes due.199
The lease provision in issue stated: "Any subletting by Lessee shall
be subject to the approval of Lessor, which approval shall not be unrea-
sonably withheld. ' 2 °' Plaintiffs objected to the proposed sublease on
two grounds: they wished to keep a restaurant on the premises, and the
suggested subtenant was already a tenant in another building in the
shopping center.20 1 The court looked to New Jersey and New York
opinions for guidance in determining whether these stated reasons for
withholding consent were reasonable. The New Jersey case, Broad &
Branford Place Corp. v. JJ Hockenjos Co.,20 2 offered only a basic rea-
sonable man standard: "the action of a reasonable man in the land-
to renew is "part of the lessee's present interest"); L. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS § 132, at 282 (2d ed. 1966) ("the renewed lease is but an extension of the old").
194. L. SIMES, supra note 193, § 230, at 282. Simes advances this view to explain why cove-
nants of perpetual renewal are held not to violate the Rule against Perpetuities.
195. 35 N.C. App. 170, 241 S.E.2d 140, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 90, 244 S.E.2d 258 (1978).
196. Id. at 170-71, 241 S.E.2d at 141.
197. Id. at 172, 241 S.E.2d at 141.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 176, 241 S.E.2d at 144.
200. Id. at 171, 241 S.E.2d at 141.
201. Id. at 172, 241 S.E.2d at 142. The evidence revealed that the building was constructed for
restaurant purposes and that a restaurant in the building would afford plaintiffs a greater opportu-
nity to realize percentage rentals. Id. at 174, 241 S.E.2d at 143.
202. 132 N.J.L. 229, 39 A.2d 80 (1944).
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lord's position. ' 20 3  American Book Co. v. Yeshiva University
Development Foundation, Inc.,2° the New York case, provided more
concrete aid to the court in a series of "objective" tests of reasonable-
ness: "(1) financial responsibility, (2) the 'identity' or 'business charac-
ter' of the subtenant-i.e. his suitability for the particular building, (3)
the legality of the proposed use, (4) the nature of the occupancy-i.e.
office, factory, clinic, or whatever."205 The court of appeals found that
lessor's refusal was grounded on considerations such as those in tests
(2) and (4), and concluded that on the facts of Jones, the withholding of
consent from a subtenant in a different business was reasonable. 0 6 A
caveat to the holding was the court's statement that this type of case
will always turn on its facts so that a finding that a lessor's reason for
refusal of consent accords with one or more of the tests may not neces-
sarily be conclusive proof that the landlord's grounds were
reasonable.20 7
One may question the significance of the court's reference to the
reasonable landlord standard and the "objective" tests of American
Book Co. because the inquiry is essentially a factual one in each case;
the standards used by the court of appeals will provide no definite an-
swers on the issue of reasonableness. Although the tests may be viewed
as simply common sense expressions of the expectations of the lessor
and lessee, their articulation by the court of appeals will nevertheless
serve as a useful tool for analysis of this type of sublease consent
provision.
203. Id. at 232, 39 A.2d at 82. The court also stated:
Arbitrary considerations of personal taste, sensibility, or convenience do not constitute
the criteria of the landlord's duty under an agreement such as this. Personal satisfaction
is not the sole determining factor. . . .The term "reasonable" is relative and not readily
definable. As here used, it connotes action according to the dictates of reason--such as is
just, fair and suitable in the circumstances.
Id. See generally Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 679 § 6 (1973).
204. 59 Misc. 2d 31, 297 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1969).
205. Id. at -, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 160.
206. 35 N.C. App. at 176, 241 S.E.2d at 144.
207. Id. The court noted that the burden of proof on the unreasonableness of the landlord's
refusal to consent is on the lessee. Id. See generaly Broad & Branford Place Corp. v. J.J. Hock-
enjos Co., 132 N.J.L. 229, 233, 39 A.2d 80, 82 (1944); Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 679, 683 (1973).
The court did not have to consider whether the proposed subtenant's status as a current ten-
ant of plaintiff Jones in the shopping center would be reasonable grounds to refuse consent to the
sublease. One court has found that this excuse-that the proposed subtenant was a tenant in
another building owned by the landlord-was "insufficient in law" to constitute a reasonable re-
fusal of consent by the landlord. Krieger v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 62 N.J. 423, 424, 302 A.2d 129,
129 (1973).
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G Personal Property208
The subject of the court of appeals' inquiry in Montford v.
Grohman20 9 was the effect on plaintiffs constitutional personal prop-
erty exemption (for the protection of personal property from the claims
of creditors) of a security interest held by defendant finance company
in plaintiffs household goods. Plaintiff and defendant finance com-
pany entered into a consumer loan agreement by which defendant took
a security interest in all of plaintiffs personal property and plaintiff
waived her legal exemption rights.2z 0 Plaintiff defaulted on the loan;
defendant established its right to possess plaintiffs property and that
her belongings were worth no more than $500.211 The lower court
found that plaintiff was entitled to her constitutional personal property
exemption of $500,212 despite the security interest held by the finance
company.1 3 Holding that the security interest took priority over the
personal property exemption, the court of appeals reversed and deter-
mined that plaintiff was not entitled to retain $500 of personal
property.214
The constitutional personal property exemption exempts "from
sale under execution or other final process of any court, issued for the
collection of any debt" an amount of personal property, not less than
$500, for all state residents.21 5 Plaintiff argued that this exemption
should protect her last $500 of assets even though she had freely en-
tered into the security agreement with defendant finance company.
216
The court of appeals, however, declared that the exemption is limited
to the situation expressly covered by its language-it serves to preserve
a debtor's property from final sale but not to guarantee that he will be
208. The supreme court in Lee-Moore Oil Co. v. Cleary, 295 N.C. 417, 245 S.E.2d 720 (1978),
found that the owner of a chattel and the owner of the realty to which the chattel is attached may
agree expressly or impliedly, orally or in writing, that the chattel will remain the personal property
of the owner rather than become a fixture of the property, and that such an agreement will be
binding on subsequent purchasers of the realty who take with knowledge of the arrangement.
209. 36 N.C. App. 733, 245 S.E.2d 219 (1978), appealdismissed, 295 N.C. 551, 248 S.E.2d 727
(1978).
210. Id. at 734, 245 S.E.2d at 220.
211. Id. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-503 (Cum. Supp. 1977) establishes the right of the secured
party to take possession of the collateral upon default of the debtor.
212. N.C. CONST. art. X, § 1.
213. 36 N.C. App. at 734, 245 S.E.2d at 221.
214. Id. at 738, 245 S.E.2d at 223.
215. N.C. CONsT. art. X, § 1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-378 (1969) limits the amount of the per-
sonal property exemption to a maximum of $500.
216. 36 N.C. App. at 735, 245 S.E.2d at 221.
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able to keep his last assets in all circumstances.21 7 The owner is free to
dispose of or encumber those assets in a manner outside the reach of
the personal property exemption, that is, by voluntary sale, gift, or, as
here, security interest.2 18 Plaintiff's choice to enter into the security
agreement was binding on her, and the personal property exemption
did not render defendant finance company's security interest null.21 9
The New Mexico court in Hernandez v. S.L C Finance Co.,220 cited by
the court of appeals, reached a similar conclusion on the theory that if
an owner can sell his otherwise "exempt" property, he certainly can
encumber it with a security interest. The owner then cannot call upon
the statutory exemption for protection from his contract.2
Although the court reached the proper result according to the lan-
guage and policy of the exemption, it did suggest that this area might
be an appropriate one for legislative action.222 If such security interests
in household goods were barred, a debtor's final assets would be pre-
served, except for sale or gift by the debtor . 2 3  Whether this result
would be sound is questionable; as the New Mexico court stated, sub-
jecting one's goods to a security interest is not as final a step as selling
those goods. Therefore, if the legislature were to prevent security inter-
ests in household goods, arguably it should also prevent a debtor from
selling his final assets. Neither result accords with the debtor's owner-
ship rights in the property. The Montford result is preferable to a legis-
lative change in the personal property exemption because it recognizes
the owner's power to dispose of his property as he wishes through vol-
untary security agreements.
217. Id. at 736, 245 S.E.2d at 222.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 737, 245 S.E.2d at 222; Gf. Gaster v. Hardie, 75 N.C. 460 (1876) (establishing the
following order of payment when debtor has given a chattel mortgage: (1) mortgage debt, (2)
debtor's personal property exemption, and (3) amounts owing to a judgment creditor).
The court expressly stated that the waiver provision in the agreement was not the basis of its
decision. 36 N.C. App. at 737, 245 S.E.2d at 222-23. An executory waiver of the right to the
exemption by the debtor is not enforceable. See Branch & Co. v. Tomlinson, 77 N.C. 388, 391
(1877).
220. 79 N.M. 673, 448 P.2d 474 (1968).
221. Id. at 675, 448 P.2d at 476. The court noted that "such property [often] is the poorman's
only source of cash in an emergency," and he may need to sell or encumber it. Id.
222. 36 N.C. App. at 738, 245 S.E.2d at 223. The court referred to First National Bank of
Amarillo v. LaJoie, 537 P.2d 1207 (Sup. Ct. Okla. 1975). The controlling statute in LaJole prohib-
ited a seller "in [a] consumer credit sale from taking [a] security interest in property other than
[the] property sold." Id. at 1208, OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A, § 2-407 (1971). The provision is from the
UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.407. The limitation on security interests in § 2.407 ap-
plies, however, only to consumer credit sales and not to consumer loans (the situation in
Afontford). Id.; see 537 P.2d at 1209.
223. 36 N.C. App. at 738, 245 S.E.2d at 223.
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H Wills, Trusts and Esates224
The North Carolina Court of Appeals for the first time interpreted
the meaning of "net income" in the determination of the surviving
spouse's year's allowance under G.S. 30-3 1225 in Pritchard v. Firt-Citi-
zens Bank & Trust Co. 226 In Pritchard the widow petitioned the clerk
of superior court for allotment of a year's allowance pursuant to G.S.
30-27227 (allowance assigned in superior court) rather than the mini-
mum year's allowance of $2000 in G.S. 30-15.228 Determining that the
widow's petition complied with G.S. 30-31, the superior court awarded
her a year's allowance of $40,640; one of the remaindermen under the
trust established by decedent for his wife and children appealed.22 9
224. In a will construction case, Sutton v. Sutton, 35 N.C. App. 670, 242 S.E.2d 644 (1978), the
court of appeals construed a gift by a husband to his wife of "a sufficient amount of my real and
personal property when added to the value of my home, and other property that she will receive
outside of this Will, that will equal one-third of my net estate" to be a gift of an undivided interest
in the testator's real property rather than a specific dollar figure because testator provided in the
will that the property was to be managed and the income to be distributed for the benefit of his
wife.
In Thompson v. Ward, 36 N.C. App. 593, 244 S.E.2d 485, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 556, 248
S.E.2d 735 (1978), the court of appeals held that a holographic devise of "the use of" certain
realty to the heirs of testatrix's brother-in-law for "as long as they wish to live there" was a gift of
only a life estate despite the statutory presumption that any devise of realty is in fee simple under
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-38 (1977); the testatrix's intent to convey a lesser estate was clearly shown
because she used language of "fee simple" elsewhere when she so intended.
In In re Will of Weston, 38 N.C. App. 564, 248 S.E.2d 359 (1978), the court of appeals found
that an attesting witness, if he had sight at the time of the execution of the will and was able to
testify satisfactorily that the will read to him was the one he had witnessed, was "available" to give
testimony to prove an attested will under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-18.1 (1976) even though he was
blind at the time of the proceeding.
In a caveat proceeding challenging testatrix's capacity to make a will in Inre Will of Worrell,
35 N.C. App. 278, 241 S.E.2d 343, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 90, 244 S.E.2d 263 (1978), the court of
appeals held that an instruction by the trial court that the jury was to consider whether testatrix
"recognized her obligation to the objects of her bounty and their relation to her" was not in error
and that this factor was relevant to the question of testamentary capacity.
225. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-31 (1976) provides in part:
The said commissioners shall be sworn by the magistrate and shall proceed as prescribed
in this Chapter, except that they may assign to the plaintiff a value sufficient for the
support of the plaintiff according to the estate and condition of the decedent and without
regard to the limitations set forth in this Chapter . . . and the total value of all al-
lowances shall not in any case exceed the one half to the average annual net income of
the deceased for three years next preceding his death.
The purpose of the year's allowance is to provide the surviving spouse with immediate funds
for support pending administration of the decedent's estate.
226. 38 N.C. App. 489, 248 S.E.2d 467 (1978).
227. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-27 (1976). For discussion of the operation of the allowance as-
signed in superior court, see 1 N. WIGGINS, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN NORTH
CAROLINA § 173 (1964).
228. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-15 (1976).
229. 38 N.C. App. at 490-91, 248 S.E.2d at 468-69. The evidence established that the commis-
sioners had based the award on the decedent's "adjusted gross income" from his federal income
Holding that "net income" under G.S. 30-31 signifies the after-tax in-
come of the decedent, the court of appeals reversed the award because
the lower court had improperly used an adjusted gross income base.230
Appellant contended that the allowance to the surviving spouse of
a maximum amount of "one half of the average annual net income of
the deceased for three years next preceding his death" should be con-
strued as one-half of the average sum left after the deduction of federal
and state income taxes and not one-half of the average adjusted gross
income of decedent. 23 1 The court of appeals looked to the purpose of
the statute in order to resolve the issue. The 1868-69 Legislative Ses-
sion enacted the alternative system that now exists: the widow may take
either a minimal allowance,232 or, upon the required showing,233 may
take an amount "sufficient for the support of herself and her family
according to the estate and condition of her husband .. ".. 234 The
court found that the intention of the second alternative, by which the
spouse may take a much greater sum than the $2000 of G.S. 30-15, was
to grant the surviving spouse "of a solvent decedent ... an amount
sufficient to maintain for a period that standard of living to which he or
she had been accustomed .... -235 The court concluded that the al-
lowance should be based upon that amount of income that the family
in the past actually had had available for its living needs.236 "Net in-
come" thus under G.S. 30-31 can refer only to the decedent's income
after deductions for federal and state income taxes are made.237
The decision of the court of appeals is a sound one. G.S. 30-27
provides the surviving spouse with the opportunity to claim an allow-
ance based upon the familial standard of living prior to decedent's
death. This privilege should not be abused by allowing the spouse to
claim an allowance based on one-half of the average gross income of
tax returns for the three years before his death. The average adjusted gross income figure based
on the three years was $81,289. Id. at 490, 248 S.E.2d at 469.
230. Id. at 493-94, 248 S.E.2d at 470-71.
231. Id. at 490, 248 S.E.2d at 469.
232. Law of March 27, 1869, ch. 93, § 10, 1868-69 N.C. Pub. Laws 205 (current version at N.C.
GEN. STAT § 30-15 (1976)).
233. Id. § 22, 1868-69 N.C. Pub. Laws 205 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-29
(1976)).
234. Id. § 24, 1868-69 N.C. Pub. Laws 205 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-31
(1976)).
235. 38 N.C. App. at 491,248 S.E.2d at 469. The court emphasized that the § 30-31 computa-
tion provides the maximum allowance that may be assigned; the award may of course be for less
than this maximum amount. Id. at 493, 248 S.E.2d at 470.
236. Id. at 493, 248 S.E.2d at 470.
237. Id.
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the decedent without taking into account the tax burdens incurred by
that income. The court's interpretation-limiting the basis for the al-
lowance to the after-tax income of the decedent-protects the interests
of both the surviving spouse and the estate and is consonant with the
policy of the alternative allowance procedures.
In Dew v. Shockley,2 38 the court of appeals determined that testa-
trix's gift of all of her property to her "two brothers and three sisters, to
have and to hold the same for and during the term of their natural lives
with remainder in fee to their children, in equal shares, the children of
any deceased child to take the share the parent, if living, would
take, '2 39 conveyed a joint life estate with right of survivorship to her
brothers and sisters and a remainder in fee to their childrenper capita.
Although the court's construction of the gift as a joint life estate is cor-
rect according to North Carolina precedent, its reasoning concerning
the per capita remainder to the children is erroneous.
The common law presumption favoring joint tenancies with right
of survivorship still applies to the creation of life estates;2 40 G.S. 41-
2,241 which abolishes survivorship in joint tenancies in estates of inheri-
tance, is not applicable. Because there was no language in the will indi-
cating an intent that the brothers and sisters take as tenants in common,
the court found the presumption controlling.242 Similarly, the general
rule in class gifts is that members of the class takeper capita rather than
per stirpes.243 The testatrix's intent was clear on this point because she
gave the remainder to the children "in equal shares." 2' The court con-
cluded that any children of a deceased child would take per stirpes,
however, because any gift to them was expressly limited to the amount
that the parent would have taken if alive.245
The court stated that any children alive at the testatrix's death
would take a vested remainder subject to open to allow children born
after her death but before the termination of the life estate to share in
238. 36 N.C. App. 87, 243 S.E.2d 177, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 9 (1978).
239. Id. at 88, 243 S.E.2d at 179.
240. Id. at 89, 243 S.E.2d at 179; see Burton v. Cahill, 192 N.C. 505, 135 S.E. 332 (1926) (deed
of life estate to two daughters with remainder to their children: daughters took as joint tenants
with right of survivorship and children took per capita).
241. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (1976).
242. 36 N.C. App. at 89-90, 243 S.E.2d at 180.
243. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Bryant, 258 N.C. 482, 128 S.E.2d 758 (1963); Burton
v. Cahill, 192 N.C. 505, 135 S.E. 332 (1926).
244. 36 N.C. App. at 90, 243 S.E.2d at 180.
245. Id.
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the gift.246 The court, however, confused this question of when the
class closes with the question of the minimum membership of the class:
Were the distribution purely per capita, with the roll called at the
falling in of the life estate, children of brothers and sisters, alive at
testatrix's death, or born during the life estate, but dead by the falling
in of the life estate, would not be in the class of takers, and their
children would take nothing. The per stirpes direction preserves the
grandchildren's share.247
Because the children took a vested remainder, the per stirpes direction
was not necessary to preserve their interests or make them transmissi-
ble.24 s If a child were to die prior to the termination of the life estate,
his remainder would not be defeated, absent an express or implied con-
dition of survivorship; the authoritative view, which the court appar-
ently did not follow, is that there is no implied condition of
survivorship in a gift to a class such as this.249
The limitation to "the children of any deceased child" meant that
the children of the brothers and sisters took a vested remainder subject
to divestiture if they died before the life tenants and left children; the
children's children then would take their interests.2 50 The critical case
arises, however, if a child were to predecease the life tenants and leave
no children. According to the court, his interest would be lost. This
approach is contrary to the general view that the child's remainder will
pass to his estate because it has not been divested by the occurrence of
a condition subsequent.251 Therefore, the court's implication that a
child must survive to the termination of the life estate in order to take
an interest in the property is inconsistent both with the general rules on
minimum membership for class gifts and with prior North Carolina
law.252
246. Id. at 91, 243 S.E.2d at 181. See also Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, 255 N.C.
122, 120 S.E.2d 588 (1961); Beam v. Gilkey, 225 N.C. 520, 35 S.E.2d 641 (1945) (direction that
property be equally divided among children of life tenant did not affect vesting of remainder);
Chas. W. Priddy & Co. v. Sanderford, 221 N.C. 422, 20 S.E.2d 341 (1942).
247. 36 N.C. App. at 90, 243 S.E.2d at 180.
248. 2 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 653, at 105 (2d ed. 1956).
249. Id. § 578, at 19. The supreme court has found an implied condition of survivorship in an
alternative contingent remainder to a class of brothers and sisters, although the condition prece-
dent was unrelated to survivorship. Lawson v. Lawson, 267 N.C. 643, 148 S.E.2d 546 (1966).
250. 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 248, § 583, at 25-26; see Parker v. Parker, 252 N.C.
399, 113 S.E.2d 899 (1960).
251. 2 L. SiMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 248, § 583, at 26-27.
252. See Pinnell v. Dowtin, 224 N.C. 493, 31 S.E.2d 467 (1944) (gift to two named children
rather than to class); Mason v. White, 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 421 (1862). The supreme court in Mason
held that in a gift of a life estate to testator's wife and remainder to the wife's children, the estate
of a child who had predeceased the wife (life tenant) could claim the child's share: "there is no
ground on which it can be concluded that the death of one of the legatees divested her legacy in
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Although the court's interpretation causes no difficulty at the pres-
ent time because no children of the brothers and sisters have prede-
ceased the life tenants without children, this problem could certainly
arise in the future. Because the textatrix created a vested remainder in
the children without any express condition of survival, the court's con-
struction would ignore her intention by depriving the estate of children
who predecease the life tenants and leave no children of their own from




.A. State and Local Sales Tax
In Gregory Poole Equipment Co. v. Coble,' the North Carolina
Court of Appeals held that exemption from the state sales tax does not
preclude the assessment of a local sales tax.'
Plaintiff, a dealer in industrial equipment, had accepted used ma-
chinery as a trade-in on new machinery. Although the three percent
state sales tax was paid on the sale of the new equipment, no local sales
tax was paid to three counties in which the dealer operated because the
equipment was sold and delivered to purchasers outside those coun-
ties.3 Later plaintiff sold the used equipment to purchasers within those
same three counties, but paid neither state nor local sales tax on the
sales.4 Because state sales tax had been paid on the sale of the new
favor of the surviving legatees. To have this effect, there must be words of exclusion; e.g., "to the
children of A, living at the time of her death." Id. at 423.
1. 38 N.C. App. 483, 248 S.E.2d 378 (1978).
2. Id. at 487, 248 S.E.2d at 381.
3. Id. at 484, 248 S.E.2d at 379. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-467 (1972) provides:
The local sales tax... shall be applicable to such retail sales ... which are made
... by retailers whose place of business is located within the taxing county.... How-
ever, no tax shall be imposed where the tangible personal property sold is delivered to
the purchaser at a point outside the taxing county by the retailer or his agent, or by a
common carrier.
4. 38 N.C. App. at 484, 248 S.E.2d at 379.
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equipment, the used equipment sales were clearly exempt from state
sales tax under G.S. 105-164.13(16).'
Plaintiff's contention that the used equipment sale was also exempt
from local sales tax was based on the language of the statute governing
local sales tax, which authorizes a one percent local sales tax on sales of
articles "now subject to" the three percent state sales tax.6 Plaintiff ar-
gued that a sale is "subject to" state sales tax only when that tax is
assessed and collected.7 Using this interpretation, plaintiff maintained
that because its sale of the used equipment was not "subject to" the
state tax by reason of the exemption, local sales tax could not apply."
The court agreed with the Secretary of Revenue that "subject to"
refers not to those transactions for which a state sales tax is actually
assessed, but to any transaction to which the state sales tax is applica-
ble, without regard to whether that transaction might ultimately qualify
for an exemption under another section of the statute. 9 Because plain-
tiff's sale of the used equipment was "subject to" the state sales tax
before that sale qualified for the exemption, local sales tax could be
collected on the sale, even though state sales tax was not. l0
The court noted that, for local sales tax not to apply to the transac-
tion, plaintiff would have had to have qualified for an exemption from
that tax, just as it had for the state sales tax.," This conclusion was
supported by the language of G.S. 105-467,12 which clearly states that
the exemptions and exclusions applicable to the state sales tax are
equally applicable to the local tax. Plaintiff had qualified for an ex-
emption from the state tax on the sale of the used equipment because it
had paid tax on the new equipment for which the used was taken in
trade.'3 Had plaintiff also paid local sales tax on the sale of the new
equipment, it would have owed no local tax on the later sale of the used
equipment.
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.13(16) (1972) provides that sales of used articles taken in
trade are exempt from state sales tax "provided the tax levied in this Article is paid on the gross
sales price of the new article."
6. See id. § 105-467.
7. 38 N.C. App. at 487, 248 S.E.2d at 380.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 487, 248 S.E.2d at 381.
10. Id.
II. Id.
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-467 (1972). "The exemptions and exclusions contained in G.S.
105-164.13 . .. shall apply with equal force and in like manner to the local sales and use tax
authorized to be levied and imposed under this Article." Id.; see note 5 supra.
13. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
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This result is undoubtedly correct if the local and state sales tax
provisions are to be harmonized. In G.S. 105-47414 the legislature has
clearly expressed its intent that all provisions relevant to the state sales
tax apply to the local sales tax, and that the provisions governing each
are to be harmonized. 5 If the state sales tax exemptions and exclusions
are to apply "with equal force and in like manner"' 6 to the local tax,
whether a local exemption is available must be determined by reference
to the statute governing state sales tax exemptions.' 7 The particular
exemption involved in this case deals with transactions in used goods.
Those goods are exempt from state sales tax only when they are taken
in trade on a new article, on which the state sales tax is paid.'" A con-
dition must be met for the exemption to apply. If the exemption is to
apply "with equal force" to the local sales tax, an equivalent condition
must be met. Because the transaction in this case clearly did not meet
this condition, the local sales tax was properly assessed.
B. Estate and Inheritance Taxes
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in First National Bank of
Shelby v. Dixon,'9 held that the beneficiary of a life insurance policy
must contribute to payment of federal estate and state inheritance taxes
incurred by reason of inclusion of the policy's proceeds in a decedent's
gross estate.20 The court also held that the federal and state tax liabili-
ties caused by the policy's inclusion are not debts of the estate but liens
upon the asset in the hands of the beneficiary. 2'
Because federal and state law apparently conflicted on the issue of
liability for estate taxes attributable to inclusion of life insurance poli-
cies in the estate, and the North Carolina statute was silent on the issue
of liability for inheritance taxes on the same amount, plaintiff bank, as
administrator of an estate, had brought an action for declaratory judg-
ment against the beneficiary of two life insurance policies.22 The fed-
eral Internal Revenue Code gives the personal representative of an
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-474 (1972).
15. See id.
16. Id. § 105-467.
17. Id. § 105-164.13 (1972 & Cum. Supp. 1977) is aimed primarily at exempting sales of
certain products from the state sales tax. Prescription drugs are, for example, exempt from the
state sales tax and therefore also exempt from local sales tax. See id. § 105-164.13(13) (1972).
18. Id. § 105-164.13(16) (1972).
19. 38 N.C. App. 430, 248 S.E.2d 416 (1978).
20. Id. at 435-36, 248 S.E.2d at 419-20.
21. Id. at 437, 248 S.E.2d at 420.
22. Id. at 431, 248 S.E.2d at 417.
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estate the right to recover from beneficiaries of life insurance policies
the proportionate share of tax imposed on the estate when the proceeds
of the policy were included in the decedent's gross estate,23 unless dece-
dent's will directs otherwise.24 North Carolina case law has held, how-
ever, that unless a decedent's will contains contrary instructions,
federal estate taxes are to be paid by the residuary estate without con-
tribution even though the estate includes nonprobate assets such as life
insurance.25 Further, the state statute, G.S. 105-13,26 provides that pro-
ceeds of life insurance policies receivable by beneficiaries are taxable
when the decedent retained incidents of ownership, 27 but does not spec-
ify who shall pay the state tax.
Defendant, decedent's wife, was the residuary legatee of dece-
dent's estate and the beneficiary of two life insurance policies owned by
decedent and valued at $160,000.28 The proceeds of the policies2 9 had
been included in decedent's gross estate for purposes of federal and
North Carolina 31 taxation, and therefore gave rise to both estate and
23. Under the federal statute, I.R.C. § 2042, "incidents of ownership," which would cause the
policy to be included in the decedent's gross estate, include the "power to change the beneficiary,
to surrender or cancel the policy, to assign the policy, to revoke an assignment, to pledge the
policy for a loan," etc. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042.1(c)(2) (1958). The term
also includes a reversionary interest in the policy or its proceeds, whether arising by the
express terms of the policy or other instrument or by operation of law, but only if the
value of the reversionary interest immediately before the death of the decedent exceeded
five percent of the value of the policy.
Id. § 20.2042-1(c)(3).
Under North Carolina law, the term "incident of ownership" includes a reversionary interest
in the policy or its proceeds. A reversionary interest "includes a possibility that the policy, or the
proceeds of the policy, may return to the decedent or his estate, or may be subject to a power of
disposition by him." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-13(2) (1972).
24. I.R.C. § 2206 provides:
Unless the decedent directs otherwise in his will, if any part of the gross estate on which
tax has been paid consists of proceeds of policies of insurance on the life of the decedent
receivable by a beneficiary other than the executor, the executor shall be entitled to re-
cover from such beneficiary such portion of the total tax paid as the proceeds of such
policies bear to the taxable estate.
25. See Cornwell v. Huffman, 258 N.C. 363, 128 S.E.2d 798 (1972); Craig v. Craig, 232 N.C.
729, 62 S.E.2d 336 (1950). See generally Comment, A4pportionment of the Federal Estate Tax-
Should North Carolina Adopt an Apportionment Statute?, 52 N.C.L. REV. 737 (1974).
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-13 (1972).
27. See note 23 supra.
28. 38 N.C. App. at 431, 248 S.E.2d at 417.
29. The proceeds of the policies, after adjustments for the applicable marital deduction and
other exemptions, were included in the decedent's gross estate. Id; see I.R.C. § 2206. When
proceeds of the policy are received by the surviving spouse and a marital deduction is allowed
(I.R.C. § 2056), § 2206 only applies to such insurance policy proceeds to the extent that those
proceeds exceed the aggregate marital deduction.
30. See I.R.C. § 2042.
31. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-13 (1972).
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inheritance taxes. Decedent's will did not indicate how the tax liability
was to be satisfied, and the personalty in the estate was insufficient to
pay the taxes assessed by reason of the policies' inclusion in the gross
estate.3 1 Plaintiff argued that decedent's wife, as beneficiary of the poli-
cies, should pay the ratable portion of the estate and inheritance taxes
assessed because of the inclusion. 3
Defendant contended that she was not responsible for any portion
of the federal estate taxes because those taxes were a debt of the estate,
and therefore had to be satisfied out of the residuary estate.3 4 This con-
tention rested on Park v. Carroll,35 in which federal estate taxes were
clearly denominated debts of the estate chargeable to the residuary es-
tate and not against specific legacies or devises.36  The court dis-
tinguished Park, stating that the contention that federal estate taxes are
debts of the estate is premised on the estate's personal representative
controlling "all of the assets of the estate to which [he] may look for
satisfaction of the tax imposed and for which he is primarily liable. '37
Because the personal representative does not have control of nonpro-
bate assets such as life insurance proceeds, the court said the tax liabil-
ity incurred on those proceeds is not a debt of the estate, but a lien
upon the assets in the hands of the beneficiaries.3 8 The court thus
carved out an exception to the Park rule that required the federal estate
tax liability, as a debt of the estate, to be satisfied out of the residuary
estate.39 The exception is narrow: to the extent that the federal estate
tax liability is based on inclusion in the gross estate of nonprobate as-
sets such as life insurance,40 the tax liability is not a debt satisfiable out
of the residuary estate, but a lien on the asset in the hands of the recipi-
32. 38 N.C. App. at 431-32, 248 S.E.2d at 417.
33. Id. at 432, 248 S.E.2d at 418.
34. Id. at 437, 248 S.E.2d at 420.
35. 18 N.C. App. 53, 196 S.E.2d 40 (1973).
36. The Park court noted:
In North Carolina where the testator fails to express in his will any direction as to the
payment of the debts of the estate (including federal estate taxes), legacies abate in the
following order: (1) residuary, (2) general, (3) specific and demonstrative, ratably and,
after the personalty has been exhausted, the same order applies to the testator's realty.
Id. at 57, 196 S.E.2d at 43. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-15-5 (1976).
37. 38 N.C. App. at 437, 248 S.E.2d at 420.
38. Id.
39. "[In the absence of a contrary testamentary provision, federal estate taxes are chargeable
to the residuary estate. . . ." 18 N.C. App. at 58, 196 S.E.2d at 43.
40. The exception applies not only to life insurance proceeds under I.R.C. § 2206, but also to
property over which decedent had a power of appointment, as governed by I.R.C. § 2207. See
First Nat'l Bank v. Wells, 267 N.C. 276, 148 S.E.2d 119 (1966).
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ent or beneficiary.41 The estate's personal representative can, therefore,
reach those nonprobate assets for satisfaction of any tax their inclusion
in the gross estate might incur.
This decision brings North Carolina law squarely in line with the
federal statute.42 Although the court was compelled to distinguish
Park in order to find that the federal estate tax provision did not con-
flict with North Carolina principles governing payment of estate taxes
from the residuary estate,43 had any conflict existed the federal statute
would have controlled.44
The court had less difficulty resolving the question whether a ben-
eficiary of life insurance policies should contribute to state inheritance
taxes, even though no North Carolina statute or decision deals pre-
cisely with the issue. The North Carolina statute provides that pro-
ceeds of life insurance policies receivable by beneficiaries are subject to
inheritance tax when the decedent retained incidents of ownership, but
does not specify who shall pay the tax.45 G.S. 105-15 does provide that
devisees under decedent's will are primarily liable for inheritance taxes
on property devised to them under the will, but does not address the
question of liability for inheritance taxes on nonprobate assets such as
life insurance policies.46 Confronted with statutory silence on the issue,
the court was "constrained by equity and the example of our federal
and sister state governments"'47 to hold that the beneficiary is primarily
liable for taxes incurred by reason of a life insurance policy's inclusion
in decedent's taxable estate.48
This decision ensures that the personal representative of the estate,
who is liable under state law for all inheritance taxes due on any estate
under his control,49 may proceed against the beneficiary of a life insur-
ance policy when the proceeds are includable in the decedent's taxable
estate under G.S. 105-13.50 Otherwise, inheritance taxes imposed by
reason of both probate and nonprobate assets would have to be satis-
fied by the estate without contribution from the nonprobate assets, cre-
41. 38 N.C. App. at 437, 248 S.E.2d at 420.
42. By judicial decision, North Carolina law now parallels both I.R.C. § 2206 and I.R.C.
§ 2207. See note 40 supra.
43. 38 N.C. App. at 434, 248 S.E.2d at 419.
44. Id.
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-13 (1972).
46. Id. § 105-15.
47. 38 N.C. App. at 436, 248 S.E.2d at 420.
48. Id.
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-28 (1972).
50. Id. § 105-13.
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ating an undue burden on the probate assets of the estate.-5
C. Ad Valorem Taxes :52 Exempt Propery 53
All real and personal property within North Carolina is subject tc
taxation 54 unless excluded from the tax base5 s or exempt from taxa-
tion.5 6 The statutory exemptions and exclusions are based not only on
the character of the owner, but also on how the property is used.5 7 If
the use of the property can be characterized as commercial, that prop-
erty will have to bear its just share of the community tax burden, re-
gardless of the character of the owner. 8 As might be expected, statutes
exempting specific property from taxation because of the purpose for
which that property is used are construed strictly against exemption
and in favor of taxation.5 9
In In re North Carolina Forestry Foundation,6" the North Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed two court of appeals decisions6" denying an
5 1. It should be kept in mind that estate planning can avoid the result dictated by this case.
The life insurance policy will not be swept back into decedent's gross estate unless decedent re-
tained incidents of ownership in the policy. See note 23 supra. Also, decedent's will can specify
how the federal estate and state inheritance taxes are to be satisfied. See text accompanying note
24 supra.
52. Uniform appraisal standards for all real and personal property subject to ad valorem
taxation appear in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-283 (Interim Supp. 1978). In 1978 the legislature
amended the statute to provide that the value of land acquired by eminent domain is not evidence
of the true value in money of comparable land for purposes of appraising property for ad valorem
taxation. Law of June 16, 1978, ch. 1297, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 1978, at 215. The
amendment is effective for tax years beginning on or after January 1, 1979.
The amendment serves to ensure that land will be appraised at its "true value," since the
higher prices sometimes paid for strategically located land acquired by eminent domain will not
be allowed to distort the appraised value of similar property.
53. The second session of the 1977 legislature amended § 105-275(1) to extend from 12
months to 48 months the period that property awaiting export may be stored without losing its
exemption from county property taxes. The amendment is effective January 1, 1980. Law of June
16, 1978, ch. 1200, § 4, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 1978, at 121 (to be codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-275(1)).
54. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-274 (1972).
55. See id. § 105-275 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Under the statute certain classes of both real and
personal property are designated special classes and are not to be "listed, appraised, assessed, or
taxed." Id.
56. See id. § 105-278.1 to .9.
57. See, e.g., id. § 105-278.4. This statute exempts real and personal property owned by a
nonprofit educational institution if that property is of a kind "commonly employed in the per-
formance of those activities. . . properly incident to the operation of an educational institution"
and if the property is "wholly and exclusively used for educational purposes." Id.
58. See Trustees of Guilford College v. Guilford County, 219 N.C. 347,13 S.E.2d 622 (1941);
County of Rockingham v. Board of Trustees of Elon College, 219 N.C. 342, 13 S.E.2d 618 (1941).
59. See Latta v. Jenkins, 200 N.C. 255, 258, 156 S.E. 857, 858-59 (1931).
60. 296 N.C. 330, 250 S.E.2d 236 (1979).
61. 35 N.C. App. 414, 242 S.E.2d 492 (1978), aj'd, 296 N.C. 330, 250 S.E.2d 236 (1979) (tax
liability for Foundation's property in Onslow County (approximately 51,000 acres)); 35 N.C. App.
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exemption or exclusion for 81,000 acres of timberland owned by the
North Carolina Forestry Foundation. The Foundation claimed tax ex-
empt status for the timberland under four statutes. Three of those stat-
utes exempt property used exclusively for educational, scientific or
charitable purposes; 62 the other exempts property owned by the Uni-
versity of North Carolina.63
The court found that the Foundation's property was exempt under
none of the statutes. In 1945, the Foundation had leased the forest to a
paper company for ninety-nine years in order to secure an outlet for the
forest's merchantable timber and pulpwood.64 Under the original
lease, the Foundation was responsible for cutting and delivering the
timber and pulpwood to the paper company, and retained operational
control of the forest.65 That control was relinquished pursuant to a
1951 lease amendment, which gave the lessee virtually complete control
over the forest.66 Although all revenues received from the lease were
still used by the Foundation for educational purposes, the land itself
was operated by the corporate lessee primarily as a commercial timber
farm and only incidentally used by the Foundation for research.67 The
property could not qualify for tax exemption, therefore, under any of
the three statutes requiring exclusive use for educational, scientific or
charitable purposes.68 Nor could it qualify for exemption as property
430, 242 S.E.2d 502 (1978), aj'd, 296 N.C. 330, 250 S.E.2d 236 (1979) (tax liability for approxi-
mately 30,000 acres in Jones County).
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-275(12) (Cum. Supp. 1977) excludes from the tax base "[r]eal
property owned by a nonprofit corporation or association exclusively held and used by its owner
for educational and scientific purposes as a protected natural area." Id. § 105-278.4 exempts real
and personal property used for educational purposes if "[w]holly and exclusively used for educa-
tional purposes by the owner or occupied gratuitously by another nonprofit educational institution
. . . and wholly and exclusively used by the occupant for nonprofit educational purposes." Id.
§ 105-278.6(7) exempts property owned by "[a] nonprofit, life-saving, first aid, or rescue squad
organization" if "[a]s to real property, it is actually and exclusively occupied and used ... for
charitable purposes."
63. Id. § 116-16 (1972) exempts the lands and other property belonging to the University of
North Carolina from all kinds of public taxation.
64. 296 N.C. at 332, 250 S.E.2d at 238. When the forest was acquired in 1934, the attorney
general expressed his opinion that it should be tax exempt. The lease was executed in 1945, and
amended to give the lessee control in 1951, but it was not until 1969 that the attorney general
decided that the forest was no longer tax exempt. Id. at 331-33, 250 S.E.2d at 238-39.
65. Id. at 332, 250 S.E.2d at 238.
66. Id. at 338, 250 S.E.2d at 241.
67. Id. at 339, 250 S.E.2d at 241-42.
68. Although the exclusive use issue was determinative, the Foundation's arguments for ex-
emption also failed on other grounds. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-275 (Cum. Supp. 1977), for exam-
ple, requires that exempt property be held and used exclusively as a protected natural area. The
court said that the forest was not such an area "due to the extensive program of road building,
construction of drainage ditches and fire lanes, site preparation .... leasing of hunting rights
. . ., and the cutting of timber and pulpwood." 296 N.C. at 339, 250 S.E.2d at 242.
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owned by the University of North Carolina under G.S. 116-16.69 Al-
though North Carolina State University was represented on the foun-
dation's Board of Directors,70 and was to receive the Foundation's
assets upon dissolution,7' the university had neither legal nor beneficial
ownership of the forest.72
Prior North Carolina decisions clearly support the court's con-
struction of the exemption statutes involved in this case. In determin-
ing whether property falls within a tax exemption provision, the
primary or dominant use, and not an incidental or secondary use, will
control." Even property owned by the state or a municipal corporation
will not be accorded tax exempt status when it enters the realm of com-
mercial use.74 In this case, the lease permitted the Foundation to use
the property for educational and scientific purposes only upon the con-
dition that such use not interfere with the operations of the corporate
lessee.7" The dominant use of the forest was clearly commercial, there-
fore, since the corporation's right to cut timber and pulpwood took pre-
cedence over the Foundation's use.7 6
Although the court's construction of the applicable exemption stat-
utes cannot be faulted, the tax structure that mandated such a result
deserves scrutiny. The North Carolina Constitution specifies that the
legislature may only exempt from ad valorem taxation "property held
for educational, scientific, literary, cultural, charitable, or religious pur-
poses."77 From 1969 through 1973 the Foundation was authorized by
statute to pay ten cents per acre in lieu of the standard ad valorem tax
on similar real property.78 A comment accompanying the 1973 repeal79
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-16 (1972); see 296 N.C. at 340, 250 S.E.2d at 242.
70. 35 N.C. App. 414, 430, 242 S.E.2d 492, 502 (1978). The court of appeals also noted that
the Foundation's Board of Directors "is in no way controlled by North Carolina State University
and apparently has the power to act without regard to the wishes of the University." Id.
71. Id.
72. 296 N.C. at 340, 250 S.E.2d at 242.
73. See Redevelopment Comm'n v. Guilford County, 274 N.C. 585, 593, 164 S.E.2d 476, 481
(1968).
74. Id. at 589, 164 S.E.2d at 479.
75. 296 N.C. at 333, 339, 250 S.E.2d at 238-39, 242.
76. Id. at 339, 250 S.E.2d at 241-42.
77. N.C. CONsT. art. V, § 2, cl. 3.
78. 296 N.C. at 340, 250 S.E.2d at 239. This option was available under Law of July 1, 1969,
ch. 185, § 1, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 1365 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-279(b)). The
section was repealed by Law of May 22, 1973, ch. 668, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 994. The provi-
sion allowed any corporation, trust, foundation, association or other entity that owned timberland
and was organized and operated exclusively to receive, hold, invest and administer property and
to make expenditures for the sole benefit of an educational institution, to pay to the county in
which the timberland was located 15% of the proceeds of the gross sales of forest products or 10€
per acre per year, whichever was greater.
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of this "in lieu of' option noted that the provision was clearly unconsti-
tutional."0 The option failed to comport with the constitutional stric-
,ture that the purpose for which real property is held controls the
legislative grant of exemptions. Although the "in lieu of' provision did
not purport to exempt real property, it did allow imposition of an insig-
nificant tax on timberland without regard to the purpose for which the
land was held. Under the option, the Foundation's tax liability for the
81,000 acre forest was only $8,100 per year, even though the forest was
used primarily for commercial purposes. After repeal of-the option,
and with no "exclusive use" exemption available, the Foundation's
1974 tax liability for the 51,000 acres located in Onslow County was
$25,466.40.81 The large discrepancy between the two tax liabilities il-
lustrates that the "in lieu of' provision was tantamount to an exemp-
tion and was, therefore, subject to the constitutional 'restriction.
Because it did not comply with the restriction, it was properly repealed.
Its repeal signified that the Foundation and others owning timberland
used commercially must bear their share of the tax burden, even if they
expend revenues derived from a commercial use for the sole benefit of
an educational institution.
D. Income Tax
The second session of the 1977 legislature enacted the Manufac-
turer's Income Tax Credit Act.82 The Act provides an inventory tax
credit against state income taxes for manufacturers who maintain ex-
cessive levels of inventories in the state.83 Generally, manufacturers
will qualify for the credit if their inventory exceeds fifteen per cent of
their total cost of manufacturing.8 4
The tax credit applies against the income tax due for the year in
-which the applicable inventory tax is paid.85 Although excess credits
and losses may be carried forward five years, the carry-forward must be
used in the earliest taxable year possible and to its maximum extent
before any excess credit may be carried forward to a later taxable
79. Law of May 22, 1973, ch. 668, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 994.
80. H. LEwis, 1973 SUPPLEMENT TO THE ANNOTATED MACHINERY ACT OF 1971, at 69 (Insti-
tute of Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1973).
81. 35 N.C. App. 414, 418, 242 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1978). The liability to Jones County for the
31,000 acres located there is not revealed in the opinion.
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-163.01 to .02 (Interim Supp. 1978).
83. Id. § 105-163.03. The credit applies against taxes due for tax years beginning on or after
January 1, 1980.
84. Id.
85. Id. § 105-163.03(8)(b).
1979] TAXATION 1151
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
year.86 The manufacturer must file with his income tax return docu-
mentation supporting the availability of the credit.
87
The inventory tax credit was designed to attract heavy industry to
North Carolina. Because the statute does not provide an across-the-
board credit for all manufacturers, many smaller North Carolina com-
panies that have long supported local communities by providing em-
ployment and expanding the tax base will not qualify for the credit.
Were the credit extended to all manufacturers, however, the revenue
loss might well be burdensome. The justification for the limited credit
is that the revenue loss expected when the current statute becomes ef-
fective will be offset eventually by additional tax revenues from compa-
nies that relocate in North Carolina. Whether heavy industry will
indeed be attracted by another tax concession is debatable.
Of the many factors that influence a business' decision to locate in
a particular area, state and local taxation may be the least significant.
Studies of the effect of taxation on industrial location reveal that mar-
kets, sources of raw materials, and labor supply are the major determi-
nants of location decisions for most businesses. 8 Not only do tax
incentives not dominate business location decisions, but the benefits
new industry brings to a state may well "prove less than their fiscal,
social, and environmental costs." 9 Also, any benefits may be short-
lived because all state governments can employ tax incentives. Exist-
ence of a tax concession in one state may spur neighboring states to
offer concessions that are even more attractive. It is conceivable that
competing states may end up with a less productive, less equitable tax
structure without realizing the benefits of industrial expansion.90
Additionally, any tax concession to attract business must be con-
sidered in light of state tax policy, which has broader objectives than
mere attraction of business. A fundamental tax policy is fairness in
apportioning tax burdens, and a tax reduction for some will .result in
higher taxes for others. Tax equity is, therefore, sacrificed to the extent
that some are singled out for preferential treatment.91
Any criticism of tax incentives does not mean that such incentives
86. Id.
87. Id. § 105-163.03(8)(d), .04.
88. C. Liner, Taxation and Industrial Location (June 1, 1976) (unpublished article in Univer-
sity of North Carolina Law School Library).
89. G. CORNIA, W. TESTA & F. STOCKER, STATE-LOCAL FISCAL INCENTIVES AND ECO-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT, at iii (Academy for Contemporary Problems 1978).
90. See id. at 17.
91. See id. at 3, 18.
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should never be used to attract business. It should, however, suggest
that tax concessions alone will do little to attract industry. Businesses
desiring to expand or relocate are more interested in the cost and avail-




The court of appeals, in Ballenger v. Crowell,u a medical malprac-
tice action, considered issues of first impression concerning contribu-
92. C. Liner, supra note 88, at 5. Liner's conclusion rests on the location theory, which as-
sumes that "firms try to choose the location that maximizes total profit." 1d. at 2. The factors
likely to have the greatest impact on total profit are, therefore, the major determinants of business
location under this theory. "For most firms, tax differentials are less important determinants be-
cause they have a small effect on total profit, are partly offset by income tax deductibility, and are
often offset by such other considerations as local amenities and quality of public services." Id. at
5.
1. In Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Holt, 36 N.C. App. 284, 244 S.E.2d 177 (1978), the
North Carolina Court of Appeals held that claims for attorney malpractice sound in contract
rather than tort. Id. at 288, 244 S.E.2d at 180. Plaintiff insurance company, relying on waivers of
mechanics' and laborers' liens signed by defendant contractor, issued certain title insurance
policies. Prior liens were later discovered on the property and plaintiff was required to make
payment. The insurance company sued Holt on the basis of indemnity agreements in the lien
waivers. Holt, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against the attorneys who had certified title to
the insurance company alleging that the attorneys had failed to use reasonable care in determining
the existence of unpaid lien creditors. Thus it was not the attorney's client who sued the attorney
for malpractice but rather a third party.
In areas involving malpractice by other types of professionals, North Carolina courts have
clearly recognized that the malpractice claim sounds in tort. Medical malpractice actions are an
example of this approach. See text accompanying notes 21-28 infra. Additionally, in Perfecting
Servs. Co. v. Product Dev. & Sales Co., 261 N.C. 660, 136 S.E.2d 56 (1964), in which defendant
design engineer was sued for negligence in the design of a mechanical model, the court found that
industrial design is a profession and held that the professional "may incur liability in tort by
reason of negligent performance." The reason the attorney malpractice claim did not sound in
tort is not evident. Perhaps the court feared unlimited liability for attorneys if they were
vulnerable to claims from those not in privity of contract. Perhaps the choice was the court's way
of ensuring the "right" outcome in a case involving unusual facts. For a suggestion that the choice
is based on desired outcome, see Averill, Attorney's Liability to Third Persons for Negligent
Malpractice, 2 LAND & WATER L. Rv. 380, 381 (1967). But the result is unsatisfactory for it
leaves certain elements of the action under contract law, e.g., damages, while other elements, such
as causation and duty of care, must, presumably, still be determined under tort law. For further
discussion of Holt, see this Survey, Commercial Law: Contracts.
2. 38 N.C. App. 50, 247 S.E.2d 287 (1978).
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tory negligence and limitation of actions.' Plaintiff had a chronic
neurological disease for which defendant doctor began to treat him in
1960. Although the standard treatment for plaintiffs disease was sur-
gery, defendant instead treated him with medication for the pain.
Plaintiff, as a result, became addicted to morphine in 1962. Plaintiff
knew that he was addicted, but believed that the treatment was proper
and necessary because the doctor had so informed him. He continued
under defendant's care until 1974, and during this entire period defend-
ant continued to treat him with morphine. In 1974 plaintiff consulted
other doctors, left defendant's care, and began treatment for the drug
addiction. Plaintiff sued defendant for malpractice and defendant, by
way of defense, claimed that plaintiff was contributorily negligent in
accepting his addiction.
The court held that plaintiff was not contributorily negligent as a
matter of law,' relying on the general rule that a patient has a right to
trust in his doctor's skill and judgment and will not be found guilty of
contributory negligence for so doing.6 Thus, a patient is not contribu-
torily negligent for continuing his treatment when he knows that he has
become an addict, unless he knows of the doctor's negligence or he
himself does something wrong.' The facts in this case are quite the
opposite of the situation in which a patient refuses to follow his doc-
tor's instructions and thus causes himself further injury. When a pa-
tient relies on his doctor's judgment and is aware that the treatment is
causing him injury, but is not aware that this is due to the doctor's
negligence, he will not be barred from recovery because of his sup-
posed contributory negligence.
The Ballenger decision is in line with the few cases presenting
analogous fact situations cited by the court. In both King v. Solomon'
3. For discussion of the court's treatment of limitation of actions, see text accompanying
notes 11-17.
4. 38 N.C. App. at 51-53, 247 S.E.2d at 289-90.
5. Id. at 56, 247 S.E.2d at 292.
The vey relation [between doctor and patient] assumes trust and confidence on the part
of the patient in the capacity and skill of the physician; and it would indeed require an
unusual state of facts to render a person who is possessed of no medical skill guilty of
contributory negligence because he accepts the word of his physician and trusts in the
efficacy of the treatment prescribed by him.
Id
6. Cf. Kelly v. Caroll, 36 Wash. 2d 482, 219 P.2d 79 (1950) (patient's reliance on defendant
drugless healer found not to be contributory negligence when patient died after defendant negli-
gently misdiagnosed and treated him for appendicitis). Id. at 501, 219 P.2d at 90.
7. 38 N.C. App. at 55, 247 S.E.2d at 291.
8. 323 Mass. 326, 81 N.E.2d 838 (1948), citedin Ballenger v. Crowell, 38 N.C. App. at 55,
247 S.E.2d at 291.
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and Los Alamos Medical Center v. Coe,9 plaintiff patient became ad-
dicted to morphine because of defendant doctor's negligent treatment.
In both cases, even though the patient knew of the addiction and
sought more medication, it was held that the patient had the right to
rely on the doctor's expertise and was, therefore, not liable for failing to
question the treatment.
B. Limitation of Actions
Ballenger also dealt with statute of limitations problems in medical
malpractice actions. The court held that there may be a continued
course of treatment exception to the general rule that malpractice ac-
tions accrue at the time of the defendant's negligence.' 0 Defendant
claimed that plaintiffs cause of action accrued in 1962 when he became
addicted to morphine and was thus barred by the statute of limitations.
Plaintiff claimed that the action accrued in 1974 when he ended the
doctor-patient relationship with defendant. The court, agreeing with
plaintiff, held that "the cause of action accrued at the earlier of (1) the
termination of defendant's treatment of the plaintiff or (2) the time at
which the plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury."'
In reaching its decision, the court reviewed the statutes of limita-
tions governing malpractice actions as well as related case law. G.S. 1-
15(b), 12 which concerns injuries not readily apparent, was found to be
inapplicable since the injury in this case was patent. G.S. 1-15(c),' 3 a
subsection specifically concerning professional malpractice actions that
was added by the 1975 amendment of G.S. 1-15, was also inapplicable
because the case was pending when the amendment was enacted. Be-
cause these were the only special statutes that might have been applica-
ble, the question before the court was whether North Carolina
recognizes a common law continued course of treatment exception to
the general three-year statute applicable in civil actions.14
The court then proceeded to review case law relating to limitation
of actions in medical malpractice cases, beginning with Shearin v.
Lloyd. In that case, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
9. 58 N.M. 686, 275 P.2d 175 (1954), cited in Ballenger v. Crowell, 38 N.C. App. at 55, 247
S.E.2d at 291.
10. 38 N.C. App. at 59, 247 S.E.2d at 294.
11. Id. at 60, 247 S.E.2d at 294.
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
13. Id. § 1-15(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
14. Id. § 1-52 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
15. 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957).
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cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run from
the time of defendant's wrongful act, and not from the time when
plaintiff patient discovers the injuries caused by the act. The Shearin
court thus rejected the discovery rule exception 16 under which the
cause of action is held not to accrue until the time of discovery of the
harmful consequences of the doctor's negligence. 17
Shearin, however, unlike Ballenger, involved a latent injury
caused by the doctor's single act of negligence in leaving a foreign ob-
ject in plaintifi's body. Because the continuing course of treatment ex-
ception does not apply to such circumstances, the question whether
North Carolina recognizes a continued course of treatment exception
was not before the Shearin court. The Shearin court's affirmance of the
general rule that the cause of action accrues at the time of defendant's
wrongful act did not therefore bar the Ballenger court from adopting
the continuing course of treatment exception."
G.S. 1-15(a) has now statutorily overruled Shearin by enacting a
discovery rule exception. This provision provides for accrual of the
cause of action in cases of latent injury at the time of discovery of the
injury, but in no case later than four years (ten years when damages are
sought by reason of a foreign object being left in the body) from the last
act of defendant giving rise to the cause of action. 9 Because the Ballen-
ger rule applies to different circumstances than does the discovery rule,
there is no conflict between the four year outer limit in G.S. 1-15(c) and
the absence from the Ballenger rule of any similar limit. In cases in
which there is an ongoing doctor-patient relationship and a continuing
course of treatment, that the injury is not discovered until more than
four years after infliction will not bar the action so long as the injurious
course of treatment continues.
Although referred to as an exception, the continuing course of
treatment rule adopted in Ballenger may actually create no exception at
all. The factual pattern that lies behind the Ballenger rule appears to
be one in which there is negligent treatment throughout the entire
course of the doctor-patient relationship. The "exception" apparently
does not apply when a single negligent act is followed by continued
treatment; rather, it applies when the entire course of treatment is neg-
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(b), (c) (Cum. Supp. 1977) now supplies a statutory discovery rule
exception.
17. Jones v. Sugar, 18 Md. App. 99, 105, 305 A.2d 219, 222 (1973).
18. See 38 N.C. App. at 57-58, 247 S.E.2d at 293.
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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ligent.2° In this situation the entire treatment is tortious, and the negli-
gence constitutes a continuing tort.21 Thus
the [negligent] treatments were not separate and distinct acts, sepa-
rate and distinct causes of action. They constituted an entire course
of treatment. . . and the whole thereof constituted but one cause of
action. . . . [The tort was a continuing one, and, where the tort is
continuing, the right of action is also continuing
22
On these facts, then, there is no completion of defendant's wrongful act
until the doctor-patient relationship is terminated. When the relation-
ship ends and the wrongful act is completed, the cause of action ac-
crues. This simply seems to be an extension of the general rule that the
cause of action accrues at the time of defendant's wrongful act.
Moreover, interpretation of the second prong23 of the continuing
course of treatment "exception" creates some difficulty. That require-
ment provides that the statute of limitations will begin to run before the
end of the course of treatment if the patient discovers the injury. But
"discovery of the injury" could mean discovery of the actual physical
injury itself or it could mean discovery of defendant doctor's negligence
in causing the injury. The Ballenger court apparently applied the latter
interpretation. 24 This ambiguity may cause conflicts in construction of
the statutory discovery rule of G.S. 1-15(b) and (c).
Whichever interpretation is intended, it is clear that the Ballenger
court accepts the discovery rule within the context of the continued
course of treatment "exception." In this context the discovery rule acts
to reduce the period of limitations. This approach accords with the
policies behind the statute of limitations, which are "to prevent stale
claims and to protect potential defendants from protracted fear of
litigation. '2
In Ward v. Ho/point Division, General Electric Co.,26 the court of
appeals attempted to clarify prior law concerning accrual of actions in
cases involving nonapparent defects in property that cause injury at
some later time. Plaintiffs sued for damages resulting from a fire in a
shopping center in 1969. The fire was allegedly caused by a negligently
20. See Tortorello v. Reinfeld, 6 N.J. 58, 66, 77 A.2d 240, 244 (1950).
21. See Annot., 144 A.L.R. 209, 227 (1943).
22. Peteler v. Robinson, 81 Utah 535, 549, 17 P.2d 244, 249 (1932).
23. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
24. 38 N.C. App. at 60, 247 S.E.2d at 294. The court found that there was conflicting evi-
dence about whether plaintiff knew that the medication provided by defendant was not necessary
and held that this was a question for the jury on remand.
25. Id. at 59, 247 S.E.2d at 294.
26. 35 N.C. App. 495, 241 S.E.2d 710, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 94, 244 S.E.2d 263 (1978).
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designed deep fat fryer that was manufactured and sold by defendant
in 1962 to a company that was not a party to the action. Defendant
claimed that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations because
the action accrued in 1962 when the fryer was sold. The court, how-
ever, upheld plaintiffs' claim that there was no accrual of their cause of
action until the time of the actual injury in 1969.27
As in Ballenger, G.S. 1-15(b) was found to be inapplicable because
it concerns situations in which there is an injury that is not readily ap-
parent to plaintiff. The court found that there was no injury at all to
plaintiffs in this case until the time of the fire, and that that injury was
readily apparent.28 The court's examination of case law revealed that
there are two lines of cases in North Carolina dealing with accrual of
actions when a latent defect later causes injury to person or property.
The line of cases represented by Hocutt v. Wilmington & Weldon _R_,29
Raftery v. Vick Construction Co.,3" and Pinkston v. Baldwin, Lima,
Hamilton Co. 31 provides that the cause of action accrues at the time of
the actual injury. On the other hand, Hooper v. Carr Lumber Co.,32
State v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., and Jarrell v. Samsonite Colp.34 pro-
vided that the cause of action accrues at the time of defendant's wrong-
ful act or omission. The court of appeals in Ward followed the Hlocutt
rule and relied on the holding that
the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to
run at the time of actual injury to a plaintiff who is not in privity with
the manufacturer or seller of defective goods and thus suffered no
technical or slight injury at the time of the sale of the goods.35
There is usually no conflict between the Hooper and the Hocutt
rules because the act and the injury are simultaneous. In cases in
which the injured plaintiff is in privity with the defendant seller or
manufacturer, for instance, defendant's wrongful act and the injury oc-
27. Id. at 496-97, 241 S.E.2d at 711-12.
28. Id. at 500, 241 S.E.2d at 713.
29. 124 N.C. 214, 32 S.E. 681 (1899) (diversion of water through defendant's ditches caused
flooding of plaintiffs land many years after ditches dug).
30. 291 N.C. 180, 230 S.E.2d 405 (1976) (plaintiffs intestate killed when hit on head by part
of crane manufactured by defendant's predecessor more than three years before injury).
31. 292 N.C. 260, 232 S.E.2d 431 (1977) (plaintiff's intestate killed when crane manufactured
by defendant fell).
32. 215 N.C. 308, 1 S.E.2d 818 (1939) (defendant's logging operations caused flooding of
plaintiff's land).
33. 9 N.C. App. 557, 176 S.E.2d 796 (1970) (plaintiffs building damaged when engine of
plane manufactured by defendant failed and plane crashed into building).
34. 12 N.C. App. 673, 184 S.E.2d 376 (1971), cert. denied, 280 N.C. 180 (1972) (plaintiff cus-
tomer in restaurant injured when she fell from defective chair manufactured by defendant).
35. 35 N.C. App. at 499-500, 241 S.E.2d at 713.
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cur at the same time, because the sale of a defective product constitutes
the first injury to the plaintiff buyer.36 Difficulties arise, however, in
determining the time of accrual of the cause of action when the plaintiff
injured by the defective product is not in privity with the defendant
seller. In this situation the injury and defendant's wrongful act are not
simultaneous because no technical injury arises at the time of the sale.
As recognized by Ward, in the latter circumstances it is usually
determined that the cause of action accrues when actual injury occurs.
This comports with the general rule in North Carolina, as discussed
above in relation to medical malpractice cases, which provides that a
cause of action accrues at the time of defendant's wrongful act that
causes injury to the plaintiff. The crucial moment is the one at which
the first injury occurs. Between parties that are in privity even a techni-
cal injury is sufficient to begin the running of the statute. It is unimpor-
tant that the substantial damages do not occur until some later time.37
With respect to a party not in privity with the seller, however, not until
the defect actually causes substantial injury to that party is there an
invasion of his rights and a cause of action. In the latter circumstances
Hooper, nevertheless, provided that the cause of action accrued at the
time of the wrongful act.
The court of appeals in Ward, however, follows the Hocutt rule
and holds that in the nonprivity situation the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until the time of the injury. It thus appears that, under
the court's interpretation of these two cases, Hooper is not controlling
in situations in which the wrongful act and the injury are not
simultaneous.
C Consortium
In Cozart v. Chapin, s the court of appeals held that a husband has
no cause of action for loss of consortium resulting from injuries to his
wife even when the injuries were intentionally inflicted.39 Plaintiff wife
sued defendant dentist alternatively on theories of negligence and as-
sault and battery, and in conjunction with this action plaintiff husband
36. See Thurston Motor Lines v. General Motors Corp., 258 N.C. 323, 128 S.E.2d 413 (1962).
37. See Williams v. General Motors Corp., 393 F. Supp. 387 (M.D.N.C. 1975), a4'd, 538
F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1976); Mast v. Sapp, 140 N.C. 533, 53 S.E. 350 (1906); Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 821,
830 (1965).
38. 35 N.C. App. 254, 241 S.E.2d 144, cert. denied, 294 N.C. 736, 244 S.E.2d 154 (1978).
39. Id. at 255, 241 S.E.2d at 145-46.
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sued for loss of consortium. °
The Chapin court suggested that it might be time to reexamine the
rule first established in Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co.4 barring an
action for loss of consortium due to injuries negligently caused the
spouse by a third person. The court nevertheless proceeded to extend
the rule by finding that a claim for loss of consortium is also barred
when the injuries were intentionally inflicted. Under the court of ap-
peals' reading of Hinnant, an action for loss of consortium might lie
when there is intentional infliction of injury to consortium itself (as, for
example, in cases of alienation of affections or criminal conversation),
but not when there is an intentional infliction of some injury to the
person of one's spouse causing loss of consortium.
D. Damages
In Matthews v. Lineberry4" plaintiff student was permitted to re-
cover damages for loss of time from school and for repeating a course.
Defendant claimed that there was no evidence of monetary loss or
damages and that there could be no recovery because damages were
too uncertain. The court, in upholding plaintiffs recovery, observed
that rules on uncertainty of damages relate to uncertainty about the
cause or fact of damages and not about their measure or extent.43
It appears that these precise elements of damages have not before
been claimed in North Carolina. As a general rule, however, "the fact
that the full extent of the damages must be a matter of some specula-
tion is no ground for refusing all damages."'  Thus damages may be
allowed even when it is not possible to calculate with precision the
claimed item.
To some extent, one may analogize the present facts to the situa-
tion of lost work time. Although there is an immediate economic im-
pact when one misses work and not when one loses time from school,
loss of school time could have an economic impact at a later time.
Moreover, a plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for prospective as
well as past and present injuries.45 Finally, not only may a plaintiff
40. As a result of a dental operation, plaintiff wife suffered severe paralysis in her lower lip
and was experiencing numbness and tingling on contact. Id. at 255, 241 S.E.2d at 145.
41. 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
42. 35 N.C. App. 527, 241 S.E.2d 735, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 91, 244 S.E.2d 259 (1978).
43. Id. at 529, 241 S.E.2d at 737.
44. Brown v. Moore, 286 N.C. 664, 673, 213 S.E.2d 342, 349 (1975) (wrongful death action
for death of 17-year-old boy).
45. King v. Britt, 267 N.C. 594, 597, 148 S.E.2d 594, 598 (1966).
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recover for loss of earnings, a plaintiff may also recover for "loss of
time, or loss from inability to perform ordinary labor. ' 46 Certainly in
this case plaintiff suffered a loss of time from school and an inability to
perform ordinary school activities, and thus recovery for these losses is
justified by the prevailing rules on damages.
SHERI A. VAN GREENBY
46. Owens v. Kelly, 240 N.C. 770, 773, 84 S.E.2d 163, 165 (1954).
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